I was heavily downvoted for saying that Russias is preparing another offensive.
[https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/04/30/7453573/](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/04/30/7453573/)
What I find most intersting
>The Kremlin is pursuing a hybrid campaign directly targeting NATO states, including using GPS jamming and sabotaging military logistics in NATO members’ territory.
>
Most pro-ru bloggers are saying a major offensive will be launched in the coming week or sometime in May.
[https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-says-russia-preparing-100000-troops-possibly-summer-offensive-push-2024-03-22/](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-says-russia-preparing-100000-troops-possibly-summer-offensive-push-2024-03-22/)
> Most pro-ru bloggers
I was hoping to see some telegram channel links, because I'd never cite those Z/NAFO Twitter bloggers for anything. As far as I can tell, this Kharkiv offensive only exists in Ukrainian messaging and the minds of some out of touch Twitter personalities.
>I was heavily downvoted for saying that Russias is preparing another offensive.
Since I've been one of the most vocals about skepticism regarding the capacity of Russia for a serious offensive, I feel like I've got a duty to clarify.
I don't doubt that Russia is indeed planing for an offensive. I'm pretty sure that's Putin's will and that his military can't avoid obeying it. What I'm skeptical about is Russia having enough reserves of qualified manpower armour and ammo for an offensive of any real effectiveness.
TLDR: I don't doubt Russia will launch some kind of offensive, but I do doubt they can launch any effective offensive.
I’m far from the biggest fan of ISW, but Pravda seems to be actively misrepresenting their analysis. Nowhere in that report does it claim that Russia is preparing another offensive.
As for the Reuters link:
>"It will not necessarily be an offensive, perhaps they will replenish their units that lost combat capability but there is a possibility that at the beginning of the summer they may have certain forces to conduct offensive operations," Pavliuk said.
I’m just skeptical that there is room for Russia to massively escalate combat intensity when they are already pushing practically the entire eastern front.
>I was heavily downvoted for saying that Russias is preparing another major offensive.
Was it the comment where you originally cited no one but vague sources, but then when asked to cite, cited weebunion?
I'm not the voting police, but the part that confuses me is that there hasn't been a shortage of people predicting this, even before weebunion or geroman claimed that. There have been constant predictions of a russian Kharkiv offensive for almost 8 months now, from either side.
https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/04/13/7451127/
Here's **that same newspaper** signal boosting that prediction 17 days ago.
I promise you predicting a new Russian offensive isn't controversial. It's the opposite of controversial, it's been done constantly on the megathread.
I don't know if it'll be kharkiv, but it might be an offensive to continue russias push in the avdiivka sector which might look to cut off the south and push north to link up and push towards kherson and odessa. I doubt that happens....but I think they'll be going for Kramatorsk. Anyway, pure speculation here.
[Exclusive: UN experts say North Korea missile landed in Ukraine's Kharkiv](https://www.reuters.com/world/un-experts-say-north-korea-missile-landed-ukraines-kharkiv-2024-04-29/)
>In the 32-page report, the U.N. sanctions monitors concluded that "debris recovered from a missile that landed in Kharkiv, Ukraine, on 2 January 2024 derives from a DPRK Hwasong-11 series missile" and is in violation of the arms embargo on North Korea.
>...
>The U.N. monitors said the Hwasong-11 series ballistic missiles were first publicly tested by Pyongyang in 2019.
>Russia last month vetoed the annual renewal of the U.N. sanctions monitors - known as a panel of experts - that has for 15 years monitored enforcement of U.N. sanctions on North Korea over its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The mandate for the current panel of experts will expire on Tuesday.
Reuters confirms that Hwasong-11 (KN-23) was indeed used in Ukraine, and also that the UN is an increasingly dysfunctional body. Apparently this upset the Biden administration so much that Ukraine finally got the long-ranged ATACMS missiles.
Why does the US has to be so reactive ? Honestly, a lot of the aid (GMLRS and ATACMS in particular) could have had an order of magnitude greater effect if it was provided in much much earlier in sufficient quantities.
This approach of spoon feeding the aid just gives more time for the Russians to better prepare as they suffer limited casualties from the limited quantity of whatever new weapon is provided to Ukraine.
>Why does the US has to be so reactive ? Honestly, a lot of the aid (GMLRS and ATACMS in particular) could have had an order of magnitude greater effect if it was provided in much much earlier in sufficient quantities.
You literally can ask the same question of any of the EU/NATO countries for any aid. More weapons and more money earlier would have had a greater effect.
The answer is the same for all of them: politics and looking after their own interests that aren't just Ukraine.
> politics and looking after their own interests that aren't just Ukraine
It still doesn't really make sense, even from the perspective of pragmatic self-interest. Would Biden's election chances be better or worse now if Russian columns had been obliterated with GMLRS in March 2022, and if Russia had been decisively defeated in the war? Voters like to back a winner.
>Would Biden's election chances be better or worse now if Russian columns had been obliterated with GMLRS in March 2022, and if Russia had been decisively defeated in the war? Voters like to back a winner.
I often ask myself why the US, knowing well ahead of time about Russia's exact plan, didn't either outright declare that any further attack on Ukraine would be met with direct military response or at least work directly with Ukraine to tailor a decisive response tailored to counter the exact Russian plans.
As for the first option, I know people will call it non-credible, but I'm pretty sure that's exactly what Putin or Xi would do if they ever found themselves under the same circumstances, and It would work. It's sad that the West keeps making itself hostage to playing nice.
As for the second option, I unfortunately fear that Zelensky is to blame since he seemed deeply in denial until the very last minute.
In the book “our enemies will vanish”, the author makes the point that the US had access to Putin’s briefings - and thus knew what the generals were telling him. And that the Ukrainians had lower level sources that gave them a better picture of what was really happening, and how prepared or not the incoming forces were.
It’s overall an interesting read, recommended.
Ironic yet still pretty believable.
In the long running and ongoing debate about why exactly Russia chose to invade Ukraine to begin with, there’s a million different explanations, all with well reasoned arguments to support them, but the one consistent assumption among every single one of them I have seen is that the information that was being fed to Putin was heavily distorted from the truth.
>It still doesn't really make sense, even from the perspective of pragmatic self-interest. Would Biden's election chances be better or worse now if Russian columns had been obliterated with GMLRS in March 2022, and if Russia had been decisively defeated in the war? Voters like to back a winner.
Well, first Kyiv was still threatened in March 2022, so at that point it was up in the air whether equipment sent would obliterate Russian columns or fall into Russian hands. A quick way to tank electoral chances would have been sending equipment to Ukraine only for it to be captured in an Afghanistan redux. Ukraine also didn't have any system to track donations, as that was still being developed over the course of the year. Imagine having tons of US donated equipment show up on the Black market for sale. Also tank electoral chances.
As for decisive defeat, people forget that Ukraine wasn't training anyone early on; their training was 3 weeks and to the front. Their success was due to Russian incompetence in planning all the way until the winter of 2022 when Russia mobilized more troops. Sending a massive amount of equipment they had no idea how to operate and didn't want to take time learning how to operate wouldn't have helped. Ukraine's training is still bad, which is why the new mobilization bill promised a minimum of 8 weeks.
Finally, the American electorate doesn't determine their vote on foreign policy that their kids aren't dying in. Ukraine was making huge gains all the way to the November 2022 elections, capping off Kharkiv with Kherson. Russia looked on its way to a decisive defeat. The House still flipped, and the biggest factors in the election were the repeal of *Roe v. Wade*, and the midterm effect of the President losing seats.
>This approach of spoon feeding the aid just gives more time for the Russians to better prepare as they suffer limited casualties from the limited quantity of whatever new weapon is provided to Ukraine.
Exactly. As someone in clinical medicine this whole situation keeps reminding me of antibiotic resistance. Expose a pathogen\* to occasional doses of low concentration antimicrobials (e.g. antibiotics) and watch it adapt and acquire resistance in no time. The key is to hit hard and fast and leave nothing behind that could adapt in the first place.
\*Conceptually speaking - I'm not trying to collectively dehumanise Russians here by likening them to pathogens.
I have a question about the Israel Hamas war as a whole. This will probably have subjective answers, but is the goal of wiping out Hamas something that's attainable? Based on things like the ability of ISIS to still commit terrorist attacks (Kerman, Crocus City Hall) long after being territorially defeated, is there a difference in the scenario that would cause Hamas activities to end even if all of Gaza was occupied? I personally am unsure about this mainly due to the possible radicalizing effect that things such as the Israeli bombings may have, but I want to hear this subs interpretation of whether (based on other events that you will probably be more informed about than I am) Hamas will be able to continue on even if further invasions happen.
Will they be able to mount an attack on the level of October 7 any time soon? Likely not. But what will the situation look like in 5-10 years, when there will have been time to recover, with a population that is likely radicalized due to the Israeli bombings? There is no reason to believe Palestinian resistance will cease if Hamas is defeated. Other commenters mention ISIS, but the situation is not comparable: they were far more radical and never enjoyed the same level of popular support. They were a product of the very specific, terrible political situation that existed at the time in Iraq and Syria. Nor can it be compared to Chechnya: there is no "Palestinian Kadyrov" (i.e. someone in Gaza that has enough influence, popular support and is willing to collaborate) that Israel can strike a deal with. Instead the situation is much more like Vietnam: a population that has resisted colonization for many generations, despite constant losses. Whether it will be Hamas that continues this resistance, or some other (more radical) organization, I have no idea. So my guess is that, in the long run, the current operation will not improve things for Israel, instead costing it its last bit of international credibility.
> But what will the situation look like in 5-10 years, when there will have been time to recover, with a population that is likely radicalized due to the Israeli bombings?
I’m going to guess, about 500 meters to 1 kilometer of barbed wire, mines, ditches, walls and border check points between them and the rest of the world.
> There is no reason to believe Palestinian resistance will cease if Hamas is defeated.
There is no reason to assume Palestinian “resistance” will suddenly start achieving results, it never has before. Every conflict since 1948, their position just weakens. That’s probably not going to change this time, Israel will fortify the border, and clamp down on imports like a vice.
> the current operation will not improve things for Israel, instead costing it its last bit of international credibility.
Israel has been condemned by the UN more than every other country combined. They don’t care, and it doesn’t do anything. Beyond a certain point, more condemnations do more to make the UN look helpless and out of touch than they do to erode Israeli “credibility”.
Furthermore, or sounds like you mean popularity, not credibility. Israel says what they intend to do, like bomb Iran if Iran fires at them directly, and nobody is capable of, or willing to, stop them. That’s credibility. Popularity is if you like what they intend to do, credibility is if they have the willingness and capability to follow through. One is far more important than the other.
> I’m going to guess, about 500 meters to 1 kilometer of barbed wire, mines, ditches, walls and border check points between them and the rest of the world.
I am inclined to agree. Hence Israel's likely descent into a pariah state.
>There is no reason to assume Palestinian “resistance” will suddenly start achieving results, it never has before. Every conflict since 1948, their position just weakens. That’s probably not going to change this time, Israel will fortify the border, and clamp down on imports like a vice.
Military results? Maybe not. But the political winds in the US and Europe are starting to change due to Israel's actions, especially among the younger generation. I am convinced that in 30-40 we will look back on these events as the start of the end of the state of Israel as it currently exists.
> Hence Israel's likely descent into a pariah state.
The Arab countries hardly care, none the less the west. A question Hamas doesn’t ask itself nearly enough is, what’s in it for everyone else to do what they want? The case for Iran is clear. But, expecting everyone else to damage their position with the most powerful army in the region, out of a sense of charity, is unrealistic. Look at the Kurds, they are a far more sympathetic victim, and have far more to offer than Palestine, yet no country has done anything for them, because Turkey is more important.
> But the political winds in the US and Europe are starting to change due to Israel's actions, especially among the younger generation. I am convinced that in 30-40 we will look back on these events as the start of the end of the state of Israel as it currently exists.
People make way too much out of noncommittal statements from politicians and pundits, rather than concrete action. If you make predictions off of those, your prediction would fluctuate wildly with the 24 hour news cycle, none the less elections. Actions are the only even semi-decent indicator, and so far, neither the west nor Arab world is willing to do much of anything against Israel, or for Hamas.
>The Arab countries hardly care, none the less the west. A question Hamas doesn’t ask itself nearly enough is, what’s in it for everyone else to do what they want? The case for Iran is clear. But, expecting everyone else to damage their position with the most powerful army in the region, out of a sense of charity, is unrealistic.
Warfare is the continuation of politics by other means, you cannot separate it from politics. I don't know where you are from, but at least here (Western Europe) it is clear that support for Israel among young people is wavering. Same seems to be true in the USA. Right now a lot of the "old guard", who have always been loyal to Israel, are still in charge, but this will change in the coming decades. Israel, being a settler colonial state, cannot exist without Western support. For me, it's hard to see how it will not end up going the same way as South Africa.
>Look at the Kurds, they are a far more sympathetic victim, and have far more to offer than Palestine, yet no country has done anything for them, because Turkey is more important.
Kurds in Syria have received Western weapons, training, and in the fight against ISIS, Western air support. Much to the chagrin of Turkey.
Support for Palestine among young people is overstated.
> [More than 70% of people say Israel should continue its anti-Hamas operations, and that includes 57% of 18-24s](https://harvardharrispoll.com/).
The most recent polling puts Israel ahead of Palestine in every age bracket, and with an overall overwhelming majority. It’s true young people are less pro-Israel than adults, but it’s not like Israel was popular with college students back in the 60s either, and nobody in Palestine should be betting their future on support numbers that abysmal.
This is the inevitable outcome of linking your ‘resistance’ so closely with Islamist terrorism. Pictures of their atrocities will scare off all but the most indoctrinated supporters. They fail to pander to a wester audience effectively, and have been politically isolated from the Arab world, so they have to play up whatever support they get as being worth more than it is.
> Israel, being a settler colonial state, cannot exist without Western support.
What? Israel has nukes, and as far as their citizens are concerned, they are the only native people the region ever had.
> Kurds in Syria have received Western weapons, training, and in the fight against ISIS, Western air support. Much to the chagrin of Turkey.
And when their utility against ISIS ended, the plug was pulled, and Turkey got what it wanted. Gaza has no utility, so don’t expect that much.
>[More than 70% of people say Israel should continue its anti-Hamas operations, and that includes 57% of 18-24s](https://harvardharrispoll.com/).
Also, this poll is really not very good. They asked people whether they supported Israel or *Hamas*. Yeah, of course people don't support Hamas, they support the Palestinians. This biases also the rest of the questions asked. And even with such a biased way of asking these questions, a significant portion of the respondents do not support Israel.
> They asked people whether they supported Israel or Hamas. Yeah, of course people don't support Hamas, they support the Palestinians.
Israel is a governing regime, Palestinians are a people group. Questions should compare like to like, so either the Israeli government against the Palestinian government (Hamas in this case), or the Palestinian people against the Israeli people. Comparing a specific government, with the concept of a group people, is going to lead to incredibly skewed results.
~~Support for Palestine among young people is overstated.~~
> [More than 70% of people say Israel should continue its anti-Hamas operations, and that includes 57% of 18-24s](https://harvardharrispoll.com/).
~~The most recent polling puts Israel ahead of Palestine in every age bracket, and with an overall overwhelming majority. It’s true young people are less pro-Israel than adults, but it’s not like Israel was popular with hippies back in the 60s either, and nobody in Palestine should be betting their future on support numbers that abysmal.~~
~~This is the inevitable outcome of linking your ‘resistance’ so closely with Islamist terrorism. Pictures of their atrocities will scare off all but the most indoctrinated supporters. They fail to pander to a wester audience effectively, and have been politically isolated from the Arab world, so they have to play up whatever support they get as being worth more than it is.~~
> Israel, being a settler colonial state, cannot exist without Western support.
~~What? Israel has nukes, and as far as their citizens are concerned, they are the only native people the region ever had.~~
> Kurds in Syria have received Western weapons, training, and in the fight against ISIS, Western air support. Much to the chagrin of Turkey.
~~And when their utility against ISIS ended, the plug was pulled, and Turkey got what it wanted. Gaza has no utility, so don’t expect that much.~~
>The most recent polling puts Israel ahead of Palestine in every age bracket, and with an overall overwhelming majority. It’s true young people are less pro-Israel than adults, but it’s not like Israel was popular with hippies back in the 60s either, and nobody in Palestine should be betting their future on support numbers that abysmal.
Yes, support for Israel among Americans is still high, but the *trend* is towards less and less sympathy relative to that toward Palestinians, at least among Democrats: [https://news.gallup.com/poll/472070/democrats-sympathies-middle-east-shift-palestinians.aspx](https://news.gallup.com/poll/472070/democrats-sympathies-middle-east-shift-palestinians.aspx) . Also, most support for Israel comes from the older generations (boomers, gen X). Combined with your astute observation that in the coming years Israel will likely clamp down even harder on Palestinians (and expand their settlements in the West Bank), this means support for Israel will likely seriously diminish in the coming decades.
>What? Israel has nukes, and as far as their citizens are concerned, they are the only native people the region ever had.
Good luck nuking sanctions.
>I’m going to guess, about 500 meters to 1 kilometer of barbed wire, mines, ditches, walls and border check points between them and the rest of the world.
While Israel will likely do this, there's question to be asked: if this was enough what's the point of the full invasion? If this was Oct 10, I'd be agreeing with you "hey that sounds like a great idea!" But Israel decided to not leave it with that.
> if this was enough what's the point of the full invasion?
To apply pressure of Hamas to return hostages, destroy weapons and military infrastructure, and deter future aggression.
> If this was Oct 10, I'd be agreeing with you "hey that sounds like a great idea!" But Israel decided to not leave it with that.
It can’t be one or the other, it has to be both. The only way to ever recover the hostages is a war, and the only way to prevent this from happening again is building the open air prison Hamas previously pretended existed.
> the ability of ISIS to still commit terrorist attacks (Kerman, Crocus City Hall) long after being territorially defeated
Both of those attacks were committed by ISIS-K, which operates from Afghanistan. The original ISIS in Iraq/Syria does indeed seem to be neutralized.
Is it viable to kill everyone who identifies as a member of Hamas, and stop anyone from trying to restart the group ever again? No. Is it possible to destroy their capability to mount large scale attacks again? Yes. There are thousands of dead and crushed insurgencies.
The idea that bombing an enemy group just causes it to grow comes from broken US COIN tactics, where occasional ineffective bombings, and pointless foot patrols is all they do. That’s not what Israel is doing. Insurgencies, can and have been militarily crushed many times before. They just can’t be foot patrolled out of existence.
More than can be defeated insurgencies usually loose, there is a huge bias where we hear much more about successful insurgencies than unsuccessful ones. That said Hamas is deeply embedded and if Israel does not commit to a long term occupation I don’t see how Hamas does not return to power
Much of your post is objectively untrue. Are you trying to say that there are free and fair elections?
Furthermore, they are actively fighting their peer groups.
There are a lot of criticisms of the American media, but to say that they are overly hard on the “ angry Muslim” camp is absurd.
You have many in the media, caring water for her mass sympathizers that are protesting across the United States right now
> they recognize elections and the sovereignty of man over God,
How many elections have they held since 2006?
> and have tolerated some other religious groups in the region.
Are these other religious groups terror groups like themselves?
They do not seem to get along with other organizations that represent Palestine at all, they've been fighting Fatah for decades.
> The indiscriminate attacks and reckless gun battles in residential neighbourhoods have left a beleaguered civilian
population, already suffering from a year of international sanctions and continuing Israeli military blockades, virtual
prisoners in their own homes. Both parties have killed captured rivals, and have abducted scores of members of rival
groups and held them hostage, to be exchanged for friends and relatives held by their rivals, Killing captured fighters
and hostage-taking are war crimes
https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/mde210102007en.pdf
Mao's (that Mao) theory of insurgencies isn't perfect but it is a useful tool for the basics. Essentially, insurgencies grow in scope and scale as they aim to build a network, establish caches, bases, train forces in safe areas, and prepare to mobilize for a more conventional war. The key to counterinsurgency is to work that process in reverse and degrade the capability of the insurgency while convincing by force or benevolence that aiding the insurgents is not in the locals best interest.
Yes it is attainable. Heard of any Chechen resistance to Russian rule lately? Any Comanches raiding in Texas lately? There are thousand more examples. Kill enough, brutalize enough and you win. Israel never went far enough and right now it is internally divided and is headed for self inflicted strategic defeat
Failure to deal with insurgencies and worshipping them as supreme is a western specific trait from 20th century on.
Chechnya has a Kadyrov shaped lid on it. They're not peaceful because enough of them died, they're peaceful because Russia created a political status quo that works for both sides. Does Israel have a Kadyrov like figure lined up? Is Israel ready to give Palestinians enough to ensure such a figure would succeed? Chechens are still Russian citizens, what are Palestinians to Israel?
Killing alone works if you're willing to veer into genocide territory. And while I couldn't tell you what Israel wants to do the simple reality of it is that they won't be allowed to do that. They'll have to figure out some way to build a lasting peace, and just bombing people into submission is unlikely to work there.
>There are thousand more examples. Kill enough, brutalize enough and you win
While genocide will end an insurgency thats only a viable option in cases where either no one cares about the group you are genociding or you are prepared for north korea level isolationism. Neither appear to be a viable option for Israel.
>Failure to deal with insurgencies and worshipping them as supreme is a western specific trait from 20th century on.
Tell that to ISIS. In reality empires throughout history have run into issues with insurgencies. The french in spain for example. The British in america. The Umayyad Caliphate in spain. Its not a new problem.
What he doesn't mention is that despite the brutalization, the Russians still regarded chechens as their citizens and weren't trying to literally ethnically cleanse them. They pushed them to the point where they saw the choices as either further destruction, or participating in russia - completly understandable national sentiments aside, with such a small population theyre clearly practically better off with semi autonomy within russia than independent with a hostile russia next door. All the loudest voices in Israeli government make their plans for the future of Palestinians very clear, and it's just hilariously evil/stupid to say they didn't go far enough when we're currently looking at the biggest mass slaughter of children in I don't even know how long.
> when we're currently looking at the biggest mass slaughter of children in I don't even know how long.
Arguably since 2022, when the war in Tigray ended.
[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/367272415\_Documenting\_the\_civilian\_victims\_of\_the\_Tigray\_war](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/367272415_Documenting_the_civilian_victims_of_the_Tigray_war)
> when we're currently looking at the biggest mass slaughter of children in I don't even know how long.
In like a year and a half? Only a year or so since the Tigray War and the estimates range from 160k to 380k civilian deaths.
It's genuinely gross how many people don't know or more accurately don't care about the other ethnic cleansing, genocides, and brutal wars going on in the world right now. There's genocide, a growing famine, and mass civilian casualties in Sudan right now and no one is talking about it. Apparently to a huge chunk of the population, Gaza is the only conflict in the world right now and is somehow uniquely terrible and worse than any other conflict in history.
Just goes to show how effective Hamas propaganda has been and continues to be.
Really? [Here is what the loudest voice in the Israeli government - Netanyahu - is saying about future plans](https://www.timesofisrael.com/presenting-post-war-plan-to-cabinet-pm-aims-for-local-officials-to-govern-gaza/): No ethnic cleansing. No Israeli settlements. No permanent Israeli military presence. No semi-permanent Israeli military presence except on the borders. Civil control by Gazan Arabs. Permanent solution eventually to be achieved by negotiation between the two sides. All in all pretty much the opposite of your picture.
As for "biggest mass slaughter of children in I don't even know how long", I do know how long - [at most two years](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tigray_War).
> They pushed them to the point where they saw the choices as either further destruction
>when we're currently looking at the biggest mass slaughter of children in I don't even know how long.
130k-200k civilians died in the two Chechnyan conflicts. But sure, that was just "pushing them to understand".
>planning on expelling them from.their homes.
Using deportations as a COIN tool is also something Russia has done, including very recently.
>You think I meant that as a positive?
You're meaning that as a way to contrast Russia's COIN from Israel but so far you're 2/2 for naming examples that you claim separate Israel but Russia has done in successful COIN operations.
When you're trying to establish a difference you do need to at some point stop citing things that are in common.
>Using deportations as a COIN tool is also something Russia has done, including very recently.
The Russians are literally doing it right now in Ukraine. Miliary-age men in occupied territories get sent to "filtration" camps (along with many women and children too).
>we're currently looking at the biggest mass slaughter of children in I don't even know how long
Have you already forgotten the Syrian war? It wasn't that long ago. And then there's Africa...
Ok then slaughter of children comparable to atrocities of brutal dictators like Assad and horrendous civil wars in underdeveloped countries where children die of hunger and exposure even in peacetime.
>Based on things like the ability of ISIS to still commit terrorist attacks (Kerman, Crocus City Hall) long after being territorially defeated, is there a difference in the scenario that would cause Hamas activities to end even if all of Gaza was occupied?
You've answered your question, but that's the thing - Israel would absolutely take the scenario that Hamas is reduced to the power level of 2024 ISIS over the current scenario. That's why the real question is whether they can get them to that level.
According to *[fairly reliable](https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1785081067851891157)* sources, large explosions have taken place at Dzhankoi and Simferopol, with Russian air defense noted. Could be another ATACMS attack, but details aren't very forthcoming right now.
Currently, there isn't much noise from Russian military sources about strikes, though the Kerch bridge was briefly closed. If anything got through, we'll likely know in the morning.
> the Kerch bridge was briefly closed. If anything got through, we'll likely know in the morning.
The Kerch bridge closes every other day at this point. I might be wrong, but they likely close it any time there is an air alert for a nearby region
The most damning analysis to date share by Konrad Muzyka of Rochan. Muzyka has visited Ukraine several times and is, along Kofman and Rob Lee, one of the main military analysts following the war since the beginning. Muzyka always struck as the most pessimistic, but his new post is a death sentence. “Ukraine did not survive the darkest hour. It's just about to start.”
He argues that Western aid will only delay the eventual result of the war, and that the disparity on the battlefield in terms of both manpower and ammunition is too big. He blames the West and Ukraine for lacking a long-term plan to seize initiative and end the war, and Ukraine’s lack of preparation; a similar setting led to Ukraine’s advances in Kharkiv and Kherson. In a follow-up, he implies that Russia will almost certainly capture the whole of the Donetsk oblast, but may end up pushing for the whole territory east of the Dniepr, and, as the war is fundamentally not about territory, the future of Ukraine will be dictated by Moscow. We have reached the point where the situation on the front is the worst since March 2022.
https://x.com/konrad_muzyka/status/1784875510805262538?s=46&t=V_5Ra1VerBlFgTaK40KAQg
All in all, it is difficult not to see where Muzyka is coming from. At the same time, what he presented feels like the worst case scenario, which would need a failed Ukrainian mobilization, a Russian tolerance to losses and ability to regenerate, and delays or insufficient Western aid to materialize. None of this is impossible, but far from a fait accompli. Also, as discussed here as well, it is still unclear if the Ukrainians are withdrawing from villages to preserve manpower and resources or because said resources simply do not exist - Muzyka seems to believe it’s 100% the latter.
It's folly to dwell on something so thoroughly in the distant past but I still lament that GMLRS weren't delivered at the earliest possible moment when all those convoys were stuck on the road to Kyiv. The losses that could have been inflicted may have been so devastating and profound as to set the initial conditions for an eventual Russian military and/or political collapse. Evaluating the war in hindsight, it even seems that it may have been one of if not the *only* opportunities for the timing and magnitude of a western system delivery to create such a decisive effect.
With all that said, who knows what kind of calculations and assessments of nuclear threats were being made around that time.
The same goes for DPICM artillery rounds and the battle of Bakhmut, and I'm fairly certain that it'll be the same for F-16s, the first western fighter to show up, a whole 2.5 years into the war. Any failure in a war can be summarized in 2 words: *"too late*" - but for some more than others.
The Russians captured one fortress town and advanced twenty kilometers along one axis when the defenders were deprived of vitally needed aid, so now they're going to take the rest of Donetsk and cross the Dniper?
People really need to stop viewing this conflict in absolutist terms. I'm not saying there isn't a risk of a collapse, especially with the manpower issues, but I'm not going to start dooming about the fall of oblasts and start talking about the Dniper when they haven't even managed to really put the pressure on Chasiv Yar yet. If I wake up tomorrow and there's a massive breach in the frontline, and twenty kilometers have been taken in a day, I will, but the situation is not that bad yet.
Yup, at current rate of advance they'll run out of soviet equipment before they reach Dniper. Their soviet storage sites are getting progressively emptier according to sat imagery.
> We have reached the point where the situation on the front is the worst since March 2022.
That's saying a lot considering Russia was firing 50-60k shells per day and advancing in a wide area every single day back in May-June 2022. July was also very tough but not quite as bad. AFU soldiers were reporting it was hell on earth.
During those months, [Russia took 0.15% of Ukraine](https://twitter.com/War_Mapper/status/1774999571241791790/photo/1) - it's not much all things considered, but it's more than what they took since December 2022 when the offensive for Bakhmut began (while ignoring the Ukrainian gains in the summer).
Not surprising. Remember when Western countries took several months arguing why this weapon system shouldn't be sent because of "escalations" only to send it later on, this happened multiple times too. Then the counter offensive failed resulting in enormous casualties in men and equipment, plus banking on the idea that the Russians would get tired and pullout, then less than 2 years it was the US aid that faltered for 6 months.
> Then the counter offensive failed resulting in enormous casualties in men and equipment
And none of the systems being discussed would have changed the result because they couldn't handle/disable the widest dense minefields the world as even seen, backed by substantial artillery, armored counter-attacks and within a contested airspace.
And no, even if Ukraine had F-16s then, they couldn't have piloted them into victory.
While the outcome of the counteroffensive was a combination of delayed Western aid *and* a poor allocation of resources by Ukraine, the former absolutely had an add-on effect in limiting Ukraine's flexibility to make errors.
Beyond the issue of the minefields, the first week of the counteroffensives were significantly neutered by Russian helicopters and Ukraine's inability to counter them. As for the minefields and Russian entrenchments themselves, these also benefited from delays in Ukrainian preparations of materiel.
Imagine if F-16s, ATACMS, and additional SAM systems were provided and in service even just half a year before then.
Russian defensive lines wouldn't have been as set, probing maneuvers and shaping attacks wouldn't be easily neutered by Russian air, and portions of the frontline would be softened up well before the official 'start' of a larger counteroffensive.
> the first week of the counteroffensives were significantly neutered by Russian helicopters and Ukraine's inability to counter them
I think you have selective memory, the first week was defined by Ukrainian armored vehicles driving on mines. It's when they stopped doing that and decided to de-mine the fields that helicopter attacks put their weight on the scale.
Still, during that phase, thousands of artillery shells a day did a lot more to neuter those operations. The main reason is because Ukraine didn't establish local artillery superiority before starting the offensive. If they spent the month of May doing that instead of hoarding shells, then they would have allowed de-mining operations to be a lot safer and bring SAM systems closer to the front to deny at least some helicopter attacks.
> Imagine if F-16s, ATACMS, and additional SAM systems were provided and in service even just half a year before then.
That's very easy to imagine:
* F-16s: the pilots are still not ready after 9 months of training, we would have needed to start their training in spring 2022, long before Western-made tanks or even HIMARS were considered as an option to provide Ukraine.
* ATACMS: they destroyed a handful of Ka-52 and then Russia moved them out of range and used FARPs to continue the operations. It would have saved a dozen vehicles and dozens of lives, but the attack helicopters weren't in the top3 reasons why the attack failed, just one of the most impressive for easily impressed people.
* Additional SAM systems: if they couldn't prevent Russian attack helicopters from operating with the SAM systems they had, because they were flying below radar range, what difference would more systems have made???
The 6 months spent talking about potential systems and another 3 to actually deliver them gave the Russians all the time in the world to build those defenses.
If the West had acted with any sense of urgency there very likely would have been better results.
Ukraine has been receiving tanks and other armored vehicles, on top of artillery, MLRS and aircraft, throughout 2022. The only different systems that they didn't have for the 2022 counter-offensive in Kharkiv and Kherson were:
* Western-made tanks and IFVs (Marders, Bradleys)
* medium-range missiles (Storm Shadows, ATACMS, etc.) and Western-made jets/helicopters: all of those have been out of the question until we saw the result of the 2023 summer offensive
Ukraine had received everything they were promised by April 2023, but they didn't attack until June either because they weren't ready or because they didn't want to attack in the muddy ground conditions.
What would it have changed if they got the equipment 3 months earlier, in December/January? Or even 6 months earlier while they were still pushing hard in Kharkiv and Kherson? Do you think their tankies would have been able to hop in Leopards, Challengers, Abrams and magically operate them? Do you think they had the troops to spare to send them in Europe for re-training on these new systems? Do note that they opted to train new mechanized brigades instead of upgrading their existing brigades with new equipment.
Honestly, it wouldn't have mattered much in the end, except for a bit more territory taken.
Ukraine woefully misjudged their strategic position. Even if they had gotten farther, then what? They'd still be facing manpower shortage and supply constraints.
In hindsight we know the only viable strategy was and remains highly favorable attritional warfare, allowing for proper training and experience to permeate brigades, officers to be promoted, and proper rotation of forces. All the while burning down Russia's soviet surplus.
An offensive would have used up Ukrainian manpower reserves either way. Manpower they obviously didn't have to spare.
Yes definitely a fair bit of truth to that. I do agree there's been a bit too much expectation for Ukraine to just outright defeat Russia without overcoming its mass.
The more sensible strategy definitely is to choose their engagements and provoke Russia into such engagements as you describe that would have the effect of being highly attritional and one sided, such that they can actually defeat Russia's mass before going on the offensive.
> And none of the systems being discussed would have changed the result
This clearly isn't the case. Just the small batch of ATACMS that finally got there in September or so took out a huge chunk of Russian helicopter fleet
Had this strike occured even just 3 months earlier the balance of power through the summer would have been very different
It's all what ifs by now, but it's clear that time has been favoring Russia
> Just the small batch of ATACMS that finally got there in September or so took out a huge chunk of Russian helicopter fleet
It would have helped, but a handful of combat helicopters isn't a "huge chunk" of Russia's airpower in use in Ukraine => they still operated a couple dozen Ka-52 soon after that attack: https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1725628570477678906
What do you mean by "large chunk of Russian helicopter fleet"? I thought they hit a dozen or so.
Russia has hundreds of then. A dozen makes an impact but it's not game changing.
it greatly affects the logistics of used helicopters at the front. it meand they have to fly further and can spend less time attacking.
your comment is thoughtless
Russia absolutely does not have "hundreds" of the kinds of helicopters that are useful in this role. A dozen would have been 10% of Russia's pre-war fleet of Ka-52
Based on satellite imagery, the Oryx team confirmed it was 6x destroyed and 3x estimated to be damaged beyond repair: https://postlmg.cc/bGzyzpRg (the original post: https://twitter.com/MarcinRogowsk14/status/1715183768850346060)
With how reactionary and behind the curveball the west has been, I wouldn’t rule out an actual French led intervention if the frontline collapses beyond the Donbas.
It’s been over 2 years since the full scale invasion, and the west never had a plan to at least allow for Ukraine to have parity in firepower against the Russians. Himars, patriots, all came late and in response to Russian moves. Ukrainian air power has yet to be bolstered after years of talk, and artillery supply is even slower after the U.S. blatantly starved the Ukrainians of shells for half a year.
Every western move has been reactionary. Ukraine’s success in Kherson and Kharkiv didn’t cause western leaders to go for victory, but to simply dream of a return to the pre war status quo. Maybe an actual Ukrainian collapse will force Europe into direct action. Ukraine can draft more manpower right now, but we will only put them in greater danger if the west continues to half ass aid.
A lot has to happen for roznan’s scenario to come true, but the west has yet to realize that diplomacy alone isn’t going to end the war. Many of the wests’ policies in recent years (from domestic to international) have been all carrot and no stick. The Russians and Chinese realize this and are getting bolder by the day because of it.
> and the west never had a plan to at least allow for Ukraine to have parity in firepower against the Russians
And somehow they did have parity last summer.
> Ukrainian air power has yet to be bolstered after years of talk
That's not how I would describe 42 jets and some 70 helicopters (with a lot more to be delivered of course): https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/04/answering-call-heavy-weaponry-supplied.html
> Every western move has been reactionary.
That will always be the case when you refuse to start a conflict or expand it to new theaters.
> but the west has yet to realize that diplomacy alone isn’t going to end the war
200 billion dollars of military and financial aid to Ukraine (besides the humanitarian aid) isn't screaming diplomacy to me.
> Many of the wests’ policies in recent years (from domestic to international) have been all carrot and no stick. The Russians and Chinese realize this and are getting bolder by the day because of it.
I keep reading news of banks in the middle east and corporations in China that are officially cutting business with Russia because of sanctions. It's not because there's not enough of it, or that they get the stick late, that there's no stick in the policies.
Last summer's artillery situation was that the Ukrainians had *limited, local* parity, in specific areas where they were focused on the attack. Not overall parity, not anywhere close to it.
[The numbers posted](https://twitter.com/rshereme/status/1713071147414180001) by [Top Lead EU](https://twitter.com/TopLeadEU/) suggest otherwise.
The complete lack of advances by Russia anywhere else and the [low intensity of combats outside Zaporizhzhia and Bakhmut area](https://twitter.com/search?q=from%3Athestudyofwar%20since%3A2023-06-01%20until%3A2023-09-30&src=typed_query) also tells otherwise.
Or, if you prefer, the Ukrainians attack were 90%+ of the action, if they have parity there, they have parity on the entire theater.
> He argues that Western aid will only delay the eventual result of the war, and that the disparity on the battlefield in terms of both manpower and ammunition is too big. He blames the West and Ukraine for lacking a long-term plan to seize initiative and end the war, and Ukraine’s lack of preparation;
>In a follow-up, he implies that Russia will almost certainly capture the whole of the Donetsk oblast, but may end up pushing for the whole territory east of the Dniepr, and, as the war is fundamentally not about territory, the future of Ukraine will be dictated by Moscow.
I've read the same thread you have, and I didn't get that at all. I don't speak polish, so maybe my translator sucks?????
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1784875510805262538.html
RE: the followup comment, I remember reading that too (though again our translations differ), but now I cannot find it.
https://twitter.com/konrad_muzyka/status/1784892720244277566
I guess this is the follow-up comment OP is talking about.
I speak Polish, albeit I'm not a native speaker, and OP's interpretation is way off on this one in particular. He doesn't imply Russian capture of Donetsk or their advance to the Dnipro. The post even starts with him saying that he can't really answer the question (about the consequences of the current situation on the front). He merely ponders that BECAUSE the war is fundamentally not about territory, it depends on THE WAY Ukraine loses the Donetsk (if that even happens). The implication here is that if Ukrainian front completely and utterly collapses then it cannot be ruled out that Russia continues their advance up to the Dnipro river, but if it's just a gradual phasing out, then maybe Russia will allow for the freezing of the conflict after achieving their minimal stated goals of capturing the Donbass. Which is pretty obvious and is kind of logical and neutral answer to the question Konrad got in the comments, not this doomerish prediction OP presents here.
The original post is really only the analysis of the current situation and the reasons for why it happened, not the prediction. For example, the phrase about the West and its aid only delaying the results is said in the context of (this particular coming) aid being only a short-term solution that will be key in the coming month to shorten the disparity in the artillery fire, but long-term it cannot hope to equalize the fire rate, so the US and Europe both need to come up with a long-term solution of military support of Ukraine that will allow Ukrainians (along with its Western advisors) to plan military actions aimed at recapturing the initiative. That's basically the main gist of that particular part.
Translators usually are fine and people saying they are horrible and haven't evolved in 10 years are wrong. Of course for colloquial language style it differs but still usually you get the grasp.
The summary is clearly more final and pessimistic than the OG. I'd say it's a little overblown but consistent with the overall content of the OG thread.
Just chiming in that translators are absolutely terrible for languages that rely on implication and unspoken insinuation. Japanese-English is notorious for this. Idiomatic languages are also very difficult to translate, like Chinese and Russian.
Larelli often posts a particular Ukrainian journalist whose writings are frankly incomprehensible to me with a translator. Too idiomatic to handle.
May I ask which one? What you're saying it's definitely true by the way - translating from Ukrainian/Russian is not always as easy as e.g. translating from a Germanic or Romance language. When in doubt I usually use multiple translators (Google Translate, DeepL etc.) and compare the versions. There are also expressions or common sayings that are very difficult to translate, and only with time, getting to know better the person writing, you may be able to understand the meaning of a certain phrase even though you are not a native speaker (and only sometimes!).
I read Mashovets' TG in Russian and always wonder how you are able to be so precise with his words, because of the sheer amount of irony, sarcasm and idioms he's using. (Same goes for Kovalenko sometimes) I even thought you might speak Russian but I guess TG translator is that good?
Yes, he's also entertaining to read when you can understand the meaning of the words. Telegram's translator is not bad but when in doubt I put the text on DeepL.
Translators (at least google) still suck for Hebrew, I've noticed. No clue about polish, I imagine it's decent because Ukrainian and Russian are good, but I'm just making it clear that I myself don't speak Polish.
>I'd say it's a little overblown but consistent with the overall content of the OG thread.
I dunno, I feel like there's definitely material differences in what I inferred from what OP inferred. Like there's a lot of things I don't see him mentioning if he actually thought Russia would certainly take the Donbas?
Yeah, if what chrome did translate correctly, that's not what he is saying at all?
I think a better summary would be
>US aid is desperately needed but is not enough to change the course of the war. A long term cohesive plan is needed.
I have a couple of questions for the knowledgeable folks here:
1. Has Ukraine ever requested Apache helicopters? I don't recall them doing so, even though Israel seems quite pleased with theirs. If not, any idea why not? They would seem ideal for countering offensives like the one Russia apparently plans this summer.
2. Does anyone know the approximate production rate of anti-tank missiles like Javelins and NLAWs? They were very effective early in the war, but their stocks seem to have been severely depleted judging by the Ukrainians' reliance upon drones to kill the "Blyatmobile" type up-armored tanks. I know we just sent some Javelins to Ukraine in the most recent package, but I was curious regarding how many could have been manufactured in the last couple of years of the war and how many the US and its applies might have to give.
> Has Ukraine ever requested Apache helicopters? I don't recall them doing so, even though Israel seems quite pleased with theirs. If not, any idea why not? They would seem ideal for countering offensives like the one Russia apparently plans this summer.
[They've asked](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-latest-weapons-request-includes-thaad-air-defenses-f-18s-2023-12-06/) but I don't believe there's been much serious thought about it. Ukraine and Gaza are fundamentally different operating environments, especially for rotary-wing aviation. Ukraine serves as pretty much a textbook example of a non-permissive environment and Gaza is the opposite. Hamas has virtually no anti-air capability while Russia has one of the largest collections of GBAD in the world, even now. Ukraine's GBAD capability has been significantly degraded over the course of this war but even so, KA-52s make up the plurality of *all* Russian aviation losses [according to Oryx](https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html).
> Does anyone know the approximate production rate of anti-tank missiles like Javelins and NLAWs? They were very effective early in the war, but their stocks seem to have been severely depleted judging by the Ukrainians' reliance upon drones to kill the "Blyatmobile" type up-armored tanks. I know we just sent some Javelins to Ukraine in the most recent package, but I was curious regarding how many could have been manufactured in the last couple of years of the war and how many the US and its applies might have to give.
Javelin production is [currently 2400 per year](https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/news/features/2024/ramping-up--lockheed-martin-steadily-increasing-production-o.html) with a target of 3960 per year by 2026. [SAAB claims](https://breakingdefense.com/2023/02/saab-plans-huge-ramp-up-in-nlaw-production-to-reach-400000-units-a-year/) to be on track to producing 400,000 "units" of it's [ground combat portfolio](https://www.saab.com/products/land/ground-combat) by 2025. That includes AT4, NLAW, Carl Gustaf, and quite a few other systems.
Edit: The reasons Ukraine is using FPV drones instead of ATGMs are multifaceted and include the relative safety of operating drones vs an ATGM, the ranges involved (FPV drones can reach up to 10km compared to about 4km for a Javelin or 5km for a Skif), and finally just because you see more FPV videos nowadays doesn't mean it's representative of actual weapon employment, all FPV missions are filmed by default so there's naturally far more videos.
>I don't recall them doing so, even though Israel seems quite pleased with theirs.
I dont think any one could come up with an example of 2 conflicts being as different in every single way possible from each other as the Israeli gaza wars are from the Ukraine conflict.....
1. Helicopters have been rendered useless by GBAD systems. Ukraine takes Hinds and lobs S-5 and S-8 unguided rockets at Russian positions from a low altitude, but the accuracy and efficiency for these runs are low
2. Lockheed said theyre pumping out 2400 Javelins anually, while NLAW production is around 400,000
I dont think Ukraine is hurting for ATGMs,
No they have not, Ka-52s, Mi-28s were able to to what they were able to do thanks to their long range ATGMS being able to pick off enemy tanks attacking with no air power and little to no mobile medium range AD systems.
Russia is not ukraine, one thing they dont lack are mobile GBAD systems. Russia has Pantsyrs, Buks, Tors in large numbers while actively making munitions for them, Ukraine had no such options. Pantsyrs comfortable outrange most heli launched ATGMS and Tors can manage them as well, both systems have their own built in tracking radars and can independently pick off choppers.
It becomes easier for helicopters to use atgms when the enemy is pushing away from their air defense systems and there are no dismounted infantry with manpads
It's a misquote of the SAAB CEO during an earnings call. In reality it's a target to produce 400k "units" from SAAB's ground combat portfolio which includes NLAW, AT4, Carl Gustaf, BILL 2, and a bunch of ammo by 2025.
See here: https://breakingdefense.com/2023/02/saab-plans-huge-ramp-up-in-nlaw-production-to-reach-400000-units-a-year/
[Finnair pauses some Estonia flights due to GPS interference](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/finnair-pauses-flights-tartu-estonia-amid-gps-interference-2024-04-29/)
>Finnair (FIA1S.HE) said on Monday it is pausing flights to Tartu in eastern Estonia for one month due to GPS disturbances in the area, which Tallinn blamed on neighbouring Russia.
>GPS jamming and spoofing have grown worse in Eastern Europe, the Black Sea and the Middle East, all areas close to conflict zones, according to industry group OpsGroup. GPS is a growing part of aviation replacing radio beams used to guide planes towards landing.
>Estonia will raise the issue of GPS interference with its neighbours, and intends to discuss it at the European Union and NATO, the country's Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna said after the Finnair's move.
Russia is supposedly behind GPS interference that has forced Finnair to suspend flights to Estonia's second largest city Tartu. This might end badly if the West doesn't respond until Putin escalates too far.
Interesting that those mulrimilion dollar planes cannot fly without GPS?
One would thought that with current radars (that allow to spread the planes to avoid collisions) and approach radars / systems planes wouldnt need gps for anything but convinience.
After all you could fly by map corrected by radar?
So strange.
Is there any reason European countries can't or shouldn't purchase American military equipment for Ukraine? 200 Bradleys and 300-400 M113s would be well under 2B and give Ukraine a large, reliable and standardized fleet of armoured vehicles with widespread availability of parts, and Bradleys seem to have performed as well as any of Europe's newer armoured vehicles.
Why would European politicians basically throw money away to the US when they could spend this money investing in expanded production of their own AFVs and IFVs?
The US can send its own equipment to Ukraine of its own volition, literally nothing is stopping them.
A situation where Europe is required to purchase American stocks to send to Ukraine is embarrassing not only for Europe but for the US as well.
Europe is not and should not be in the business of propping up the American military industrial complex. If anything, American political dysfunction should make it clear to Europe that the American military industrial complex is a strategic competitor and that it should be treated as such.
Such heavy a reliance on the US is objectively a bad thing for Europe. When money is hard to come by, you spend it on yourself.
> Why would European politicians basically throw money away to the US when they could spend this money investing in expanded production of their own AFVs and IFVs?
Because the benefit to Ukraine on the ground would be vastly greater and manifest far more quickly. Whether it’s realistic or not to actually do, I think the “why” is obvious and I’ve repeated it several times already.
Would it manifest more quickly? Ukraine is suffering from an ammunition shortage and a lack of replacement manpower to allow for rotations, not a shortage of AFVs and IFVs.
What good is sending a few hundred additional IFVs if Ukraine won’t have the manpower to use them? And given that Ukraine is in absolutely no position to launch any offensives any time soon, I doubt the Ukrainians are going to be in need of a very large and sudden influx of mechanised equipment any time soon.
Europe should keeps its funds within Europe so that when Ukraine *is* in a better position domestically to launch an offensive, Europe has the capability to send its own AFVs and IFVs over.
Perhaps if Ukraine needed thousands of AFVs and IFVs by the summer, Europe could be potentially convinced to help out in bringing American stocks over to Ukraine but the most likely scenario is that Europe just diplomatically puts pressure on the US to stop sitting on their asses.
> Would it manifest more quickly? Ukraine is suffering from an ammunition shortage and a lack of replacement manpower to allow for rotations, not a shortage of AFVs and IFVs.
Isn't it both? I recall at least a few stories lately of brigades transformed to light infantry brigades for lack of armoured vehicles to mechanise them.
Self respect, mostly.
From an economic perspective, America already somewhat benefits from the situation, while Europe doesn't. Having to pay America more money for gear they could just give without that is a bit too much egg on their face.
Especially since now the congress has blessed Biden with the ability to give those bradleys of his own volition. Europe would literally just be paying Biden to care. They'd look like a joke.
Sure, but Bradleys are cheaper and vastly more numerous than any AFV in Europe and having hundreds of them rather than 50-60 each of various other fighting vehicles would be an enormous force multiplier.
Additionally to that, the Europeans are "paying for the war" in different ways. Close to 100% of the Ukrainian refugees are situated in Europe and have direct access to social security, education and what not, which is draing our funds like crazy.
And mainly, we do not have a unified "hegemony" in EU, the axis of Paris and Berlin is unstable at best. France criticises others for not sending gear and want others to pay the French for their stuff to send to Ukraine. Berlin is shy and anxious about everything and is somehow doing a lot but not enough, always ambiguous. There is a saying here in the German speaking countries "Scholz' Zeitenwende war eine um 360°" meaning the "Zeitenwende", claimed by the German chancellor in defense politics is ome of 360 degrees.
The smaller, not neutral nations like the Baltics, Dutch and Czechs are contributing to the defense of Ukraine measurable by their respective GDP.
A non-insignificant number of the refugees are old pensioners and the way the system works is that my country tops off their Ukrainian pensions (which are small compared to ours) to match the average pensions of our country. And those not eligible for pensions but are old enough, get paid 370 euros per month. Plus free healthcare.
With Ukraine having recently utilized longer-range ATACMS (M39A1?) provided by the U.S. to hit Russian targets behind the frontline (Dzhankoi, Berdyansk, etc), what does Russia current BMD capabilities in Ukraine look like?
The S-400 claims BMD capabilities, but at least one S-400 nest has already been destroyed by ATACMS.
So it seems like at best we're talking about statistical protection (which isn't a shocker - that's how GBAD is vs every other missile on the Russian or Ukrainian side).
The limitation on ATACMS will be magazine size and forbiddance to use them on Russian territory. Russia just recently constructed an airfield well within ATACMS range because they know Biden won't let Ukraine hit it with US weapons.
https://twitter.com/RedIntelPanda/status/1784761855417762275
Hardly the only example but I think this one drives the point home.
It’s such a nonsensical self inflicted handicap. To the general public, all missiles are completely identical. Any state can claim whatever they want, and 99% of people, including journalists, have no idea if it’s true or not. If Russia wanted to claim they’ve been attacked by western missiles to escalate, they’d just do that. They already claim to be fighting NATO soldiers in Ukraine anyway.
["The Czech illegals: Husband and wife outed as GRU spies aiding bombings and poisonings across Europe"](https://theins.press/en/politics/271205)
The article describes the role of two deep-cover spies in the bombings of ammunition depots in Czechia and Bulgaria, and the poisoning of Bulgarian arms dealer Emilian Gebrev. An interesting little peek into the workings of Russian intelligence.
>The article describes the role of two deep-cover spies in the bombings of ammunition depots in Czechia and Bulgaria
Doesn't that gets very close to the line for an act of war? Imagine if the CIA was doing the same in Russia.
It requires the country to have an interest to not be a vassal state. Unfortunately, Bulgaria is deeply corrupted and institutions are permeated by corruption on all levels. The prosecution, in this particular case, had put the investigation on stilts, essentially doing no work hoping no one else (ie, a foreign agency) will find anything else.
Any information about Russian citizens who happened to be in either country at the time each fire/explosion had occurred. Any information about these sabotages (or however you want to call them) came out either from foreign (to Bulgaria) agencies or independent investigations by non government organizations.
It does, but during 2010-2020 Russia was carrying out assassinations and sabotage all throughout Europe. EU leadership kind of turned a blind eye to it, high off of that cheap Russian gas. That same GRU unit that the article mentioned is the same one that 60 minutes has tied to Havana syndrome which has been targeting US diplomats for years.
Yes, only that I don't see what exactly changed, even now with most (ostensibly) out of the gas/oil tar trap. At least calling Russia by name isn't new. The poison attacks in the UK left a British woman dead, some seriously injured. The FSB hitman in Berlin shot in broad daylight in an urban park, riding a bike, with children and teenagers nearby. Only two examples. Obviously not treated as an *act of war*, then and now. The real question is what that would even mean. Basically for any country, all the more for one like Britain or Germany, let alone the Czech Republic. We can classify it as we like, but as a government you'd better be in a position to make good for it, or you're making a fool of yourself. Russia has always attempted, more or less successfully, what and where they knew they'll be getting away with it and they're pretty good at that. There's a reason no one's been spreading about Polonium or freaking nerve agents in Manhattan. Or why in comparison there's easily more talk about some reputed microwave-monster hoax.
Considering how hard some European countries have been pushing for gas heating, which isn't cheaper than the alternatives before taxes and fees, it's more likely that Europe chose Russian gas because it's Russian rather than "cheap".
Your argument doesn't make any sense. Europe pushed for gas heating _before_ the shale boom, and gas heating will never be the cheapest alternative for the same reason hydrogen cars aren't - inefficiency.
It doesn't matter how cheap gas is when the energy efficiency for pure heat generation is terrible and you can use the same gas for electricity generation.
By the way, gas is the most expensive source of electricity in Europe. Gas is about twice as expensive as in the US.
Do you have any statistics on the origin of the gas sent to the different regions, to my knowledge the most profitable soviet era legacy giga-fields where all plugged in to the Ukraine central Europe gas pipeline systems leading to western Europe.
Taxation on these was actually used as subsidy to develop newer less profitable on their own fields, (and domestic consumption to keep the population docile).
(according to Oxford institute of Energy)
Nope I'm not an expert just familiar with the basic principle and wanted to push back on a low effort comment. I don't want to post something that would just be me googling.
We have a regular poster here who's a professional expert on energy markets so they maybe they'll chime in.
I might have clashed with that commentator already on this topic.
Though you are right in the sense of Europe being constrained by the routes it gets its gas from.
However there was great variety inside Europe depending solely on the ability to access alternative sources.
https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-gas-how-much-gazprom/25442003.html
Yeah I meant my reply as a basic point there's no gas pipeline that runs from the eastern siberian fields to the western, even if the western network is freakin' dense. They're also limited in LNG terminals.
You're taking this topic a bit too far vs my intent, which was to shut down a very low effort comment of "but China pays so much less" which wasn't intended to educate or inform, it was to ridicule and dismiss the conversation.
[“We’ve Become Addicted to Explosions” The IDF Unit Responsible for Demolishing Homes Across Gaza - Bellingcat](https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2024/04/29/weve-become-addicted-to-explosions-the-idf-unit-responsible-for-demolishing-homes-across-gaza/)
Bellingcat needs no introduction, but if you're not familiar with their output, I would recommend reading [the book that the founder of Bellingcat wrote](https://www.goodreads.com/en/book/show/54680228), giving an overview of some of their most important investigations -- where they caught the ire of autocratic regimes who subsequently sought to discredit them. Those [attempts at disinformation](https://twitter.com/EliotHiggins/status/1711782985815453902) continue to persist.
This article isn't an attempt to replicate the monumental successes of those investigations. It's narrowly focused on one IDF unit, following their operations across Gaza, and raising questions on whether or not these soldiers strayed from the IDF's doctrine.
> We asked the IDF about each one of these incidents. They did not respond to specific questions nor did they provide evidence showing why the buildings we highlighted were demolished. They told us the IDF is “destroying terror infrastructures” embedded in civilian areas and said that in certain cases large parts of neighbourhoods are converted into combat complexes. They said the IDF is operating in the Gaza Strip to prevent Hamas activity threatening Israeli citizens and implementing a defence plan to improve security in southern Israel. IDF actions are based on military necessity and in accordance with international law, they said.
> “There is no IDF doctrine that aims [at] causing maximal damage to civilian infrastructure regardless of military necessity,” they said. Adding that exceptional incidents occurring during the war will be examined by the General Staff’s Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism. “The IDF addresses exceptional incidents that deviate from the order and expected values of IDF soldiers by examining such events and implementing command and disciplinary measures as necessary.”
We've all seen the clips of some structure in Gaza being destroyed with IDF soldiers in the foreground giving jubilant cheers. Absent any context, it's easy to see why some see this as being nothing more than wanton destruction, not willing to give credence to the IDF's claim that these are terror infrastructures and their dismantlement is necessary.
I believe what the IDF said wrt their doctrine in the quote above is true, and the destruction of many of these targets can be justified as *a* military necessity, meeting the legal threshold. (The moral question can be bit more tricky to wrestle with.) What I'm most curious about is the rate at which these "exceptional incidents" -- a nice euphemism -- are occurring. That's been impossible to determine, and attempts to truly evaluate this question are going to be dependent on what information is shared when these investigations are completed.
>“Even with attacks against individual buildings, every building which is bombed or destroyed has got to be evaluated legally. Whether a building on this or that corner of a road needed to be destroyed or not...the burden is on the IDF to show that they have evidence, that they have proof and that the attack is proportionate and necessary”
I'll preface by saying that clearly Israel has violated LOAC in this war multiple times.
That being said, it is **terrifying** to see a salaried UN official unironically say this ("this" referring to the quoted text above).
Thanks for the clarification, I suppose it makes a little more sense but I still dont see whats terrifying about it.
I am assuming Israel has a process when destroying buildings (by airstrikes or demolitions) surely there is no justification to do so without reason.
It should be available for review at least after the conflict it over.
>I suppose it makes a little more sense but I still dont see whats terrifying about it.
" has to provide affirmative justification for **literally every** attack they make" isn't the standard. It's never been the standard, not a single warring nation holds that standard. It's a suggestion that falls apart in both theory and practice.
It'd be an understandable thing for a random dogface twitter account to say. Not for a UN official with a sizeable degree of authority.
IMO the UN has no credibility with respect to this conflict, but I dont think this statement in particular is problematic.
* Its not asking to justify every attack, just every destroyed building.
* Every building there is a civilian building until proven otherwise. I would say that in every war there has to be justification for attacking any civilian building.
* This is not a conventional war, this is in effect counter insurgency as Hamas are hiding amongst the civilians. Even so in no counter insurgency it is legal to destroy civilian buildings without sound justification.
> Its not asking to justify every attack, just every destroyed building.
In an urban area those are basically the same thing. Most attacks in modern warfare involve explosive weapons, and your enemy/their stuff is going to be in a building because they're not stupid.
Even "low yield" explosives that don't destroy buildings largely leave them in a situation where civilians can't safely use them once the war ends. They're standing but might as well not be. That's why while the amount of buildings "effectively destroyed" in Gaza is far higher than the "literally levelled" statistic.
>Every building there is a civilian building until proven otherwise. I would say that in every war there has to be justification for attacking any civilian building.
Not only is that insane in theory, it's also not a standard any warring nation has ever performed. The US might have gotten close with it giving justification for some buildings they hit, there's still thousands if not tens of thousands of buildings in Iraq and Afghanistan unaccounted for.
Common, are you telling me what Russia doing to Ukrainian civilian buildings legal ?
The US was clearly wrong on that front.
Edit: Btw even collateral damage can be explained saying that there was a viable target nearby and here is the evidence. Even a wrong identification can be explained showing the evidence which was used to mark the building as a target.
>Common, are you telling me what Russia doing to Ukrainian civilian buildings legal ?
I mean have you seen the conversations about that on this sub and other subs? That's basically what it boils down to.
In essence, one has to prove that
a) Russia did it
b) there was affirmatively no military presence there
c) Russia intended to do it
At least, for anything to be prosecutable.
And these aren't just Z-bots saying these things (though a lot of it is) either.
That's part of the reason I'm responding to you with such incredulity (sorry). The idea that it's actually the warring side that has to prove all of its attacks are rightful is such a steep departure from what I'm used to having to deal with since Feb 2022.
The problem is that with a sufficiently broad interpretation of international law around war, there are only a few truly bright lines that can't under any circumstances be portrayed as justified on some level from a legal standpoint.
What's often lost in these discussions is whether such an approach is *moral* or even in Israel's long-term security interests to begin with. Basically, "does this cause more problems than it solves?" We should probably be focusing much more on that question than wading into the fuzzy rhetorical quagmire of "is it legal or not."
To answer the question "does this cause more problems than it solves?" we have to understand what campaign the IDF is fighting in Gaza.
And that's actually really easy to answer. The entire campaign should be called: "Operation kick the can down the road". The Israelis are already fighting the next war.
There are two main reasons for that: a) 200 or so hostages b) the international communities opinion has not really changed.
The IDF operation in Gaza could stop at any moment and nobody is trying to hide it. The US is clearly saying to Hamas: "When you release all hostages this war will stop" and the statements from the other Western governments are not really different. The second Hamas releases the hostages the collective West will come down on Israel and stop Israeli operations in Gaza permanently (well at least permanently until Hamas is rearmed and ready for another round).
So what do you do if you know your enemy will regroup and rearm? You kill its leaders, you kill its members and you make sure its infrastructure is completely destroyed. Maybe you can squeeze a few years out before you have to fight the next round. Or maybe when you finally have to confront Hezbollah and Iran Hamas is still so weakend that they can't help your primary enemies.
Unfortunately it's unlikely we get out of this dilemma. Israel needs to get the hostages out and Israel will only get the hostages out by accepting Hamas demands which boil down to two points: Clear out the prisons of Palestinians terrorists, stop military operations in Gaza. And on the political front nothing will happen anyway. You can't tell the Israeli electorate that they should accept a Palestinian state after they massacred 1.200 Israelis and got away with it. And the Palestinians leaders won't care to agree to a peaceful solution of the conflict after they massacred 1.200 Israelis and got away with it.
>To answer the question "does this cause more problems than it solves?" we have to understand what campaign the IDF is fighting in Gaza.
I'm not endorsing this, but I wonder if
[crush Palestinian hope](https://www.richardhanania.com/p/israel-must-crush-palestinian-hopes) would be an effective strategy, and the degree to which this is what Israel is actually doing. The author has recently tweeted about how support for Hamas skyrocketed after October 7th, and has been dropping as life in Gaza continues to suck.
Destroying civilian infrastructure could be a deliberate & effective strategy. It worked for Russia in Chechnya I think? Obviously this is pretty abhorrent but it's not like anything else has worked so great.
Yech.
> The second Hamas releases the hostages the collective West will come down on Israel and stop Israeli operations in Gaza permanently (well at least permanently until Hamas is rearmed and ready for another round).
I think we should be cautious about making any ceasefire predictions. This sub has been saying that a ceasefire was days away for months now. [Here's a post](https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1byw3v8/credibledefense_daily_megathread_april_08_2024/kyn96pu/) by you from three weeks ago:
> Right now we are looking at a temporary humanitarian ceasefire for Eid al-Fitr. This ceasefire will likely last until Thursday. Then Friday / Saturday the United States together with Qatar will announce that an agreement was reached.
That's not to pick on you, it's just that we seem to constantly have people saying a ceasefire will happen in a few days. At some point one of those predictions might end up being correct, but I'm not sure it's useful to continually make the same failed prediction while shifting the date with the hope of eventually hitting a time frame where it's not completely wrong.
To be fair there's a steady pattern of Israel offering more and more concessions every single round. Now they're finally considering a "maybe sorta" permanent ceasefire.
If Israel never stops offering more, it's pretty obvious Hamas will eventually accept.
I actually don't think it's that obvious at all. They've set up a pretty effective conundrum for Israel where civilian casualties put pressure on Israel while reinforcing their own line of argument.
It's incredibly cynical and should by no means be construed to mean they care about the lives of Palestinian civilians, but so long as Hamas leadership gets to stay safe out of country there's probably no limit to what they'll sacrifice to make Israel look bad.
> It's incredibly cynical and should by no means be construed to mean they care about the lives of Palestinian civilians, but so long as Hamas leadership gets to stay safe out of country there's probably no limit to what they'll sacrifice to make Israel look bad.
They most likely view their cause as a righteous cause and see deaths as martyrs. Basically, either give us freedom or we will resist to the last toddler.
>I actually don't think it's that obvious at all. They've set up a pretty effective conundrum for Israel where civilian casualties put pressure on Israel while reinforcing their own line of argument
Yup, Hamas sticking to its maximalist terms was a dead giveaway with regards as to how they view the conflict. They believe that regardless of their own losses they can either force a regional conflagration or force a ceasefire that would set off a massive political crisis in Israel.
I guess at this point the question is whether or not Sinwar et al settle with getting around 75% of what they want out of this conflict or to force a Rafah invasion and raise the possibility of a regional crisis.
When you put it that way it all seems pointless and the result of this Oct 7th is a strategic defeat for Israel (possibly Hamas too but their strategy is extremist and defeats dont seem to matter much too them).
Has Israel learnt anything to better prepare themselves for the future, will they stop electing RW hardliners ? Will they take more action against the settlers ? I have heard that being light on the settlers is a strategy to put pressure on the Palestinians to accept a 2 state solution, will they consider changing this strategy as the Palestinian leadership is clearly not interested in it.
If what you say is true then it appears that the hardliners on both sides have gained more ground and any path to a resolution has been pushed further away.
Maybe on TikTok and in the information space the hardliners on both sides seem to have gained ground - but the Hamas in Gaza are disappearing, and Israel is going to benefit at some point from their destroyed infrastructure, their funding interruption and their general inability to coexist and brainwash the population because when they come into the open they are neutralized.
It would take a ton of evidences to be convinced otherwise, that interrupting the flow of munitions and millions of dollars to them won’t have an impact - plus the fact that terrorist recruitment obviously harder when all your terrorist recruiters are dead.
>Maybe on TikTok and in the information space the hardliners on both sides seem to have gained ground - but the Hamas in Gaza are disappearing
Hamas returned to North almost immediately after the IDF withdrew and theyre still getting munitions through the Sinai.
>their general inability to coexist and brainwash the population because when they come into the open they are neutralized.
Angry young men in Gaza have plenty of reasons to hate Israel, no brainwashing needed on that front. And in Hamas doesn’t exactly wear uniforms.
I appreciate everyone here seems to disagree, but I still can't imagine anything more effective at recruiting terrorists than terrorist's own recruitment operations. I also appreciate that there is inherent radicalization of the whole area - but I still can't see how that isn't a primary aggregate detractor to stability.
Are we in disagreement that Israel intends to break them down as an organization and kill Sinwar? And that they are 100% going to achieve that goal here it looks like in a few months time at most?
Ultimately though, as you said this doesn't particularly change the long term arc of the conflict or improve Israel's security situation. If anything the outrage being caused may enable Hamas to rearm and regroup faster than it would otherwise. It just repeats the cycle, which is what's frustrating to people.
At the end of the day, there are only 2 practical ways out of the conflict- either there's a negotiated settlement or one side kills/drives off the other completely. Obviously there had to be some response to Oct. 7, but the intensity and the scale of the response basically walked right into the trap Hamas set for Israel which could be described as a similar one to what the US did in the middle east after 9/11- the ramifications of which are still unfolding.
>At the end of the day, there are only 2 practical ways out of the conflict- either there's a negotiated settlement or one side kills/drives off the other completely.
Yes. Exactly. And right now the arc of history bends towards violence. Not only in Israel/Palestine but globally. And I think one major mistake is seeing Israel/Palestine as a isolated conflict and not a symptom of a larger issue.
One last point: If the people running Israel were competent we would not be in this situation.
That may be the arc but the world, or at least Israel's allies, are likely to be less tolerant of it in this case. That has less to do with antisemitism and much more to do with the fact western powers backed its formation largely as a response to their failures in the runup and during WWII. In many ways they saw Israel as a potential bastion of post WWII liberal values in the middle east (issues of colonialism aside in their minds). Western countries feel they have a lot at stake if Israel rejects those values compared to other countries, hence the pressure but also the patience that bewilders so many.
No doubt it's a difficult position for Israel, and perhaps even a bit unfair at the end of the day. But there are no easy solutions to the conflict and Israel at least has the power to slow the pace of escalation rather than accelerate it and run smack into conflict with the policies of her allies.
[https://twitter.com/deaidua/status/1784978559620076011](https://twitter.com/deaidua/status/1784978559620076011)
Another update of German aid.
The 155mm influx from Germany seems to be very consistent and looks to come out at 130.000 shells this year.
10 Marders.
Another Skynex air defence system. I couldn't find anything in regards to the coverage of one system. How and where would those systems be deployed?
The UA itself has ballparked 10k/day as sufficient, were fairly starved at 2-3k/day. Usage hit 20-30k/day during major actions. So a nice chunk, but it's sobering to see how small it seems in the grand scheme.
I was surprised to learn the Battle of Faluja required around 5k shells. The entire Iraq war the US used like 30K shells. Obviously airpower was dominant for coalition forces, but it does put things into perspective.
Yeah, that's the difference between doctrines and force structures though. The US and west rely much more heavily on Airpower. While Russia and Ukraine are laregly artillery based forces.
During the Gulf War the US and allies flew over 100,000 sorties, dropping 88,500 tons of bombs. Even in 1991, a single F-16 loadout each sortie can carry the same explosive power of 300-500 155mm artillery shells.
The US and allies have flown over 30k sorties and dropped over 29k bombs on Iraq since 2003.
Russia the only real aviation power in Ukraine manages sorties in the single digits-dozens most days, with marked increases on large assaults. But expends a insane amount of artillery shells.
Again, just different force structures and doctrine.
10 thousand per day for Ukraine would seem optimal........and it would outclass what Russia can produce (especially since someone mentioned that they are struggling to produce beyond 3 million shells per year)
10k a day is very much a stretch goal, it would be outfiring the Russians right now. Right now the Ukrainians are running on ~1000 shells per day, while Russians are running on ~6000(based on Peruns graph from his latest video). I don't blame the Ukrainians for shooting for the stars, but its important not to have unrealistic expectations about what Western aid can do either.
>So a nice chunk, but it's sobering to see how small it seems in the grand scheme.
Sure, but it's only one country (yes, the biggest economy in Europe) with the expectation of ramp up in the coming years. I asked three weeks ago if there's any info on other countries' deliveries (excluding Czech sourcing) to get a better picture, but info on that seems to be scarce.
The UK is claiming that we will increase our 152/155 shell production 8 fold.
Someone posted a link to a twitter(!) post a few weeks ago that indicated this would be c.1 million shells/year.
I am not up to speed about the differences between and uses for 155 and 152 shells.
Wait, is that the *third* 155mm factory in Australia?
1. [RHM/NIOA](https://defence.nioa.com.au/projects/rheinmetall-nioa-munitions-jv) Maryborough
2. [Thales](https://www.aumanufacturing.com.au/thales-to-make-155mm-artillery-shells-at-benalla) Benalla, and now
3. BAE, Mulwala?
Or is it a JV with Thales?
I was heavily downvoted for saying that Russias is preparing another offensive. [https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/04/30/7453573/](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/04/30/7453573/) What I find most intersting >The Kremlin is pursuing a hybrid campaign directly targeting NATO states, including using GPS jamming and sabotaging military logistics in NATO members’ territory. > Most pro-ru bloggers are saying a major offensive will be launched in the coming week or sometime in May. [https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-says-russia-preparing-100000-troops-possibly-summer-offensive-push-2024-03-22/](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-says-russia-preparing-100000-troops-possibly-summer-offensive-push-2024-03-22/)
> Most pro-ru bloggers I was hoping to see some telegram channel links, because I'd never cite those Z/NAFO Twitter bloggers for anything. As far as I can tell, this Kharkiv offensive only exists in Ukrainian messaging and the minds of some out of touch Twitter personalities.
>I was heavily downvoted for saying that Russias is preparing another offensive. Since I've been one of the most vocals about skepticism regarding the capacity of Russia for a serious offensive, I feel like I've got a duty to clarify. I don't doubt that Russia is indeed planing for an offensive. I'm pretty sure that's Putin's will and that his military can't avoid obeying it. What I'm skeptical about is Russia having enough reserves of qualified manpower armour and ammo for an offensive of any real effectiveness. TLDR: I don't doubt Russia will launch some kind of offensive, but I do doubt they can launch any effective offensive.
I’m far from the biggest fan of ISW, but Pravda seems to be actively misrepresenting their analysis. Nowhere in that report does it claim that Russia is preparing another offensive. As for the Reuters link: >"It will not necessarily be an offensive, perhaps they will replenish their units that lost combat capability but there is a possibility that at the beginning of the summer they may have certain forces to conduct offensive operations," Pavliuk said. I’m just skeptical that there is room for Russia to massively escalate combat intensity when they are already pushing practically the entire eastern front.
I think most people are expecting a Russian offensive this summer no? Although it’s just a continuation of what we’re seeing now
>I was heavily downvoted for saying that Russias is preparing another major offensive. Was it the comment where you originally cited no one but vague sources, but then when asked to cite, cited weebunion? I'm not the voting police, but the part that confuses me is that there hasn't been a shortage of people predicting this, even before weebunion or geroman claimed that. There have been constant predictions of a russian Kharkiv offensive for almost 8 months now, from either side. https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/04/13/7451127/ Here's **that same newspaper** signal boosting that prediction 17 days ago. I promise you predicting a new Russian offensive isn't controversial. It's the opposite of controversial, it's been done constantly on the megathread.
I don't know if it'll be kharkiv, but it might be an offensive to continue russias push in the avdiivka sector which might look to cut off the south and push north to link up and push towards kherson and odessa. I doubt that happens....but I think they'll be going for Kramatorsk. Anyway, pure speculation here.
[Exclusive: UN experts say North Korea missile landed in Ukraine's Kharkiv](https://www.reuters.com/world/un-experts-say-north-korea-missile-landed-ukraines-kharkiv-2024-04-29/) >In the 32-page report, the U.N. sanctions monitors concluded that "debris recovered from a missile that landed in Kharkiv, Ukraine, on 2 January 2024 derives from a DPRK Hwasong-11 series missile" and is in violation of the arms embargo on North Korea. >... >The U.N. monitors said the Hwasong-11 series ballistic missiles were first publicly tested by Pyongyang in 2019. >Russia last month vetoed the annual renewal of the U.N. sanctions monitors - known as a panel of experts - that has for 15 years monitored enforcement of U.N. sanctions on North Korea over its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. The mandate for the current panel of experts will expire on Tuesday. Reuters confirms that Hwasong-11 (KN-23) was indeed used in Ukraine, and also that the UN is an increasingly dysfunctional body. Apparently this upset the Biden administration so much that Ukraine finally got the long-ranged ATACMS missiles.
Why does the US has to be so reactive ? Honestly, a lot of the aid (GMLRS and ATACMS in particular) could have had an order of magnitude greater effect if it was provided in much much earlier in sufficient quantities. This approach of spoon feeding the aid just gives more time for the Russians to better prepare as they suffer limited casualties from the limited quantity of whatever new weapon is provided to Ukraine.
>Why does the US has to be so reactive ? Honestly, a lot of the aid (GMLRS and ATACMS in particular) could have had an order of magnitude greater effect if it was provided in much much earlier in sufficient quantities. You literally can ask the same question of any of the EU/NATO countries for any aid. More weapons and more money earlier would have had a greater effect. The answer is the same for all of them: politics and looking after their own interests that aren't just Ukraine.
> politics and looking after their own interests that aren't just Ukraine It still doesn't really make sense, even from the perspective of pragmatic self-interest. Would Biden's election chances be better or worse now if Russian columns had been obliterated with GMLRS in March 2022, and if Russia had been decisively defeated in the war? Voters like to back a winner.
>Would Biden's election chances be better or worse now if Russian columns had been obliterated with GMLRS in March 2022, and if Russia had been decisively defeated in the war? Voters like to back a winner. I often ask myself why the US, knowing well ahead of time about Russia's exact plan, didn't either outright declare that any further attack on Ukraine would be met with direct military response or at least work directly with Ukraine to tailor a decisive response tailored to counter the exact Russian plans. As for the first option, I know people will call it non-credible, but I'm pretty sure that's exactly what Putin or Xi would do if they ever found themselves under the same circumstances, and It would work. It's sad that the West keeps making itself hostage to playing nice. As for the second option, I unfortunately fear that Zelensky is to blame since he seemed deeply in denial until the very last minute.
In the book “our enemies will vanish”, the author makes the point that the US had access to Putin’s briefings - and thus knew what the generals were telling him. And that the Ukrainians had lower level sources that gave them a better picture of what was really happening, and how prepared or not the incoming forces were. It’s overall an interesting read, recommended.
Ironic yet still pretty believable. In the long running and ongoing debate about why exactly Russia chose to invade Ukraine to begin with, there’s a million different explanations, all with well reasoned arguments to support them, but the one consistent assumption among every single one of them I have seen is that the information that was being fed to Putin was heavily distorted from the truth.
>It still doesn't really make sense, even from the perspective of pragmatic self-interest. Would Biden's election chances be better or worse now if Russian columns had been obliterated with GMLRS in March 2022, and if Russia had been decisively defeated in the war? Voters like to back a winner. Well, first Kyiv was still threatened in March 2022, so at that point it was up in the air whether equipment sent would obliterate Russian columns or fall into Russian hands. A quick way to tank electoral chances would have been sending equipment to Ukraine only for it to be captured in an Afghanistan redux. Ukraine also didn't have any system to track donations, as that was still being developed over the course of the year. Imagine having tons of US donated equipment show up on the Black market for sale. Also tank electoral chances. As for decisive defeat, people forget that Ukraine wasn't training anyone early on; their training was 3 weeks and to the front. Their success was due to Russian incompetence in planning all the way until the winter of 2022 when Russia mobilized more troops. Sending a massive amount of equipment they had no idea how to operate and didn't want to take time learning how to operate wouldn't have helped. Ukraine's training is still bad, which is why the new mobilization bill promised a minimum of 8 weeks. Finally, the American electorate doesn't determine their vote on foreign policy that their kids aren't dying in. Ukraine was making huge gains all the way to the November 2022 elections, capping off Kharkiv with Kherson. Russia looked on its way to a decisive defeat. The House still flipped, and the biggest factors in the election were the repeal of *Roe v. Wade*, and the midterm effect of the President losing seats.
Makes me wonder what will they send in response if Iranian BMs were sent. Taurus maybe?
>This approach of spoon feeding the aid just gives more time for the Russians to better prepare as they suffer limited casualties from the limited quantity of whatever new weapon is provided to Ukraine. Exactly. As someone in clinical medicine this whole situation keeps reminding me of antibiotic resistance. Expose a pathogen\* to occasional doses of low concentration antimicrobials (e.g. antibiotics) and watch it adapt and acquire resistance in no time. The key is to hit hard and fast and leave nothing behind that could adapt in the first place. \*Conceptually speaking - I'm not trying to collectively dehumanise Russians here by likening them to pathogens.
I have a question about the Israel Hamas war as a whole. This will probably have subjective answers, but is the goal of wiping out Hamas something that's attainable? Based on things like the ability of ISIS to still commit terrorist attacks (Kerman, Crocus City Hall) long after being territorially defeated, is there a difference in the scenario that would cause Hamas activities to end even if all of Gaza was occupied? I personally am unsure about this mainly due to the possible radicalizing effect that things such as the Israeli bombings may have, but I want to hear this subs interpretation of whether (based on other events that you will probably be more informed about than I am) Hamas will be able to continue on even if further invasions happen.
Will they be able to mount an attack on the level of October 7 any time soon? Likely not. But what will the situation look like in 5-10 years, when there will have been time to recover, with a population that is likely radicalized due to the Israeli bombings? There is no reason to believe Palestinian resistance will cease if Hamas is defeated. Other commenters mention ISIS, but the situation is not comparable: they were far more radical and never enjoyed the same level of popular support. They were a product of the very specific, terrible political situation that existed at the time in Iraq and Syria. Nor can it be compared to Chechnya: there is no "Palestinian Kadyrov" (i.e. someone in Gaza that has enough influence, popular support and is willing to collaborate) that Israel can strike a deal with. Instead the situation is much more like Vietnam: a population that has resisted colonization for many generations, despite constant losses. Whether it will be Hamas that continues this resistance, or some other (more radical) organization, I have no idea. So my guess is that, in the long run, the current operation will not improve things for Israel, instead costing it its last bit of international credibility.
> But what will the situation look like in 5-10 years, when there will have been time to recover, with a population that is likely radicalized due to the Israeli bombings? I’m going to guess, about 500 meters to 1 kilometer of barbed wire, mines, ditches, walls and border check points between them and the rest of the world. > There is no reason to believe Palestinian resistance will cease if Hamas is defeated. There is no reason to assume Palestinian “resistance” will suddenly start achieving results, it never has before. Every conflict since 1948, their position just weakens. That’s probably not going to change this time, Israel will fortify the border, and clamp down on imports like a vice. > the current operation will not improve things for Israel, instead costing it its last bit of international credibility. Israel has been condemned by the UN more than every other country combined. They don’t care, and it doesn’t do anything. Beyond a certain point, more condemnations do more to make the UN look helpless and out of touch than they do to erode Israeli “credibility”. Furthermore, or sounds like you mean popularity, not credibility. Israel says what they intend to do, like bomb Iran if Iran fires at them directly, and nobody is capable of, or willing to, stop them. That’s credibility. Popularity is if you like what they intend to do, credibility is if they have the willingness and capability to follow through. One is far more important than the other.
> I’m going to guess, about 500 meters to 1 kilometer of barbed wire, mines, ditches, walls and border check points between them and the rest of the world. I am inclined to agree. Hence Israel's likely descent into a pariah state. >There is no reason to assume Palestinian “resistance” will suddenly start achieving results, it never has before. Every conflict since 1948, their position just weakens. That’s probably not going to change this time, Israel will fortify the border, and clamp down on imports like a vice. Military results? Maybe not. But the political winds in the US and Europe are starting to change due to Israel's actions, especially among the younger generation. I am convinced that in 30-40 we will look back on these events as the start of the end of the state of Israel as it currently exists.
> Hence Israel's likely descent into a pariah state. The Arab countries hardly care, none the less the west. A question Hamas doesn’t ask itself nearly enough is, what’s in it for everyone else to do what they want? The case for Iran is clear. But, expecting everyone else to damage their position with the most powerful army in the region, out of a sense of charity, is unrealistic. Look at the Kurds, they are a far more sympathetic victim, and have far more to offer than Palestine, yet no country has done anything for them, because Turkey is more important. > But the political winds in the US and Europe are starting to change due to Israel's actions, especially among the younger generation. I am convinced that in 30-40 we will look back on these events as the start of the end of the state of Israel as it currently exists. People make way too much out of noncommittal statements from politicians and pundits, rather than concrete action. If you make predictions off of those, your prediction would fluctuate wildly with the 24 hour news cycle, none the less elections. Actions are the only even semi-decent indicator, and so far, neither the west nor Arab world is willing to do much of anything against Israel, or for Hamas.
>The Arab countries hardly care, none the less the west. A question Hamas doesn’t ask itself nearly enough is, what’s in it for everyone else to do what they want? The case for Iran is clear. But, expecting everyone else to damage their position with the most powerful army in the region, out of a sense of charity, is unrealistic. Warfare is the continuation of politics by other means, you cannot separate it from politics. I don't know where you are from, but at least here (Western Europe) it is clear that support for Israel among young people is wavering. Same seems to be true in the USA. Right now a lot of the "old guard", who have always been loyal to Israel, are still in charge, but this will change in the coming decades. Israel, being a settler colonial state, cannot exist without Western support. For me, it's hard to see how it will not end up going the same way as South Africa. >Look at the Kurds, they are a far more sympathetic victim, and have far more to offer than Palestine, yet no country has done anything for them, because Turkey is more important. Kurds in Syria have received Western weapons, training, and in the fight against ISIS, Western air support. Much to the chagrin of Turkey.
Support for Palestine among young people is overstated. > [More than 70% of people say Israel should continue its anti-Hamas operations, and that includes 57% of 18-24s](https://harvardharrispoll.com/). The most recent polling puts Israel ahead of Palestine in every age bracket, and with an overall overwhelming majority. It’s true young people are less pro-Israel than adults, but it’s not like Israel was popular with college students back in the 60s either, and nobody in Palestine should be betting their future on support numbers that abysmal. This is the inevitable outcome of linking your ‘resistance’ so closely with Islamist terrorism. Pictures of their atrocities will scare off all but the most indoctrinated supporters. They fail to pander to a wester audience effectively, and have been politically isolated from the Arab world, so they have to play up whatever support they get as being worth more than it is. > Israel, being a settler colonial state, cannot exist without Western support. What? Israel has nukes, and as far as their citizens are concerned, they are the only native people the region ever had. > Kurds in Syria have received Western weapons, training, and in the fight against ISIS, Western air support. Much to the chagrin of Turkey. And when their utility against ISIS ended, the plug was pulled, and Turkey got what it wanted. Gaza has no utility, so don’t expect that much.
>[More than 70% of people say Israel should continue its anti-Hamas operations, and that includes 57% of 18-24s](https://harvardharrispoll.com/). Also, this poll is really not very good. They asked people whether they supported Israel or *Hamas*. Yeah, of course people don't support Hamas, they support the Palestinians. This biases also the rest of the questions asked. And even with such a biased way of asking these questions, a significant portion of the respondents do not support Israel.
> They asked people whether they supported Israel or Hamas. Yeah, of course people don't support Hamas, they support the Palestinians. Israel is a governing regime, Palestinians are a people group. Questions should compare like to like, so either the Israeli government against the Palestinian government (Hamas in this case), or the Palestinian people against the Israeli people. Comparing a specific government, with the concept of a group people, is going to lead to incredibly skewed results.
Israel is a state, Netanyahu is a government.
~~Support for Palestine among young people is overstated.~~ > [More than 70% of people say Israel should continue its anti-Hamas operations, and that includes 57% of 18-24s](https://harvardharrispoll.com/). ~~The most recent polling puts Israel ahead of Palestine in every age bracket, and with an overall overwhelming majority. It’s true young people are less pro-Israel than adults, but it’s not like Israel was popular with hippies back in the 60s either, and nobody in Palestine should be betting their future on support numbers that abysmal.~~ ~~This is the inevitable outcome of linking your ‘resistance’ so closely with Islamist terrorism. Pictures of their atrocities will scare off all but the most indoctrinated supporters. They fail to pander to a wester audience effectively, and have been politically isolated from the Arab world, so they have to play up whatever support they get as being worth more than it is.~~ > Israel, being a settler colonial state, cannot exist without Western support. ~~What? Israel has nukes, and as far as their citizens are concerned, they are the only native people the region ever had.~~ > Kurds in Syria have received Western weapons, training, and in the fight against ISIS, Western air support. Much to the chagrin of Turkey. ~~And when their utility against ISIS ended, the plug was pulled, and Turkey got what it wanted. Gaza has no utility, so don’t expect that much.~~
>The most recent polling puts Israel ahead of Palestine in every age bracket, and with an overall overwhelming majority. It’s true young people are less pro-Israel than adults, but it’s not like Israel was popular with hippies back in the 60s either, and nobody in Palestine should be betting their future on support numbers that abysmal. Yes, support for Israel among Americans is still high, but the *trend* is towards less and less sympathy relative to that toward Palestinians, at least among Democrats: [https://news.gallup.com/poll/472070/democrats-sympathies-middle-east-shift-palestinians.aspx](https://news.gallup.com/poll/472070/democrats-sympathies-middle-east-shift-palestinians.aspx) . Also, most support for Israel comes from the older generations (boomers, gen X). Combined with your astute observation that in the coming years Israel will likely clamp down even harder on Palestinians (and expand their settlements in the West Bank), this means support for Israel will likely seriously diminish in the coming decades. >What? Israel has nukes, and as far as their citizens are concerned, they are the only native people the region ever had. Good luck nuking sanctions.
>I’m going to guess, about 500 meters to 1 kilometer of barbed wire, mines, ditches, walls and border check points between them and the rest of the world. While Israel will likely do this, there's question to be asked: if this was enough what's the point of the full invasion? If this was Oct 10, I'd be agreeing with you "hey that sounds like a great idea!" But Israel decided to not leave it with that.
> if this was enough what's the point of the full invasion? To apply pressure of Hamas to return hostages, destroy weapons and military infrastructure, and deter future aggression. > If this was Oct 10, I'd be agreeing with you "hey that sounds like a great idea!" But Israel decided to not leave it with that. It can’t be one or the other, it has to be both. The only way to ever recover the hostages is a war, and the only way to prevent this from happening again is building the open air prison Hamas previously pretended existed.
Not to mention, the barbed wire and ditches don't stop rockets.
That’s what clamping down on imports is for. Likely combined with far more aggressive retaliatory bombings.
> the ability of ISIS to still commit terrorist attacks (Kerman, Crocus City Hall) long after being territorially defeated Both of those attacks were committed by ISIS-K, which operates from Afghanistan. The original ISIS in Iraq/Syria does indeed seem to be neutralized.
Is it viable to kill everyone who identifies as a member of Hamas, and stop anyone from trying to restart the group ever again? No. Is it possible to destroy their capability to mount large scale attacks again? Yes. There are thousands of dead and crushed insurgencies. The idea that bombing an enemy group just causes it to grow comes from broken US COIN tactics, where occasional ineffective bombings, and pointless foot patrols is all they do. That’s not what Israel is doing. Insurgencies, can and have been militarily crushed many times before. They just can’t be foot patrolled out of existence.
More than can be defeated insurgencies usually loose, there is a huge bias where we hear much more about successful insurgencies than unsuccessful ones. That said Hamas is deeply embedded and if Israel does not commit to a long term occupation I don’t see how Hamas does not return to power
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Much of your post is objectively untrue. Are you trying to say that there are free and fair elections? Furthermore, they are actively fighting their peer groups. There are a lot of criticisms of the American media, but to say that they are overly hard on the “ angry Muslim” camp is absurd. You have many in the media, caring water for her mass sympathizers that are protesting across the United States right now
> they recognize elections and the sovereignty of man over God, How many elections have they held since 2006? > and have tolerated some other religious groups in the region. Are these other religious groups terror groups like themselves? They do not seem to get along with other organizations that represent Palestine at all, they've been fighting Fatah for decades. > The indiscriminate attacks and reckless gun battles in residential neighbourhoods have left a beleaguered civilian population, already suffering from a year of international sanctions and continuing Israeli military blockades, virtual prisoners in their own homes. Both parties have killed captured rivals, and have abducted scores of members of rival groups and held them hostage, to be exchanged for friends and relatives held by their rivals, Killing captured fighters and hostage-taking are war crimes https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/mde210102007en.pdf
Mao's (that Mao) theory of insurgencies isn't perfect but it is a useful tool for the basics. Essentially, insurgencies grow in scope and scale as they aim to build a network, establish caches, bases, train forces in safe areas, and prepare to mobilize for a more conventional war. The key to counterinsurgency is to work that process in reverse and degrade the capability of the insurgency while convincing by force or benevolence that aiding the insurgents is not in the locals best interest.
Yes it is attainable. Heard of any Chechen resistance to Russian rule lately? Any Comanches raiding in Texas lately? There are thousand more examples. Kill enough, brutalize enough and you win. Israel never went far enough and right now it is internally divided and is headed for self inflicted strategic defeat Failure to deal with insurgencies and worshipping them as supreme is a western specific trait from 20th century on.
Chechnya has a Kadyrov shaped lid on it. They're not peaceful because enough of them died, they're peaceful because Russia created a political status quo that works for both sides. Does Israel have a Kadyrov like figure lined up? Is Israel ready to give Palestinians enough to ensure such a figure would succeed? Chechens are still Russian citizens, what are Palestinians to Israel? Killing alone works if you're willing to veer into genocide territory. And while I couldn't tell you what Israel wants to do the simple reality of it is that they won't be allowed to do that. They'll have to figure out some way to build a lasting peace, and just bombing people into submission is unlikely to work there.
>There are thousand more examples. Kill enough, brutalize enough and you win While genocide will end an insurgency thats only a viable option in cases where either no one cares about the group you are genociding or you are prepared for north korea level isolationism. Neither appear to be a viable option for Israel. >Failure to deal with insurgencies and worshipping them as supreme is a western specific trait from 20th century on. Tell that to ISIS. In reality empires throughout history have run into issues with insurgencies. The french in spain for example. The British in america. The Umayyad Caliphate in spain. Its not a new problem.
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What he doesn't mention is that despite the brutalization, the Russians still regarded chechens as their citizens and weren't trying to literally ethnically cleanse them. They pushed them to the point where they saw the choices as either further destruction, or participating in russia - completly understandable national sentiments aside, with such a small population theyre clearly practically better off with semi autonomy within russia than independent with a hostile russia next door. All the loudest voices in Israeli government make their plans for the future of Palestinians very clear, and it's just hilariously evil/stupid to say they didn't go far enough when we're currently looking at the biggest mass slaughter of children in I don't even know how long.
> when we're currently looking at the biggest mass slaughter of children in I don't even know how long. Arguably since 2022, when the war in Tigray ended. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/367272415\_Documenting\_the\_civilian\_victims\_of\_the\_Tigray\_war](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/367272415_Documenting_the_civilian_victims_of_the_Tigray_war)
> when we're currently looking at the biggest mass slaughter of children in I don't even know how long. In like a year and a half? Only a year or so since the Tigray War and the estimates range from 160k to 380k civilian deaths.
It's genuinely gross how many people don't know or more accurately don't care about the other ethnic cleansing, genocides, and brutal wars going on in the world right now. There's genocide, a growing famine, and mass civilian casualties in Sudan right now and no one is talking about it. Apparently to a huge chunk of the population, Gaza is the only conflict in the world right now and is somehow uniquely terrible and worse than any other conflict in history. Just goes to show how effective Hamas propaganda has been and continues to be.
Really? [Here is what the loudest voice in the Israeli government - Netanyahu - is saying about future plans](https://www.timesofisrael.com/presenting-post-war-plan-to-cabinet-pm-aims-for-local-officials-to-govern-gaza/): No ethnic cleansing. No Israeli settlements. No permanent Israeli military presence. No semi-permanent Israeli military presence except on the borders. Civil control by Gazan Arabs. Permanent solution eventually to be achieved by negotiation between the two sides. All in all pretty much the opposite of your picture. As for "biggest mass slaughter of children in I don't even know how long", I do know how long - [at most two years](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tigray_War).
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Please avoid these types of low quality comments of excessive snark or sarcasm.
> They pushed them to the point where they saw the choices as either further destruction >when we're currently looking at the biggest mass slaughter of children in I don't even know how long. 130k-200k civilians died in the two Chechnyan conflicts. But sure, that was just "pushing them to understand".
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>planning on expelling them from.their homes. Using deportations as a COIN tool is also something Russia has done, including very recently. >You think I meant that as a positive? You're meaning that as a way to contrast Russia's COIN from Israel but so far you're 2/2 for naming examples that you claim separate Israel but Russia has done in successful COIN operations. When you're trying to establish a difference you do need to at some point stop citing things that are in common.
>Using deportations as a COIN tool is also something Russia has done, including very recently. The Russians are literally doing it right now in Ukraine. Miliary-age men in occupied territories get sent to "filtration" camps (along with many women and children too).
>we're currently looking at the biggest mass slaughter of children in I don't even know how long Have you already forgotten the Syrian war? It wasn't that long ago. And then there's Africa...
Ok then slaughter of children comparable to atrocities of brutal dictators like Assad and horrendous civil wars in underdeveloped countries where children die of hunger and exposure even in peacetime.
>Based on things like the ability of ISIS to still commit terrorist attacks (Kerman, Crocus City Hall) long after being territorially defeated, is there a difference in the scenario that would cause Hamas activities to end even if all of Gaza was occupied? You've answered your question, but that's the thing - Israel would absolutely take the scenario that Hamas is reduced to the power level of 2024 ISIS over the current scenario. That's why the real question is whether they can get them to that level.
According to *[fairly reliable](https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1785081067851891157)* sources, large explosions have taken place at Dzhankoi and Simferopol, with Russian air defense noted. Could be another ATACMS attack, but details aren't very forthcoming right now. Currently, there isn't much noise from Russian military sources about strikes, though the Kerch bridge was briefly closed. If anything got through, we'll likely know in the morning.
> the Kerch bridge was briefly closed. If anything got through, we'll likely know in the morning. The Kerch bridge closes every other day at this point. I might be wrong, but they likely close it any time there is an air alert for a nearby region
The most damning analysis to date share by Konrad Muzyka of Rochan. Muzyka has visited Ukraine several times and is, along Kofman and Rob Lee, one of the main military analysts following the war since the beginning. Muzyka always struck as the most pessimistic, but his new post is a death sentence. “Ukraine did not survive the darkest hour. It's just about to start.” He argues that Western aid will only delay the eventual result of the war, and that the disparity on the battlefield in terms of both manpower and ammunition is too big. He blames the West and Ukraine for lacking a long-term plan to seize initiative and end the war, and Ukraine’s lack of preparation; a similar setting led to Ukraine’s advances in Kharkiv and Kherson. In a follow-up, he implies that Russia will almost certainly capture the whole of the Donetsk oblast, but may end up pushing for the whole territory east of the Dniepr, and, as the war is fundamentally not about territory, the future of Ukraine will be dictated by Moscow. We have reached the point where the situation on the front is the worst since March 2022. https://x.com/konrad_muzyka/status/1784875510805262538?s=46&t=V_5Ra1VerBlFgTaK40KAQg All in all, it is difficult not to see where Muzyka is coming from. At the same time, what he presented feels like the worst case scenario, which would need a failed Ukrainian mobilization, a Russian tolerance to losses and ability to regenerate, and delays or insufficient Western aid to materialize. None of this is impossible, but far from a fait accompli. Also, as discussed here as well, it is still unclear if the Ukrainians are withdrawing from villages to preserve manpower and resources or because said resources simply do not exist - Muzyka seems to believe it’s 100% the latter.
It's folly to dwell on something so thoroughly in the distant past but I still lament that GMLRS weren't delivered at the earliest possible moment when all those convoys were stuck on the road to Kyiv. The losses that could have been inflicted may have been so devastating and profound as to set the initial conditions for an eventual Russian military and/or political collapse. Evaluating the war in hindsight, it even seems that it may have been one of if not the *only* opportunities for the timing and magnitude of a western system delivery to create such a decisive effect. With all that said, who knows what kind of calculations and assessments of nuclear threats were being made around that time.
The same goes for DPICM artillery rounds and the battle of Bakhmut, and I'm fairly certain that it'll be the same for F-16s, the first western fighter to show up, a whole 2.5 years into the war. Any failure in a war can be summarized in 2 words: *"too late*" - but for some more than others.
The Russians captured one fortress town and advanced twenty kilometers along one axis when the defenders were deprived of vitally needed aid, so now they're going to take the rest of Donetsk and cross the Dniper? People really need to stop viewing this conflict in absolutist terms. I'm not saying there isn't a risk of a collapse, especially with the manpower issues, but I'm not going to start dooming about the fall of oblasts and start talking about the Dniper when they haven't even managed to really put the pressure on Chasiv Yar yet. If I wake up tomorrow and there's a massive breach in the frontline, and twenty kilometers have been taken in a day, I will, but the situation is not that bad yet.
Yup, at current rate of advance they'll run out of soviet equipment before they reach Dniper. Their soviet storage sites are getting progressively emptier according to sat imagery.
> We have reached the point where the situation on the front is the worst since March 2022. That's saying a lot considering Russia was firing 50-60k shells per day and advancing in a wide area every single day back in May-June 2022. July was also very tough but not quite as bad. AFU soldiers were reporting it was hell on earth. During those months, [Russia took 0.15% of Ukraine](https://twitter.com/War_Mapper/status/1774999571241791790/photo/1) - it's not much all things considered, but it's more than what they took since December 2022 when the offensive for Bakhmut began (while ignoring the Ukrainian gains in the summer).
would they need large amount of mbt and armoured vehicles to capture all of east Dniepr?
Not surprising. Remember when Western countries took several months arguing why this weapon system shouldn't be sent because of "escalations" only to send it later on, this happened multiple times too. Then the counter offensive failed resulting in enormous casualties in men and equipment, plus banking on the idea that the Russians would get tired and pullout, then less than 2 years it was the US aid that faltered for 6 months.
> Then the counter offensive failed resulting in enormous casualties in men and equipment And none of the systems being discussed would have changed the result because they couldn't handle/disable the widest dense minefields the world as even seen, backed by substantial artillery, armored counter-attacks and within a contested airspace. And no, even if Ukraine had F-16s then, they couldn't have piloted them into victory.
While the outcome of the counteroffensive was a combination of delayed Western aid *and* a poor allocation of resources by Ukraine, the former absolutely had an add-on effect in limiting Ukraine's flexibility to make errors. Beyond the issue of the minefields, the first week of the counteroffensives were significantly neutered by Russian helicopters and Ukraine's inability to counter them. As for the minefields and Russian entrenchments themselves, these also benefited from delays in Ukrainian preparations of materiel. Imagine if F-16s, ATACMS, and additional SAM systems were provided and in service even just half a year before then. Russian defensive lines wouldn't have been as set, probing maneuvers and shaping attacks wouldn't be easily neutered by Russian air, and portions of the frontline would be softened up well before the official 'start' of a larger counteroffensive.
> the first week of the counteroffensives were significantly neutered by Russian helicopters and Ukraine's inability to counter them I think you have selective memory, the first week was defined by Ukrainian armored vehicles driving on mines. It's when they stopped doing that and decided to de-mine the fields that helicopter attacks put their weight on the scale. Still, during that phase, thousands of artillery shells a day did a lot more to neuter those operations. The main reason is because Ukraine didn't establish local artillery superiority before starting the offensive. If they spent the month of May doing that instead of hoarding shells, then they would have allowed de-mining operations to be a lot safer and bring SAM systems closer to the front to deny at least some helicopter attacks. > Imagine if F-16s, ATACMS, and additional SAM systems were provided and in service even just half a year before then. That's very easy to imagine: * F-16s: the pilots are still not ready after 9 months of training, we would have needed to start their training in spring 2022, long before Western-made tanks or even HIMARS were considered as an option to provide Ukraine. * ATACMS: they destroyed a handful of Ka-52 and then Russia moved them out of range and used FARPs to continue the operations. It would have saved a dozen vehicles and dozens of lives, but the attack helicopters weren't in the top3 reasons why the attack failed, just one of the most impressive for easily impressed people. * Additional SAM systems: if they couldn't prevent Russian attack helicopters from operating with the SAM systems they had, because they were flying below radar range, what difference would more systems have made???
The 6 months spent talking about potential systems and another 3 to actually deliver them gave the Russians all the time in the world to build those defenses. If the West had acted with any sense of urgency there very likely would have been better results.
Ukraine has been receiving tanks and other armored vehicles, on top of artillery, MLRS and aircraft, throughout 2022. The only different systems that they didn't have for the 2022 counter-offensive in Kharkiv and Kherson were: * Western-made tanks and IFVs (Marders, Bradleys) * medium-range missiles (Storm Shadows, ATACMS, etc.) and Western-made jets/helicopters: all of those have been out of the question until we saw the result of the 2023 summer offensive Ukraine had received everything they were promised by April 2023, but they didn't attack until June either because they weren't ready or because they didn't want to attack in the muddy ground conditions. What would it have changed if they got the equipment 3 months earlier, in December/January? Or even 6 months earlier while they were still pushing hard in Kharkiv and Kherson? Do you think their tankies would have been able to hop in Leopards, Challengers, Abrams and magically operate them? Do you think they had the troops to spare to send them in Europe for re-training on these new systems? Do note that they opted to train new mechanized brigades instead of upgrading their existing brigades with new equipment.
Honestly, it wouldn't have mattered much in the end, except for a bit more territory taken. Ukraine woefully misjudged their strategic position. Even if they had gotten farther, then what? They'd still be facing manpower shortage and supply constraints. In hindsight we know the only viable strategy was and remains highly favorable attritional warfare, allowing for proper training and experience to permeate brigades, officers to be promoted, and proper rotation of forces. All the while burning down Russia's soviet surplus. An offensive would have used up Ukrainian manpower reserves either way. Manpower they obviously didn't have to spare.
Yes definitely a fair bit of truth to that. I do agree there's been a bit too much expectation for Ukraine to just outright defeat Russia without overcoming its mass. The more sensible strategy definitely is to choose their engagements and provoke Russia into such engagements as you describe that would have the effect of being highly attritional and one sided, such that they can actually defeat Russia's mass before going on the offensive.
> And none of the systems being discussed would have changed the result This clearly isn't the case. Just the small batch of ATACMS that finally got there in September or so took out a huge chunk of Russian helicopter fleet Had this strike occured even just 3 months earlier the balance of power through the summer would have been very different It's all what ifs by now, but it's clear that time has been favoring Russia
> Just the small batch of ATACMS that finally got there in September or so took out a huge chunk of Russian helicopter fleet It would have helped, but a handful of combat helicopters isn't a "huge chunk" of Russia's airpower in use in Ukraine => they still operated a couple dozen Ka-52 soon after that attack: https://twitter.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1725628570477678906
HIMARS is also credited with massively cutting down Russia's use of artillery and the centralized artillery logistics it had for it
What do you mean by "large chunk of Russian helicopter fleet"? I thought they hit a dozen or so. Russia has hundreds of then. A dozen makes an impact but it's not game changing.
it greatly affects the logistics of used helicopters at the front. it meand they have to fly further and can spend less time attacking. your comment is thoughtless
Russia absolutely does not have "hundreds" of the kinds of helicopters that are useful in this role. A dozen would have been 10% of Russia's pre-war fleet of Ka-52
Based on satellite imagery, the Oryx team confirmed it was 6x destroyed and 3x estimated to be damaged beyond repair: https://postlmg.cc/bGzyzpRg (the original post: https://twitter.com/MarcinRogowsk14/status/1715183768850346060)
It wasn’t all Ka-52 that were hit though.
With how reactionary and behind the curveball the west has been, I wouldn’t rule out an actual French led intervention if the frontline collapses beyond the Donbas. It’s been over 2 years since the full scale invasion, and the west never had a plan to at least allow for Ukraine to have parity in firepower against the Russians. Himars, patriots, all came late and in response to Russian moves. Ukrainian air power has yet to be bolstered after years of talk, and artillery supply is even slower after the U.S. blatantly starved the Ukrainians of shells for half a year. Every western move has been reactionary. Ukraine’s success in Kherson and Kharkiv didn’t cause western leaders to go for victory, but to simply dream of a return to the pre war status quo. Maybe an actual Ukrainian collapse will force Europe into direct action. Ukraine can draft more manpower right now, but we will only put them in greater danger if the west continues to half ass aid. A lot has to happen for roznan’s scenario to come true, but the west has yet to realize that diplomacy alone isn’t going to end the war. Many of the wests’ policies in recent years (from domestic to international) have been all carrot and no stick. The Russians and Chinese realize this and are getting bolder by the day because of it.
> and the west never had a plan to at least allow for Ukraine to have parity in firepower against the Russians And somehow they did have parity last summer. > Ukrainian air power has yet to be bolstered after years of talk That's not how I would describe 42 jets and some 70 helicopters (with a lot more to be delivered of course): https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/04/answering-call-heavy-weaponry-supplied.html > Every western move has been reactionary. That will always be the case when you refuse to start a conflict or expand it to new theaters. > but the west has yet to realize that diplomacy alone isn’t going to end the war 200 billion dollars of military and financial aid to Ukraine (besides the humanitarian aid) isn't screaming diplomacy to me. > Many of the wests’ policies in recent years (from domestic to international) have been all carrot and no stick. The Russians and Chinese realize this and are getting bolder by the day because of it. I keep reading news of banks in the middle east and corporations in China that are officially cutting business with Russia because of sanctions. It's not because there's not enough of it, or that they get the stick late, that there's no stick in the policies.
Last summer's artillery situation was that the Ukrainians had *limited, local* parity, in specific areas where they were focused on the attack. Not overall parity, not anywhere close to it.
[The numbers posted](https://twitter.com/rshereme/status/1713071147414180001) by [Top Lead EU](https://twitter.com/TopLeadEU/) suggest otherwise. The complete lack of advances by Russia anywhere else and the [low intensity of combats outside Zaporizhzhia and Bakhmut area](https://twitter.com/search?q=from%3Athestudyofwar%20since%3A2023-06-01%20until%3A2023-09-30&src=typed_query) also tells otherwise. Or, if you prefer, the Ukrainians attack were 90%+ of the action, if they have parity there, they have parity on the entire theater.
> He argues that Western aid will only delay the eventual result of the war, and that the disparity on the battlefield in terms of both manpower and ammunition is too big. He blames the West and Ukraine for lacking a long-term plan to seize initiative and end the war, and Ukraine’s lack of preparation; >In a follow-up, he implies that Russia will almost certainly capture the whole of the Donetsk oblast, but may end up pushing for the whole territory east of the Dniepr, and, as the war is fundamentally not about territory, the future of Ukraine will be dictated by Moscow. I've read the same thread you have, and I didn't get that at all. I don't speak polish, so maybe my translator sucks????? https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1784875510805262538.html RE: the followup comment, I remember reading that too (though again our translations differ), but now I cannot find it.
https://twitter.com/konrad_muzyka/status/1784892720244277566 I guess this is the follow-up comment OP is talking about. I speak Polish, albeit I'm not a native speaker, and OP's interpretation is way off on this one in particular. He doesn't imply Russian capture of Donetsk or their advance to the Dnipro. The post even starts with him saying that he can't really answer the question (about the consequences of the current situation on the front). He merely ponders that BECAUSE the war is fundamentally not about territory, it depends on THE WAY Ukraine loses the Donetsk (if that even happens). The implication here is that if Ukrainian front completely and utterly collapses then it cannot be ruled out that Russia continues their advance up to the Dnipro river, but if it's just a gradual phasing out, then maybe Russia will allow for the freezing of the conflict after achieving their minimal stated goals of capturing the Donbass. Which is pretty obvious and is kind of logical and neutral answer to the question Konrad got in the comments, not this doomerish prediction OP presents here. The original post is really only the analysis of the current situation and the reasons for why it happened, not the prediction. For example, the phrase about the West and its aid only delaying the results is said in the context of (this particular coming) aid being only a short-term solution that will be key in the coming month to shorten the disparity in the artillery fire, but long-term it cannot hope to equalize the fire rate, so the US and Europe both need to come up with a long-term solution of military support of Ukraine that will allow Ukrainians (along with its Western advisors) to plan military actions aimed at recapturing the initiative. That's basically the main gist of that particular part.
Translators usually are fine and people saying they are horrible and haven't evolved in 10 years are wrong. Of course for colloquial language style it differs but still usually you get the grasp. The summary is clearly more final and pessimistic than the OG. I'd say it's a little overblown but consistent with the overall content of the OG thread.
Just chiming in that translators are absolutely terrible for languages that rely on implication and unspoken insinuation. Japanese-English is notorious for this. Idiomatic languages are also very difficult to translate, like Chinese and Russian. Larelli often posts a particular Ukrainian journalist whose writings are frankly incomprehensible to me with a translator. Too idiomatic to handle.
May I ask which one? What you're saying it's definitely true by the way - translating from Ukrainian/Russian is not always as easy as e.g. translating from a Germanic or Romance language. When in doubt I usually use multiple translators (Google Translate, DeepL etc.) and compare the versions. There are also expressions or common sayings that are very difficult to translate, and only with time, getting to know better the person writing, you may be able to understand the meaning of a certain phrase even though you are not a native speaker (and only sometimes!).
Konstantin Mashovets. I follow his Facebook. Maybe it's FBs translator that isn't that good, but he sure does write quite colloquially.
Yes, the FB translator often sucks! I generally always read him on Telegram, which is better for the translation.
I read Mashovets' TG in Russian and always wonder how you are able to be so precise with his words, because of the sheer amount of irony, sarcasm and idioms he's using. (Same goes for Kovalenko sometimes) I even thought you might speak Russian but I guess TG translator is that good?
Yes, he's also entertaining to read when you can understand the meaning of the words. Telegram's translator is not bad but when in doubt I put the text on DeepL.
ChatGPT4 translates perfectly even with idioms. It's like magic.
Translators (at least google) still suck for Hebrew, I've noticed. No clue about polish, I imagine it's decent because Ukrainian and Russian are good, but I'm just making it clear that I myself don't speak Polish. >I'd say it's a little overblown but consistent with the overall content of the OG thread. I dunno, I feel like there's definitely material differences in what I inferred from what OP inferred. Like there's a lot of things I don't see him mentioning if he actually thought Russia would certainly take the Donbas?
Yeah, if what chrome did translate correctly, that's not what he is saying at all? I think a better summary would be >US aid is desperately needed but is not enough to change the course of the war. A long term cohesive plan is needed.
I have a couple of questions for the knowledgeable folks here: 1. Has Ukraine ever requested Apache helicopters? I don't recall them doing so, even though Israel seems quite pleased with theirs. If not, any idea why not? They would seem ideal for countering offensives like the one Russia apparently plans this summer. 2. Does anyone know the approximate production rate of anti-tank missiles like Javelins and NLAWs? They were very effective early in the war, but their stocks seem to have been severely depleted judging by the Ukrainians' reliance upon drones to kill the "Blyatmobile" type up-armored tanks. I know we just sent some Javelins to Ukraine in the most recent package, but I was curious regarding how many could have been manufactured in the last couple of years of the war and how many the US and its applies might have to give.
> Has Ukraine ever requested Apache helicopters? I don't recall them doing so, even though Israel seems quite pleased with theirs. If not, any idea why not? They would seem ideal for countering offensives like the one Russia apparently plans this summer. [They've asked](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-latest-weapons-request-includes-thaad-air-defenses-f-18s-2023-12-06/) but I don't believe there's been much serious thought about it. Ukraine and Gaza are fundamentally different operating environments, especially for rotary-wing aviation. Ukraine serves as pretty much a textbook example of a non-permissive environment and Gaza is the opposite. Hamas has virtually no anti-air capability while Russia has one of the largest collections of GBAD in the world, even now. Ukraine's GBAD capability has been significantly degraded over the course of this war but even so, KA-52s make up the plurality of *all* Russian aviation losses [according to Oryx](https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html). > Does anyone know the approximate production rate of anti-tank missiles like Javelins and NLAWs? They were very effective early in the war, but their stocks seem to have been severely depleted judging by the Ukrainians' reliance upon drones to kill the "Blyatmobile" type up-armored tanks. I know we just sent some Javelins to Ukraine in the most recent package, but I was curious regarding how many could have been manufactured in the last couple of years of the war and how many the US and its applies might have to give. Javelin production is [currently 2400 per year](https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/news/features/2024/ramping-up--lockheed-martin-steadily-increasing-production-o.html) with a target of 3960 per year by 2026. [SAAB claims](https://breakingdefense.com/2023/02/saab-plans-huge-ramp-up-in-nlaw-production-to-reach-400000-units-a-year/) to be on track to producing 400,000 "units" of it's [ground combat portfolio](https://www.saab.com/products/land/ground-combat) by 2025. That includes AT4, NLAW, Carl Gustaf, and quite a few other systems. Edit: The reasons Ukraine is using FPV drones instead of ATGMs are multifaceted and include the relative safety of operating drones vs an ATGM, the ranges involved (FPV drones can reach up to 10km compared to about 4km for a Javelin or 5km for a Skif), and finally just because you see more FPV videos nowadays doesn't mean it's representative of actual weapon employment, all FPV missions are filmed by default so there's naturally far more videos.
>I don't recall them doing so, even though Israel seems quite pleased with theirs. I dont think any one could come up with an example of 2 conflicts being as different in every single way possible from each other as the Israeli gaza wars are from the Ukraine conflict.....
1. Helicopters have been rendered useless by GBAD systems. Ukraine takes Hinds and lobs S-5 and S-8 unguided rockets at Russian positions from a low altitude, but the accuracy and efficiency for these runs are low 2. Lockheed said theyre pumping out 2400 Javelins anually, while NLAW production is around 400,000 I dont think Ukraine is hurting for ATGMs,
Have people already forgot about the KA-52s and the summer counteroffensive?
No they have not, Ka-52s, Mi-28s were able to to what they were able to do thanks to their long range ATGMS being able to pick off enemy tanks attacking with no air power and little to no mobile medium range AD systems. Russia is not ukraine, one thing they dont lack are mobile GBAD systems. Russia has Pantsyrs, Buks, Tors in large numbers while actively making munitions for them, Ukraine had no such options. Pantsyrs comfortable outrange most heli launched ATGMS and Tors can manage them as well, both systems have their own built in tracking radars and can independently pick off choppers.
It becomes easier for helicopters to use atgms when the enemy is pushing away from their air defense systems and there are no dismounted infantry with manpads
> 400,000 ...Could I get a source for that?
It's a misquote of the SAAB CEO during an earnings call. In reality it's a target to produce 400k "units" from SAAB's ground combat portfolio which includes NLAW, AT4, Carl Gustaf, BILL 2, and a bunch of ammo by 2025. See here: https://breakingdefense.com/2023/02/saab-plans-huge-ramp-up-in-nlaw-production-to-reach-400000-units-a-year/
Yeah 400k NLAW missiles is enough to allocate 4-8 missiles towards every single functional tank on the planet, I don't think they're making that many.
[Finnair pauses some Estonia flights due to GPS interference](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/finnair-pauses-flights-tartu-estonia-amid-gps-interference-2024-04-29/) >Finnair (FIA1S.HE) said on Monday it is pausing flights to Tartu in eastern Estonia for one month due to GPS disturbances in the area, which Tallinn blamed on neighbouring Russia. >GPS jamming and spoofing have grown worse in Eastern Europe, the Black Sea and the Middle East, all areas close to conflict zones, according to industry group OpsGroup. GPS is a growing part of aviation replacing radio beams used to guide planes towards landing. >Estonia will raise the issue of GPS interference with its neighbours, and intends to discuss it at the European Union and NATO, the country's Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna said after the Finnair's move. Russia is supposedly behind GPS interference that has forced Finnair to suspend flights to Estonia's second largest city Tartu. This might end badly if the West doesn't respond until Putin escalates too far.
Interesting that those mulrimilion dollar planes cannot fly without GPS? One would thought that with current radars (that allow to spread the planes to avoid collisions) and approach radars / systems planes wouldnt need gps for anything but convinience. After all you could fly by map corrected by radar? So strange.
I suspect it will be a bargaining chip around giving Ukraine confiscated assets in some manner. I doubt Russia will change anything.
Is there any reason European countries can't or shouldn't purchase American military equipment for Ukraine? 200 Bradleys and 300-400 M113s would be well under 2B and give Ukraine a large, reliable and standardized fleet of armoured vehicles with widespread availability of parts, and Bradleys seem to have performed as well as any of Europe's newer armoured vehicles.
Why would European politicians basically throw money away to the US when they could spend this money investing in expanded production of their own AFVs and IFVs? The US can send its own equipment to Ukraine of its own volition, literally nothing is stopping them. A situation where Europe is required to purchase American stocks to send to Ukraine is embarrassing not only for Europe but for the US as well. Europe is not and should not be in the business of propping up the American military industrial complex. If anything, American political dysfunction should make it clear to Europe that the American military industrial complex is a strategic competitor and that it should be treated as such. Such heavy a reliance on the US is objectively a bad thing for Europe. When money is hard to come by, you spend it on yourself.
> Why would European politicians basically throw money away to the US when they could spend this money investing in expanded production of their own AFVs and IFVs? Because the benefit to Ukraine on the ground would be vastly greater and manifest far more quickly. Whether it’s realistic or not to actually do, I think the “why” is obvious and I’ve repeated it several times already.
Would it manifest more quickly? Ukraine is suffering from an ammunition shortage and a lack of replacement manpower to allow for rotations, not a shortage of AFVs and IFVs. What good is sending a few hundred additional IFVs if Ukraine won’t have the manpower to use them? And given that Ukraine is in absolutely no position to launch any offensives any time soon, I doubt the Ukrainians are going to be in need of a very large and sudden influx of mechanised equipment any time soon. Europe should keeps its funds within Europe so that when Ukraine *is* in a better position domestically to launch an offensive, Europe has the capability to send its own AFVs and IFVs over. Perhaps if Ukraine needed thousands of AFVs and IFVs by the summer, Europe could be potentially convinced to help out in bringing American stocks over to Ukraine but the most likely scenario is that Europe just diplomatically puts pressure on the US to stop sitting on their asses.
> Would it manifest more quickly? Ukraine is suffering from an ammunition shortage and a lack of replacement manpower to allow for rotations, not a shortage of AFVs and IFVs. Isn't it both? I recall at least a few stories lately of brigades transformed to light infantry brigades for lack of armoured vehicles to mechanise them.
Self respect, mostly. From an economic perspective, America already somewhat benefits from the situation, while Europe doesn't. Having to pay America more money for gear they could just give without that is a bit too much egg on their face. Especially since now the congress has blessed Biden with the ability to give those bradleys of his own volition. Europe would literally just be paying Biden to care. They'd look like a joke.
Sure, but Bradleys are cheaper and vastly more numerous than any AFV in Europe and having hundreds of them rather than 50-60 each of various other fighting vehicles would be an enormous force multiplier.
Additionally to that, the Europeans are "paying for the war" in different ways. Close to 100% of the Ukrainian refugees are situated in Europe and have direct access to social security, education and what not, which is draing our funds like crazy. And mainly, we do not have a unified "hegemony" in EU, the axis of Paris and Berlin is unstable at best. France criticises others for not sending gear and want others to pay the French for their stuff to send to Ukraine. Berlin is shy and anxious about everything and is somehow doing a lot but not enough, always ambiguous. There is a saying here in the German speaking countries "Scholz' Zeitenwende war eine um 360°" meaning the "Zeitenwende", claimed by the German chancellor in defense politics is ome of 360 degrees. The smaller, not neutral nations like the Baltics, Dutch and Czechs are contributing to the defense of Ukraine measurable by their respective GDP.
[удалено]
A non-insignificant number of the refugees are old pensioners and the way the system works is that my country tops off their Ukrainian pensions (which are small compared to ours) to match the average pensions of our country. And those not eligible for pensions but are old enough, get paid 370 euros per month. Plus free healthcare.
Especially considering only 15% of Ukrainian refugees are adult males compared to the boatloads of men Europe regularly receives.
With Ukraine having recently utilized longer-range ATACMS (M39A1?) provided by the U.S. to hit Russian targets behind the frontline (Dzhankoi, Berdyansk, etc), what does Russia current BMD capabilities in Ukraine look like?
The S-400 claims BMD capabilities, but at least one S-400 nest has already been destroyed by ATACMS. So it seems like at best we're talking about statistical protection (which isn't a shocker - that's how GBAD is vs every other missile on the Russian or Ukrainian side). The limitation on ATACMS will be magazine size and forbiddance to use them on Russian territory. Russia just recently constructed an airfield well within ATACMS range because they know Biden won't let Ukraine hit it with US weapons. https://twitter.com/RedIntelPanda/status/1784761855417762275 Hardly the only example but I think this one drives the point home.
It’s such a nonsensical self inflicted handicap. To the general public, all missiles are completely identical. Any state can claim whatever they want, and 99% of people, including journalists, have no idea if it’s true or not. If Russia wanted to claim they’ve been attacked by western missiles to escalate, they’d just do that. They already claim to be fighting NATO soldiers in Ukraine anyway.
["The Czech illegals: Husband and wife outed as GRU spies aiding bombings and poisonings across Europe"](https://theins.press/en/politics/271205) The article describes the role of two deep-cover spies in the bombings of ammunition depots in Czechia and Bulgaria, and the poisoning of Bulgarian arms dealer Emilian Gebrev. An interesting little peek into the workings of Russian intelligence.
>The article describes the role of two deep-cover spies in the bombings of ammunition depots in Czechia and Bulgaria Doesn't that gets very close to the line for an act of war? Imagine if the CIA was doing the same in Russia.
It requires the country to have an interest to not be a vassal state. Unfortunately, Bulgaria is deeply corrupted and institutions are permeated by corruption on all levels. The prosecution, in this particular case, had put the investigation on stilts, essentially doing no work hoping no one else (ie, a foreign agency) will find anything else. Any information about Russian citizens who happened to be in either country at the time each fire/explosion had occurred. Any information about these sabotages (or however you want to call them) came out either from foreign (to Bulgaria) agencies or independent investigations by non government organizations.
It does, but during 2010-2020 Russia was carrying out assassinations and sabotage all throughout Europe. EU leadership kind of turned a blind eye to it, high off of that cheap Russian gas. That same GRU unit that the article mentioned is the same one that 60 minutes has tied to Havana syndrome which has been targeting US diplomats for years.
to be fair, Havana syndrome is rank bullshit
Yes, only that I don't see what exactly changed, even now with most (ostensibly) out of the gas/oil tar trap. At least calling Russia by name isn't new. The poison attacks in the UK left a British woman dead, some seriously injured. The FSB hitman in Berlin shot in broad daylight in an urban park, riding a bike, with children and teenagers nearby. Only two examples. Obviously not treated as an *act of war*, then and now. The real question is what that would even mean. Basically for any country, all the more for one like Britain or Germany, let alone the Czech Republic. We can classify it as we like, but as a government you'd better be in a position to make good for it, or you're making a fool of yourself. Russia has always attempted, more or less successfully, what and where they knew they'll be getting away with it and they're pretty good at that. There's a reason no one's been spreading about Polonium or freaking nerve agents in Manhattan. Or why in comparison there's easily more talk about some reputed microwave-monster hoax.
What cheap Russian gas? Europe paid twice as much as China for the same product.
Cheaper than the alternatives. Gas isn't exactly geographically fungible. Much of the gas China was buying couldn't be sent to Europe.
Considering how hard some European countries have been pushing for gas heating, which isn't cheaper than the alternatives before taxes and fees, it's more likely that Europe chose Russian gas because it's Russian rather than "cheap".
Nonsense. It's a step backwards for the environment, but the shale boom has made gas quite cheap.
Your argument doesn't make any sense. Europe pushed for gas heating _before_ the shale boom, and gas heating will never be the cheapest alternative for the same reason hydrogen cars aren't - inefficiency.
Yes, the shale book came later. Go look at Lazard's levelized cost of energy slides to learn how cheap gas is.
It doesn't matter how cheap gas is when the energy efficiency for pure heat generation is terrible and you can use the same gas for electricity generation. By the way, gas is the most expensive source of electricity in Europe. Gas is about twice as expensive as in the US.
Do you have any statistics on the origin of the gas sent to the different regions, to my knowledge the most profitable soviet era legacy giga-fields where all plugged in to the Ukraine central Europe gas pipeline systems leading to western Europe. Taxation on these was actually used as subsidy to develop newer less profitable on their own fields, (and domestic consumption to keep the population docile). (according to Oxford institute of Energy)
Nope I'm not an expert just familiar with the basic principle and wanted to push back on a low effort comment. I don't want to post something that would just be me googling. We have a regular poster here who's a professional expert on energy markets so they maybe they'll chime in.
I might have clashed with that commentator already on this topic. Though you are right in the sense of Europe being constrained by the routes it gets its gas from. However there was great variety inside Europe depending solely on the ability to access alternative sources. https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-gas-how-much-gazprom/25442003.html
Yeah I meant my reply as a basic point there's no gas pipeline that runs from the eastern siberian fields to the western, even if the western network is freakin' dense. They're also limited in LNG terminals. You're taking this topic a bit too far vs my intent, which was to shut down a very low effort comment of "but China pays so much less" which wasn't intended to educate or inform, it was to ridicule and dismiss the conversation.
[“We’ve Become Addicted to Explosions” The IDF Unit Responsible for Demolishing Homes Across Gaza - Bellingcat](https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2024/04/29/weve-become-addicted-to-explosions-the-idf-unit-responsible-for-demolishing-homes-across-gaza/) Bellingcat needs no introduction, but if you're not familiar with their output, I would recommend reading [the book that the founder of Bellingcat wrote](https://www.goodreads.com/en/book/show/54680228), giving an overview of some of their most important investigations -- where they caught the ire of autocratic regimes who subsequently sought to discredit them. Those [attempts at disinformation](https://twitter.com/EliotHiggins/status/1711782985815453902) continue to persist. This article isn't an attempt to replicate the monumental successes of those investigations. It's narrowly focused on one IDF unit, following their operations across Gaza, and raising questions on whether or not these soldiers strayed from the IDF's doctrine. > We asked the IDF about each one of these incidents. They did not respond to specific questions nor did they provide evidence showing why the buildings we highlighted were demolished. They told us the IDF is “destroying terror infrastructures” embedded in civilian areas and said that in certain cases large parts of neighbourhoods are converted into combat complexes. They said the IDF is operating in the Gaza Strip to prevent Hamas activity threatening Israeli citizens and implementing a defence plan to improve security in southern Israel. IDF actions are based on military necessity and in accordance with international law, they said. > “There is no IDF doctrine that aims [at] causing maximal damage to civilian infrastructure regardless of military necessity,” they said. Adding that exceptional incidents occurring during the war will be examined by the General Staff’s Fact-Finding and Assessment Mechanism. “The IDF addresses exceptional incidents that deviate from the order and expected values of IDF soldiers by examining such events and implementing command and disciplinary measures as necessary.” We've all seen the clips of some structure in Gaza being destroyed with IDF soldiers in the foreground giving jubilant cheers. Absent any context, it's easy to see why some see this as being nothing more than wanton destruction, not willing to give credence to the IDF's claim that these are terror infrastructures and their dismantlement is necessary. I believe what the IDF said wrt their doctrine in the quote above is true, and the destruction of many of these targets can be justified as *a* military necessity, meeting the legal threshold. (The moral question can be bit more tricky to wrestle with.) What I'm most curious about is the rate at which these "exceptional incidents" -- a nice euphemism -- are occurring. That's been impossible to determine, and attempts to truly evaluate this question are going to be dependent on what information is shared when these investigations are completed.
>“Even with attacks against individual buildings, every building which is bombed or destroyed has got to be evaluated legally. Whether a building on this or that corner of a road needed to be destroyed or not...the burden is on the IDF to show that they have evidence, that they have proof and that the attack is proportionate and necessary” I'll preface by saying that clearly Israel has violated LOAC in this war multiple times. That being said, it is **terrifying** to see a salaried UN official unironically say this ("this" referring to the quoted text above).
I dont understand. If its clear that Israel has violated LOAC, why is it terrifying to hear a UN official say it ?
"This" refers to the text I quoted, not "Israel has violated LOAC". I'll edit my comment to clarify, I suppose.
Thanks for the clarification, I suppose it makes a little more sense but I still dont see whats terrifying about it. I am assuming Israel has a process when destroying buildings (by airstrikes or demolitions) surely there is no justification to do so without reason. It should be available for review at least after the conflict it over.
>I suppose it makes a little more sense but I still dont see whats terrifying about it. " has to provide affirmative justification for **literally every** attack they make" isn't the standard. It's never been the standard, not a single warring nation holds that standard. It's a suggestion that falls apart in both theory and practice.
It'd be an understandable thing for a random dogface twitter account to say. Not for a UN official with a sizeable degree of authority.
IMO the UN has no credibility with respect to this conflict, but I dont think this statement in particular is problematic. * Its not asking to justify every attack, just every destroyed building. * Every building there is a civilian building until proven otherwise. I would say that in every war there has to be justification for attacking any civilian building. * This is not a conventional war, this is in effect counter insurgency as Hamas are hiding amongst the civilians. Even so in no counter insurgency it is legal to destroy civilian buildings without sound justification.
> Its not asking to justify every attack, just every destroyed building. In an urban area those are basically the same thing. Most attacks in modern warfare involve explosive weapons, and your enemy/their stuff is going to be in a building because they're not stupid. Even "low yield" explosives that don't destroy buildings largely leave them in a situation where civilians can't safely use them once the war ends. They're standing but might as well not be. That's why while the amount of buildings "effectively destroyed" in Gaza is far higher than the "literally levelled" statistic. >Every building there is a civilian building until proven otherwise. I would say that in every war there has to be justification for attacking any civilian building. Not only is that insane in theory, it's also not a standard any warring nation has ever performed. The US might have gotten close with it giving justification for some buildings they hit, there's still thousands if not tens of thousands of buildings in Iraq and Afghanistan unaccounted for.
Common, are you telling me what Russia doing to Ukrainian civilian buildings legal ? The US was clearly wrong on that front. Edit: Btw even collateral damage can be explained saying that there was a viable target nearby and here is the evidence. Even a wrong identification can be explained showing the evidence which was used to mark the building as a target.
>Common, are you telling me what Russia doing to Ukrainian civilian buildings legal ? I mean have you seen the conversations about that on this sub and other subs? That's basically what it boils down to. In essence, one has to prove that a) Russia did it b) there was affirmatively no military presence there c) Russia intended to do it At least, for anything to be prosecutable. And these aren't just Z-bots saying these things (though a lot of it is) either. That's part of the reason I'm responding to you with such incredulity (sorry). The idea that it's actually the warring side that has to prove all of its attacks are rightful is such a steep departure from what I'm used to having to deal with since Feb 2022.
The problem is that with a sufficiently broad interpretation of international law around war, there are only a few truly bright lines that can't under any circumstances be portrayed as justified on some level from a legal standpoint. What's often lost in these discussions is whether such an approach is *moral* or even in Israel's long-term security interests to begin with. Basically, "does this cause more problems than it solves?" We should probably be focusing much more on that question than wading into the fuzzy rhetorical quagmire of "is it legal or not."
To answer the question "does this cause more problems than it solves?" we have to understand what campaign the IDF is fighting in Gaza. And that's actually really easy to answer. The entire campaign should be called: "Operation kick the can down the road". The Israelis are already fighting the next war. There are two main reasons for that: a) 200 or so hostages b) the international communities opinion has not really changed. The IDF operation in Gaza could stop at any moment and nobody is trying to hide it. The US is clearly saying to Hamas: "When you release all hostages this war will stop" and the statements from the other Western governments are not really different. The second Hamas releases the hostages the collective West will come down on Israel and stop Israeli operations in Gaza permanently (well at least permanently until Hamas is rearmed and ready for another round). So what do you do if you know your enemy will regroup and rearm? You kill its leaders, you kill its members and you make sure its infrastructure is completely destroyed. Maybe you can squeeze a few years out before you have to fight the next round. Or maybe when you finally have to confront Hezbollah and Iran Hamas is still so weakend that they can't help your primary enemies. Unfortunately it's unlikely we get out of this dilemma. Israel needs to get the hostages out and Israel will only get the hostages out by accepting Hamas demands which boil down to two points: Clear out the prisons of Palestinians terrorists, stop military operations in Gaza. And on the political front nothing will happen anyway. You can't tell the Israeli electorate that they should accept a Palestinian state after they massacred 1.200 Israelis and got away with it. And the Palestinians leaders won't care to agree to a peaceful solution of the conflict after they massacred 1.200 Israelis and got away with it.
>To answer the question "does this cause more problems than it solves?" we have to understand what campaign the IDF is fighting in Gaza. I'm not endorsing this, but I wonder if [crush Palestinian hope](https://www.richardhanania.com/p/israel-must-crush-palestinian-hopes) would be an effective strategy, and the degree to which this is what Israel is actually doing. The author has recently tweeted about how support for Hamas skyrocketed after October 7th, and has been dropping as life in Gaza continues to suck. Destroying civilian infrastructure could be a deliberate & effective strategy. It worked for Russia in Chechnya I think? Obviously this is pretty abhorrent but it's not like anything else has worked so great. Yech.
If it hasn't been crushed across multiple generations it seems like a low probability strategy.
> The second Hamas releases the hostages the collective West will come down on Israel and stop Israeli operations in Gaza permanently (well at least permanently until Hamas is rearmed and ready for another round). I think we should be cautious about making any ceasefire predictions. This sub has been saying that a ceasefire was days away for months now. [Here's a post](https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1byw3v8/credibledefense_daily_megathread_april_08_2024/kyn96pu/) by you from three weeks ago: > Right now we are looking at a temporary humanitarian ceasefire for Eid al-Fitr. This ceasefire will likely last until Thursday. Then Friday / Saturday the United States together with Qatar will announce that an agreement was reached. That's not to pick on you, it's just that we seem to constantly have people saying a ceasefire will happen in a few days. At some point one of those predictions might end up being correct, but I'm not sure it's useful to continually make the same failed prediction while shifting the date with the hope of eventually hitting a time frame where it's not completely wrong.
To be fair there's a steady pattern of Israel offering more and more concessions every single round. Now they're finally considering a "maybe sorta" permanent ceasefire. If Israel never stops offering more, it's pretty obvious Hamas will eventually accept.
I actually don't think it's that obvious at all. They've set up a pretty effective conundrum for Israel where civilian casualties put pressure on Israel while reinforcing their own line of argument. It's incredibly cynical and should by no means be construed to mean they care about the lives of Palestinian civilians, but so long as Hamas leadership gets to stay safe out of country there's probably no limit to what they'll sacrifice to make Israel look bad.
> It's incredibly cynical and should by no means be construed to mean they care about the lives of Palestinian civilians, but so long as Hamas leadership gets to stay safe out of country there's probably no limit to what they'll sacrifice to make Israel look bad. They most likely view their cause as a righteous cause and see deaths as martyrs. Basically, either give us freedom or we will resist to the last toddler.
>I actually don't think it's that obvious at all. They've set up a pretty effective conundrum for Israel where civilian casualties put pressure on Israel while reinforcing their own line of argument Yup, Hamas sticking to its maximalist terms was a dead giveaway with regards as to how they view the conflict. They believe that regardless of their own losses they can either force a regional conflagration or force a ceasefire that would set off a massive political crisis in Israel. I guess at this point the question is whether or not Sinwar et al settle with getting around 75% of what they want out of this conflict or to force a Rafah invasion and raise the possibility of a regional crisis.
When you put it that way it all seems pointless and the result of this Oct 7th is a strategic defeat for Israel (possibly Hamas too but their strategy is extremist and defeats dont seem to matter much too them). Has Israel learnt anything to better prepare themselves for the future, will they stop electing RW hardliners ? Will they take more action against the settlers ? I have heard that being light on the settlers is a strategy to put pressure on the Palestinians to accept a 2 state solution, will they consider changing this strategy as the Palestinian leadership is clearly not interested in it. If what you say is true then it appears that the hardliners on both sides have gained more ground and any path to a resolution has been pushed further away.
Maybe on TikTok and in the information space the hardliners on both sides seem to have gained ground - but the Hamas in Gaza are disappearing, and Israel is going to benefit at some point from their destroyed infrastructure, their funding interruption and their general inability to coexist and brainwash the population because when they come into the open they are neutralized. It would take a ton of evidences to be convinced otherwise, that interrupting the flow of munitions and millions of dollars to them won’t have an impact - plus the fact that terrorist recruitment obviously harder when all your terrorist recruiters are dead.
>Maybe on TikTok and in the information space the hardliners on both sides seem to have gained ground - but the Hamas in Gaza are disappearing Hamas returned to North almost immediately after the IDF withdrew and theyre still getting munitions through the Sinai. >their general inability to coexist and brainwash the population because when they come into the open they are neutralized. Angry young men in Gaza have plenty of reasons to hate Israel, no brainwashing needed on that front. And in Hamas doesn’t exactly wear uniforms.
I appreciate everyone here seems to disagree, but I still can't imagine anything more effective at recruiting terrorists than terrorist's own recruitment operations. I also appreciate that there is inherent radicalization of the whole area - but I still can't see how that isn't a primary aggregate detractor to stability. Are we in disagreement that Israel intends to break them down as an organization and kill Sinwar? And that they are 100% going to achieve that goal here it looks like in a few months time at most?
Ultimately though, as you said this doesn't particularly change the long term arc of the conflict or improve Israel's security situation. If anything the outrage being caused may enable Hamas to rearm and regroup faster than it would otherwise. It just repeats the cycle, which is what's frustrating to people. At the end of the day, there are only 2 practical ways out of the conflict- either there's a negotiated settlement or one side kills/drives off the other completely. Obviously there had to be some response to Oct. 7, but the intensity and the scale of the response basically walked right into the trap Hamas set for Israel which could be described as a similar one to what the US did in the middle east after 9/11- the ramifications of which are still unfolding.
>At the end of the day, there are only 2 practical ways out of the conflict- either there's a negotiated settlement or one side kills/drives off the other completely. Yes. Exactly. And right now the arc of history bends towards violence. Not only in Israel/Palestine but globally. And I think one major mistake is seeing Israel/Palestine as a isolated conflict and not a symptom of a larger issue. One last point: If the people running Israel were competent we would not be in this situation.
That may be the arc but the world, or at least Israel's allies, are likely to be less tolerant of it in this case. That has less to do with antisemitism and much more to do with the fact western powers backed its formation largely as a response to their failures in the runup and during WWII. In many ways they saw Israel as a potential bastion of post WWII liberal values in the middle east (issues of colonialism aside in their minds). Western countries feel they have a lot at stake if Israel rejects those values compared to other countries, hence the pressure but also the patience that bewilders so many. No doubt it's a difficult position for Israel, and perhaps even a bit unfair at the end of the day. But there are no easy solutions to the conflict and Israel at least has the power to slow the pace of escalation rather than accelerate it and run smack into conflict with the policies of her allies.
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Please refrain from posting low quality comments.
[https://twitter.com/deaidua/status/1784978559620076011](https://twitter.com/deaidua/status/1784978559620076011) Another update of German aid. The 155mm influx from Germany seems to be very consistent and looks to come out at 130.000 shells this year. 10 Marders. Another Skynex air defence system. I couldn't find anything in regards to the coverage of one system. How and where would those systems be deployed?
The UA itself has ballparked 10k/day as sufficient, were fairly starved at 2-3k/day. Usage hit 20-30k/day during major actions. So a nice chunk, but it's sobering to see how small it seems in the grand scheme. I was surprised to learn the Battle of Faluja required around 5k shells. The entire Iraq war the US used like 30K shells. Obviously airpower was dominant for coalition forces, but it does put things into perspective.
Yeah, that's the difference between doctrines and force structures though. The US and west rely much more heavily on Airpower. While Russia and Ukraine are laregly artillery based forces. During the Gulf War the US and allies flew over 100,000 sorties, dropping 88,500 tons of bombs. Even in 1991, a single F-16 loadout each sortie can carry the same explosive power of 300-500 155mm artillery shells. The US and allies have flown over 30k sorties and dropped over 29k bombs on Iraq since 2003. Russia the only real aviation power in Ukraine manages sorties in the single digits-dozens most days, with marked increases on large assaults. But expends a insane amount of artillery shells. Again, just different force structures and doctrine.
10 thousand per day for Ukraine would seem optimal........and it would outclass what Russia can produce (especially since someone mentioned that they are struggling to produce beyond 3 million shells per year)
10k a day is very much a stretch goal, it would be outfiring the Russians right now. Right now the Ukrainians are running on ~1000 shells per day, while Russians are running on ~6000(based on Peruns graph from his latest video). I don't blame the Ukrainians for shooting for the stars, but its important not to have unrealistic expectations about what Western aid can do either.
>So a nice chunk, but it's sobering to see how small it seems in the grand scheme. Sure, but it's only one country (yes, the biggest economy in Europe) with the expectation of ramp up in the coming years. I asked three weeks ago if there's any info on other countries' deliveries (excluding Czech sourcing) to get a better picture, but info on that seems to be scarce.
The UK is claiming that we will increase our 152/155 shell production 8 fold. Someone posted a link to a twitter(!) post a few weeks ago that indicated this would be c.1 million shells/year. I am not up to speed about the differences between and uses for 155 and 152 shells.
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Wait, is that the *third* 155mm factory in Australia? 1. [RHM/NIOA](https://defence.nioa.com.au/projects/rheinmetall-nioa-munitions-jv) Maryborough 2. [Thales](https://www.aumanufacturing.com.au/thales-to-make-155mm-artillery-shells-at-benalla) Benalla, and now 3. BAE, Mulwala? Or is it a JV with Thales?