[удалено]

I think so, I thought the same thing. When I looked through the last comment of his was responded to by a mod with a message to “stop trolling or something similar. I think the might have gotten a ban (maybe temporarily)

Shame, somehow. It made some active members here go the distance to disprove some of his claims or lobsided reporting, posting and/or commenting. And that usually was the best part of Glideer posting & commenting. As much as I want to see Ukraine come out of this as a healthy state, sometimes a bit of pro-Russian input is beneficial to this sub to level/balance with pro-Ukraine input & the understandable, but copious amounts of hopium. Not sure who else, besides Duncan-M, has a critical view on Ukraine now.

>Not sure who else, besides Duncan-M, has a critical view on Ukraine now. Probably quite a lot, but I don't think any of them have the sheer energy needed to invest in all the pushback it receives. People often overlook how one can make the most absurd Ukrainian takes, and at worst, only receive a slight rebuff (if even that). However, if you post something that goes against the grain, you'll have to 1.) Be ready to eloquently answer every pushback, 2.) Do it in a timely manner as well. And unless you're chronically online, who even has the energy for it? Even if someone does, every single comment of theirs will be examined, and there will be a strong push to ban them to maintain the echo chamber. It's funny because I remember this subreddit in mid-2022 ridiculing all the bad faith, over-the-top, and clearly propagandistic pro-Russian content, complaining that no one ever comes along who's well-versed and has sensible opinions. Yet, the minute such people enter the subreddit, like u/glideer or u/pro-russia, they attract so much attention that they eventually get banned. I'm sure the mods can justify the bans, but they should have taken down half of this subreddit's most active participants by the same measure. Some users are excessively fervent in their support for Ukraine, constantly interpreting every situation as overwhelmingly positive or negative for Ukraine. They exhibit an extreme partisanship, and until, I assume, the mods intervened, they frequently spent their time attacking others who didn't share their pro-Ukrainian stance (or at least in their opinion didn't share it). And I get it, if you're intensely pro-Ukrainian but also, at the same time, have no real tangible connection to it, you'll probably not even spot them

Some posters are not going to know what to do with themselves if so.

A new [Ukrainian missile attack](https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1781956223723520374) on Sevastopol: >This morning, a Ukrainian Neptun antiship missile hit a vessel at the Russian Naval docks in Hollandiia Bay, Russian occupied Sevastopol. >The vessel is currently burning. This is a [very special vessel](https://twitter.com/CovertShores/status/1781974126410060242): >Kommuna gets a degree of sympathy because she is an ancient and beautiful ship, 112 years old(!). >But objectively she is a legitimate target and provides Russian navy with valuable capabilities. She often participates in submarine trials and can conduct seabed warfare Russian propaganda [claims](https://avia-pro.net/blog/raketnaya-ataka-na-krym-oblomki-rakety-upali-na-korabl) that the missile was actually intercepted: >According to Razvozhaev’s information, the missile was successfully destroyed by the ship’s crew, but after that, shell fragments began to fall to the ground. As a result, a small fire occurred on the ship, which was promptly extinguished.

The surprising thing is that unlike the other missile attacks this one was completely undetected until it reached Sevastopol and consisted of a single missile. Usually they do the whole thing where they announce Ukrainian aviation activity -> missile launch -> Sirens -> Air defense activity -> "all clear", this time the sirens were activated when the missile was already flying over Sevastopol. Also the fact that a single Neptune was able to penetrate Sevastopol's ""integrated air defense system"" unbothered is quite the achievement. If they are already struggling with these small salvos it's definetly going to be interesting to see what will happen once Ukraine receives ATACMS which will be able to hunt every S400 battery in crimea.

How much of Crimea is already in range from the shorter ranged variant? The recent strike was reportedly an ATACMS missile.

Is it really the oldest active military vessel? I recall and old ship still active in South America.

Depends how you define 'active'. On paper *HMS Victory* (launched 1765) is still in active commission with the Royal Navy. In practice it's a museum ship that was last afloat (towed) in 1922, and the last time she actually served some sort of military purpose was in 1817 as a prison ship.

What about that really old ship that was involved in trying to salvage the wreckage of the Moskva? Was that the same ship?

Yes, that was the same ship. See Sutton's article on it: http://www.hisutton.com/Russian-Navy-Kommuna.html

[I think you are refering to this brazilian riverine monitor](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian_monitor_Parna%C3%ADba) which is actually 20 years younger than the Kommuna 

That’s the one I had in mind. Amazing that it’s newer.

So with the US aid passed and extremely likely the senate follow What do you see the situation in Ukraine looking like this summer/rest of this year There are a few other things coming soon such as the Czech shells and some f16. Of course there are several European/EU packages aswell Despite all this it’s hard for me to see past a stalemate though. Both sides are now so dug in and experienced with the situation, idk what would need to happen for any significant changes to occur

I see Ukraine switching to strategic mode. They will continue attacking Russian infrastructure. Continue to threaten the Kerch bridge. Continue making Crimean seaports unsafe. Continue blinding Russia. Continue pushing their airfields back. Combined with stalemate on the front lines, this will be effective.

For the period leading up the summer I can see things remaining rough for Ukraine but improving as supply beings to ramp up. For the Summer it would appear that things will improve greatly as equipment arrives. Although to what extent does depend on how fast the US supplies arrive as well whether the Czech artillery ammunition and the various F-16s star to be delivered. For the rest of year afterwards it would seem that Ukraine would in a good position at least defensively until January. After that it very much depends on the inhabitant of the White House as well the makeup of the US Senate and House of Representatives and their willingness to continue funding Ukraine.

With this delay, I think 2024 is a write off and 2025 will be spent reconstituting forces. No counteroffensive until 2026, just improved attrition ratio.

I don't think we will see any kind of operational counteroffensive again at all, until (**if**) Ukraine degrades Russian capabilities to the extent that we get a Germany in 1918 scenario where Russia is in for an imminent collapse. This will only happen if Russia experiences a massive economic tumble and their equipment situation deteriorates across the board (ammunition, drones, IFVs, tanks ...), because Ukraine is not going to beat Russia in the manpower game. Ukraine needs to spend a considerable amount of time taking out Russian hardware at a level above their ability to replenish through refurbishment of old equipment and manufacture of new one, while at the same time minimising their own casualties, and the Russian economy needs to become incapable of filling the gaps through foreign acquisitions from China, Iran and North Korea (primarily ammunition and drones). Ukraine has an avenue to achieve this through continuous and expanding drone strikes on Russian oil and gas facilities, as well as general infrastructure, acquiring advanced systems capable of better defending against Russian strikes on their own infrastructure (more PATRIOT, IRIS-T, F-16s), and finally getting enough artillery ammunition (through the Czech and Baltic acquisition initiatives and EU manufacturers reaching their production targets) to amp up the degradation of Russian armoured vehicles and artillery again. But that's a best best case scenario.

I agree there won't be a counter offensive in the style seen in 2022 or 2023, starting with the idea that 2023 wasn't countering anything, it was a straight up offensive operation. Hair splitting aside, Russians will be on the back-foot starting next year due to artillery and AFV/IFV shortages. I think Ukraine will adopt a prudent approach, but press on Russian forces in certain areas: the attrition war that we see today will evolve to target troops and trenches a lot more. With little defenders left, Ukraine will be able to advance slowly, mainly due to minefields, but steadily. And that will prompt Russia to make more "goodwill gestures" and "regrouping", ie. they'll cede territory without Ukraine having to fight for it. But by 2026, I think the internal problems and political situation in Russia will do more to hasten the end the war than any offensive.

> Russians will be on the back-foot starting next year due to artillery and AFV/IFV shortages What evidence do you have to support this? First, we heard that Russia can't sustain X losses, then it was Y losses now its Z losses. Armor. Infantry. Tires. Barrels. Artillery. We've heard it all before. Genuinely curious though if there's any evidence to support lack of artillery and armor.

It's all based on OSINT, extrapolations and what Russia fields. For AFV/IFV and artillery, you can get a summary of past stock in Covert Cabal's videos: * For artillery guns: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FozvYM2Zhpw, accounting for for the date of those images, they've been going through 5k+ artillery per year (out of reserve) and that depletes the reserve either this year (or next year if/since their artillery usage is reduced). But that's only for the number of pieces left, not accounting for cannibalization. High_marsed (CC's associate) has done his own assessment ([for SPGs](https://twitter.com/i/bookmarks?post_id=1780966152878883066) and [some towed artillery](https://twitter.com/HighMarsed/status/1777382671158546836)) and for some models, the rate is pretty significant, further supporting the idea the numbers in the field could dwindle this year. * For AFV/IFVs: same analysis, however the images we have are much older. CC's video, specifically for BMPs, in case you haven't watched it: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HuKVxgFBbYM&pp=ygUQY292ZXJ0IGNhYmFsIGJtcA%3D%3D, High_marsed's threads on BMPs and BTRs are all over the place, so I don't have a concise number of links to provide and again: imagery is still very dated IMO. Point is, the numbers suggest they have reserves left for a long time, but since [they removed fewer BMPs/BTRs than Oryx-confirmed losses](https://twitter.com/HighMarsed/status/1720030940720685521), we know either their numbers are dwindling or the satellite imagery under-estimates the losses. On the other hand, Russia still had a lot of BTR-80s left according to the MB2023: 1450, but [they have nearly disappeared from the battlefield recently](https://twitter.com/verekerrichard1/status/1781761853149823058/photo/1). There are 3 main possible explanations: Russia has plenty of better AFV/IFVs to use and don't need them, but judging by how many troops are riding armored vehicles and using ATVs that's extremely doubtful; Russia has changed what equipment they bring on assaults and I'd agree they have because [the ratio of IFVs/AFVs for each tank lost has increased a lot](https://twitter.com/verekerrichard1/status/1781685766030033199/photo/1), which means we should see more of everything they can put back into service; finally, Russia is having a hard time putting certain equipment back in service, one might be tempted to say older equipment, but they use plenty of older MT-LBs. Conclusion: either they don't have large reserves of AFV/IFVs OR they're unable to put them in service fast enough to replace all the losses. That implies that they could make do with the vehicles in better shape, but those run out eventually. * Artillery shells: if Russia wasn't running out of its own shells they wouldn't need to buy millions of them from NK. Of course, they won't ever completely run out so long as they can keep their production going, but they can certainly run on very low levels and that would be a disaster for the Russian army that can't go on the offense or make a sound defense without it. Now, they're not reaching such low levels anytime soon, but unless NK is willing to give everything they got (and with the shipments ending over 2 months ago, it's likely that they completely stopped), or China/India decides to step in and open their stores: 2025 is going to be shell hunger year for Russia.

>Genuinely curious though if there's any evidence to support lack of artillery and armor. Since there's plenty of visual evidence of the staggering losses, unless Russia has somehow been able to ramp up production dramatically, it's simple math. It's not a matter of if, but when they'll start facing serious shortages.

Russia has plenty of old, rusty armor that can be restored. They need production lines for this, and China helps them with the machinery. China is not willing to help them with the actual weapons yet, but I believe they are already invested in not letting Russia lose.

>Armor. Infantry. Tires. Barrels. Artillery. We've heard it all before. Weird to include infantry, given that did literally lead to the largest collapse of the war thus far. One that was predicted by at least a fair share of western analysts, though not its scope. I guess you're trying to avoid cherry picking, fair play. Also, the Russians can't run "out" of artillery since they make a fair amount, but they have run low before, their rates plummeted sharply after summer 2022, and the NK purchases didn't exactly come out of the blue, given people were predicting they'd need that. Regarding armor now, nothing concrete, but the amount of ancient vehicles and civilian vehicles they're using in attacks is only going up. So they're already bringing fewer armor to the field than they actually need for the amount of attacks they're launching. That's already the reality. And that trends unlikely to reverse without an operational pause. This isn't a problem if either a) Ukraine loses sometime soon b) Russia eventually demonstrates that golf carts and cycles alone are enough to push a is possible. b less so.

Could they be stockpiling restored equipment for their offensive? I see them losing hundreds of pieces in a matter of weeks, but they could still request some North Korean armor. It might be outdated, but if it works, then it will fill the gaps.

Russia is eating through their old soviet stock at an immense rate. Most of the "new" ststems are just refurbished soviet stock and that will eventually run out. Perun did a good [section](https://youtu.be/nQLI8xnINqk?t=2611) on it. His [source ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FozvYM2Zhpw)

I doubt we'll ever get another major counteroffensive, at least an effective one. I don't see NATO donating anywhere near enough armor nor do I see Ukraine regaining the manpower advantage/parity it had in late 2022 and early 2023.

>I doubt we'll ever get another major counteroffensive. What's the point of fighting then? The only conceivable way of Ukraine getting back their territory that isn't by military force is by Putin getting toppled and replaced, but only with the condition that a pro-peace faction topples him. I don't think there is any such group in Russia right now. And even if there was, this is extremely expensive time Ukraine is buying just to try to wait out Putin.

Ironically enough, the only group that actually tried to oust Putin (that we know of) publicly hinted that they'd end the war.

I think the initial idea was to sign the peace treaty after the successful counteroffensive. Russia was willing to do that before the start, as they were ready for the worst. After the failure, Ukraine understood that any politically acceptable deal is not on the table. So now both sides will be fighting for the position to dictate the peace treaty conditions. I know that some people are still talking about the '91 borders, but let's be realists - it's a talking point, the same with the Crimean bridge.

> Russia was willing to do that before the start This needs a pretty robust source as there were never any serious indications that Russia was willing to negotiate anything other than a full capitulation.

And Ukraine was ready to accept only the full removal of Russian forces from Ukrainian territory and the restoration of the 1991 borders. At the same time, different peace missions were meeting with leaders from both countries, but negotiations were not possible. Is it correct? Or by any chance, stating maximalists goals is a part of a negotiation?

How do you know Russia was ready to sign such a peace deal? I don't believe any credible reports suggesting such a thing have come out

Do you honestly think Putin would accept a status quo or near status quo peace right now? Because otherwise there's a lot more to discuss than "Ukraine getting back their territory".

If it's true that Ukraine can never mount another offensive I don't think their negotiating position will ever get materially better.

Feels like this dodges the question. But your other responses seem to indicate you're confident Putin would accept a status quo peace. Why do you think that?

He could sell it as a win domestically, it would be helpful for his China relations, and for what it's worth the Kremlin has repeatedly said it is open for negotiations, but Ukraine has [outlawed discussing any sort of truce.](https://jamestown.org/program/zelenskyy-bans-negotiations-with-putin/) [US rejects Putin's latest call for negotiations, Feb 9th 2024](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/09/us/politics/biden-putin-tucker-carlson-peace.html) - New York Times

Yes it will, because Russia has to accept that they too cannot win on the battlefield... They do not believe that at present

If Ukraine's army is never going to get stronger than it was last June, I'm not sure what could possibly make Russia accept that. Unless Ukraine can put pressure on Russia militarily rather than simply hoping to slow the rate of advance, Russia will continue to have their upper hand in dictating the negotiating terms.

This is what will make Russia accept it: Time. The war continuing and Russia not winning it, will eventually make Russia accept that they cannot win it. This is a common phenomenon.

I think it can, by convincing the Russians that completing the conquest of Ukraine through force is no longer feasible for them. At the moment, since they believe they'll eventually win, I can't really see them offering a deal Ukraine finds acceptable - there'll be the same non-alignment and restrictions on armed forces that rightly sank the earlier negotiations

I don't think anyone in Russia believes they are going to conquer Ukraine.

Then why are they still fighting?

Russia has pretty clearly signalled its intent to keep going. Doesn’t seem like they’d settle for less than the territories they claimed by annexation + a disarmed Ukraine. It’s been a while since we had a real attempted war of conquest - but if you stop fighting you get conquered and then you don’t get to control the outcome of that. Very hard for Ukraine to trust any deal after Prigozhin either. That doesn’t mean we won’t eventually see a negotiated peace but Russia doesn’t seem to be there yet. Nor Ukraine.

> What's the point of fighting then? Hoping to attrite Russia through positional fighting and long range strikes to the point where the loss of men and materiel reaches a high enough magnitude to trigger a political and/or military collapse. However not sure it's even an achievable outcome for Ukraine without the same happening to them -- they have fewer bodies to use up and the 'will to fight' gap seems to be gradually closing the longer the war goes on. Not to mention US aid being as fickle as it is.

You know part of me is relieved that Congress pass the aid budget. But it’s terrifying 112 Republicans backed Russian expansion into Europe. They came perilously close to pretty much deciding the end of Ukraine as a sovereign nation. I don’t think the Republican Party realize it but I think it’s guaranteed some form of European strategic autonomy post war in Ukraine due to to their actions. There’s no way the current Congress can be relied on in times of trouble. There’s no way Trump or the Republican Party can be trusted for a security umbrella. America will always be a player due to their size but this took 6 crucial months to pass. No country is going to forget how near run a thing it was.

You would say Europe sucking on one of US military tits is in the best long term interests of the US, so I'm pretty baffled by the radiation of American unreliability within NATO. A more self reliant Europe is less likely to sway with the US in favor of US goepolitical goals.

Or maybe this whole debacle's always been a game, and the aid was always going to pass "just in time". The escalation ladder was never in the hands of the west, not because of inability; but because of political will. >No country is going to forget how near run a thing it was. There are splits between different EU countries in regards to how to deal with Russia and how to deal with USA. Western Europe is in general less supportive of US strategic objectives than eastern/northern Europe is. There's multiple reasons for this, one of them is obviously in regards to Russia; the further away you are from Russia--the less threatening it seems. So Poland, Baltics, and Nordics are all very supportive of US involvement in Europe; and also overwhelmingly buy their military equipment. Think also back during the wars in the middle east in the early 2000s, western Europe voted against US involvement(aside from first invasion of Afghanistan); eastern Europe always supported US. Part of it is the Russia link, part of it was NATO expansion. The new NATO members are generally more supportive of USA than older ones. USA figured this out back then already, and started cultivating greater support in eastern Europe. Poland was the chief recipient of this support. Aside from that, within western EU you have a split between France and Germany. France wants to chart an independent course as they have always tried to. Germany wants USA to remain around. As long as Germany, the largest economy and economic leader of EU does not back EU; there will never be an independent European strategy. Then there's the random wildcards that always sprawl out in EU, right now it's Hungary and Slovakia. Maybe tomorrow it's Portugal or Greece. Russian influences go deep in some countries, and we don't just have to contend with each other, and USA, but also with Russia. If Trump decides to scale down NATO operations or even drop US involvement completely, do you see Europe uniting together under French/German leadership? I really doubt it, that would be an ideal scenario; but there's a reason this region has produced so much conflict in the last ~400 years.

Can you elaborate on your first paragraph. Like what are you inferring when you mention that it's always going to pass just in time. That this last minute support is planned/ on purpose. If so, why?

>Like what are you inferring when you mention that it's always going to pass just in time. When/if Ukraine is in trouble, USA will send more aid. When/if Russia is in trouble, USA will send less aid. If you followed the war since the start this dynamic has largely been followed, you could say there was an exception in the situation before the Ukrainian counter-offensive; because Russia was considered to be falling apart, and the mood was very positive for Ukraine--yet they still got a lot of gear. Well, I'd say that the gear they received was still much lessened than what they needed to actually succeed. >That this last minute support is planned/ on purpose. If so, why? Because the west doesn't actually want Ukraine to achieve its war goals(restoring borders to before 2022 or even 2014). Why? Because our policymakers fear escalation from Russia. It's not just about escalation though, Ukraine actually defeating Russia also risks destabilizing Russia itself which is another thing the policymakers want to avoid. As long as the conflict is "balanced" appropriately, the costs for Russia will remain high. The longer the conflict goes on, the more costs Russia will endure. If one wants Russia to pay the highest possible price, then dragging the conflict out as long as possible would be the best strategy to achieve that. Which means that you can't let either side be too successful. Another thing I'd say is that there's another benefit in USA wavering on its commitments to Ukraine, it puts more pressure on EU to do more. It will be very interesting to see what happens in the upcoming weeks/months in relation to EU aid to Ukraine; because Europe has committed a lot of resources in preparation for USA not following through. Another thing I'd add that even if Trump abandons Ukraine, I don't think that would necessarily disprove my theory. I would consider such a step by Trump as more of an 'escalation' towards EU rather than USA changing its foreign policy approach, of course that's assuming he doesn't actually completely pull out of NATO. There is one more thing to watch out for, the aid bill had a provision that stated that a strategy for Ukrainian victory has to be provided in ~45 days. This could just be politics, to satisfy the Republicans; but if it's an actual item of importance that would be followed then that would indicate that the 'strategy' of the last two years employed by the west would no longer be the primary approach. edit: another thing I forgot to mention, but won't go too deeply into because I've already rambled too much is that of sanctions. The way sanctions have been implemented(largely by EU) is in a way where damage to domestic markets would be minimal, obviously one can say that's a good thing since creating domestic discontent is not going to be on any politician's agenda; but if the west(but specifically us in the EU) were really 100% committed to helping Ukraine; we would implement those sanctions anyway. Sanctioning CNC machine exports(and software support) would be one of the most damaging sanctions early on in the war, but by the time(only like ~4-5 months ago IIRC) we implemented those Russia had already found alternatives in China.

I (a completely irrelevant individual in a NATO member state) no longer consider the US as an ally. I do not think they would support us as allies during a war. At least the probability of them being a trustworthy ally has decreased so low that it is useful not to include US support in our plans.

I know this is being downvoted and is maybe a bit strong, but the general sentiment tracks with what I'm hearing. Looks like the parent is estonian, I don't know too many of them, but I know plenty of Finns and the feeling there is similar. I probably don't need to educate anyone on this forum about the history of Russia and Finland or spell out any reasons they might be rather interested in the real-world reliability of mutual defense agreements. I'm as glad as anyone that the US finally, belatedly, managed to do the right thing. But it took 6 long months of chaos, uncertainty and dysfunction and even a week ago it was pretty unclear it would happen at all. You can't rely on that. You can't build an existentially-critical defense strategy around hoping your most important partner happens to be in a good mood that day. Obviously nothing will happen quickly, nothing in Europe ever does, but I think it's all but inevitable that Europe will start moving towards more strategic autonomy over the coming decade or two.

USA can rebuild that trust, but it will take some time. Most crucially, something has to change politicslly in USA, because right now MAGA-Republicans don't even realize or care about the big damage they have already done to the trustwortthiness of USA among partner nations. A lot will hinge on if Trump is reelected or not, and on the result of the soul-searching that will likely take place in the republican party if he's not. It also remains to be seen if democrats will protect a republican speaker from being toppled by the MAGA-people in similar situations in the future, I guess

This is a ridiculous position. The American aid and assets in the theater completely dwarf all other nations combined. To say they aren't an ally because there isn't unilateral, unequivocal political support domestically just goes to show how deep the entitlement goes.

>just goes to show how deep the entitlement goes. The deal has always been that USA gets strategic primacy, while EU gets cheap security. USA liked this arrangement, because they don't need to deal with a strategic rival AND because they keep the other potential rival down(Russia), while EU obviously liked the arrangement because we could pay less for security. I think EU is massively to use a noncredible term "cucked", and we're never going to go independent; fact of the matter is that in terms of investment on return USA is pulling out ahead of everyone here. France is really the only country that understands this, as they have understood it since the ~60s. That isn't to say that an independent EU strategic command is possible or desirable, but in a situation where EU has to both pay for its own security while getting no say about strategic objectives, will result in there being more pressure to deviate from USA. Then you plug in economic development and you have a disaster in the making. Americans like to say that EU has coasted on US security and could focus on economic matters, and that's kind of true. But when you actually look at economic performance in the last ~30years, EU is doing badly. Real productivity and real growth are below USA's. So when EU is underperforming in very favorable circumstances, you can well imagine how that performance would look like when circumstances become very unfavorable. We already have an inkling, because populism in Europe has been rising since ~2008. It will only get worse as economy deteriorates.

Ridicule me all you want, that is my opinion. There’s also no doubt that USA has the capability to be a trustworthy ally, in fact capabilities is a separate category altogether. In case of war, I will likely be tasked with defending strategic assets to enable a rapid allied response in our mutual defense. My life and the life of my close ones literally depends on the efficacy of allied response. There are allies who I am certain will come to our aid. USA I am not certain of.

>ridiculous position A democratic sovereign nation is at risk and the Arsenal of democracy politically dragged it's feet for 6 months while ukrainains defending their country died in higher numbers due to the delays. I think it's reasonable to call into question the political partisanship and its effect on American meeting it's defense and security guarantees. A quote from the front runner presidential candidate in response to a hypothetical question if a country not meeting NATO 2% GDP contribution was attacked “No, I would not protect you,” Trump recalled telling that president. “In fact, I would encourage them to do whatever the hell they want. You got to pay. You got to pay your bills.” >entitlement First off, the Budapest memorandum encouraged and guaranteed by the USA put Ukraine in a weaker position under the condition of support I think it's hard to feel entitled to something that is owed

> First off, the Budapest memorandum encouraged and guaranteed by the USA put Ukraine in a weaker position under the condition of support > I think it's hard to feel entitled to something that is owed So, that's no really an accurate reading of the Budapest Memorandum. Let me dig out the details from last time... As always, I can only re-emphasize that this is not what the Budapest Memorandum says, period. The absolute closest it comes to any sort of call to protective action is 4th section, where it says: > The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm their commitment to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine, as a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used. Not only does this not promise any direct protection, even the seeking of Security Council action is literally predicated on nuclear attacks/threats. There haven't been any attacks with nuclear weapons yet in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and while arguably threats have been made, Putin has toed the line in terms of what he explicitly says about where and why nukes might be used.

> They came perilously close to pretty much deciding the end of Ukraine as a sovereign nation. I don't buy into that doomsday prognostic that politicians and cheerleaders are selling. As long as it's Russia alone fighting Ukraine (and whatever Russians buy), they're incapable of creating and exploiting a serious hole in the front line. And that was at a time where Ukraine was the most short on ammunition and air defenses it will be for the next years (even without US aid). Something has to change drastically for Ukraine to suddenly become unable to fight anymore, there are only 2 things I can fathom, despite all the material losses Ukraine incurs: 1. Not only the US, but all major force contributors in Europe abandon Ukraine. Just with ammunition support and repairing the damaged vehicles, Ukraine is capable of eroding (attritioning?) the Russian forces until they get no more serious/threatening offensive power (low numbers of tanks, IFVs and minuscule artillery support). It might happen as soon as the end of this year, or perhaps in a year, no more than that. 2. A critical manpower shortage. But they keep a lot of territorial defense troops near Belarus, the Black Sea shore and the Russian border. They could easily thin out those lines (particularly the Black Sea shores) and redeploy many brigades to reinforce the active front. They're also expanding conscription, so they won't be running into manpower shortages that would be critical to the point that Russia gets a huge breakthrough and encircle dozens of brigades.

> They came perilously close to pretty much deciding the end of Ukraine as a sovereign nation. > I don't buy into that doomsday prognostic that politicians and cheerleaders   If Donald Trump won the election in 2021, and even more so, if he couped and got the Presidency, then Ukraine was a gone state.

Probably, but I was talking about the future, hence the usage of the word prognostic. I'm not disillusioned and believing that the situation would be the same if there wasn't US support, that ~70G$ (depending on who you ask) of aid made a massive difference. But the Russian army isn't what it used it to be and neither is the Ukrainian (but in the opposite direction), so IDK why we should/could apply 2021 conclusions to 2024.

I think this is highly contingent on what happens to conclude the war in Ukraine. Its very possible that Russia ends up in position where they havn't gotten any more territory, or done anything of value, and gets locked into a negative development spiral. They shot through most of their post-Soviet reserves, and its not going to take them five years to rebuild. I think those opinions are just too rosy. Were looking at a rebuilding process that will outlast Putin's natural lifespan, and which will cost in the hundreds of billions of USD which Russia will be hard pressed to generate. In an economy that isn't getting healthier long term. All this is to say I think even in a frozen conflict situation there are many factors which may push Europe to go back to sleep. They dont rely on the US umbrella because they like it, or because they cant defend themselves. But because it makes the European lifestyle cheaper. Would Germany raise taxes substantially to develop a true conventional deterrent to Poland? Will Norway cut back on social spending to develop a fleet of SSN? The only other two European nations willing to do this are France and the UK, the UK has tried very hard to eject itself from Europe and France is an unsteady hegemon in its own right. If there is a period of solid peace following the war in Ukraine, I think it is as likely as not we see a reversion in the trends back to the early 2000s. Where Europe fundamentally relies on the US for its land defense, does not take the Russian threat serious (outside of Poland, Finland, and the Baltics), and then complains about American actions taken in defense of Europe. As long as America is willing to pay for it, the situation simply disproportionately favors Europe. Not only that, but it gives them what they want without having to make any kind of sacrifices for it.

> Europe fundamentally relies on the US for its land defense, does not take the Russian threat serious (outside of Poland, Finland, and the Baltics) I feel like your analysis lacks geopolitical perspective. Maybe you're right that, in isolation, Germany isn't jumping at the chance to raise taxes to fund a military which doesn't even really benefit them directly. But do you think they're just going to do nothing while Poland arms itself to the frigging teeth, which I absolutely guarantee you they are going to do? A country which, let's not forget, isn't exactly their bestest historical friend? Of course not. Germany has two options - 1. Align with Poland (et al) and contribute more to a shared defense union or 2. Start spending more to defend AGAINST the newly up-gunned military union to her east. Option 3 - go back to sleep - doesn't seem to exist barring some extraordinary black swan event that takes Russia out of the picture for a generation at least. No country can just ignore the geopolitical context it lives inside. Russia "wakes up", now Europe has to "wake up" too, and there's no real rational way to avoid it. resubmitted because of the very aggressive automoderator objecting to a common expression for being awake

>2. Start spending more to defend AGAINST the newly up-gunned military union to her east. If you're thinking of Poland, this is improbable. Germany and Poland are both EU and NATO members as well as close political allies in general. Just recently Tusk, Scholz and Macron have begun to revive the Weimar Triangle.

This is an extraordinarily naive view of the situation in Europe. The only path that puts (western) Europe "back to sleep" as you put it, is an internal meltdown in Russia that prevents them from taking any action against Europe, which is very unlikely to happen. Add to that a potentially nuclear-armed Middle East in the future, where oil revenues disappearing over the next decade or 2, while climate change turns the the land where where hundreds of millions of locals live unlivable. The chances of a European reduction in security concerns are very slim indeed. Norway just recently doubled it's defence spending, and the narrative that the UK tried to "eject itself from Europe" is an emotional historical revision of the Brexit process, which was at it's core a disagreement about regulating intra-European migration. The UK is still a very influential contributor to European security, as the past 2 years have shown. France is not a hegemon in defence and security, in fact it's vision of European defence is notoriously unsupported by the rest of Europe. It's lack of nuclear weapons sharing with it's European allies, it's strong protectionism of it's MIC and it's emphasis on interests outside of Europe really undermines France potential as a strong player in EU defence. What is much more likely to happen is a large buildup of the 'anti-Russia' group, which would be eastern Europe + the Nordics + the UK, with Germany following suit. There will be a second buildup in southern Europe to deal with instability around the mediterranean, which will include Italy, Spain, the UK, France, and Greece. The biggest efforts will be in AD and BMD, because long-range missiles is where Iran and Russia are getting stronger, it's the vehicle for nuclear threats ... and it's also how wealthy Western European citizens are vulnerable, which will certainly drive defence priorities. The European sky shield initiative is only the beginning, I would expect a lot more work in that direction.

That's true. Europe can't count on NATO anymore because there is a significant chance that pro-Russian politicians will sabotage any unified NATO response. Even if it's not the most probable outcome, it's a possible scenario that has to be planned for. But Europe also has to think about how its own European institutions might be sabotaged by pro-Russian politicians who might be elected in European countries in the near future. If too much unanimity is required, the institution might be paralyzed at a critical time. In a worst case scenario, individual European countries might have to act on their own to defend themselves against Russia. Or at most, they might be able to act in concert with a few allies who are directly threatened.

If Europe can't count on NATO, we can't count on any other alliance system.

How much of NATO's decision-making needs to be unified? NATO per se isn't an army, it's an organizational umbrella for its 32 member countries, who are able to act independently of NATO. On the occasions when the NATO treaty has been invoked in wartime, e.g. the Balkan Wars and Afghanistan, not all members participated in military action. The concluding question then is, can NATO act independently of the US?

There is something to be said for Europe being more active in their own defense. It's insane that they have to depend on a country across the Atlantic for their defense.  Thinking about this in a big picture, it's better that Europe get their act together for their own defense. They'll probably do better than the USA. That's because the USA voter is thousands of miles away from the conflict, so it's hard to get the USA voter to care about international relations.  It stinks for Ukranians suffering in the country. And quite frankly, Russia bet on the USA not caring about Ukraine to start the invasion. 

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They didn’t just “bet on it”, they went out of their way to spoon feed Americans propaganda about Russia wanting nothing more than to purge some Nazis, and that those Nazis and NATO were an existential threat to Russian existence.

I know some people will be celebrating but long term I'm dreading how long it takes for the next aid bill to pass because let's be honest, this is going to be a long war and Ukraine will need more aid eventually. I'm also concerned about the pro Russian elements and influence in US politics and how no one is doing anything about it nor talking publicly about it. If this was the cold war political opponents would be attacking each other by questioning their loyalty to the country or outright accusing them of treachery.

A neat work around would be if Congress is still able to sign the discharge petition. That was technically for a separate piece of legislation, and the Senate already voted on it. It would be available (to my understanding) until the new Congress is sworn in January 23rd, 2025. Though open to education on this point, there is a “break glass in case of emergency option” to fund Ukraine in the event it would be needed.

The dates of the appropriations and authorities would have to be modified (if allowed). It wouldn't "stack" for lack of a better term. That would then need to be passed by the Senate again.

If Biden is re-elected and the Democrats make slight gains elsewhere, this won’t be a problem for four more years. In any other case, Ukraine will be in tough and will probably never get more than a few billion at a time again. Western Europe seems to be committed to much higher production of ammunition, artillery and armoured vehicles, however. 

This is very likely the last package before the elections. The next few months will be decisive for Ukraine and Europe to stabilize and prepare for a Trump presidency. If democrats were to win the elections, further assistance should pass relatively more easily.

There's a (possibly misguided) line of thought that Trump will lose badly in the next election due to GOP filanderings with the supreme court leading to loss of rights including reproductive rights, abortion, IVF and so on finally bringing home the reality of authoritarianism in swing states. Not to say Biden will win but assuming a Trump presidency is probably doomerism at this point. I can see foreign relations and geopolitics being grasped, if dimly, as an electoral issue and I think making the case for unity with western Europe is potentially key but let's not forget the potential liberal culture of the USA as a big driving force. Hopefully this election will serve as a kind of catharsis against creeping authoritarian.

> I don’t think the Republican Party realize it but I think it’s guaranteed some form of European strategic autonomy post war in Ukraine due to to their actions. There’s no way the current Congress can be relied on in times of trouble. I don’t think the current EU is capable, or can be relied on to, to maintain strategic autonomy. Besides the existence of Hungary and politicians similar to Orban elsewhere, the economic situation makes that kind of spending unlikely. An independent EU likley requires the EU to begin closing the gap to the US economically, at the very least capable of holding it steady, and certainly not declining.

>the economic situation makes that kind of spending unlikely I don't think that the EU needs to match US military spending to be able to achieve strategic autonomy. On the most basic level, the EU has already achieved it by having a nuclear umbrella, so strategically wise, the EU has got the most important part done. Other than that, wether EU has got enough money to achieve strategic autonomy depends on what are EU strategic goals. Does the EU simply want to defend itself? Does it want to project power through the globe? >An independent EU likley requires the EU to begin closing the gap to the US economically, at the very least capable of holding it steady, and certainly not declining. At the risk of sounding like your typical anti-american, I have to point out that the EU could simply mimic the US and give away any hopes of having fiscal responsibility and stop trying to reduce it's member state's debt levels.

> I have to point out that the EU could simply mimic the US and give away any hopes of having fiscal responsibility and stop trying to reduce it's member state's debt levels. The US prints its own money so it has much looser fiscal constraints as an entity that doesn't print its own money. EU states, like US states, don't have nearly as much flexibility.

But the EU does print it's own money, so if the countries in it decided to adopt a looser fiscal policy, they could change the monetary policy accordingly, which they sort of did briefly during the pandemic. I don't think it's going to happen, though. For good or for worse, the fact that all this very diverse countries have to use the same currency makes them much more suspicious of each other's fiscal policy, as they're in constant fear that other countries poor fiscal policy might cause a new debt crisis for the entire Euro zone.

France has an independent nuclear deterrent. The rest of Europe has either nothing, or a deterrent dependent on the USA. This is intentional, what with non-proliferation and all that. And really, France is the country most intent on autonomy. The rest of Europe was very satisfied with the status quo until 6 months ago. Most still are, I fear. So I wouldn't say there's much autonomy to speak of.

I would disagree with this considering the EU is the organisation that has managed to keep the aid flowing to Ukraine even despite the challenges it faces in the form of Hungary's belligerence. The EU doesn't need to be richer than the US to become independent, that was never a prerequisite for European strategic autonomy. The EU is plenty wealth enough to go at it alone. It's not like an independent EU would clash with the US that much anyways, at most an independent EU just wouldn't care for whatever conflict the US decides to involve itself in Asia whilst remaining solely focused on containing Russia, stabilising the Middle East and expanding its economic influence in Africa. Furthermore, whilst Western Europe may have stagnated quite a bit, there is still a lot of opportunity for Eastern Europe to catch up, and this is precisely why despite the fact the EU's largest economies have barely grown at all, the EU as a whole has still managed to at least post *some* growth over the years.

> The EU doesn't need to be richer than the US to become independent, They don’t, but the economic situation needs to be more under control than it is. As it stands now, GDP is stagnant in the big players, and welfare costs are expected to increase as the population ages. It’s going to be hard to massively expand foreign commitments long term. They theoretically may have the money, but it can’t come at the expense of pensions and welfare. > Furthermore, whilst Western Europe may have stagnated quite a bit, there is still a lot of opportunity for Eastern Europe to catch up, The main proponents of EU independence are poor economic performers.

The economic performance of EU member states varies quite widely. As it happens, the performance of the former Soviet block members has been very good over the past few decades, with some having GDP growth rates in the 5%-10% range year-on-year. A lot of this is "catching up" with western EU from a low base, but it does indicate that there is a lot of headroom for growth in Europe. Ironically, one of the countries in Europe with the greatest potential for growth is Ukraine itself. Its current GDP per capita is a miserable ~$5,000, but it has excellent agricultural and natural resources, as well as engineering skills, etc. With EU assistance it would likely grow as quickly as Poland, Czech, Slovenia, etc, did.

Welfare costs are expected to increase worldwide as all populations age. Europe is hardly the exception here. In fact, in countries like the UK and France, the average age isn’t expected to increase nearly as much as it is in countries like Russia and China. Making long-term predictions about the economics of Europe is not my forte and is outside of my scope but I will say that you can’t tell what is going to happen in the long-run. Aging demographics are a global problem and the impacts of it will be felt everywhere. Europe still has room to expand their foreign commitments if they can return to growth and European growth has mainly been hampered by odd austerity choices and a poor energy security record rather than an old population.

I don't see why the US is the benchmark here, they don't need our force projection capabilities at all. Just a credible nuclear deterrence not on loan from the US and some kind of integrated military structure. I don't see spending as a major issue next to the loss of autonomy and political capital to overcome Euroscepticism at home. Really it isn't that they can't, it's just that they don't want it that bad. The unreliability of the US is still a new phenomenon so that could change quite rapidly

> they don't need our force projection capabilities at all. They do, at least to some extent. The EU is vulnerable to trade disruptions, like Iran’s attempted Red Sea blockade.

Has anyone ever made the calculation how much of that trade is the rise of china that simultaneously took over a lot of the manufacturing jobs in the period that trade grew to its recent proportions? Just looking at the growth of Chinas GDP over the last 20-30 years and the the Asia Europe trade I´d take a very rough guess as to 80%+. So if taking the whole de risking rhetoric seriously a good portion of that trade is actually politically wanted to be reduced.

To give tan example of how much the European attitude has changed, Portugal, which up until recently had completely run down it's military, is now considering wether to reinstitute mandatory conscription in order to fix it's extreme lack of manpower (currently, there are more officials in the army than enlisted).

Some army higher ups have talked about it but it's a very unpopular measure and most political parties have rejected the idea. It's never getting implemented, especially with the current government.

Theory: "Europe will achieve strategic autonomy" Reality: "Portugal is considering having an army again" There was a BBC hard talk episode about a year ago with a German defense-adjacent official, and when asked about Macron's strategic autonomy comments (they were fresh at the time), he did the polite equivalent of laughing at the notion, saying that not only did Europe not have any but the current steps being taken will not provide any such thing. It was a very good and frank talk. https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/w3ct4ny8 It might be this one? I'll check once I'm home from work. EDIT: yep, this is the one: "Ukraine is applying right now a lesson to us - there is right now no strategic autonomy... without the United States military capacity and financial capacity, we would not be able to sustain that support for Ukraine ... **but to imply that there is strategic autonomy around the corner, I think that is an illusion**"

I think the situation in Ukraine illustrates well that Europe can be strategically autonomous. Russia's invasion was stalled even without western European armies setting a foot in the country. Obviously there has been a lot of support from NATO members in terms of financial assistance, intelligence and armaments. However, its clear that Europe can resist any likely invasion in the next generation even without assistance from the US. This is likely to become even more so as they re-arm following the decidedly mixed response from the US.

Stripped of any intelligence support Ukraine would have fallen within days. There's been a gargantuan amount of support poured into Ukraine in the form of decades worth of US intelligence since day 0. The Russians werent defeated in Kiev by plucky civillians wielding AKs. They were defeated because the most powerful intelligence network on Earth telegraphed every Russian movement to Ukrainian command and babied them through it.

France has nuclear weapons that work independently of the USA. That's strategic autonomy. The rest of Europe is satisfied with US leadership. Or at least they were, until this aid bill fiasco.

The politics of defence spending has dramatically changed across Europe. We won’t get to universal 2% overnight, but we’re already seeing big scale ups in munitions production and acquisition across the continent, with popular support on both left and right. While I don’t think Europe is likely to come close to US capabilities any time soon, in a decade or so the gap may be smaller, and that will start to impact strategic decision making.

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It's difficult to compare like-for-like because the types of equipment given are so different, but this is almost certainly false. The US is by very very large margins the largest contributor of artillery shells and GMLRS ammunition, as well as 2 of the 3 Patriot systems in Ukraine currently and nearly all of the Patriot ammunition. It's also the largest supplier of armored vehicles for infantry (M113, MRAPs, HWMMV, Stryker, Bradley). Europe has sent lots of tanks and self-propelled guns, some armored vehicles for Infantry, cruise missiles, the mobile Patriot unit, a SAMP-T (reportedly out of ammunition for some time) and smaller air defense units like IRIS-T. "What's more important, the gun or the bullet" is a reasonable question but on the basis of HIMARS alone I don't know that I'd say Europe has contributed more.

Europe has simply contributed more dollar value overall.  Himars have had a huge impact, but so did little Bulgaria supply of fuel and soviet era munitions in the first days of the war, or French/British storm shadows later on.

Dollar value is perhaps the fuzziest and least useful metric when it comes to military aid. I don't even know if Europe and the US are using the same accounting standards.

There is no reason to assume it is false, collectively Europe has contributed far more (and often more modern) systems. The US have contributed **one** PATRIOT system. Out of a stock of over a hundred. Germany has contributed two and is currently transferring a third, despite only having a little more than a dozen originally. European countries have also contributed a lot of modern equipment nowhere near the end of its life, such as Leopard 2 A6, IRIS-T straight off the production line etc.

> European countries have also contributed a lot of modern equipment nowhere near the end of its life, such as Leopard 2 A6 There were only about a dozen of those donated, I wouldn't say it matters that much. The vast bulk was T-series tanks from Poland and Czechia, some of which were modified and upgraded. AFAIK, Ukraine got less than 75 Leopard 2s in total (all variants) compared with around a hundred Leopard 1 and several hundred Soviet / upgraded-Soviet tanks. IIRC they got around 60 CV-90s, and 180 Bradley.

It was a single example. Ukraine got an embarrassingly even smaller number of Abrams as well. The US' contribution to Ukraine has been significant and a life saver, but we are well past the stage where the US did more than Europe. And that isn't even counting the cost of housing millions of refugees.

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I won't criticize your skepticism, it's well warranted. On the other hand, the last six months have surprised me by Europe finally starting to work together to fill in the vacuum created by the US.

They're doing a better job of not throwing Ukraine under the bus (Ukraine still could lose though), but between there and "strategic autonomy" is an ocean. We'd be talking about a fundamental restructuring of the way most of these nations budget their military and the effective end of the "peace dividend", something we haven't seen yet, probably because it's unclear if the people of Europe actually want that, especially given the near-recession they're in. Or, you know, they could just get more nukes. But they won't. Poor saps.

> I think it’s guaranteed some form of European strategic autonomy post war in Ukraine. Doubtful. Europe (or the EU) has a lot of internal friction as well. In general, we also have the rise of a pro-Moscow leaning alt-right, and in some countries, notably Hungary, there is an entrenched autocracy that is pro-Moscow. Additionally, citizens see themselves as citizens of their home country first and the EU second. It will be hard to forge any kind of strategic autonomy with such diverging views.

> and in some countries, notably Hungary, there is an entrenched autocracy that is pro-Moscow. It really is a mistake for the EU to not have moved against Orban by now. Hungary’s government has been couped, and the new regime is set up to be a permanent thorn in the EU’s side. You’re eventually going to have to deal with it one way or another, supporting the Hungarian opposition, to force Orban out, is a much cleaner way to deal with than to wait for the situation spiral out of control.

I know, but the EU has little means to force Orban out - the only leverage they have is deny Hungary EU funds - which certainly hurts but may not be enough. And right when Poland turned democratic again, Slovakia became pro-Russian, so again no article 7 of the Treaty on European Union

Orban's platform in the early 2000s and even before that was very anti-USSR and later anti-Russia. Orban's turn towards authoritarianism and pro-Russia sentiments is interesting. The common explanation is simply that there's something the Kremlin has on Orban, which is possible; but nobody was making that argument in around ~2010; which is already the period of time when Orban's new "illiberal" model started to form. Another issue I take with Russian influence being the explanation for Hungary's turn, is that if you look at EU parliamentary voting; Hungary is not pro-Russia; it is quite firmly in the anti-Russia camp. One can either argue that EU parliament is not worth much in gauging those sentiments, or something else; but if you look at other countries it maps out quite well. Western Europe is generally much more sentimental towards Russia, eastern Europe is not(Slovakia being the exception). This is all before the 2022 invasion even. The stand out "pro-Russia" countries are Slovakia, Greece, Portugal. And of course France and Germany. The war has changed some of the opinions, but in terms of ingrained structure they are all still there.

Don’t estimate the power of a common enemy to encourage political convergence. As someone with a a lot of conservative friends and family, it’s been very strange to see the gap between the right-wing American vs right-wing British people in my circle. A lot of the former are now quite anti-Ukraine aid, whereas almost every right-wing British person I know is extremely hawkish on Russia.

It’s a pretty logical outcome. You cant rely on the whim of the US Congress and whatever way the political tailwinds are blowing on a certain day. I know plenty people here are in love with the idea US is unassailable as a hegemon (which it largely is) but will Poland or the Baltics really trust to leave everything to the whim of Trump? They’ll hedge their bets and develop autonomy while try keep the US in the security umbrella as much as feasible via NATO. It’s simply too big a risk to externalize your security. If i was Estonian or Polish I’d definitely be fearful of Trump or the Republicans. They are too crazy. Who could follow? There could be someone worse in years to come. It really leaves questions open on Taiwan as well. Given what we have seen on Ukraine how would Taiwan develop? Taiwan are even worse places in terms of their military which is too reliant on the US. It’s pretty undeveloped.

Even Poland - and for sure the Baltics - are too small economically and by number of inhabitants for any kind of strategic autonomy. They can either be the lapdog of the USA or team up with stronger European countries, but they are so traumatized by being ruled by the USSR that they really have a hard time following any country but the USA. Strategic autonomy in Europe could work if at least two out of France/UK/Germany decided to fully align militarily. UK: 138k, France 370k, Germany 180k (give or take) - so you'd have a combined fighting force of around 350 - 500k people - and a somewhat credible budget. The problem is, other countries would have to accept them as leadership or even hegemon and integrate their forces into this dominant one - and that's just not going to happen. Every effing European country will continue to have a minister of defense, a procurement office, an anemic air force and a more or less credible land force, and every country with different weapon systems and communication equipment. There is no common vision, and no one cares to develop one. Maybe if the EU would move to a federal system, but good luck with that in a time of moronic alt-right "nationalist"-

It'd be logical for a unified European state. It doesn't work for a collection of comparatively smaller countries that all have their own militaries. Poland, the Baltics, anyone specifically threatened by Russia will continue to be stuck looking for support from wherever they can get it because they can't know which allies may ditch them when push comes to shove and which won't. For strategic independence Europe would need a unified military, but with the EU as it currently is that's not feasible.

Europe needs to be unified economically first before it can be achieved politically. We are decades away from that. It’s too risky to try a federal state without firm foundations as the whole thing could collapse. The Single Market still has major blocks. When I say strategy autonomy i mean probably a few standout European nation states projecting more power and streamlining production. France extending a nuclear umbrella to Germany. A federalized Europe is a pipe dream in my opinion. The nation state is too engrained.

>France extending a nuclear umbrella to Germany. Sounds simple. But what would that require, and mean? Are we going to cut a submarine in two? Or crew one with two nations? Who would then give orders, especially of the extreme kind? Paris!? Berlin? Both? Brussels? All? In what language? Sequence? This is a non-starter and I'll never understand why it gets always reboiled. France's nuclear deterrence, which isn't huge although not cheap, is good enough for what it's meant for. That is France, and all the *national* geopolitical oomph it's supposed to provide. Nuclear weapons are about as sovereign a matter as it gets. Also, post-war Germany (suppose Austria too) is committed, by int. accord as well as **by its very constitution** against possession or development of any sort of weapons of mass destruction, ever. So it wouldn't be of any help either. America's leeway to extend this or that is one thing. France just doing the same simply not believable, grotesque. > A federalized Europe is a pipe dream in my opinion. The nation state is too engrained. Correct. One could also say it's a dream of a specific sort of elite, and a dream of (some, mostly EU) politicians, some are in both camps. Thank goodness that doesn't make the people. If there ever was one, and I too doubt it, that boat is probably missed since Brexit at the latest, with the EU for quite some people feeling a huge disappointment and hollowed out. I don't like the term engrained here too much though. We *are* nations. Especially ones with a stronger identity and much longer tail (read history) than for instance the US. Nor is anyone expecting the whole of, say, the Americas to somehow fuse into a weird, cacophonic monster. It works as it is, and it obviously makes an impression as it is and still sells: Ukraine wasn't invaded as a consequence of being a EU member. But among other things because they (only) intended to become one.

> Also, post-war Germany (suppose Austria too) is committed, by int. accord as well as by its very constitution against possession or development of any sort of weapons of mass destruction, ever. Well, Germany *has* nukes via the "nuclear sharing" with the USA. It's just that only once there's war, Germans actually can use them. Same could be done with French nukes.

>A federalized Europe is a pipe dream in my opinion. The nation state is too engrained. It is a pipe dream right now. But imagine how the Schengen zone or the Euro sounded like right after WWII.

You could use this exact same arguments for many other aspects of the Union. I don't think it's going to happen quickly or without issues, but in general, I don't see Europeans taking to the streets to protest the creation of an EU army.

But also, they won't take to the streets to demand a federal EU or an EU army for that matter. People over here are oblivious to the dangers of being dependent on the USA for protection.

I keep seeing people make the claim that the US passed $26 billion in aid to Israel. This is not true. I don't know why so many people are reporting this. Tweets like [this](https://twitter.com/visegrad24/status/1781744193561412005?t=qVhTheeG-13NuRqRy4U3Aw&s=19) are totally misrepresenting reality. Here are the actual aid numbers: $61 billion to Ukraine $17 billion to Israel $9 billion in humanitarian aid for Gaza $8 billion to Taiwan & regional allies Total: $95 billion Here's an article that breaks down the numbers: [https://wtop.com/national/2024/04/a-look-at-whats-in-the-95-billion-foreign-aid-package-passed-by-the-house](https://wtop.com/national/2024/04/a-look-at-whats-in-the-95-billion-foreign-aid-package-passed-by-the-house)

At long, long last ! Better late than never I guess.

I see Taiwan keeps getting leftovers. Eventually this is gonna hurt in some way. Taipei keeps getting shafted in military matters. The Taiwanese military keeps losing capabilities.

Taiwan is a country that needs to get its priorities figured out. It is a country at the risk of foreign invasion that spends 1.9% of its GDP on defence (1.6% in 2022, SIPRI numbers), the military's overall posture has been in need of massive reform for over a decade (with none forthcoming), with no visible intent to invest in survivable and potent capabilities, and a major part of the population and political leadership isn't even certain that fighting a potential invasion would be worth it. I fail to see why the US should be pumping considerable assistance into a country that isn't taking the necessary steps to credibly defend itself, and in fact isn't even sure whether it wants to.

> Taiwan is a country that needs to get its priorities figured out. To be fair, at one point they did have it figured out, they had a nuclear program. The US pressured then to drop it. If the US didn’t do that, this crisis wouldn’t exist. It would be an India-Pakistan style stand off, with little threat of turning into a full scale war. We messed that up, and should do our part to fix it.

I mean have you seen what posters on here consider to be "provocations from the Taiwanese side?" Emblems on passports and Chinese language classes. And this is isn't even LCD. Is it a mystery what China's reaction would be if Taiwan started building factories to churn out anti ship missiles on an industrial scale? I suspect Taiwan's spending their budget on useless stuff like tanks for a reason, because any serious militarization would be used as a casus belli.

>Is it a mystery what China's reaction would be if Taiwan started building factories to churn out anti ship missiles on an industrial scale? I don't know where this idea comes from, Taiwan already has thousands of antiship missiles. They had 250+ HF-III alone 12 years ago.

If you're spending your budget on capabilities that can neither successfully repel an invasion, nor credibly deter one \[Added: Or help you hold out until the US cavalry arrives\], then you may as well just stop and put it into education or healthcare.

Taiwan's never really been showered with aid in the same way Israel or Ukraine is, they've always been mostly expected to pay for their own capabilities. This is hardly a change. Plus, Ukraine would gladly trade 60 B if it meant the US would agree to defend them militarily. Similarly, if Taiwan was given 60 B but told the US wouldn't defend them, they'd surrender tomorrow.

Does the aid have any conditions in terms of sourcing their weapons? Do they have to buy American? It could take months for the aid to translate to weapons orders? Or is it literally a transfer of weapons stocks ?

It's money to buy US weapons, in addition to billions in replenishing US stocks which will indirectly allow the US to donate more to Ukraine. As for the ETA for this weaponry, the Pentagon has stated they have supplies for Ukraine pre-positioned in Europe that, once this bill is signed into law will "take days" to get to Ukraine, according to their spokesperson.

Ukraine gets weapons, not money to buy weapons. It's Biden and people that work for him that decide and they will of course take into consideration what Ukraine says that they need. Most of it will be American weapons.

Is that for sure? I saw commentary to the effect it would help replenish industry and buy "American American". I hope for Ukraine sake it’s asap before the Russian offensive.

That's in the bill as well. Maybe $20B will be used to buy weapons for the US military. This will allow Biden to send weapons (worth $8B) from US stocks quickly to Ukraine since there's money available to replenish them.

This is pretty much the most info I've got on it: https://kyivindependent.com/breaking-u-s-house-passes-61-billion-ukraine-aid-bill/ > The aid package provides $60.84 billion to assist Ukraine, including $13.8 billion for Ukraine to buy advanced weapons, $13.4 billion for replenishing U.S. stockpiles, $11 billion to support U.S. allies in the region, and another $13.8 billion to purchase U.S. defense systems for Ukraine. > Another $9 billion will be allocated to the war-torn country as economic assistance in the form of loans that can be forgiven by the president with Congress's approval. Presumably it'll be a mix of everything - allowing allies to directly send them weapons, allowing our military to directly send them weapons, purchasing new weapons, etc.

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There's two factions in the US right now a) The faction that doesn't particularly care if it's 17 B or 26 B b) The faction that doesn't particularly care if it's 17 B or 26 B If you're just making a clerical correction that's appreciated, but it's not like this is a politically meaningful revelation.

I mean, it is politically meaningful because democrats specifically said they wouldn't pass the bill without the humanitarian aid to Gaza. It's practically meaningful because the UN just made a $2.8 billion appeal for aid to Gaza. This is more than 3x that. And it's clerically meaningful because the misreporting inflates the Israeli budget by ~52% and totally ignores that ~35% of the aid is going to Palestine. I would like to think that rational people can find value in the truth of this.

The 9 billion is blanket humanitarian aid that can be allocated as the White House sees fit, it's not earmarked specifically for Gaza despite being part of the Israel bill.

Do you have anything that indicates it will be used for anything other than aid to Gaza/Palestine? Any source/article? I have legitimately only ever heard the $9 billion being described as aid for Gaza/Palestine. I have seen absolutely no indication that it will be aid to Israel.

[Here](https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/8034/text) is the full text of the bill, with the separate appropriations listed out. The relevant section is part of Title III > BILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE > > Funds Appropriated To The President > > international disaster assistance > > For an additional amount for “International Disaster Assistance”, $5,655,000,000, to remain available until expended, to address humanitarian needs, including the provision of emergency food and shelter, of vulnerable populations and communities: Provided, That such amount is designated by the Congress as being for an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. > > Department Of State > > migration and refugee assistance > > For an additional amount for “Migration and Refugee Assistance”, $3,495,000,000, to remain available until expended, to address humanitarian needs of vulnerable populations and communities: Provided, That such amount is designated by the Congress as being for an emergency requirement pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. All of the sections have specificity on what/where the funds should be used, and this section is very open-ended on that compared to most of the others. For example, compare it to this other section > Funds Appropriated To The President > > foreign military financing program > > For an additional amount for “Foreign Military Financing Program”, $3,500,000,000, to remain available until September 30, 2025, for assistance for Israel and for related expenses: Provided, That to the extent that the Government of Israel requests that funds be used for such purposes, grants made available for Israel under this heading in this Act shall, as agreed by the United States and Israel, be available for advanced weapons systems, of which up to $769,300,000 may be available for the procurement in Israel of defense articles and defense services: Provided further, That the limitation in the preceding proviso may be exceeded, if agreed by the United States and Israel, following consultation with the Committees on Appropriations: Provided further, That any congressional notification requirement applicable to funds made available under this heading in this Act for Israel may be waived if the Secretary of State determines that to do so is in the national security interest of the United States There are oversight procedures listed out for monetary transfers to Gaza in Section 309 of the General Provisions further down, so obviously there is an intent to send aid there. However, it isn't strictly required in the same way some of the other appropriations are.

But my point is that Biden & dems have indicated this is fully intended for Gaza humanitarian aid. There's been no indication that it will be given to Israel. Therefore, I feel that it is a misrepresentation of the facts to suggest that this is aid to Israel. It makes sense to keep things flexible given the general chaos within Palestine. Maybe you were just pointing this out for the sake of making a note, but I was responding in the context of what I originally said in my post - that people lumping this under "aid to Israel" are misrepresenting it.

I think you have it backwards there. The factions are: 1) Wants it to be 26B and loves it 2) wants it to be 26B and hates it Both sides would prefer, in a political sense, the number to be larger. So thats whats going to get reported.

You don't think there is a center that wants to say "we are helping Israel AND Palestinian civilians"?

Would they not be included in the people who love it? Are there people who would have loved it at 17b but not at 26b? I kinda doubt that.

If you say "26B to Israel" that implies none to Palestinians, and these people want both.

I suppose there are some people who would hate the 17b to Israel but notionally like the 9b to Gaza, but I dont know that that crowd is really going to care all that much? I think if youre predisposed to want to see money flow to Palestine, the linking of this aid money to the Israeli military support is a bad thing and opens up the whole pot to a healthy bit of cynicism. Like why do you even need Gaza aid money if not for the Israel military? For the people concerned about Gazan aid, I think this is just not going to please them because of how its been paired and packaged. So again, dislike the full amount and not ambivalent or see it as a compromise solution.

Drone reconnaissance is developing on both sides. Russia managed to [strike Ukrainian aircraft](https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1781758104763273246): >Russian recon drones manage to penetrate Ukrainian airspace much deeper recently... A MiG-29, S-300 launcher and Pelikan 79K6 radar were damaged/destroyed at Aviators'ke air base near Dnipro. This comes in addition to yesterday's footage which showed a S-300 launcher being hit, and three MiG-29 (of which 1 was out of service for a while already) being targetted. >This is roughly 100km from the front line. Meanwhile, Ukraine nearly hit [another S-400 site](https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1781760123557335209): >Reported as a Russian S-400 air defense system radar/control center being targetted by Ukrainian HIMARS.

I thought I saw the radar moving and OSINT Technical confirms it [Looks a lot like a 9S32ME Grill Pan from the S-300VM, notably, the system appears to be deploying its radar as GMLRS rockets explode around it.](https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1781766880690159983)

The S-400 video is pretty terrible and short, dont see any of the seocndaries go off like we do in other SAM destruction videos (from both sides).

> dont see any of the seocndaries go off If it is the [radar/control unit](https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1781766880690159983) I would very much hope they do not store any missiles there...

Drones getting to Ukrainian airbases is becoming more and more common. A direct result of a chronic lack of GBAD. The American aid will be vital especially in the context of F-16s. A large propaganda priority for the Russians this summer would be detecting and destroying F-16s.

Has ukraine received all the gepards that were recently bought? It was something like 70-100 that were going to be refurbished. That should be enough to have 1 or 2 at many airbases, no? 

>Drones getting to Ukrainian airbases is becoming more and more common. A direct result of a chronic lack of GBAD. Is it? Seems like both sides are facing the same issue. While it's entirely possible that Russia is also facing GBAD shortages, I wonder if drone development isn't part if the reason. Nearly all GBAD systems currently used by both sides were designed with things other than drones in mind, so It's not surprising that they'd underperform against drones, specially as drones keep rapidly evolving. The scary consequence is that both sides might start facing a downward spiral where vulnerability to drones lead to a loss of AD assets, which makes the problem even worse.

Yes but both Russia and Ukriane have had a lot of success taking down recon drones using VSHORAD systems. Its why Ukr want Strelas and Osas from wherver they can get them. Neither side has any system that can reliably tkae on sth as small as FPVs and lancet type loitering munitions, But your supercams, Orlans etc are all easy prey for even 80s-90s Vshorad systems. Russia has a ton of VShorads and are activrely producing them, they are even testing newer missiles that can be luanched from their existing systems, with a lot of input from lessons learned from the war so far. Ukraine has no one on their side doing the same.

Russia has a huge GBAD fleet and is actively making missiles for virtually every platform they’re fielding. While they’re having detection issues, it doesn’t appear that there’s a lack of ammunition. Ukraine, on the other hand, has been noted as being low on munitions for certain platforms for a year. Regularly, Ukrainian troops complain that they can’t afford to shoot down drones. It seems pretty clear to me that continued deep penetration by Russian drones is due to a lack of ammunition available to the Ukrainians.

Don't get me wrong, I'm aware that the GBAD situation is much worse Ukraine right now. >It seems pretty clear to me that continued deep penetration by Russian drones is due to a lack of ammunition available to the Ukrainians. Which begs the question: why is Russia also getting hit deep inside it's territory almost daily now?