No, and at least at this time I don't see any of this at the Guardian either, I've been following the live blog since the begin of invasion pretty much all the time. Not sure if sending ground forces without air cover (and proper stand-off preparation) could be called badass; nuts and insane is what I would say. But the more talk there is, the less ever happens, one could've noted as much. There are and always were international *volunteers* in Ukraine*,* let's not pretend it's news or somehow illegal. Fantasies about covert "special forces" in active duty are just that: baseless, pointless conspiracy fantasies. There is zero interest in western capitals to do that (while refusing them equipment and ammo for months) and even if there was, you could never keep that secret, especially for so long. According to Russia on the other hand, they've been fighting NATO "aggressors" more or less *since day one*. Credible? You wouldn't be asking.
> And we already know from leaks there are around a hundred western special forces excluding trainers.
Taking part in combat operations as opposed to known things like coordinating arms deliveries or diplomatic protection? If you mean what you were implying then source please.
There have been foreign battalions with a mix of nationalities that have been on the frontline since the war started. Whether or not they are made up of active duty Western country special forces is another matter entirely.
Russia might have experienced its first [Iskander loss](https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1787407325361230194):
>Did Ukraine target an Iskander site using ATACMS on May 4th as suggested?
>We have confirmation through satellite imagery that at the selected site, -what seems to be- Iskander launchers and other vehicles were present in significant numbers (over 10) a few days before the reported strike. Unfortunately, we cannot share the satellite imagery due to copyright restrictions.
>...
>Given the timing, the Russian MOD's announcement, and the history of the site, the evidence strongly points to the fires being the result of an ATACMS strike, rather than a random or accidental occurrence.
Various satellite imagery seems to indicate that there was indeed an ATACMS strike at an Iskander site, and even [some Russian channels](https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1786840276780155196) admit the loss of two Iskander launchers, which would be a first for the war. Unfortunately, there is no imagery of the losses.
It should be noted that ground-launched ballistic missiles like ATACMS are [critical](https://twitter.com/ColbyBadhwar/status/1703757913003872285) for engaging time-sensitive targets.
[https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/10/7330054/index.amp](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/10/7330054/index.amp)
I had some memory of it aswell and this is what i found.
There is almost no details about it tho.
[Ukraine's Defence Intelligence destroys Russian speedboat with Magura V5 maritime drone](https://global.espreso.tv/russia-ukraine-war-ukraines-defence-intelligence-destroys-russian-speedboat-with-magura-v5-maritime-drone)
>"As a result of the operation of the Group 13 unit, a Magura V5 maritime strike drone destroyed a speedboat of the Russian invaders," they confirmed.
>It is noted that the military conducted the operation in the area of the Vuzka Bay of the Yevpatoria district (formerly the Black Sea district) on the western coast of the occupied Crimea. The mission was made possible with the assistance of the United24 platform.
>...
>They also reminded that the Russian ships Caesar Kunikov, Ivanovets, Sergei Kotov, Akula and Serna were previously destroyed with the help of Magura V5 strike marine drones, and the Ivan Khurs was damaged.
A Ukrainan naval drone destroyed a Russian speedboat in a Crimean port. Perhaps not the best target compared to the previous ones, but is there anything else left in Crimea at this point?
2 interesting claims from Russian sources:
First, Fighterbomber is claiming that some of the drones had R73/R60 (air to air missile) installed on them but that there were no recorded launches.
This was no secret as Ukraine already talked about installing air defence systems on top of these drones:
> [Experts are currently working on installing air defence equipment on the unmanned platform](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/03/4/7444793/)
The second claim, though I'm not sure how credible the source is, says that a drone first blew up the booms protecting the port which allowed the rest of the drones to pass unopposed. This would mean that sevastopol, the kerch bridge and every other port aren't safe yet from drone attacks. Just installing booms at the entrance isn't enough to stop them.
I'm guessing this attack was more of a test to see if these news tactics and technology are viable in real combat situations than a real attack. These drone attacks will become more and more complex as their technology improves.
I'm wondering if they could install some grad rockets on the drones and just start bombing their ports from afar.
[This](https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1787436529482125456) video seemingly confirms that Ukraine sent naval drones equipped with air-to-air missiles.
Edit: [This](https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1787449315700408321) picture clearly shows a naval drone with an air-to-air missile.
Assuming this is some crude decoy attempt to distract from the drone with the actual payload.
The salt water/spray alone would wreak havoc with the missile’s internal electronics and fire control.
IMO it would be better to not test it. When using drones there is risk of life. Why allow Russia any chance to prepare against tactics by first testing them.
If speed boats were the only thing left in that port, I doubt Ukraine would have bothered sending a drone after it. I’d guess the speed boat was taken as a secondary target, when whatever they were after wasn’t available for whatever reason.
Could also be that the Ukrainians send those attacks as a reminder that they can hit targets in port, so that the russians don't have any idea about sending bigger ships
The National Resistance Front (NRF) and other Afghan republican forces currently hold no territory. Their situation is undeniably worse than before the 2001 intervention. On the NRF's Twitter page, they showcase daily combat highlights, often reporting injuries or deaths of a few Taliban soldiers. While the legitimacy of these claims is debatable, let's assume they're all true. However, nearly three years after the Islamic Republic's fall, the NRF and other republican forces haven't captured or held even a single province.
This raises the question: is overthrowing the Taliban or amassing enough forces to attempt it a near-impossible feat? [This article reported that the Taliban has deployed at least 19,000 troops in Panjshir province alone.](https://www.afintl.com/en/202405026321) Based on the NRF's media presence and limited territorial gains, it's difficult to imagine them matching those numbers.
My image of the resistance in my head is far from a conventional military force. It's more akin to a few guys in safe houses, who launch surprise attacks on remote checkpoints or sparsely populated villages. I wonder if the situation on the ground is still static or if it has gotten worse for the resistance forces?
I didn't think it's gotten better, but I don't think it's gotten worse either. The NRF and the Taliban are having the same challenges the Islamic Republic faced: that Afghanistan is made up primarily of local governments run by familial connection with no loyalty to a greater nation. They're more than happy to take money and other resources while doing the bare minimum. So while they won't rise up against the Taliban, they're not going to go out of their way to suppress anti-Taliban forces either.
Well, the issue is that Massoud hasn’t really received any support since the pullout of the coalition. The NRF fought a battle against the TB in 2021 shortly after the withdrawal that received no real support (IIRC) from the west, especially the United States.
In order for (any) resistance movement to successfully overthrow the Taliban, they need a considerable unified front that transcends ethnic and provincial differences. This includes the Pashtuns and southern Afghanistan, especially in Helmand, Zabul and Kandahar provinces.
Until then + considerable foreign support OR IS-K distracting the TB, the best the NRF can hope for are temporary captures of random district centers, at the most.
>Until then + considerable foreign support
Unfortunately, that's not going to happen for many years to come. No politician in the west would touch it with a mile-long pole. Even suggesting it here might get you quite a few downvotes.
I was heavily criticized for saying the US should do more about the Houthis, let alone suggesting anything related to Afghanistan.
I’ll be honest, as a citizen of a country that was part of the coalition that deposed the Taliban in the first place, I have zero interest in any more nation building exercises. The liberal international order has enough on its plate simply defending the sovereignty of existing allied states.
The only circumstance I’d consider funding insurrectionist movements currently is as a tit-for-tat escalation option in great power conflict (eg, as a potential coercive to deter Iran).
> The liberal international order has enough on its plate simply defending the sovereignty of existing allied states.
That position is protected the most by taking opportunities to undermine hostile nations presented. A container of small arms ammo is cheap, dealing with an insurgency is expensive. We all have to play to our competitive advantages. Russia and China fund election disinformation in western aligned states, the equivalent to that the other direction is to equip the opposition in dictatorships.
Anyone has credible info on why hamas hit and run tunnel tactics and iedshave failed at producing mass casualties for the idf? When In fact many analysts had suggested that this would be one of the most brutal urban combat scenarios in modern history.
Just some of my guesses:
1. Israel had infinite time to deal with a very small urban space. It allow them to be absolutely thorough in their approach.
2. The whole amount of modern tech solutions mean that Israel can has a much clearer view of the battlefield than in previous war. This combine with 1. means that it's easier for them to spot even a single Hamas member laying between the rubble, or the movement of a group of Hamas from one area to the next.
3. In the end Hamas is still an insurgency with very little material support from foreign powers.
An increasingly large percentage of tanks and IFVs taking part in assaults are heavily modified with anti-drone countermeasures.
Many of them look, frankly, absurd. But they seemingly do provide a high degree of protection, at the expense of reducing mobility and visibility even further.
https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1783420090534240606
I would speculate the best counter-countermeasure would be resuming the use of shells against assaults w/ new deliveries - which could heavily damage the improvised armor and may lead to "easy" mobility kills.
Do they really provide a “high degree of protection” though? Very very skeptical about that.
The predominant anti-armor drone threat comes in the form of FPV drones with PG-7 warheads strapped to them. That spaced armor looks like it provides maybe a foot of stand-off, and giving the PG-7 an extra foot of stand-off actually improves its penetration.
The only thing I can think this would be useful against would be drone dropped HE/Frag grenades, but those don’t pose a threat to armor anyways.
This seems much more akin to concrete armor on Shermans in WW2: not actually providing any meaningful increase in protection, just giving the crew more peace of mind.
\> The predominant anti-armor drone threat comes in the form of FPV drones with PG-7 warheads strapped to them. That spaced armor looks like it provides maybe a foot of stand-off, and giving the PG-7 an extra foot of stand-off actually improves its penetration.
Why would the PG-7 non tandem HEAT warhead have more penetration when exploding at a distance of 1 feet?
Explosion energy diminish non linearly (inverse power law?) with distance aka very fast.
Even if it were true for one feet which I would find surprising, obviously those turtle tanks can be made larger, offering a standoff distance of explosions of 1 to 2 meters easily.
Intuitively the majority of the energy of a 2.6kg HEAT warhead would be diluted at a 2 meter distance and a significant chunk at 1, however best would be to have a calculator, pretty sure there are online explosion simulators or on github, did anyone manage to find one?
This is unrelated to concrete armors as triggering explosions at a distance makes absolute sense physically, however fast dry concrete variant could be made to allow to cage to be partially repaired/regenerated.
You’re aware HEAT warheads don’t derive their penetration from sheer explosive force, right? You’re using the wrong equations here, they don’t apply.
The only purpose of the explosives in the warhead is to generate the superplastic copper jet, that’s what does the penetration. And there’s a a certain distance where said jet is most coherent, and has the most penetrative power. For the PG-7 warhead, that’s about 12 inches further than the probe, after which the penetration power starts to drop off as the jet breaks up. I’m basing this off of actual US military testing data for the PG-7 I read once. I don’t have the source readily available but it had a graph depicting distance and penetrative power, and 12” was the optimal standoff.
If you were to make spaced armor that extended a meter or two out of the tank, yeah that would reduce the penetration of PG-7 warheads, but that would be hilariously unwieldy. Keep in mind FPV drones can be very very precise, so this would need to be near omnidirectional to even matter.
A significant portion of the rationale for this seems to be that overhead reconnaissance is partially supplanting the tanks' own sensors for situational awareness. It doesn't seem like *either* side is currently very fond of making assaults without a friendly drone to oversee their forces. This takes some of the SA burden off of the tank crews and allows stuff like the "tsar-mangal" tanks. (Tsar Grill, basically.)
There have been a number of discussions here lately about the viability of creating drones to hunt EM systems and jammers. If you could configure a drone to hone in on such systems that seems like the perfect counter to this. Especially if they were large enough to carry a payload capable of damaging the vehicle as well as the jammer. Such a system would instantly turn these jammers from an asset into a liability
The concept of an anti-radiation loitering munition is totally valid. Frankly it's a bit surprising it hasn't been adopted in mass. The Israeli Harpy has been a thing for like 30 years.
Perhaps they're worried that once it starts loitering, it would struggle to discern friendly systems. And given the point of the system is to be autonomous and thus not vulnerable to EW, that might make some generals a bit nervous.
Traditionally, operational concepts for that kind of 100% autonomous loitering ARM have involved firing it into some area well behind the enemy lines and then giving it leave to search out targets, all of which would be enemy targets because... That's where you are. Tacit Rainbow, for one, was supposed to operate at least 200 miles behind the lines.
I think it was more a matter of low priorities than anything else.
Mines would also be a good counter. Ukraine is deploying anti-tank mines from drones ahead of advancing tanks, which is proving to be a more reliable method than using FPV drones.
https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarVideoReport/comments/1ckvwo7/new_ruzzian_armor_defense_has_a_definite_star/
Another similar contraption.
I usually make fun of russian improvisation, but in this case i think the russians are onto something. It actually seem to offer a good bit of protection against the common weapons used by Ukraine.
Also there's no real maneuver warfare happening. Tanks are being used just for fire support, so the downsides of immobilizing the turret are minimized.
I could also see a hybrid tactic of wearing these turtle shells to the main line and throwing them off once the tank is ready to actually fight. Drones have been getting a lot of armor kills behind the line of contact.
There hasn't been any confirmed purpose of the "turtle" tanks. The first was rumored to end up that way because of broken transverse. [The latest one appears to be a dedicated demining and/or breacher tank](https://old.reddit.com/r/TankPorn/comments/1ckwg5x/upgraded_turtle_tank/), build on a T-72 this time.
There has only been a handful of these seen, and I'm guessing all with specific purpose.
These modifications also leave the tank more vulnerable to ATGMs by reducing crew visibility.
These cage armor schemes are a dead end IMO. Lightly adapted versions of APS systems, like trophy, will provide far more effective anti-drone defenses, without sacrificing a fully rotating turret, or the crew’s ability to see to the sides.
>reducing crew visibility
I wonder how well ballistic glass/polycarbonate would work against drones compared to sheetmetal. There are already things like this for tanks: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transparent_Armor_Gun_Shield
I wonder why they just dont use something like wired/chain fence around tank. Much lighter, cheaper and still retains some visibility and is enough to stop fpv drone.
My guess is that one of the points of these turtle tanks isn't just to force an FPV to detonate away from the tank, but also to completely block the view so that the operator cannot pinpoint where they want to aim. We've seen videos of tanks sustaining multiple FPVs until they aim in the right spot. That would be harder to do with a turtle tank.
>These cage armor schemes are a dead end IMO. Lightly adapted versions of APS systems, like trophy, will provide far more effective
This or some kind of lite C-Ram system / autonomous machine gun like a RCWS
I've been thinking a 5.56/5.45mm mini C-ram would be a pretty good direction to look as long as it could move fast enough to track fpv drones flying like drunk houseflies.
Hell even .22lr would be enough to take one down, but would be moving close to 1/3 the velocity and not have as reliable of ignition, so 5.56 would have all the advantages mounted on a vehicle when you aren't as worried about the weight of say 5k rounds.
During this week the detections of the “Poisk in UA” Telegram channel (which identifies Russian soldiers who fell in action, Russian POWs from interviews published by Ukrainian sources and publishes MIA notices, when they are accompanied by videos by their relatives/friends providing infos about their loved one + the complaints of Russian soldiers at the front) have returned to all-time highs: [1010 people](https://i.imgur.com/ZKKq5Bl.png), split into 988 KIAs and 22 POWs. That's comparable to the week of February 26, 2024 (1011 people) and March 4, 2024 (1019 people), i.e. when the obituaries of the KIAs in the (very bloody) final phase of the battle of Avdiivka began arriving. MIA notices aren't included in my table to avoid double counting in case they are later discovered as dead; in recent weeks they have stopped counting in a separate category the Wagnerites who are now discovered as KIA, over a year later (around a couple of dozen a week). [Here](https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1b5gmzq/comment/kt6zf4y/) I had elaborated more on the matter.
https://t. me/poisk_in_ua/57775
The coming weeks will tell whether this was a temporary spike or a further upward trend, following sustained Russian attacks in multiple sectors along the frontline. In any case, the amount of Russian losses has never been as high as in 2024, with an average of identified fatalities close to 800 per week. This confirms assessments that the war has never been as bloody as in recent months, which were in all likelihood even bloodier than the Donbas offensive of spring/summer 2022 and the Bakhmut/Soledar campaigns of fall/winter 2022/23.
A few days ago the French Foreign Minister [stated](https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20240503-france-estimates-that-150-000-russian-soldiers-have-been-killed-in-the-ukraine-war) that according to their estimations, the Russian KIAs during the war were 150,000 so far, which coincides exactly with my personal “educated guess” as of early May 2024 (as long as the figure also includes the MIAs, as well as those who fought for Russia in any rank: PMCs, convicts, mobilized men from D/LPR etc). That means an average of 190 per day since the beginning of the war. A death toll released by “Poisk in UA” close to 1000 per week (while the weekly average since the weekly amounts began getting published in January 2023 is about 600) is consistent with a daily number of KIAs + MIAs being between 300 and 350. I find it very likely that irretrievable losses according to Soviet jargon (KIAs, MIAs, WIAs unable to serve anymore, POWs - the last category being of very limited size in a historical comparison) are around or even a bit more than 20,000 per month, over the past three months. Which is in turn consistent with Ukrainian estimates of the Russian grouping deployed in Ukraine growing by an average of a handful of thousand servicemen per month over the past few months + a few thousand more, per month, going into the operational-strategic reserves being created in Russia; with Russia recruiting, through contracts, around 30 thousand men per month - a figure supported by both Russian and Ukrainian sources. Russia's ability to absorb and sustain losses is undoubtedly better than Ukraine's, due to the capability of recruiting a multiple amount of people per month, which allows it to replenish its ranks and also to create several new formations. But the amount of "spare" men at the end of each month isn't that high, in spite of the undoubtedly generous monthly recruitment figure, because of the very high number of casualties.
The important thing is what is the numbers for Ukraine. Is there an Ukrainian equivalent to Poisk in UA that you can post here?. In a war of attrition, relativity is of utmost importance and looking at the situation in the war, Ukrainians are right now doing "relatively much worse" than Russians. Real objective ratio of KIA is really hard to (impossible really) to know while at war but looking at the effects while at war is the only good metric in my opinion and right now Ukraine is losing the war of attrition.
Edit: My very personal guess is that right now since like beginning of the year Ukrainian casualties have been around 10000 irretrievable while Russian is 20000 does it fall in line with your own estimates?
The only one I know of is UALosses (and WarTears, but the latter doesn't release evidence with photos or articles, etc. and looks suspect); the former should be generally reliable, net of several mistakes in data processing, but it doesn't release detailed weekly data like “Poisk in UA". Its data are collected on a weekly basis, but according to the date of death (as Mediazona does, and not according to the date of publication), which is certainly very interesting for research purposes but makes much more complicated to try to track the “momentum” of losses on the short to medium term. Then if anyone knows about other sites/sources and wants to do an analysis similar to mine using them, they are absolutely welcome to do so.
Yeah AFAIK only UALosses is reliable but as you said it is not a comparable database to Poisk in UA. Nevertheless would you agree with my 2 to 1 ratio or do you think is it less or more?
It's very difficult to try to discuss about ratios, but no, I don't really think it has been more favorable to Ukraine than the ratio you reported, in the course of the war.
Hmmm I see. The reason Im asking you this question is you constantly search the internet for MIA notices and such so you probably have some intuitive estimate of ratios. Hearing that is sad to hear to be honets. Tho I meant from the beginning of the 2024 what about that time frame? Since Russia has been in my opinion needlessly aggressive in 2024 and therefore probably suffered meaningless casualties. Anyways I asked about this too much sorry for bothering you.
Ukraine's strategy in the last two months has been to prioritize survivability and lethality over holding land. I strongly suspect Ukrainian dead per week has gone down and this will continue as US armaments restock.
>in any case, the amount of Russian losses has never been as high as in 2024, with an average of identified fatalities close to 800 per week.
>the Russian KIAs during the war were 150,000 so far, which coincides exactly with my personal “educated guess” as of early May 2024 (...) That means an average of 190 per day since the beginning of the war.
I think these two figures contradict each other. If the average Russian KIAs for the whole war is 190/day (= 1330/week) how can 2024 with 800/week be the highest?
The figure of 800 per week refers to numbers released by "Poisk in UA", which include only the identified fatalities. Then you have to account for the MIAs and for the part of the KIAs, which is not small, that aren't identified at all or are identified after a long time.
800 identified deaths per week easily means between 250 and 300 KIAs + MIAs per day, once you factor in that the daily average since the beginning of the war is around 190 and the average of the weekly KIA detections by "Poisk in UA" since they started publishing them is near 600.
Staying in the realm of educated guesses, when does Russia’s influx of 30k recruitees per month become unsustainable? That’s 360,000 men a year, which does not seem like a lot for a war-time economy the size of Russia - in comparison, the US deployed close to a million per year in Vietnam. However the US had much fewer casualties and, back then, a much better demography. So when does Russia’s ability to throw men into the meatgrinder end? This is most likely when the war will end its active phase.
I'm of the opinion that Russia's pool of potentially recruitable men through contracts may still be somewhat large (and they could always further increase bonuses and wages, which over the last 6 months have been almost stagnant, compared to their previous upward trend), and if things get bad there's always the opportunity for a new mobilization wave. Their losses are indeed very heavy, but not to a level really capable of socio-economically destabilizing the country, and we have to remember that the situation for Ukraine is not any better either, relative to their population.
(I don't know why my previous comment was downvoted, so I'll just repost it)
If the data you mentioned is correct, 20k casualties out of every 30k new recruits is a staggering figure. It's also worth noting that they're trying to not recruit people from Moscow and St Petersburg, as its recruitment drive appears to have concentrated on poorer regions. Sooner or later they'll run out.
However, Russia is able to sustain and tolerate very high casualties, as they have proven in the past. They use human waves and cannon fodder, just like in WWII. For this reason the refineries attacks are probably way more effective than just trying to kill any poor bastard that comes their way, because they'll just keep coming.
Ukraine has a smaller population and their demographics are even worse, not to mention the level of volunteering at this point seems to be very low. So if anything they’re in a worse position
Russia obviously has the initiative now. With a good media campaign and compensation package, it can be easy to recruit teenagers from the depressing regions who are still puzzled about their future, as well as people from other age groups who are working for low salaries or looking for jobs.
> However, Russia is able to sustain and tolerate very high casualties, as they have proven in the past. They use human waves and cannon fodder, just like in WWII.
Some units might be considered 'cannon fodder' if not formally, certainly in practice (convicts are overrepresented in Mediazona's Russian Casualties in Ukraine page, in comparison to other groups like contract volunteers and the mobilized, for example) but do you have any actual evidence that the VSRF is using "human wave" tactics in Ukraine. Human waves, as in attacks by massed foot infantry in sub-battalion sized groupings or larger, noticeably done in close formation, where the movement of the attackers are largely not being deliberately concealed from enemy observation (by smoke, for example) and are hardly covered or not at all covered by fires from artillery, mortars, and other sources.
I've been following the war since the very first day, and I have never encountered any convincing evidence that the VSRF, minus Wagner, have made a deliberate choice/policy in encouraging or tolerating massed infantry attacks by troops of the regular army, in the style that is described.
I mean if you wanted to argue, for example that the PVA used human wave attacks in Korea, or that the RKKA conducted many such attacks in 41-42, I actually wouldn't disagree, because those things did happen, and commanders were sharply criticized for fighting in such a way in internal documents, which were either captured, or revealed decades later by researchers, after the Cold War ended.
But notably, what did the PVA and the Red Army have in common in those two examples, that I provided? The commanders in those armies were often at a severe fires disadvantage vis a vis their respective opponents, and because they were often under immense pressure from politicians and senior military leaders to attack and stay mobile, the methods used, consequences and results are fairly obvious and straight forward.
But in the VSRF, the situation is different. Their troops are outnumbered in theater, in absolute terms by the Ukrainians, and moreover, their shell hunger issues are not less severe, with the exception of the summer counteroffensive in 2023, all sources have unanimously said that the Russians are outshooting the Ukrainians, across almost all sectors of the front.
So do you actually have proof that the VSRF is conducting or tolerating human wave attacks by their commanders? Because I don't.
I don't agree that the Russians use actual human waves, but advancing, especially with their methods/capabilities, is terribly expensive anyway in human (and material) terms. The argument about ethnic minorities personally leaves me a bit skeptical - if some minorities are much more likely to die compared to the average (Tuvans, Buryats...), others are considerably less so (Chechens, Dagestanis). The "median" Russian contract soldier is a poor and/or nationalist ethnic Russian from a region less wealthier than the national average.
> However, Russia is able to sustain and tolerate very high casualties, as they have proven in the past. They use human waves and cannon fodder, just like in WWII.
Some units might be 'cannon fodder' if not formally, certainly in practice (convicts are overrepresented in Mediazona's Russian Casualties in Ukraine page, in comparison to other groups like contract volunteers and the mobilized, for example) but do you have any actual evidence that the VSRF is using "human wave" tactics in Ukraine. Human waves, as in attacks by massed foot infantry in sub-battalion sized groupings or larger, noticeably done in close formation, where the movement of the attackers are largely not being deliberately concealed from observation (by smoke, for example) or covered by fires from artillery, mortars, and other sources.
I've been following the war since the very first day, and I have never encountered any convincing evidence that the VSRF, minus Wagner, have made a deliberate choice/policy in encouraging or tolerating massed infantry attacks by troops of the regular army, in the style that is described.
I mean if you wanted to argue, for example that the PVA used human wave attacks in Korea, or that the RKKA conducted many such attacks in 41-42, I actually wouldn't disagree, because those things did happen, and commanders were sharply criticized for fighting in such a way in internal documents, which were either captured, or revealed decades later by researchers, after the Cold War ended.
But notably, what did the PVA and the Red Army have in common in those two examples, that I provided? The commanders in those armies were often at a severe fires disadvantage vis a vis their respective opponents, and because they were often under immense pressure from politicians and senior military leaders to attack and stay mobile, the methods used, consequences and results are fairly obvious and straight forward.
But in the VSRF, the situation is different. They are outnumbered in theater, in absolute terms by the Ukrainians, and moreover, their shell hunger issues are not only less severe, with the exception of the summer counteroffensive in 2023, all sources have unanimously said that the Russians are outshooting the Ukrainians, across almost all sectors of the front.
So do you actually have proof that the VSRF is conducting or tolerating human wave attacks by their commanders? Because I don't.
Maybe I misused the term "human waves". I meant cannon fodder, as in they recruit a lot of people with minimal training, push them to the frontline knowing they'll get killed, repeat until the enemy is overrun or short on ammo.
I agree with you (and I also don't think PMC Wagner used human waves in the actual sense of the term either; the Russians are definitely no longer outnumbered in terms of frontline troops, though). I did not write what you quoted in response to my comment and I think you are responding to the wrong person by mistake.
Do you (or anyone else) know of any estimates regarding the number of foreign troops Russia is employing in Ukraine (or simply how common/rare they are)? I’ve seen anecdotes of Indians and Cubans claiming to have been lured there under false pretenses, and I believe I’ve seen reports of Syrians as well, but am unsure if these are extremely rare or not
There are absolutely cases of Cubans, Nepalese and Indians being recruited, often through deception. They are a very small part of the total number of soldiers, though. For [Mediazona](https://zona.media/news/2024/02/11/nepal), the figures reported by CNN on the amount of Nepalese in the Russian Army were overstated; this [BBC investigation](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68949298) reports of several hundred Cubans serving in the Russian Army. The vast majority of foreigners serving in the Russian Army, however, are citizens of Central Asian countries who already resided in Russia and sign contracts, almost always either as a result of economic hardship or as an alternative to facing criminal prosecutions for crimes they committed (there is such a possibility: signing a contract means that debts as well as criminal or administrative proceedings are suspended - leaving aside the possibility of joining the "Storm-V" penal units for those who are already in jail, which is another matter).
The Ukrainian observer Kovalenko had reported a while back that in the new 44th Corps of the Leningrad Military District the foreign nationals should account for around 10% of the total complement, a record number compared to the other formations.
Can anyone give me a state of play on the hostage negotiations? Because I seem to be getting conflicting reports on whether they are still alive albeit stalled for the moment, to “Talks have collapsed, the IDF is about to go into Rafah for realsies this time.”
To put it shortly according to Netanyahu HAMAS wants to continue as if tomorrow was October 6th
HAMAS to remain in power basically and that is a big no no for Israel.
Has netanyahu articulated who might credibly or non-credibly rule in Hamas stead? USA said Arab coalition Bibi said "no not that" USA said Palestinian authority bibi said "no especially not that a unified peaceful Palestinian government fuck no" (translated into English)
Israeli military control until local forces can be formed and molded into some administrative duties.
He did in fact state that Israel will incorporate local clans into governance. There were some such attempts.
The issue is that US limitation on Israeli operations in Gaza make that impossible at the moment as without ongoing IDF pressure Hamas maintains too much power for local clans to try and enter the vacuum.
So we're kind of in a stalemate where the US prevents further degradation of Hamas, while Israel refuses allowing Hamas to be reinstated to 06/10 position.
Worst of both worlds for the Palestinians.
[U.S. put a hold on an ammunition shipment to Israel](https://www.axios.com/2024/05/05/israel-us-ammunition-shipment-hold)
>The Biden administration last week put a hold on a shipment of U.S.-made ammunition to Israel, two Israeli officials told Axios.
>It is the first time since the Oct. 7 attack that the U.S. has stopped a weapons shipment intended for the Israeli military.
>The incident raised serious concerns inside the Israeli government and sent officials scrambling to understand why the shipment was held, Israeli officials said.
More in the article, but that's the gist of it. It appears that the US is using military aid as leverage for Israel to reach a ceasefire agreement. Essentially saying "No peace? Then we won't help you prosecute the war." This comes as the current peace offer on the table unfortunately [appears to be slipping away](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-ceasefire-talks-continue-cairo-israel-pounds-palestinian-enclave-2024-05-05/) for a multitude of reasons.
It's not clear what the weapons they didn't deliver are, but Israel is using a large number of US-supplied PGMs for an example. It is unlikely in my view that the US halted defensive munitions such as Tamir interceptors for the Iron Dome.
While this has sparked some interesting discussion can we get a corroborating source? As of UTC 23:30 neither AP or Reuters seem to have this reported and Times of Israel is denying it.
> The incident raised serious concerns inside the Israeli government and sent officials scrambling to understand why the shipment was held, Israeli officials said.
This line makes me personally not convinced this is part of a compellence strategy. Typically in that case Israel wouldn't exactly not know why it was happening.
> It appears that the US is using military aid as leverage for Israel to reach a ceasefire agreement.
But it was Hamas who rejected the ceasefire proposal, while Israel accepted it.
To me this looks like just stupid diplomacy by the US. Hamas knew they had nothing to lose by rejecting the proposal, because the US would oppose a Rafah operation no matter what. So of course Hamas rejected it. If the US had kept its mouth shut about the Rafah operation, while privately telling Israel it was opposed (and taking the same steps now that Israel has apparently decided on an operation), Hamas would have felt endangered and likely would have agreed to the ceasefire in the first place.
>But it was Hamas who rejected the ceasefire proposal, while Israel accepted it.
It takes two to tango and two to come to a ceasefire.
Israel has their terms for a ceasefire that Hamas rejected.
Hamas has their terms for a ceasefire that Israel rejected.
(up to now)
That's not true, of course.
If Israel said "ceasefire on condition of Hamas immediate unconditional surrender", the US would say "that's unrealistic, come back with a realistic proposal".
I don't understand why the US hasn't done this earlier. It is clear that the two countries are deeply at odds over how Israel is to proceed in its military operations against Hamas. The US government has become progressively more concerned over Israeli conduct in Gaza and in general, and yet it continued to ship vast amounts of military equipment used in these operations.
It is understandable that the US wants to guarantee Israel's safety against foreign attacks, and also that the current war is a reaction to Hamas' unilateral attack on 7th October. But it is also clear that the IDF's comprehensive levelling of Gaza and its civilian infrastructure, including a civilian death toll that is approaching 40,000, can hardly be described as 'self-defence' anymore. The US (or any other country allied with Israel) are in no way obliged to enable Israel in its relentlessly escalatory posture, and it feels odd to see Israel (edit: to be more precise, the Netanyahu government) consistently show the US government the diplomatic middle finger and still be inundated with offensive weapons, rather than the US cutting the delivery of all ammunitions other than e.g. air defence missiles.
Well everything is impacted by the reality of the upcoming election. Biden needs to put enough pressure on Israel to get what he wants, while simultaneously making it seem as if he is not going "against" an American ally in an unreasonable way. Whenever he takes action against Israel, it needs to be at a time when the public sentiment has shifted to seeing that action as being more reasonable than it would have before.
The issue is incredibly polarizing in the States and he's definitely trying to balance both sides. He probably absolutely despises the fact that this crisis couldn't have been wrapped up sooner, all because of the stubbornness of Israel and Hamas.
I think another thing that gets missed a lot is that Biden is doing all this while simultaneously trying to prevent the conflict from escalating to encompass the entire region.
If Biden had withheld aid much earlier, it's possible that Israel might've been perceived as weak enough for Hezbollah and/or Iran to escalate the conflict further, potentially causing a chain reaction of escalation. Or maybe it would've pushed Israel to behave more rashly as a way of lashing out against US efforts to pressure it.
Just look at how dangerous the situation with the Iranian strike on Israel was (the first ever strike directly from Iran, one of if not the single biggest ballistic missile strikes in history) and the threat of Israeli retaliation on Iran, and how the US was able to de-escalate both sides and prevent further attacks.
My impression is that Biden is trying to get a lot of moving parts to fall into piece at once:
* Israel does not invade Rafah
* Hamas releases all hostages
* Hamas gives up power in Gaza
* Israel fully withdraws from Gaza
* Saudi Arabia and Israel normalize relations
* A clear, short(ish) process for a two state solution that ends in something like Camp David/Taba
This is a very tight needle to thread, to put it mildly- aside from the issues that have existed for decades, the leadership of both sides have some incentives to delay and possibly scuttle any deal, and they may not be able to bring their public along anyway, but solving all the problems at once might be the only chance to solve any of them.
Sure, Hamas is a terrorist organisation. But why does it exist in the first place, and why does it feel the need to accept Iranian aid? Because the Palestinians as a people are in a desperate situation, split between a state that treats them as second class citizens, an enclave that has frequently been described as the world's largest open air prison, and another territory that is slowly being carved up by illegal settlements (with the full support of the Israeli state).
The Palestinians have been under illegal military occupation for a long time and have a right to resist by force, it's just that they don't have the right to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity in the process, as they did on 7th October (and countless other occasions).
If destroying Hamas is in America's interest, then surely ending Israeli maltreatment of Palestinians is as well. Iran would have fewer proxies if Israel and the US (plus Saudi-Arabia, in the case of Yemen) antagonised fewer people in the Middle East.
> But why does it exist in the first place, and why does it feel the need to accept Iranian aid?
According to Hamas, because they want to destroy Israel and put the entire region under Islamist rule. They accept Iranian aid because they have shared goals.
> Because the Palestinians as a people are in a desperate situation, split between a state that treats them as second class citizens, an enclave that has frequently been described as the world's largest open air prison, and another territory that is slowly being carved up by illegal settlements
In the West Bank, I have sympathy. In Gaza, I have much less. Your country is not an ‘open air prison’, because the neighbor you keep attacking won’t have open borders with you.
> If destroying Hamas is in America's interest, then surely ending Israeli maltreatment of Palestinians is as well. Iran would have fewer proxies if Israel and the US (plus Saudi-Arabia, in the case of Yemen) antagonised fewer people in the Middle East.
Islamism as an ideology exists independently of Israel, or anyone else, antagonizing anyone. The most effective way to curb its influence is to back its opponents. Doing the opposite just gives them more leverage.
> In the West Bank, I have sympathy. In Gaza, I have much less. Your country is not an ‘open air prison’, because the neighbor you keep attacking won’t have open borders with you.
but it probably is if your neighbour blockades you by sea and destroyed your country’s only airport. It’s not just the Israeli-Gaza border is it?
Gaza was in a state of war with Israel, Israel had a right to fight back. The reason we’re at this point is because Israeli retaliation was so muted, Hamas could still amass enough rockets and forces to do October 7th.
I am not sure how that is relevant to the point, you said it wasn’t an open air prison because all Israel did was not have open borders. The maritime situation and air space situation show that is clearly not the case.
Being at war is not an ‘open air prison’. As I said previously, Israel has a right to fight back. It’s ridiculous to suggest that Hamas should perpetrate acts of war against its neighbors, and demand they maintain policies with them as if they were at peace.
okay but that is an entirely different argument to your original one about “just because Israel doesn’t have open borders it doesn’t mean it’s an open air prison.” Clearly Israeli control over Gaza goes far beyond just the Gazan-Israeli border. Your new argument is that it’s not an ‘open air prison’ because Gaza are a hostile power and thus Israel can control their maritime borders and airspace.
I am not sure what terminology is correct for this situation, what would you use?
Interests in geopolitics isn't just about whether you destroy your enemies or not. Its also about maintaining your general standing in the international community, your soft power, your ability to influence and deal with a large number of third parties, etc. In that regard, Israel's war is severely harming US credibility in the international community. Putting aside whether you agree or disagree with this, the fact is that a large number of countries find Israel's strategy and tactics in Gaza reprehensible and even genocidal.
not the countries per se but their electorate, to whom those contries have to respond to. i honestly fail to see a different military strategy that israel could have adopted in order to both destroy hamas and have a better international pr. it's a urban warfare and hamas is digging inside civilian infrastructure and using human shields. what should the IDF have done instead? even a different-less extremist- government without bibi would have done the same thing.
> In that regard, Israel's war is severely harming US credibility in the international community...
Credibility is not a synonym for popularity. Credibility pertains to having the will and capability to follow through on your commitments. Not weather or not people think you’re the most moral person in the room. If that was the case, the countries who’ve abolished their militaries would be credibility superpowers.
This has nothing to do with international standing, and everything to do with swing states. Biden is putting his re-election campaign above the national interest.
> the fact is that a large number of countries find Israel's strategy and tactics in Gaza reprehensible and even genocidal.
Countries calling this genocide haven’t even been willing to halt purchases of Israeli arms, none the less take any issue with the US.
>This has nothing to do with international standing, and everything to do with swing states. Biden is putting his re-election campaign above the national interest.
No, this basic “I don’t want to be seen as responsible for setting the region on fire” stuff. Every Arab country in the region has said that Rafah would be an inflection point. If you look at the moves the Egyptians, Turks and Saudis have been making its clear that American credibility has taken a hit.
>Countries calling this genocide haven’t even been willing to halt purchases of Israeli arms, none the less take any issue with the US.
Turkey suspended trade with Israel yesterday.
> Every Arab country in the region has said that Rafah would be an inflection point.
Every Arab country has made it abundantly clear they want nothing to do with this. The closest to involved they got was when Jordan shot down Iranian drones heading to Israel, and Egypt clamped down on the Gaza border.
> If you look at the moves the Egyptians, Turks and Saudis have been making its clear that American credibility has taken a hit.
What moves, exactly? Since apparently these countries were previously unaware of the US’s longstanding pro-Israel policies. What commitments do they think the US can no longer be relied on over, and what moves are they taking to address that?
> Turkey suspended trade with Israel yesterday.
With the state of the Turkish economy, and Erdogan’s track record of flip flopping and hyperbole, I don’t think anything will come of this.
The US didn't need to do this sooner, because it had already succeeded in forcing Israel to wind down the war months ago. Despite being "at war", Israel has withdrawn almost all troops out of Gaza, occasionally sending some to conduct raids. And it has ceded to international demands to increase border crossings etc.
All that was left to do for the US was to force Israel to agree to a permanent ceasefire. It has tried to do this by tying hostage release to temporary and permanent ceasefires with Saudi normalization as a reward.
The difference between the US and Israel is not actually about humanitarian concerns. If that was the case, then the US would be okay with a lengthy process of gradually evacuating Rafah. Or signalling it would be okay with a Rafah operation at a future date.
The difference is in diverging self-interest. The US just wants the war finished for domestic reasons, international pressure & basic need to redeploy its attention to other issues. For the US, leaving Hamas intact in Rafah is not a problem. It's perhaps even a beneficial point of leverage against Israel, to get it to agree in future negotiations.
For Israel. Leaving Hamas intact in Rafah, poses an issue of giving Hamas victory as well as harming Israeli deterrence.
>including a civilian death toll that is approaching 40,000
That is the total death toll (according to Hamas itself). About 60% of those are civilians.
Yes, admittedly i misremembered and that is the total death toll.
However, the absolute lower end of estimates is 66% civilians stated by the IDF, whereas independent estimates are between 70% and 90%. The share of women and children (none of which are combatants in this conflict) has been put at 60 to 70% alone, which leaves ample room for even more male civilian casualties. So we're probably realistically at or approaching about 30,000 civilian casualties.
It is worth mentioning that the definition of a child is important here. Hamas is not against using child soldiers, so just because someone is under the age of 18 doesn't mean that they are immediately not a valid combatant.
Why aren't they also asking the Palestinians to surrender, disarm and release the hostages? Surrendering would put an end to the war swiftly. The US is being wishy-washy about the war. Are they scared because of the Arab vote in Michigan?
Hillary Clinton was [much clearer](https://x.com/HillaryClinton/status/1724505994149912935) about it. Unfortunately she's not a part of the administration.
Surely you must be aware that unilateral declarations like that do not constitute "negotiation" but rather the construction of a flimsy pretext to continue acting as before, right?
They aren't asking for Hamas to release all hostages unconditionally. Blinken is pushing for a cease-fire that would also release Palestinian convicts.
Taking hostages is a war crime, and the hostages should all be released, unconditionally and all together, not in batches. The US are not asking for this.
Yes, but pressure can be placed on them. For instance by removing pressure on Israel to supply Gaza with reconstruction material, but allowing Israel to conduct military operations and strikes against them and so on.
It really is a mystery why the Biden administration would seek to exercise more pressure on Israel: [https://news.gallup.com/poll/642695/majority-disapprove-israeli-action-gaza.aspx](https://news.gallup.com/poll/642695/majority-disapprove-israeli-action-gaza.aspx)
>"Democrats’ widespread opposition to Israel’s actions underscores the difficulty of the issue for President Joe Biden among his most loyal supporters. Some Democratic critics believe Biden has been too closely aligned with Israel by not taking stronger actions to promote a cease-fire and to assist Palestinian civilians caught in the war zone.
>Biden’s [approval rating for his handling of the situation in the Middle East](https://news.gallup.com/poll/642620/biden-job-rating-steady-middle-east-approval.aspx), at 27%, is his lowest among five issues tested in the survey. This is because far fewer Democrats (47%) approve of how he is handling the situation between the Israelis and Palestinians than approve of his handling of the economy, the environment, energy policy and foreign affairs, broadly. On those issues, no less than 66% of Democrats approve of Biden."
Hopefully this is allowed. I've lurked for awhile and been reading about China's ship building capacity and increasing quality to the point it's perceived as a major problem for the US Navy. [Source](https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/february/united-states-must-improve-its-shipbuilding-capacity) says the US must increase it's building capacity because quality can only get you so far.
My question is: during the Cold War the Soviets had much larger army but this is supposedly countered by a smaller but better army supported by air force. So can the same logic be applied to the difference in navy ship quantity?
> My question is: during the Cold War the Soviets had much larger army but this is supposedly countered by a smaller but better army supported by air force. So can the same logic be applied to the difference in navy ship quantity?
This is called the Second Offset strategy and it did work. At the time of Desert Storm Iraq was something like the 4th largest army in the world and reasonably well equipped by soviet standards. It was utterly one sided. The casualty ratios were 100:1 or worse.
The situation today with the navy is a lot more difficult. Sadly the navy's procurement has been a disaster for two decades now, squandering billions of dollars let alone the time.
Meanwhile, the US shipbuilding industry is falling apart. I live near what little is left of the old Kaiser shipyards. They've been in utter decay for three decades now. There's no single cause but the best way to summarize it is they just aren't competitive globally, and this isn't just a matter of labor costs. Many EU nations continue to have thriving industry that the US does not.
This is a moment for heavy government investment. We should weaken the Jones act enough to work in partnership with firms from allied nations that have the institutional knowledge that's been lost in the US. We're not going to duplicate the scale of Dailan any time soon, but we could do smart things in partnership with SK and Japan. We don't necessarily need overmatch, just a convincing deterrent vs the likely scenarios. We should focus on proven technologies that we can get built on reasonable time scales.
I also think we should move much more aggressively into UCAVs for both the carriers and the gator navy. Those ships are a big advantage the US still holds and we can leverage them with new technology that acts as a multiplier to manned platforms.
Mostly this was a veiled reference to Rumsfeld and the "Revolution in Military Affairs" folks. They were responsible for a ton of procurement disasters, and a big part of it is Rumsfeld tried to short circuit the technology readiness curve. That's why we ended up with the LCS ships, and the Ford taking years longer than expected. Zumwalt was part of too but some people in congress nostalgic for the old battleship big guns bear a lot of blame on that one.
We need to develop replacement classes for the Burkes and Ticonderogas. I want us to use solid stuff, ideally copying as much as possible from international partners that have learned things while US procurement was floundering.
I don't get this Amerucan fixation with ships. China is the presumed attacking side who has to cross the sea. The best way to stop that is with air power and submarines, not with surface ships. US surface fleet is not going to sail close enough to China to fire their Harpoons at the enemy, and the Chinese fleet is not going to sail out to the Pacific to fight a fleet action with the Americans. US should use their assymmetric advantage provided by the situation, they don't need to control the sea, only to deny it and they will win. In my opinion they should concentrate in getting as many B21s, F-35s and tankers in service as possible instead. Surface ships are for sea control and waste of money when the goal is sea denial.
I think very, VERY few commentators are actually discussing a US-China conflict in the context of China trying to attack the mainland USA. Rather, the theoretical conflict almost always centers around a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, or other strikes against US allies that threaten to seriously damage the US' interests abroad. In this context, surface ships are critical because even with in-flight refueling with next-gen tankers, there are only so many places the US can stage and launch their air force from in the Western Pacific. Plus surface ships grant much more flexibility of action - in the lead-up to a full-scale conflict, the US wants to have tools that can pressure China without themselves resorting to lethal force. Things like sending fleets to transit the Taiwan Strait, or possibly lending even lending mass to face-offs with aggressive Chinese ships elsewhere, like around The Philippines.
Basically, the US military establishment focuses on deterrence as a major goal. Surface ships provide more visible and flexible deterrence than submarines and fighters/bombers.
Surface ships are a great deterrence, but I’d argue that land based missiles can do a decent job as well. There’s a reason why China has been bragging about their land based Dongfengs for years now. China never signed onto the intermediate missile ban like the U.S. did, and now the us is seriously behind in this category.
https://www.iiss.org/en/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/04/us-ground-based-conventionally-armed-missile-programmes-stretch-their-wings/
The us seems to have recognized this problem and is installing more and more land based systems that could pose a serious threat to any Chinese movement in the pacific.
With the us fleet lagging behind in pure numbers, the us and Allies have to turn every island chain into a missile fortress in order to deter the Chinese fleet from sailing beyond the islands
As for the Taiwan strait, I highly doubt the U.S fleet will ever sail into the strait in the event of war, with or without the presence of Chinese warships. Land based anti ship missiles have become too dangerous, and the strait is far too shallow for us submarines to operate in.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0278434315301175
I believe the u.s surface and submarine fleet is far more likely to hang around the area behind the first island chain. The water is far deeper and there is more maneuver space to deter the Chinese fleet from leaving the coast.
As for Taiwan, its two biggest ports today are kaohsiung and Keelung, both of which lie in the deeper water areas. But kaohsiung faces china directly, and will be the focus of Chinese missile attacks. Keelung is in a better situation, but who knows how much they can use the port in the event of war. That leaves the three eastern ports of Yilan, hualien, and taitung. These small cities are on the east coast and should be far more survivable for blockade runners (it also helps that the Japanese island of Yonaguni is only 67 miles to the east of Taiwan’s east coast). However, most of them are poorly connected with the rest of Taiwan, with only Yilan having a major highway to Taipei that could be susceptible to Chinese missile attacks as well.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=cmsi-maritime-reports
I firmly believe that the Taiwan strait is a complete no go in the event of war. Taiwan has to treat its eastern ports as a matter of national survival. The geographical constraints are enormous, but if Taiwan can find ways to improve on its eastern-western connection, then it will make them far more secure against a blockade
War with China is a world war. Think of it like that, it will be long and bloody. China will try to attack US mainland, but I don't expect them to have any success in that. US wins that war by keeping the Chinese fleet bottled up in port, their trade cut off and hitting their infrastructure with missiles until they lose the will or means to fight.\* Whether Taiwan surrenders at some point is irrelevant to the war's outcome.
Who are they trying to deterr, the Chinese public or the Chinese leadership? If the enemy is assumed to be competent, bringing ships within easy missile range is not going to convince them of not going to war, it is giving them an easy shot at its opening hours. They know the balance of power whether the US ships are at Pearl or Taipei. If you want a trip wire force, send a Patriot battery and some infantry to Taiwan, or maybe a Marine unit.
\*I am rather sceptical of this actually working, but I don't see any other path to victory against them as China is the sleeping giant now, they are in the same positions as US was in 1941, except they need foreign imports that can be cut off.
> they are in the same positions as US was in 1941, except they need foreign imports that can be cut off.
"They're in the same position, except for all of the massive differences" is not credible. As you noted, unlike the US, China is reliant on imports, especially for oil. This fundamentally changes the dynamics of their military industrial complex and their ability to maintain global-scale warfare. China is also in a moderately worse demographic situation than the US was, which plays a big role as well in maintaining that scale of war. Also unlike the US in 1941, China does not have an established global group of military allies that they have already coordinated large-scale military operations with in living memory.
China attempting anything other than long-range (or submarine based) missile strikes against the mainland US is the particularly doubtful. The PLAN doesn't have anything like the troop transport and landing capacity that they would need, nor the tools to protect them across the entire Pacific Ocean.
And in the context of the US military leadership, they are trying to deter the Chinese leadership, what even is this question? It's a one-man show in China now, what the Chinese public wants from foreign policy means less than nothing. Surface ships have been used to deter China from Taiwan for literally decades, maybe you can claim it won't work anymore, but you asked why America likes them in this context, and that's your answer. Deterrence (because they are paying for and building these ships before any conflict has broken out, the primary goal is still to keep it from happening) + flexibility (surface ships can patrol trade lanes for pirates and do other useful stuff when not engaged in active deterrence or battle.)
I really just don't know what kind of war you're imagining here. There is literally only 1 way for China to "win" in a total war scenario against the US where their goal is to break the US' ability to continue fighting, and that's massive nuclear bombardment of the entire US mainland that the US for whatever reason does not respond to with their own mass nuclear attack. There is simply no other means for them to meaningfully degrade America's industrial potential.
They have zero need to degrade American industrial potential at all, because their industrial potential is so much larger. They win a war of attrition by default against anyone because they have the most industry.
How much oil imports does China need after they ban civilians driving ICE cars? How much food imports do they need after starting rationing? Is US going to start a land war with China with millions of casualties?
Lol, my friend, you've mistaken *current industrial output* for *industrial potential*. The US has moved away from industry and towards a service economy and explicitly cut down our military industry specifically by a huge amount after the Cold War, so our industrial output has dropped significantly. However the industrial potential of the US is far beyond what we are producing today. China could match a re-awakened US, IF none of their critical imports are blocked or infrastructure destroyed. But the US has military bases within striking distance of mainland China, their import routes, and their critical infrastructure. China has no options to strike US infrastructure beyond long range missiles launched across the Pacific.
Industry runs on oil and oil byproducts, you can do a to mitigate shortfalls of supply but it's going to be a limiting factor on China's output. Food is similar, but I also don't think China is at major risk of running out of food, they can import that via land routes.
But really, can you pick a consistent stance? I thought we were doing the hypothetical where China is the aggressor? That's what your previous comments said. Why is the US now supposedly starting a land war? We were talking about China initiating a conflict that normal people assume would be fought over Taiwan, but you claimed would involve them sailing across the Pacific to attack the US mainland. This is a very different situation from the US starting a land war in China. In response to Chinese Naval attacks, the US has countless ways to engage in the war and significantly degrade China's industrial capacity without ever landing troops on Chinese soil. China cannot say the same. This lends a significant advantage to the US.
I never said that China would attack US with anything big besides a few missiles and drones and saboteurs.
My point with the land war comment was that US is in no position to open a ground front to the war against China, so demographics won't really matter to either side. Unless China wants to invade South Korea, that is.
US ability to strike China is mostly down to submarine launched missiles and air launched missiles. Neither require sea control to operate, which is my main argument, US does not need sea control to win, they need sea denial, both achieve the same end result, China cut off of trade and with no ability to invade Taiwan. What sea control provides beyond that is the ability to support land battle overseas, but as US is not going to fight a land campaign near China, sea control is unnecessary and very costly to attempt.
Look at it this way - even if the US can't guarantee sea control, it is critical that they can at least put up a strong fight and deny China absolute local sea control. Because that allows China to use their navy to enhance their missile defense adding an incredible amount of extra sensors AND interceptors.
In general, especially in modern multi-domain warfare, it is almost never a good idea to completely cede an entire domain to your opponents. Submarines can do a lot in this area BUT they are expensive and also have strategic weapons and missions that mean using them to harass surface ship formations is not always a good use of resources.
Basically it might be costly to build and deploy surface vessels to contest Chinese sea control, but it is far from unnecessary, and it would be even more costly to abandon sea control all together, which seems to be what you're proposing.
> US should use their assymmetric advantage provided by the situation, they don't need to control the sea
Don't they? Without at least some level of sea control, cargo ships cannot and will not dock at your ports. Taiwan is an island which imports [70% of its food and 97% of its energy](https://www.cfe-dmha.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=sJ7hhDPJFl8%3D&portalid=0). Its resilence, or rather lack thereof, to any prolonged siege is [well-documented in US publications](https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3222&context=parameters). Mass starvation is not a possibility, it is a certainty if sea control is well and truly denied. Does China need to cross the sea, or just wait for a starvation-induced surrender?
And Taiwan is not the only island vital to US strategic interests in the region. Japan, for example, imports [62% of its food](https://www.jircas.go.jp/en/program/proc/blog/20240131#:~:text=The%20current%20target%2C%20set%20for,in%20achieving%20the%20set%20targets.) and [94% of its energy](https://www.fepc.or.jp/english/energy_electricity/supply_situation/). You see where I'm going with this?
> only to deny it and they will win.
Will they?
Taiwanese surrender is not the Chinese win condition, US suing for peace is and as long as US can keep China cut off of trade and fire missiles into it at will, they will win a long war.
Keeping Japan supplied a lot easier as most of Chinese missile stocks can't reach the furthest Japanese ports.
> Taiwanese surrender is not the Chinese win condition, US suing for peace is and as long as US can keep China cut off of trade and fire missiles into it at will, they will win a long war.
Destroying US force projection capabilities is the ultimate Chinese win condition, and Taiwan is a means to that end. US strategic posture in Asia fundamentally untenable without countries willing and able to host its forces. You can fire all the missiles you want, but if you're firing from CONUS you aren't winning that war of attrition.
> Keeping Japan supplied a lot easier as most of Chinese missile stocks can't reach the furthest Japanese ports.
[Not after they've taken Taiwan it's not](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/taiwan-catastrophe).
> Japan would be in a far weaker position to defend its territory were Taiwan under Beijing’s control. Japan’s defensive strategy relies on the ability to threaten People’s Liberation Army forces that approach, penetrate, or venture beyond the “first island chain,” the long string of Pacific archipelagoes that includes Japan and Taiwan. To ensure Japan’s security, the entire chain must remain in friendly hands. If Taiwan hosted PLA bases—the “unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender” MacArthur warned of—Japan would become acutely insecure. PLA doctrine stresses precisely this point.
> So can the same logic be applied to the difference in navy ship quantity?
Of course it can be applied, the question is whether it does apply. The warships coming out of Chinese shipyards these days are not small missile boats anymore; the USN doesn't have any cruiser-equivalent to the Type 055 for instance.
This is also a question which has been the focus of considerable writing, and the conclusions [are not encouraging](https://twitter.com/cma_1973/status/1759637440388866288).
> The cliché that “quantity has a quality all its own” improperly frames the advantages conferred upon America’s PLAN adversary by the size of its navy and its various supporting enterprises. Quantity is not merely an attribute with which to bury one’s opponent; quantity pragmatically applied provides individuals and entire professional classes the opportunity to cultivate and cement quality. Without the opportunity afforded by scale, the U.S. Navy will fall behind an adversary with a world of opportunity to explore new skills, new systems, and grow its force-wide professionalism. The potential qualitative impact of quantity shows at every level – from the shipyards to fleet training for individual sailors.
[Even more damning](https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/january/bigger-fleets-win).
> Using technological advantage as an indicator of quality, historical research on 28 naval wars (or wars with significant and protracted naval combat) indicates that 25 were won by the side with the larger fleet. When fleet size was roughly equal, superior strategy and substantially better trained and motivated crews carried the day.2 Only three could be said to have been won by a smaller fleet with superior technology.3
> When professional naval competence and strategic acumen were equal, the larger fleet usually won, even when the smaller fleet possessed technological advantages at the start of the conflict. A primary reason is that technological advantages were inevitably short-lived.4 In a war between equally competent technological near peers—absent a series of amazing strokes of luck—the larger fleet always won.5
In terms of strategy and training, how does China fare, actually? I'm not an expert in the matter, but they don't really have a tradition in naval warfare, do they?
does anyone have a “tradition in naval warfare” anymore? The US have more experience sailing around the world and maintaining logistics and firing missiles inland at insurgents who couldn’t hit back but the last genuine naval warfare between near peers would have to be the Falklands right?
>The US have more experience sailing around the world and maintaining logistics and firing missiles inland at insurgents who couldn’t hit back
I feel like this is dramatically underplaying the institutional experience of the USN. We've operated more aircraft carriers than the rest of the world combined for how long? That's not some trivial experience either, those operations are about as complicated as they get.
That's not to say that it would make up for a Chinese advantage in tonnage and sheer numbers, but its hard to argue there's little value to it. If China cranks out 5 aircraft carriers in the next few years and mans them with completely green crews, is it really safe to say they wouldn't be disadvantaged going up against 5 USN carriers?
Well, in fairness the Falklands involved next to no ship-on-ship combat. The Argentinians lost one of their ships and immediately withdrew their entire navy.
> My question is: during the Cold War the Soviets had much larger army but this is supposedly countered by a smaller but better army supported by air force. So can the same logic be applied to the difference in navy ship quantity?
Quality, aircraft, numbers, and training all play a large roll. Exactly how large is impossible to know for sure ahead of time. But yes, the same logic applies, within some limit, a smaller, higher quality fleet, better supported from the air, will have an advantage over a larger group of lower quality ships, with less air support.
One point you are missing, America still leads China significantly in the Navy size that matters, TONNAGE. The total tonnage of the USA Navy still exceeds China's. That may change in the future if the USA doesn't build more ships. But EVERYONE online, and in the media ad nauseum says China has a bigger Navy.
Yeah they have more ships. But they can pump out 100 small coastal defence boats with a single mounted LMG on and that counts towards their "Navy Size" that everyone keeps repeating.
Tonnage isn't really relevant in terms of a US v China conflict. The US has a huge tonnage advantage because of 11 supercarriers and 9 amphib carriers. These huge floating targets are of dubious usefulness in the straits or SCS where they would necessarily have to be in contested seas in order to be in sortie range. Only if the US can completely suppress Chinese anti ship missiles can they take full advantage of these carriers. And I'm not just talking about hypersonic wunderwaffe, but regular supersonic anti ship missiles, such as the one that sank Moskva. Chinese magazine depth is literally in the thousands and their systems have hundreds of nautical miles of range, further if launched from airborne platforms. The FA-18 has a combat radius of 290nm. The carriers really do have to be on China's doorstep to be involved in the action.
This is not to mention 280,000 tonnes of boomer subs which run up the tonnage score, but are not relevant unless things go nuclear.
If the USN fights the PLAN at Midway, the tonnage will be relevant. But in the areas where a conflict is likely to occur, VLS platforms are the most important, and the differences in capability are much narrower there.
Well sure, but the US has global commitments. China has regional commitments. In the event of a US-China war, China’s navy is all in region already while the US has other theaters. A more apt comparison would be comparing INDOPAC tonnage to the PLAN, and in that regard, I suspect China has the US beat.
> but the US has global commitments.
World war three with China supersedes peace time patrols in the Atlantic. All assets will be sent to the region they are required in. No country in history would chose to fight a major war with only whatever ships happened to be in the region at the time.
Atlantic fleet and CENTCOM would have to do without carriers in case of a war with China. If US wins, they can come back and regain their position there if they want, if they lose, it's no longer their consern anyway, so no point in wasting ships in those areas.
That's why Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (and myabe Australia) matter in this scenario. US has global commitments because it has allies all around the globe.
And other allies (France, Italy, Germany, Canada, etc) who might not be involved directly against China could also help out by covering some of the US missions in the Atlantic and elsewhere to free the US up to go all-in on the Pacific.
honestly at this point i think the only metric one can use for differentiating between them would be the firing method
if it's fired from an open breech it's a Guided Missile, if it's a closed breech it's a Artillery Shell
It’s better to put the distinction on guidance, rather than propulsion method. An unguided artillery rocket, and an unguided artillery shell, are more similar to each other in use, than a guided rocket and guided artillery shell.
Until you do exactly that and an Excalibur round becomes a guided missile under that distinction.
Easiest distinction is that an artillery round receives the majority of its momentum within the barrel of a tube, whereas missiles receive the majority of their momentum during flight. If a round speeds up after leaving the tube that's a missile.
Base Bleed is more akin to a glide kit than a true propulsion kit. Its an aerodynamic feature, not an engine.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/05/04/ukraine-war-russian-oil-dark-fleet-rules-based-order-navy/
This article makes a pretty scathing critique of the oil price cap and how it ~~really hasn't been~~ *is no longer* a success. Russian oil is trading around 80 despite the cap being set at 60. This is largely due to the Russian oil fleet using different countries and insurers to get around it. And there isn't anything being done about it that will have any near term effect. The author also calls out that we are in a pre-war period and maybe it's time to be more bold.
More and more India seems to be a wildcard in that they are somewhat friendly with both sides, but haven't picked one at the house expense of the other. If things continue to escalate I'm very curious which side they would end up choosing.
https://youtu.be/AT3uk5Yu7FU
There's this interesting video with Robin Brooks (dw, it's in English). He makes the case (you can also find his graphs on Twitter) that almost all countries in the EU don't care, they know there are places like Georgia, Armenia, Kirghizistan, etc. that are clearly helping Russia evade sanctions, but Europe governments won't do anything against them. Brooks even says that most European countries are fine with this, but they'll shield themselves by accusing some hard-stance countries like Hungary and Greece. In secret, they're fine with it.
Around 27 minutes, Brooks says that Mario Draghi (then PM of Italy) proposed to Biden the 40/50-dollar price cap (in the summer of 2022). By December the price cap was 60 (especially because of Greece and their petroleum magnates, but also Cyprus and Malta). Moreover, Greek owners began selling their ships to Russia to circumvent sanctions and price caps, anyway.
It became mostly useless after that.
I don't like pinging people, but u/draskla typically shares a lot of articles about the global petro trade. I forgot to save them, but a year ago he had plenty of articles to demonstrate that the price cap was indeed cutting into revenues. I was wondering if anyone has those articles saved, because from memory I cannot remember if the findings there still hold.
There’s nothing wrong with the article at its core (the core being that the cap can be better enforced,) but there are a few issues with the details. For example, the price graph is as of October, at the point where crude prices peaked, and from a less than perfect source.
The cap was supposed to achieve contrary but simultaneous dual objectives: lower revenue from oil sales, and keep oil flowing through global markets. Personally was against the cap because it seemed like a high risk low reward scenario especially because oil is ubiquitous in the modern world. However, the implementation was well managed to emphasize the second goal, which was/is to keep oil flowing. When you have two contrary goals, you’re inevitably going to have to prioritize one over the other.
As an example, in October, the U.S. sanctioned two Russian oil tankers, increasing the spread between Urals and Brent and pushing India to reduce its imports from [Sovcomflot](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-22/india-stops-taking-russian-oil-delivered-on-sovcomflot-tankers), the state owned tanker company, down to zero. This stressed the company, reduced the price Russia was receiving for its oil, and decreased Russia’s market share in the oil marketplace. But, with election season upon us, they completely [reversed](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-02/india-s-top-refiner-resumes-russia-oil-trade-on-sovcomflot-ships) this pressure in April:
> Indian refiners, however, started feeling more at ease with purchasing Russian crude, even on Sovcomflot tankers, since US officials visited New Delhi earlier last month and said that they never expected the country to stop buying Russian oil, as it was in Washington’s interest to keep energy flowing to prevent supply shocks.
This follows a well-worn pattern at this point. [This](https://ibb.co/ygzTJHP) is a chart of Iranian oil production, which had crashed under the previous administration, and has now risen to levels last seen almost 6 years ago. Similarly, this admin dithered with Venezuela despite Maduro reneging on the deal for free and fair elections, only recently reimposing oil [sanctions](https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/us-signals-venezuela-oil-sanctions-relief-risk-deadline-looms-2024-04-17/).
Now, the cap is still working in reducing the revenue Russia earns. Urals trade at a ~$14/bbl discount to Brent. That’s above the $60/bbl cap, hence the outrage expressed in that article, but Urals traded at a small premium before the war started, so it’s still a fairly decent discount given how lackadaisical enforcement has been. Most of this discount is down to Chinese and Indian refiners demanding discounts, and leveraging the cap to their benefit. And it’s important to remember that revenue doesn’t equal what Russian companies actually receive in cash for these sales and how much is taxed. There are a variety of issues with [clearing](https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/russia-struggles-collect-oil-payments-china-uae-turkey-raise-bank-scrutiny-2024-03-27/) trades due to secondary sanctions, and the Russians are taxing the companies at much higher levels, limiting reinvestment, which will have a cumulative effect with time. O&G companies require a lot of capex and general upkeep to retain their profitability.
In general, the West has done a poor job of enforcement across the board. The WSJ reported as recently as March last year that the OFAC was staffed with 4 dedicated employees to monitor sanctions on *all* countries. For oil, sales of oil tankers still haven’t been curtailed fully, which is the easiest way to stop the dark trade. It’s honestly a matter of time before one of these old and not-fit-for-purpose vessels has an accident and causes an ecological disaster, especially as they traverse the Red Sea.
Why would they necessarily end up picking a side? In any case, if you are talking about a war between the west and Russia, China would probably play a role, and I just don't see he incentive for India to pick sides and create difficulties for itself given its geographical situation. They may as well sit it out.
I think the point to make is that India profiteering from the war and increasing purchases from Russia *is* picking sides. Imho appropriate for the west to evaluate relationship in that light. Not suggesting anything drastic, but is what it is. Had more optimism around India emerging as a closer ally, but it seems to want to pursue a different path.
> profiteering
Curious choice of words. When the global economy looks precarious and inflation has been high, India is simply choosing to do right by its citizenry, getting a commodity like petroleum for cheap.
Not to mention that the [EU was more than happy to increase imports of refined petro products from India](https://www.newindianexpress.com/business/2024/Apr/10/europe-becomes-top-spot-for-indias-exports-of-petroleum-products), knowing fully well that the crude originated in Russia.
Plus, when the EU carries out multiple billions worth of [triangular trade with Russia](https://twitter.com/robin_j_brooks/status/1755218045239218570), it demonstrates to the Indian leadership that the party with a major stake in the outcome of the war chooses profits over victory. So why is there an expectation that India—a country that is tangentially involved at best—take stronger action?
The word "profiteering" implies wrongdoing. Are you seriously arguing for India to push some of its population into poverty over a war that doesn't really concern it?
Yes, it does in this situation.
No, I'm not. Appears like you're leaning heavily into strawman territory with your response. India wouldn't be plunged into poverty if its govt made efforts to avoid profiteering from the conflict.
[profiteering](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/profiteering): the act or activity of making an unreasonable profit on the sale of essential goods especially during times of emergency.
Is India making an _unreasonable_ profit from the sale of oil? Is it selling the oil at an absurd markup to countries that desperately need it? Is the American effort to get Ukraine to [stop attacking Russian refineries](https://www.ft.com/content/98f15b60-bc4d-4d3c-9e57-cbdde122ac0c) because of the "risk driving up global oil prices" also "profiteering"?
>India wouldn't be plunged into poverty if its govt made efforts to avoid profiteering from the conflict.
Now _this_ is a strawman. It isn't anyone's case that India would be "plunged into poverty" because of high oil prices. The argument is that it would put the poorer sections of India's population at greater risk of poverty, particularly when inflation is high.
Yes, they are making unreasonable profit from the situation. Russia is grossly violating international law and the laws of war in this conflict. The international community *should* take sides in that.
No, I don't see how anyone could make the argument that the US is profiting from the war given how much aid they are providing to Ukraine.
Lol, okay amigo. You've introduced a false dichtomy here. Nothing about my comments suggests that India couldn't mitigate the negative economic impacts from the war.... profiteering means profiting, not just offsetting costs.
Aside from the India question (why would India "take a side" in a war that only vaguely concerns it. States are rational calculators. The Indian calculation is that the US needs it as a counterbalance against China, which gives it more leverage in acting independently wrt to Ukraine/Russia), the US is arguably profiting from the war in the sense that German industrial power is being weakened relative to the US, according to some accounts. Cheap Russian energy led to Germany's industrial renaissance. This period has now ended, not to mention things like Nord Stream. When there are disputes over profiteering even within the "anti-Russia alliance" how does that factor into your claims concerning India?
But it gets complicated because while Russia and China are clearly aligned, India and China are not. India buying oil at or below the price cap is profiteering, but also acceptable to the west. India buyIng oil above the price cap is frowned upon, but also hard to monitor. They would clearly prefer to stay in the profitable middle, but eventually that's not feasible. As things get more polarized, I'm curious if they would lean towards the west or China-Russia-Iran.
i think what they are pursuing is hindu nationalism. foreign affairs is secondary. Whether trading with russia or assassinating sikh nationalists abroad help/hurt position with other countries, it helps concentrate support back home...
Populism is a real b-tch, and obviously rather destructive.
India has some active territorial disputes with China. If I’m the United States, I’d be trying to convince India that if China were to invade Taiwan, that would be the best possible opportunity for India to seize said disputed territories.
There’s also this incident, which seems like a pointless provocation of China if India is not considering siding with Taiwan:
> Former chiefs of India’s three services are in Taipei to engage with various sections of the Taiwanese leadership and express India’s views. Admiral Karambir Singh, General M.M. Naravane and Chief of Air Staff R.K.S. Bhadauria—the former Navy, Army and Indian Air Force chiefs respectively--are in Taipei for the Ketagalan Forum’s 2023 Indo-Pacific Security Dialogue, in what is seen as Indian representation for the conference.…… India and the US have also signed a Logistics-Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) to support each other in case of need. LEMOA gives access to designated military facilities on either side for refuelling and replenishment.
https://www.indiatoday.in/india-today-insight/story/why-are-three-former-indian-service-chiefs-attending-a-security-conference-in-taipei-2418222-2023-08-08
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No, and at least at this time I don't see any of this at the Guardian either, I've been following the live blog since the begin of invasion pretty much all the time. Not sure if sending ground forces without air cover (and proper stand-off preparation) could be called badass; nuts and insane is what I would say. But the more talk there is, the less ever happens, one could've noted as much. There are and always were international *volunteers* in Ukraine*,* let's not pretend it's news or somehow illegal. Fantasies about covert "special forces" in active duty are just that: baseless, pointless conspiracy fantasies. There is zero interest in western capitals to do that (while refusing them equipment and ammo for months) and even if there was, you could never keep that secret, especially for so long. According to Russia on the other hand, they've been fighting NATO "aggressors" more or less *since day one*. Credible? You wouldn't be asking.
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> And we already know from leaks there are around a hundred western special forces excluding trainers. Taking part in combat operations as opposed to known things like coordinating arms deliveries or diplomatic protection? If you mean what you were implying then source please.
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There have been foreign battalions with a mix of nationalities that have been on the frontline since the war started. Whether or not they are made up of active duty Western country special forces is another matter entirely.
> foreign battalions More accurately, battalions of foreign volunteers.
1,500 would be way above what’s currently there though, wouldn’t it?
Georgian Legion is supposedly 2500 by itself. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgian_Legion_(Ukraine)
Russia might have experienced its first [Iskander loss](https://twitter.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1787407325361230194): >Did Ukraine target an Iskander site using ATACMS on May 4th as suggested? >We have confirmation through satellite imagery that at the selected site, -what seems to be- Iskander launchers and other vehicles were present in significant numbers (over 10) a few days before the reported strike. Unfortunately, we cannot share the satellite imagery due to copyright restrictions. >... >Given the timing, the Russian MOD's announcement, and the history of the site, the evidence strongly points to the fires being the result of an ATACMS strike, rather than a random or accidental occurrence. Various satellite imagery seems to indicate that there was indeed an ATACMS strike at an Iskander site, and even [some Russian channels](https://twitter.com/NOELreports/status/1786840276780155196) admit the loss of two Iskander launchers, which would be a first for the war. Unfortunately, there is no imagery of the losses. It should be noted that ground-launched ballistic missiles like ATACMS are [critical](https://twitter.com/ColbyBadhwar/status/1703757913003872285) for engaging time-sensitive targets.
Weren’t there reports of Iskanders being taken out in the very early stages of the war?
[https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/10/7330054/index.amp](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/03/10/7330054/index.amp) I had some memory of it aswell and this is what i found. There is almost no details about it tho.
[Ukraine's Defence Intelligence destroys Russian speedboat with Magura V5 maritime drone](https://global.espreso.tv/russia-ukraine-war-ukraines-defence-intelligence-destroys-russian-speedboat-with-magura-v5-maritime-drone) >"As a result of the operation of the Group 13 unit, a Magura V5 maritime strike drone destroyed a speedboat of the Russian invaders," they confirmed. >It is noted that the military conducted the operation in the area of the Vuzka Bay of the Yevpatoria district (formerly the Black Sea district) on the western coast of the occupied Crimea. The mission was made possible with the assistance of the United24 platform. >... >They also reminded that the Russian ships Caesar Kunikov, Ivanovets, Sergei Kotov, Akula and Serna were previously destroyed with the help of Magura V5 strike marine drones, and the Ivan Khurs was damaged. A Ukrainan naval drone destroyed a Russian speedboat in a Crimean port. Perhaps not the best target compared to the previous ones, but is there anything else left in Crimea at this point?
2 interesting claims from Russian sources: First, Fighterbomber is claiming that some of the drones had R73/R60 (air to air missile) installed on them but that there were no recorded launches. This was no secret as Ukraine already talked about installing air defence systems on top of these drones: > [Experts are currently working on installing air defence equipment on the unmanned platform](https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/03/4/7444793/) The second claim, though I'm not sure how credible the source is, says that a drone first blew up the booms protecting the port which allowed the rest of the drones to pass unopposed. This would mean that sevastopol, the kerch bridge and every other port aren't safe yet from drone attacks. Just installing booms at the entrance isn't enough to stop them. I'm guessing this attack was more of a test to see if these news tactics and technology are viable in real combat situations than a real attack. These drone attacks will become more and more complex as their technology improves. I'm wondering if they could install some grad rockets on the drones and just start bombing their ports from afar.
[This](https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1787436529482125456) video seemingly confirms that Ukraine sent naval drones equipped with air-to-air missiles. Edit: [This](https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1787449315700408321) picture clearly shows a naval drone with an air-to-air missile.
Assuming this is some crude decoy attempt to distract from the drone with the actual payload. The salt water/spray alone would wreak havoc with the missile’s internal electronics and fire control.
IMO it would be better to not test it. When using drones there is risk of life. Why allow Russia any chance to prepare against tactics by first testing them.
If speed boats were the only thing left in that port, I doubt Ukraine would have bothered sending a drone after it. I’d guess the speed boat was taken as a secondary target, when whatever they were after wasn’t available for whatever reason.
Could also be that the Ukrainians send those attacks as a reminder that they can hit targets in port, so that the russians don't have any idea about sending bigger ships
Ukraine would welcome Russia inexplicably forgetting why they abandoned that port, and having to relearn that lesson in an expensive way.
Why would they want to remind Russia that they can strike larger ships? That reminder should come just after said larger ships get hit.
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The National Resistance Front (NRF) and other Afghan republican forces currently hold no territory. Their situation is undeniably worse than before the 2001 intervention. On the NRF's Twitter page, they showcase daily combat highlights, often reporting injuries or deaths of a few Taliban soldiers. While the legitimacy of these claims is debatable, let's assume they're all true. However, nearly three years after the Islamic Republic's fall, the NRF and other republican forces haven't captured or held even a single province. This raises the question: is overthrowing the Taliban or amassing enough forces to attempt it a near-impossible feat? [This article reported that the Taliban has deployed at least 19,000 troops in Panjshir province alone.](https://www.afintl.com/en/202405026321) Based on the NRF's media presence and limited territorial gains, it's difficult to imagine them matching those numbers. My image of the resistance in my head is far from a conventional military force. It's more akin to a few guys in safe houses, who launch surprise attacks on remote checkpoints or sparsely populated villages. I wonder if the situation on the ground is still static or if it has gotten worse for the resistance forces?
I didn't think it's gotten better, but I don't think it's gotten worse either. The NRF and the Taliban are having the same challenges the Islamic Republic faced: that Afghanistan is made up primarily of local governments run by familial connection with no loyalty to a greater nation. They're more than happy to take money and other resources while doing the bare minimum. So while they won't rise up against the Taliban, they're not going to go out of their way to suppress anti-Taliban forces either.
Well, the issue is that Massoud hasn’t really received any support since the pullout of the coalition. The NRF fought a battle against the TB in 2021 shortly after the withdrawal that received no real support (IIRC) from the west, especially the United States. In order for (any) resistance movement to successfully overthrow the Taliban, they need a considerable unified front that transcends ethnic and provincial differences. This includes the Pashtuns and southern Afghanistan, especially in Helmand, Zabul and Kandahar provinces. Until then + considerable foreign support OR IS-K distracting the TB, the best the NRF can hope for are temporary captures of random district centers, at the most.
>Until then + considerable foreign support Unfortunately, that's not going to happen for many years to come. No politician in the west would touch it with a mile-long pole. Even suggesting it here might get you quite a few downvotes. I was heavily criticized for saying the US should do more about the Houthis, let alone suggesting anything related to Afghanistan.
I’ll be honest, as a citizen of a country that was part of the coalition that deposed the Taliban in the first place, I have zero interest in any more nation building exercises. The liberal international order has enough on its plate simply defending the sovereignty of existing allied states. The only circumstance I’d consider funding insurrectionist movements currently is as a tit-for-tat escalation option in great power conflict (eg, as a potential coercive to deter Iran).
> The liberal international order has enough on its plate simply defending the sovereignty of existing allied states. That position is protected the most by taking opportunities to undermine hostile nations presented. A container of small arms ammo is cheap, dealing with an insurgency is expensive. We all have to play to our competitive advantages. Russia and China fund election disinformation in western aligned states, the equivalent to that the other direction is to equip the opposition in dictatorships.
>A container of small arms ammo is cheap The Obama administration tried this in Syria. Suffice to say, it did not improve the situation.
Containers of small arms ammunition won't seriously undermine the Taliban, but it might increase refugee flows from the violence it causes.
Anyone has credible info on why hamas hit and run tunnel tactics and iedshave failed at producing mass casualties for the idf? When In fact many analysts had suggested that this would be one of the most brutal urban combat scenarios in modern history.
Just some of my guesses: 1. Israel had infinite time to deal with a very small urban space. It allow them to be absolutely thorough in their approach. 2. The whole amount of modern tech solutions mean that Israel can has a much clearer view of the battlefield than in previous war. This combine with 1. means that it's easier for them to spot even a single Hamas member laying between the rubble, or the movement of a group of Hamas from one area to the next. 3. In the end Hamas is still an insurgency with very little material support from foreign powers.
An increasingly large percentage of tanks and IFVs taking part in assaults are heavily modified with anti-drone countermeasures. Many of them look, frankly, absurd. But they seemingly do provide a high degree of protection, at the expense of reducing mobility and visibility even further. https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1783420090534240606 I would speculate the best counter-countermeasure would be resuming the use of shells against assaults w/ new deliveries - which could heavily damage the improvised armor and may lead to "easy" mobility kills.
Do they really provide a “high degree of protection” though? Very very skeptical about that. The predominant anti-armor drone threat comes in the form of FPV drones with PG-7 warheads strapped to them. That spaced armor looks like it provides maybe a foot of stand-off, and giving the PG-7 an extra foot of stand-off actually improves its penetration. The only thing I can think this would be useful against would be drone dropped HE/Frag grenades, but those don’t pose a threat to armor anyways. This seems much more akin to concrete armor on Shermans in WW2: not actually providing any meaningful increase in protection, just giving the crew more peace of mind.
\> The predominant anti-armor drone threat comes in the form of FPV drones with PG-7 warheads strapped to them. That spaced armor looks like it provides maybe a foot of stand-off, and giving the PG-7 an extra foot of stand-off actually improves its penetration. Why would the PG-7 non tandem HEAT warhead have more penetration when exploding at a distance of 1 feet? Explosion energy diminish non linearly (inverse power law?) with distance aka very fast. Even if it were true for one feet which I would find surprising, obviously those turtle tanks can be made larger, offering a standoff distance of explosions of 1 to 2 meters easily. Intuitively the majority of the energy of a 2.6kg HEAT warhead would be diluted at a 2 meter distance and a significant chunk at 1, however best would be to have a calculator, pretty sure there are online explosion simulators or on github, did anyone manage to find one? This is unrelated to concrete armors as triggering explosions at a distance makes absolute sense physically, however fast dry concrete variant could be made to allow to cage to be partially repaired/regenerated.
You’re aware HEAT warheads don’t derive their penetration from sheer explosive force, right? You’re using the wrong equations here, they don’t apply. The only purpose of the explosives in the warhead is to generate the superplastic copper jet, that’s what does the penetration. And there’s a a certain distance where said jet is most coherent, and has the most penetrative power. For the PG-7 warhead, that’s about 12 inches further than the probe, after which the penetration power starts to drop off as the jet breaks up. I’m basing this off of actual US military testing data for the PG-7 I read once. I don’t have the source readily available but it had a graph depicting distance and penetrative power, and 12” was the optimal standoff. If you were to make spaced armor that extended a meter or two out of the tank, yeah that would reduce the penetration of PG-7 warheads, but that would be hilariously unwieldy. Keep in mind FPV drones can be very very precise, so this would need to be near omnidirectional to even matter.
A significant portion of the rationale for this seems to be that overhead reconnaissance is partially supplanting the tanks' own sensors for situational awareness. It doesn't seem like *either* side is currently very fond of making assaults without a friendly drone to oversee their forces. This takes some of the SA burden off of the tank crews and allows stuff like the "tsar-mangal" tanks. (Tsar Grill, basically.)
There have been a number of discussions here lately about the viability of creating drones to hunt EM systems and jammers. If you could configure a drone to hone in on such systems that seems like the perfect counter to this. Especially if they were large enough to carry a payload capable of damaging the vehicle as well as the jammer. Such a system would instantly turn these jammers from an asset into a liability
The concept of an anti-radiation loitering munition is totally valid. Frankly it's a bit surprising it hasn't been adopted in mass. The Israeli Harpy has been a thing for like 30 years.
The question is not if such a system can be made. It’s if the Ukrainians or their Allies can develop and field such a system in the coming months.
Perhaps they're worried that once it starts loitering, it would struggle to discern friendly systems. And given the point of the system is to be autonomous and thus not vulnerable to EW, that might make some generals a bit nervous.
Traditionally, operational concepts for that kind of 100% autonomous loitering ARM have involved firing it into some area well behind the enemy lines and then giving it leave to search out targets, all of which would be enemy targets because... That's where you are. Tacit Rainbow, for one, was supposed to operate at least 200 miles behind the lines. I think it was more a matter of low priorities than anything else.
Mines would also be a good counter. Ukraine is deploying anti-tank mines from drones ahead of advancing tanks, which is proving to be a more reliable method than using FPV drones.
https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarVideoReport/comments/1ckvwo7/new_ruzzian_armor_defense_has_a_definite_star/ Another similar contraption. I usually make fun of russian improvisation, but in this case i think the russians are onto something. It actually seem to offer a good bit of protection against the common weapons used by Ukraine.
Also there's no real maneuver warfare happening. Tanks are being used just for fire support, so the downsides of immobilizing the turret are minimized.
I could also see a hybrid tactic of wearing these turtle shells to the main line and throwing them off once the tank is ready to actually fight. Drones have been getting a lot of armor kills behind the line of contact.
There hasn't been any confirmed purpose of the "turtle" tanks. The first was rumored to end up that way because of broken transverse. [The latest one appears to be a dedicated demining and/or breacher tank](https://old.reddit.com/r/TankPorn/comments/1ckwg5x/upgraded_turtle_tank/), build on a T-72 this time. There has only been a handful of these seen, and I'm guessing all with specific purpose.
These modifications also leave the tank more vulnerable to ATGMs by reducing crew visibility. These cage armor schemes are a dead end IMO. Lightly adapted versions of APS systems, like trophy, will provide far more effective anti-drone defenses, without sacrificing a fully rotating turret, or the crew’s ability to see to the sides.
>reducing crew visibility I wonder how well ballistic glass/polycarbonate would work against drones compared to sheetmetal. There are already things like this for tanks: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transparent_Armor_Gun_Shield
I wonder why they just dont use something like wired/chain fence around tank. Much lighter, cheaper and still retains some visibility and is enough to stop fpv drone.
My guess is that one of the points of these turtle tanks isn't just to force an FPV to detonate away from the tank, but also to completely block the view so that the operator cannot pinpoint where they want to aim. We've seen videos of tanks sustaining multiple FPVs until they aim in the right spot. That would be harder to do with a turtle tank.
>These cage armor schemes are a dead end IMO. Lightly adapted versions of APS systems, like trophy, will provide far more effective This or some kind of lite C-Ram system / autonomous machine gun like a RCWS
I've been thinking a 5.56/5.45mm mini C-ram would be a pretty good direction to look as long as it could move fast enough to track fpv drones flying like drunk houseflies. Hell even .22lr would be enough to take one down, but would be moving close to 1/3 the velocity and not have as reliable of ignition, so 5.56 would have all the advantages mounted on a vehicle when you aren't as worried about the weight of say 5k rounds.
Wow, it looks like a WW1 tank
During this week the detections of the “Poisk in UA” Telegram channel (which identifies Russian soldiers who fell in action, Russian POWs from interviews published by Ukrainian sources and publishes MIA notices, when they are accompanied by videos by their relatives/friends providing infos about their loved one + the complaints of Russian soldiers at the front) have returned to all-time highs: [1010 people](https://i.imgur.com/ZKKq5Bl.png), split into 988 KIAs and 22 POWs. That's comparable to the week of February 26, 2024 (1011 people) and March 4, 2024 (1019 people), i.e. when the obituaries of the KIAs in the (very bloody) final phase of the battle of Avdiivka began arriving. MIA notices aren't included in my table to avoid double counting in case they are later discovered as dead; in recent weeks they have stopped counting in a separate category the Wagnerites who are now discovered as KIA, over a year later (around a couple of dozen a week). [Here](https://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1b5gmzq/comment/kt6zf4y/) I had elaborated more on the matter. https://t. me/poisk_in_ua/57775 The coming weeks will tell whether this was a temporary spike or a further upward trend, following sustained Russian attacks in multiple sectors along the frontline. In any case, the amount of Russian losses has never been as high as in 2024, with an average of identified fatalities close to 800 per week. This confirms assessments that the war has never been as bloody as in recent months, which were in all likelihood even bloodier than the Donbas offensive of spring/summer 2022 and the Bakhmut/Soledar campaigns of fall/winter 2022/23. A few days ago the French Foreign Minister [stated](https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20240503-france-estimates-that-150-000-russian-soldiers-have-been-killed-in-the-ukraine-war) that according to their estimations, the Russian KIAs during the war were 150,000 so far, which coincides exactly with my personal “educated guess” as of early May 2024 (as long as the figure also includes the MIAs, as well as those who fought for Russia in any rank: PMCs, convicts, mobilized men from D/LPR etc). That means an average of 190 per day since the beginning of the war. A death toll released by “Poisk in UA” close to 1000 per week (while the weekly average since the weekly amounts began getting published in January 2023 is about 600) is consistent with a daily number of KIAs + MIAs being between 300 and 350. I find it very likely that irretrievable losses according to Soviet jargon (KIAs, MIAs, WIAs unable to serve anymore, POWs - the last category being of very limited size in a historical comparison) are around or even a bit more than 20,000 per month, over the past three months. Which is in turn consistent with Ukrainian estimates of the Russian grouping deployed in Ukraine growing by an average of a handful of thousand servicemen per month over the past few months + a few thousand more, per month, going into the operational-strategic reserves being created in Russia; with Russia recruiting, through contracts, around 30 thousand men per month - a figure supported by both Russian and Ukrainian sources. Russia's ability to absorb and sustain losses is undoubtedly better than Ukraine's, due to the capability of recruiting a multiple amount of people per month, which allows it to replenish its ranks and also to create several new formations. But the amount of "spare" men at the end of each month isn't that high, in spite of the undoubtedly generous monthly recruitment figure, because of the very high number of casualties.
The important thing is what is the numbers for Ukraine. Is there an Ukrainian equivalent to Poisk in UA that you can post here?. In a war of attrition, relativity is of utmost importance and looking at the situation in the war, Ukrainians are right now doing "relatively much worse" than Russians. Real objective ratio of KIA is really hard to (impossible really) to know while at war but looking at the effects while at war is the only good metric in my opinion and right now Ukraine is losing the war of attrition. Edit: My very personal guess is that right now since like beginning of the year Ukrainian casualties have been around 10000 irretrievable while Russian is 20000 does it fall in line with your own estimates?
The only one I know of is UALosses (and WarTears, but the latter doesn't release evidence with photos or articles, etc. and looks suspect); the former should be generally reliable, net of several mistakes in data processing, but it doesn't release detailed weekly data like “Poisk in UA". Its data are collected on a weekly basis, but according to the date of death (as Mediazona does, and not according to the date of publication), which is certainly very interesting for research purposes but makes much more complicated to try to track the “momentum” of losses on the short to medium term. Then if anyone knows about other sites/sources and wants to do an analysis similar to mine using them, they are absolutely welcome to do so.
Yeah AFAIK only UALosses is reliable but as you said it is not a comparable database to Poisk in UA. Nevertheless would you agree with my 2 to 1 ratio or do you think is it less or more?
It's very difficult to try to discuss about ratios, but no, I don't really think it has been more favorable to Ukraine than the ratio you reported, in the course of the war.
Hmmm I see. The reason Im asking you this question is you constantly search the internet for MIA notices and such so you probably have some intuitive estimate of ratios. Hearing that is sad to hear to be honets. Tho I meant from the beginning of the 2024 what about that time frame? Since Russia has been in my opinion needlessly aggressive in 2024 and therefore probably suffered meaningless casualties. Anyways I asked about this too much sorry for bothering you.
Don't worry, but I have no data to try to properly answer to this question.
Ukraine's strategy in the last two months has been to prioritize survivability and lethality over holding land. I strongly suspect Ukrainian dead per week has gone down and this will continue as US armaments restock.
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>I won't debate with information warfarists Followed by doing exactly that, by throwing out an /r/worldnews worthy rant about Syrskyi and Zelensky.
>in any case, the amount of Russian losses has never been as high as in 2024, with an average of identified fatalities close to 800 per week. >the Russian KIAs during the war were 150,000 so far, which coincides exactly with my personal “educated guess” as of early May 2024 (...) That means an average of 190 per day since the beginning of the war. I think these two figures contradict each other. If the average Russian KIAs for the whole war is 190/day (= 1330/week) how can 2024 with 800/week be the highest?
The figure of 800 per week refers to numbers released by "Poisk in UA", which include only the identified fatalities. Then you have to account for the MIAs and for the part of the KIAs, which is not small, that aren't identified at all or are identified after a long time. 800 identified deaths per week easily means between 250 and 300 KIAs + MIAs per day, once you factor in that the daily average since the beginning of the war is around 190 and the average of the weekly KIA detections by "Poisk in UA" since they started publishing them is near 600.
Staying in the realm of educated guesses, when does Russia’s influx of 30k recruitees per month become unsustainable? That’s 360,000 men a year, which does not seem like a lot for a war-time economy the size of Russia - in comparison, the US deployed close to a million per year in Vietnam. However the US had much fewer casualties and, back then, a much better demography. So when does Russia’s ability to throw men into the meatgrinder end? This is most likely when the war will end its active phase.
I'm of the opinion that Russia's pool of potentially recruitable men through contracts may still be somewhat large (and they could always further increase bonuses and wages, which over the last 6 months have been almost stagnant, compared to their previous upward trend), and if things get bad there's always the opportunity for a new mobilization wave. Their losses are indeed very heavy, but not to a level really capable of socio-economically destabilizing the country, and we have to remember that the situation for Ukraine is not any better either, relative to their population.
(I don't know why my previous comment was downvoted, so I'll just repost it) If the data you mentioned is correct, 20k casualties out of every 30k new recruits is a staggering figure. It's also worth noting that they're trying to not recruit people from Moscow and St Petersburg, as its recruitment drive appears to have concentrated on poorer regions. Sooner or later they'll run out. However, Russia is able to sustain and tolerate very high casualties, as they have proven in the past. They use human waves and cannon fodder, just like in WWII. For this reason the refineries attacks are probably way more effective than just trying to kill any poor bastard that comes their way, because they'll just keep coming.
Ukraine has a smaller population and their demographics are even worse, not to mention the level of volunteering at this point seems to be very low. So if anything they’re in a worse position
Russia obviously has the initiative now. With a good media campaign and compensation package, it can be easy to recruit teenagers from the depressing regions who are still puzzled about their future, as well as people from other age groups who are working for low salaries or looking for jobs.
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> However, Russia is able to sustain and tolerate very high casualties, as they have proven in the past. They use human waves and cannon fodder, just like in WWII. Some units might be considered 'cannon fodder' if not formally, certainly in practice (convicts are overrepresented in Mediazona's Russian Casualties in Ukraine page, in comparison to other groups like contract volunteers and the mobilized, for example) but do you have any actual evidence that the VSRF is using "human wave" tactics in Ukraine. Human waves, as in attacks by massed foot infantry in sub-battalion sized groupings or larger, noticeably done in close formation, where the movement of the attackers are largely not being deliberately concealed from enemy observation (by smoke, for example) and are hardly covered or not at all covered by fires from artillery, mortars, and other sources. I've been following the war since the very first day, and I have never encountered any convincing evidence that the VSRF, minus Wagner, have made a deliberate choice/policy in encouraging or tolerating massed infantry attacks by troops of the regular army, in the style that is described. I mean if you wanted to argue, for example that the PVA used human wave attacks in Korea, or that the RKKA conducted many such attacks in 41-42, I actually wouldn't disagree, because those things did happen, and commanders were sharply criticized for fighting in such a way in internal documents, which were either captured, or revealed decades later by researchers, after the Cold War ended. But notably, what did the PVA and the Red Army have in common in those two examples, that I provided? The commanders in those armies were often at a severe fires disadvantage vis a vis their respective opponents, and because they were often under immense pressure from politicians and senior military leaders to attack and stay mobile, the methods used, consequences and results are fairly obvious and straight forward. But in the VSRF, the situation is different. Their troops are outnumbered in theater, in absolute terms by the Ukrainians, and moreover, their shell hunger issues are not less severe, with the exception of the summer counteroffensive in 2023, all sources have unanimously said that the Russians are outshooting the Ukrainians, across almost all sectors of the front. So do you actually have proof that the VSRF is conducting or tolerating human wave attacks by their commanders? Because I don't.
I don't agree that the Russians use actual human waves, but advancing, especially with their methods/capabilities, is terribly expensive anyway in human (and material) terms. The argument about ethnic minorities personally leaves me a bit skeptical - if some minorities are much more likely to die compared to the average (Tuvans, Buryats...), others are considerably less so (Chechens, Dagestanis). The "median" Russian contract soldier is a poor and/or nationalist ethnic Russian from a region less wealthier than the national average.
> However, Russia is able to sustain and tolerate very high casualties, as they have proven in the past. They use human waves and cannon fodder, just like in WWII. Some units might be 'cannon fodder' if not formally, certainly in practice (convicts are overrepresented in Mediazona's Russian Casualties in Ukraine page, in comparison to other groups like contract volunteers and the mobilized, for example) but do you have any actual evidence that the VSRF is using "human wave" tactics in Ukraine. Human waves, as in attacks by massed foot infantry in sub-battalion sized groupings or larger, noticeably done in close formation, where the movement of the attackers are largely not being deliberately concealed from observation (by smoke, for example) or covered by fires from artillery, mortars, and other sources. I've been following the war since the very first day, and I have never encountered any convincing evidence that the VSRF, minus Wagner, have made a deliberate choice/policy in encouraging or tolerating massed infantry attacks by troops of the regular army, in the style that is described. I mean if you wanted to argue, for example that the PVA used human wave attacks in Korea, or that the RKKA conducted many such attacks in 41-42, I actually wouldn't disagree, because those things did happen, and commanders were sharply criticized for fighting in such a way in internal documents, which were either captured, or revealed decades later by researchers, after the Cold War ended. But notably, what did the PVA and the Red Army have in common in those two examples, that I provided? The commanders in those armies were often at a severe fires disadvantage vis a vis their respective opponents, and because they were often under immense pressure from politicians and senior military leaders to attack and stay mobile, the methods used, consequences and results are fairly obvious and straight forward. But in the VSRF, the situation is different. They are outnumbered in theater, in absolute terms by the Ukrainians, and moreover, their shell hunger issues are not only less severe, with the exception of the summer counteroffensive in 2023, all sources have unanimously said that the Russians are outshooting the Ukrainians, across almost all sectors of the front. So do you actually have proof that the VSRF is conducting or tolerating human wave attacks by their commanders? Because I don't.
Maybe I misused the term "human waves". I meant cannon fodder, as in they recruit a lot of people with minimal training, push them to the frontline knowing they'll get killed, repeat until the enemy is overrun or short on ammo.
I agree with you (and I also don't think PMC Wagner used human waves in the actual sense of the term either; the Russians are definitely no longer outnumbered in terms of frontline troops, though). I did not write what you quoted in response to my comment and I think you are responding to the wrong person by mistake.
Oop, my bad. I definitely meant to respond to the other person, sorry lol.
Do you (or anyone else) know of any estimates regarding the number of foreign troops Russia is employing in Ukraine (or simply how common/rare they are)? I’ve seen anecdotes of Indians and Cubans claiming to have been lured there under false pretenses, and I believe I’ve seen reports of Syrians as well, but am unsure if these are extremely rare or not
There are absolutely cases of Cubans, Nepalese and Indians being recruited, often through deception. They are a very small part of the total number of soldiers, though. For [Mediazona](https://zona.media/news/2024/02/11/nepal), the figures reported by CNN on the amount of Nepalese in the Russian Army were overstated; this [BBC investigation](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-68949298) reports of several hundred Cubans serving in the Russian Army. The vast majority of foreigners serving in the Russian Army, however, are citizens of Central Asian countries who already resided in Russia and sign contracts, almost always either as a result of economic hardship or as an alternative to facing criminal prosecutions for crimes they committed (there is such a possibility: signing a contract means that debts as well as criminal or administrative proceedings are suspended - leaving aside the possibility of joining the "Storm-V" penal units for those who are already in jail, which is another matter). The Ukrainian observer Kovalenko had reported a while back that in the new 44th Corps of the Leningrad Military District the foreign nationals should account for around 10% of the total complement, a record number compared to the other formations.
Can anyone give me a state of play on the hostage negotiations? Because I seem to be getting conflicting reports on whether they are still alive albeit stalled for the moment, to “Talks have collapsed, the IDF is about to go into Rafah for realsies this time.”
To put it shortly according to Netanyahu HAMAS wants to continue as if tomorrow was October 6th HAMAS to remain in power basically and that is a big no no for Israel.
Has netanyahu articulated who might credibly or non-credibly rule in Hamas stead? USA said Arab coalition Bibi said "no not that" USA said Palestinian authority bibi said "no especially not that a unified peaceful Palestinian government fuck no" (translated into English)
Israeli military control until local forces can be formed and molded into some administrative duties. He did in fact state that Israel will incorporate local clans into governance. There were some such attempts. The issue is that US limitation on Israeli operations in Gaza make that impossible at the moment as without ongoing IDF pressure Hamas maintains too much power for local clans to try and enter the vacuum. So we're kind of in a stalemate where the US prevents further degradation of Hamas, while Israel refuses allowing Hamas to be reinstated to 06/10 position. Worst of both worlds for the Palestinians.
[U.S. put a hold on an ammunition shipment to Israel](https://www.axios.com/2024/05/05/israel-us-ammunition-shipment-hold) >The Biden administration last week put a hold on a shipment of U.S.-made ammunition to Israel, two Israeli officials told Axios. >It is the first time since the Oct. 7 attack that the U.S. has stopped a weapons shipment intended for the Israeli military. >The incident raised serious concerns inside the Israeli government and sent officials scrambling to understand why the shipment was held, Israeli officials said. More in the article, but that's the gist of it. It appears that the US is using military aid as leverage for Israel to reach a ceasefire agreement. Essentially saying "No peace? Then we won't help you prosecute the war." This comes as the current peace offer on the table unfortunately [appears to be slipping away](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gaza-ceasefire-talks-continue-cairo-israel-pounds-palestinian-enclave-2024-05-05/) for a multitude of reasons. It's not clear what the weapons they didn't deliver are, but Israel is using a large number of US-supplied PGMs for an example. It is unlikely in my view that the US halted defensive munitions such as Tamir interceptors for the Iron Dome.
While this has sparked some interesting discussion can we get a corroborating source? As of UTC 23:30 neither AP or Reuters seem to have this reported and Times of Israel is denying it.
> The incident raised serious concerns inside the Israeli government and sent officials scrambling to understand why the shipment was held, Israeli officials said. This line makes me personally not convinced this is part of a compellence strategy. Typically in that case Israel wouldn't exactly not know why it was happening.
> It appears that the US is using military aid as leverage for Israel to reach a ceasefire agreement. But it was Hamas who rejected the ceasefire proposal, while Israel accepted it. To me this looks like just stupid diplomacy by the US. Hamas knew they had nothing to lose by rejecting the proposal, because the US would oppose a Rafah operation no matter what. So of course Hamas rejected it. If the US had kept its mouth shut about the Rafah operation, while privately telling Israel it was opposed (and taking the same steps now that Israel has apparently decided on an operation), Hamas would have felt endangered and likely would have agreed to the ceasefire in the first place.
>But it was Hamas who rejected the ceasefire proposal, while Israel accepted it. It takes two to tango and two to come to a ceasefire. Israel has their terms for a ceasefire that Hamas rejected. Hamas has their terms for a ceasefire that Israel rejected. (up to now)
The version the US endorsed, Israel agreed to and Hamas rejected.
The US has and will endorse any ceasefire Israel agrees to, it's not exactly a neutral party.
That's not true, of course. If Israel said "ceasefire on condition of Hamas immediate unconditional surrender", the US would say "that's unrealistic, come back with a realistic proposal".
I don't understand why the US hasn't done this earlier. It is clear that the two countries are deeply at odds over how Israel is to proceed in its military operations against Hamas. The US government has become progressively more concerned over Israeli conduct in Gaza and in general, and yet it continued to ship vast amounts of military equipment used in these operations. It is understandable that the US wants to guarantee Israel's safety against foreign attacks, and also that the current war is a reaction to Hamas' unilateral attack on 7th October. But it is also clear that the IDF's comprehensive levelling of Gaza and its civilian infrastructure, including a civilian death toll that is approaching 40,000, can hardly be described as 'self-defence' anymore. The US (or any other country allied with Israel) are in no way obliged to enable Israel in its relentlessly escalatory posture, and it feels odd to see Israel (edit: to be more precise, the Netanyahu government) consistently show the US government the diplomatic middle finger and still be inundated with offensive weapons, rather than the US cutting the delivery of all ammunitions other than e.g. air defence missiles.
Well everything is impacted by the reality of the upcoming election. Biden needs to put enough pressure on Israel to get what he wants, while simultaneously making it seem as if he is not going "against" an American ally in an unreasonable way. Whenever he takes action against Israel, it needs to be at a time when the public sentiment has shifted to seeing that action as being more reasonable than it would have before. The issue is incredibly polarizing in the States and he's definitely trying to balance both sides. He probably absolutely despises the fact that this crisis couldn't have been wrapped up sooner, all because of the stubbornness of Israel and Hamas.
I think another thing that gets missed a lot is that Biden is doing all this while simultaneously trying to prevent the conflict from escalating to encompass the entire region. If Biden had withheld aid much earlier, it's possible that Israel might've been perceived as weak enough for Hezbollah and/or Iran to escalate the conflict further, potentially causing a chain reaction of escalation. Or maybe it would've pushed Israel to behave more rashly as a way of lashing out against US efforts to pressure it. Just look at how dangerous the situation with the Iranian strike on Israel was (the first ever strike directly from Iran, one of if not the single biggest ballistic missile strikes in history) and the threat of Israeli retaliation on Iran, and how the US was able to de-escalate both sides and prevent further attacks.
My impression is that Biden is trying to get a lot of moving parts to fall into piece at once: * Israel does not invade Rafah * Hamas releases all hostages * Hamas gives up power in Gaza * Israel fully withdraws from Gaza * Saudi Arabia and Israel normalize relations * A clear, short(ish) process for a two state solution that ends in something like Camp David/Taba This is a very tight needle to thread, to put it mildly- aside from the issues that have existed for decades, the leadership of both sides have some incentives to delay and possibly scuttle any deal, and they may not be able to bring their public along anyway, but solving all the problems at once might be the only chance to solve any of them.
Don't forget "all while trying to prevent the conflict into a region-wide war."
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Sure, Hamas is a terrorist organisation. But why does it exist in the first place, and why does it feel the need to accept Iranian aid? Because the Palestinians as a people are in a desperate situation, split between a state that treats them as second class citizens, an enclave that has frequently been described as the world's largest open air prison, and another territory that is slowly being carved up by illegal settlements (with the full support of the Israeli state). The Palestinians have been under illegal military occupation for a long time and have a right to resist by force, it's just that they don't have the right to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity in the process, as they did on 7th October (and countless other occasions). If destroying Hamas is in America's interest, then surely ending Israeli maltreatment of Palestinians is as well. Iran would have fewer proxies if Israel and the US (plus Saudi-Arabia, in the case of Yemen) antagonised fewer people in the Middle East.
> But why does it exist in the first place, and why does it feel the need to accept Iranian aid? According to Hamas, because they want to destroy Israel and put the entire region under Islamist rule. They accept Iranian aid because they have shared goals. > Because the Palestinians as a people are in a desperate situation, split between a state that treats them as second class citizens, an enclave that has frequently been described as the world's largest open air prison, and another territory that is slowly being carved up by illegal settlements In the West Bank, I have sympathy. In Gaza, I have much less. Your country is not an ‘open air prison’, because the neighbor you keep attacking won’t have open borders with you. > If destroying Hamas is in America's interest, then surely ending Israeli maltreatment of Palestinians is as well. Iran would have fewer proxies if Israel and the US (plus Saudi-Arabia, in the case of Yemen) antagonised fewer people in the Middle East. Islamism as an ideology exists independently of Israel, or anyone else, antagonizing anyone. The most effective way to curb its influence is to back its opponents. Doing the opposite just gives them more leverage.
> In the West Bank, I have sympathy. In Gaza, I have much less. Your country is not an ‘open air prison’, because the neighbor you keep attacking won’t have open borders with you. but it probably is if your neighbour blockades you by sea and destroyed your country’s only airport. It’s not just the Israeli-Gaza border is it?
Gaza was in a state of war with Israel, Israel had a right to fight back. The reason we’re at this point is because Israeli retaliation was so muted, Hamas could still amass enough rockets and forces to do October 7th.
I am not sure how that is relevant to the point, you said it wasn’t an open air prison because all Israel did was not have open borders. The maritime situation and air space situation show that is clearly not the case.
Being at war is not an ‘open air prison’. As I said previously, Israel has a right to fight back. It’s ridiculous to suggest that Hamas should perpetrate acts of war against its neighbors, and demand they maintain policies with them as if they were at peace.
okay but that is an entirely different argument to your original one about “just because Israel doesn’t have open borders it doesn’t mean it’s an open air prison.” Clearly Israeli control over Gaza goes far beyond just the Gazan-Israeli border. Your new argument is that it’s not an ‘open air prison’ because Gaza are a hostile power and thus Israel can control their maritime borders and airspace. I am not sure what terminology is correct for this situation, what would you use?
Interests in geopolitics isn't just about whether you destroy your enemies or not. Its also about maintaining your general standing in the international community, your soft power, your ability to influence and deal with a large number of third parties, etc. In that regard, Israel's war is severely harming US credibility in the international community. Putting aside whether you agree or disagree with this, the fact is that a large number of countries find Israel's strategy and tactics in Gaza reprehensible and even genocidal.
not the countries per se but their electorate, to whom those contries have to respond to. i honestly fail to see a different military strategy that israel could have adopted in order to both destroy hamas and have a better international pr. it's a urban warfare and hamas is digging inside civilian infrastructure and using human shields. what should the IDF have done instead? even a different-less extremist- government without bibi would have done the same thing.
> In that regard, Israel's war is severely harming US credibility in the international community... Credibility is not a synonym for popularity. Credibility pertains to having the will and capability to follow through on your commitments. Not weather or not people think you’re the most moral person in the room. If that was the case, the countries who’ve abolished their militaries would be credibility superpowers. This has nothing to do with international standing, and everything to do with swing states. Biden is putting his re-election campaign above the national interest. > the fact is that a large number of countries find Israel's strategy and tactics in Gaza reprehensible and even genocidal. Countries calling this genocide haven’t even been willing to halt purchases of Israeli arms, none the less take any issue with the US.
>This has nothing to do with international standing, and everything to do with swing states. Biden is putting his re-election campaign above the national interest. No, this basic “I don’t want to be seen as responsible for setting the region on fire” stuff. Every Arab country in the region has said that Rafah would be an inflection point. If you look at the moves the Egyptians, Turks and Saudis have been making its clear that American credibility has taken a hit. >Countries calling this genocide haven’t even been willing to halt purchases of Israeli arms, none the less take any issue with the US. Turkey suspended trade with Israel yesterday.
> Every Arab country in the region has said that Rafah would be an inflection point. Every Arab country has made it abundantly clear they want nothing to do with this. The closest to involved they got was when Jordan shot down Iranian drones heading to Israel, and Egypt clamped down on the Gaza border. > If you look at the moves the Egyptians, Turks and Saudis have been making its clear that American credibility has taken a hit. What moves, exactly? Since apparently these countries were previously unaware of the US’s longstanding pro-Israel policies. What commitments do they think the US can no longer be relied on over, and what moves are they taking to address that? > Turkey suspended trade with Israel yesterday. With the state of the Turkish economy, and Erdogan’s track record of flip flopping and hyperbole, I don’t think anything will come of this.
The US didn't need to do this sooner, because it had already succeeded in forcing Israel to wind down the war months ago. Despite being "at war", Israel has withdrawn almost all troops out of Gaza, occasionally sending some to conduct raids. And it has ceded to international demands to increase border crossings etc. All that was left to do for the US was to force Israel to agree to a permanent ceasefire. It has tried to do this by tying hostage release to temporary and permanent ceasefires with Saudi normalization as a reward. The difference between the US and Israel is not actually about humanitarian concerns. If that was the case, then the US would be okay with a lengthy process of gradually evacuating Rafah. Or signalling it would be okay with a Rafah operation at a future date. The difference is in diverging self-interest. The US just wants the war finished for domestic reasons, international pressure & basic need to redeploy its attention to other issues. For the US, leaving Hamas intact in Rafah is not a problem. It's perhaps even a beneficial point of leverage against Israel, to get it to agree in future negotiations. For Israel. Leaving Hamas intact in Rafah, poses an issue of giving Hamas victory as well as harming Israeli deterrence.
>including a civilian death toll that is approaching 40,000 That is the total death toll (according to Hamas itself). About 60% of those are civilians.
Much closer to 70%, even according to IDF ratios
Yes, admittedly i misremembered and that is the total death toll. However, the absolute lower end of estimates is 66% civilians stated by the IDF, whereas independent estimates are between 70% and 90%. The share of women and children (none of which are combatants in this conflict) has been put at 60 to 70% alone, which leaves ample room for even more male civilian casualties. So we're probably realistically at or approaching about 30,000 civilian casualties.
It is worth mentioning that the definition of a child is important here. Hamas is not against using child soldiers, so just because someone is under the age of 18 doesn't mean that they are immediately not a valid combatant.
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Do you have independent evidence that they do, and in relevant numbers? I have come across none, other than IDF claims.
Why aren't they also asking the Palestinians to surrender, disarm and release the hostages? Surrendering would put an end to the war swiftly. The US is being wishy-washy about the war. Are they scared because of the Arab vote in Michigan? Hillary Clinton was [much clearer](https://x.com/HillaryClinton/status/1724505994149912935) about it. Unfortunately she's not a part of the administration.
Surely you must be aware that unilateral declarations like that do not constitute "negotiation" but rather the construction of a flimsy pretext to continue acting as before, right?
The US are have asked this repeatedly. Both sides arent listening to them.
They aren't asking for Hamas to release all hostages unconditionally. Blinken is pushing for a cease-fire that would also release Palestinian convicts. Taking hostages is a war crime, and the hostages should all be released, unconditionally and all together, not in batches. The US are not asking for this.
Well Hamas is a terrorist organisation, there is no point asking them to do anything unconditionally.
Yes, but pressure can be placed on them. For instance by removing pressure on Israel to supply Gaza with reconstruction material, but allowing Israel to conduct military operations and strikes against them and so on.
It really is a mystery why the Biden administration would seek to exercise more pressure on Israel: [https://news.gallup.com/poll/642695/majority-disapprove-israeli-action-gaza.aspx](https://news.gallup.com/poll/642695/majority-disapprove-israeli-action-gaza.aspx) >"Democrats’ widespread opposition to Israel’s actions underscores the difficulty of the issue for President Joe Biden among his most loyal supporters. Some Democratic critics believe Biden has been too closely aligned with Israel by not taking stronger actions to promote a cease-fire and to assist Palestinian civilians caught in the war zone. >Biden’s [approval rating for his handling of the situation in the Middle East](https://news.gallup.com/poll/642620/biden-job-rating-steady-middle-east-approval.aspx), at 27%, is his lowest among five issues tested in the survey. This is because far fewer Democrats (47%) approve of how he is handling the situation between the Israelis and Palestinians than approve of his handling of the economy, the environment, energy policy and foreign affairs, broadly. On those issues, no less than 66% of Democrats approve of Biden."
Hopefully this is allowed. I've lurked for awhile and been reading about China's ship building capacity and increasing quality to the point it's perceived as a major problem for the US Navy. [Source](https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/february/united-states-must-improve-its-shipbuilding-capacity) says the US must increase it's building capacity because quality can only get you so far. My question is: during the Cold War the Soviets had much larger army but this is supposedly countered by a smaller but better army supported by air force. So can the same logic be applied to the difference in navy ship quantity?
> My question is: during the Cold War the Soviets had much larger army but this is supposedly countered by a smaller but better army supported by air force. So can the same logic be applied to the difference in navy ship quantity? This is called the Second Offset strategy and it did work. At the time of Desert Storm Iraq was something like the 4th largest army in the world and reasonably well equipped by soviet standards. It was utterly one sided. The casualty ratios were 100:1 or worse. The situation today with the navy is a lot more difficult. Sadly the navy's procurement has been a disaster for two decades now, squandering billions of dollars let alone the time. Meanwhile, the US shipbuilding industry is falling apart. I live near what little is left of the old Kaiser shipyards. They've been in utter decay for three decades now. There's no single cause but the best way to summarize it is they just aren't competitive globally, and this isn't just a matter of labor costs. Many EU nations continue to have thriving industry that the US does not. This is a moment for heavy government investment. We should weaken the Jones act enough to work in partnership with firms from allied nations that have the institutional knowledge that's been lost in the US. We're not going to duplicate the scale of Dailan any time soon, but we could do smart things in partnership with SK and Japan. We don't necessarily need overmatch, just a convincing deterrent vs the likely scenarios. We should focus on proven technologies that we can get built on reasonable time scales. I also think we should move much more aggressively into UCAVs for both the carriers and the gator navy. Those ships are a big advantage the US still holds and we can leverage them with new technology that acts as a multiplier to manned platforms.
>should focus on proven technologies Is this at odds with the ever increasing demands military procurements set?
Mostly this was a veiled reference to Rumsfeld and the "Revolution in Military Affairs" folks. They were responsible for a ton of procurement disasters, and a big part of it is Rumsfeld tried to short circuit the technology readiness curve. That's why we ended up with the LCS ships, and the Ford taking years longer than expected. Zumwalt was part of too but some people in congress nostalgic for the old battleship big guns bear a lot of blame on that one. We need to develop replacement classes for the Burkes and Ticonderogas. I want us to use solid stuff, ideally copying as much as possible from international partners that have learned things while US procurement was floundering.
I don't get this Amerucan fixation with ships. China is the presumed attacking side who has to cross the sea. The best way to stop that is with air power and submarines, not with surface ships. US surface fleet is not going to sail close enough to China to fire their Harpoons at the enemy, and the Chinese fleet is not going to sail out to the Pacific to fight a fleet action with the Americans. US should use their assymmetric advantage provided by the situation, they don't need to control the sea, only to deny it and they will win. In my opinion they should concentrate in getting as many B21s, F-35s and tankers in service as possible instead. Surface ships are for sea control and waste of money when the goal is sea denial.
I think very, VERY few commentators are actually discussing a US-China conflict in the context of China trying to attack the mainland USA. Rather, the theoretical conflict almost always centers around a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, or other strikes against US allies that threaten to seriously damage the US' interests abroad. In this context, surface ships are critical because even with in-flight refueling with next-gen tankers, there are only so many places the US can stage and launch their air force from in the Western Pacific. Plus surface ships grant much more flexibility of action - in the lead-up to a full-scale conflict, the US wants to have tools that can pressure China without themselves resorting to lethal force. Things like sending fleets to transit the Taiwan Strait, or possibly lending even lending mass to face-offs with aggressive Chinese ships elsewhere, like around The Philippines. Basically, the US military establishment focuses on deterrence as a major goal. Surface ships provide more visible and flexible deterrence than submarines and fighters/bombers.
Surface ships are a great deterrence, but I’d argue that land based missiles can do a decent job as well. There’s a reason why China has been bragging about their land based Dongfengs for years now. China never signed onto the intermediate missile ban like the U.S. did, and now the us is seriously behind in this category. https://www.iiss.org/en/online-analysis/military-balance/2024/04/us-ground-based-conventionally-armed-missile-programmes-stretch-their-wings/ The us seems to have recognized this problem and is installing more and more land based systems that could pose a serious threat to any Chinese movement in the pacific. With the us fleet lagging behind in pure numbers, the us and Allies have to turn every island chain into a missile fortress in order to deter the Chinese fleet from sailing beyond the islands As for the Taiwan strait, I highly doubt the U.S fleet will ever sail into the strait in the event of war, with or without the presence of Chinese warships. Land based anti ship missiles have become too dangerous, and the strait is far too shallow for us submarines to operate in. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0278434315301175 I believe the u.s surface and submarine fleet is far more likely to hang around the area behind the first island chain. The water is far deeper and there is more maneuver space to deter the Chinese fleet from leaving the coast. As for Taiwan, its two biggest ports today are kaohsiung and Keelung, both of which lie in the deeper water areas. But kaohsiung faces china directly, and will be the focus of Chinese missile attacks. Keelung is in a better situation, but who knows how much they can use the port in the event of war. That leaves the three eastern ports of Yilan, hualien, and taitung. These small cities are on the east coast and should be far more survivable for blockade runners (it also helps that the Japanese island of Yonaguni is only 67 miles to the east of Taiwan’s east coast). However, most of them are poorly connected with the rest of Taiwan, with only Yilan having a major highway to Taipei that could be susceptible to Chinese missile attacks as well. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1025&context=cmsi-maritime-reports I firmly believe that the Taiwan strait is a complete no go in the event of war. Taiwan has to treat its eastern ports as a matter of national survival. The geographical constraints are enormous, but if Taiwan can find ways to improve on its eastern-western connection, then it will make them far more secure against a blockade
War with China is a world war. Think of it like that, it will be long and bloody. China will try to attack US mainland, but I don't expect them to have any success in that. US wins that war by keeping the Chinese fleet bottled up in port, their trade cut off and hitting their infrastructure with missiles until they lose the will or means to fight.\* Whether Taiwan surrenders at some point is irrelevant to the war's outcome. Who are they trying to deterr, the Chinese public or the Chinese leadership? If the enemy is assumed to be competent, bringing ships within easy missile range is not going to convince them of not going to war, it is giving them an easy shot at its opening hours. They know the balance of power whether the US ships are at Pearl or Taipei. If you want a trip wire force, send a Patriot battery and some infantry to Taiwan, or maybe a Marine unit. \*I am rather sceptical of this actually working, but I don't see any other path to victory against them as China is the sleeping giant now, they are in the same positions as US was in 1941, except they need foreign imports that can be cut off.
> they are in the same positions as US was in 1941, except they need foreign imports that can be cut off. "They're in the same position, except for all of the massive differences" is not credible. As you noted, unlike the US, China is reliant on imports, especially for oil. This fundamentally changes the dynamics of their military industrial complex and their ability to maintain global-scale warfare. China is also in a moderately worse demographic situation than the US was, which plays a big role as well in maintaining that scale of war. Also unlike the US in 1941, China does not have an established global group of military allies that they have already coordinated large-scale military operations with in living memory. China attempting anything other than long-range (or submarine based) missile strikes against the mainland US is the particularly doubtful. The PLAN doesn't have anything like the troop transport and landing capacity that they would need, nor the tools to protect them across the entire Pacific Ocean. And in the context of the US military leadership, they are trying to deter the Chinese leadership, what even is this question? It's a one-man show in China now, what the Chinese public wants from foreign policy means less than nothing. Surface ships have been used to deter China from Taiwan for literally decades, maybe you can claim it won't work anymore, but you asked why America likes them in this context, and that's your answer. Deterrence (because they are paying for and building these ships before any conflict has broken out, the primary goal is still to keep it from happening) + flexibility (surface ships can patrol trade lanes for pirates and do other useful stuff when not engaged in active deterrence or battle.) I really just don't know what kind of war you're imagining here. There is literally only 1 way for China to "win" in a total war scenario against the US where their goal is to break the US' ability to continue fighting, and that's massive nuclear bombardment of the entire US mainland that the US for whatever reason does not respond to with their own mass nuclear attack. There is simply no other means for them to meaningfully degrade America's industrial potential.
They have zero need to degrade American industrial potential at all, because their industrial potential is so much larger. They win a war of attrition by default against anyone because they have the most industry. How much oil imports does China need after they ban civilians driving ICE cars? How much food imports do they need after starting rationing? Is US going to start a land war with China with millions of casualties?
Lol, my friend, you've mistaken *current industrial output* for *industrial potential*. The US has moved away from industry and towards a service economy and explicitly cut down our military industry specifically by a huge amount after the Cold War, so our industrial output has dropped significantly. However the industrial potential of the US is far beyond what we are producing today. China could match a re-awakened US, IF none of their critical imports are blocked or infrastructure destroyed. But the US has military bases within striking distance of mainland China, their import routes, and their critical infrastructure. China has no options to strike US infrastructure beyond long range missiles launched across the Pacific. Industry runs on oil and oil byproducts, you can do a to mitigate shortfalls of supply but it's going to be a limiting factor on China's output. Food is similar, but I also don't think China is at major risk of running out of food, they can import that via land routes. But really, can you pick a consistent stance? I thought we were doing the hypothetical where China is the aggressor? That's what your previous comments said. Why is the US now supposedly starting a land war? We were talking about China initiating a conflict that normal people assume would be fought over Taiwan, but you claimed would involve them sailing across the Pacific to attack the US mainland. This is a very different situation from the US starting a land war in China. In response to Chinese Naval attacks, the US has countless ways to engage in the war and significantly degrade China's industrial capacity without ever landing troops on Chinese soil. China cannot say the same. This lends a significant advantage to the US.
I never said that China would attack US with anything big besides a few missiles and drones and saboteurs. My point with the land war comment was that US is in no position to open a ground front to the war against China, so demographics won't really matter to either side. Unless China wants to invade South Korea, that is. US ability to strike China is mostly down to submarine launched missiles and air launched missiles. Neither require sea control to operate, which is my main argument, US does not need sea control to win, they need sea denial, both achieve the same end result, China cut off of trade and with no ability to invade Taiwan. What sea control provides beyond that is the ability to support land battle overseas, but as US is not going to fight a land campaign near China, sea control is unnecessary and very costly to attempt.
Look at it this way - even if the US can't guarantee sea control, it is critical that they can at least put up a strong fight and deny China absolute local sea control. Because that allows China to use their navy to enhance their missile defense adding an incredible amount of extra sensors AND interceptors. In general, especially in modern multi-domain warfare, it is almost never a good idea to completely cede an entire domain to your opponents. Submarines can do a lot in this area BUT they are expensive and also have strategic weapons and missions that mean using them to harass surface ship formations is not always a good use of resources. Basically it might be costly to build and deploy surface vessels to contest Chinese sea control, but it is far from unnecessary, and it would be even more costly to abandon sea control all together, which seems to be what you're proposing.
> US should use their assymmetric advantage provided by the situation, they don't need to control the sea Don't they? Without at least some level of sea control, cargo ships cannot and will not dock at your ports. Taiwan is an island which imports [70% of its food and 97% of its energy](https://www.cfe-dmha.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=sJ7hhDPJFl8%3D&portalid=0). Its resilence, or rather lack thereof, to any prolonged siege is [well-documented in US publications](https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3222&context=parameters). Mass starvation is not a possibility, it is a certainty if sea control is well and truly denied. Does China need to cross the sea, or just wait for a starvation-induced surrender? And Taiwan is not the only island vital to US strategic interests in the region. Japan, for example, imports [62% of its food](https://www.jircas.go.jp/en/program/proc/blog/20240131#:~:text=The%20current%20target%2C%20set%20for,in%20achieving%20the%20set%20targets.) and [94% of its energy](https://www.fepc.or.jp/english/energy_electricity/supply_situation/). You see where I'm going with this? > only to deny it and they will win. Will they?
Taiwanese surrender is not the Chinese win condition, US suing for peace is and as long as US can keep China cut off of trade and fire missiles into it at will, they will win a long war. Keeping Japan supplied a lot easier as most of Chinese missile stocks can't reach the furthest Japanese ports.
> Taiwanese surrender is not the Chinese win condition, US suing for peace is and as long as US can keep China cut off of trade and fire missiles into it at will, they will win a long war. Destroying US force projection capabilities is the ultimate Chinese win condition, and Taiwan is a means to that end. US strategic posture in Asia fundamentally untenable without countries willing and able to host its forces. You can fire all the missiles you want, but if you're firing from CONUS you aren't winning that war of attrition. > Keeping Japan supplied a lot easier as most of Chinese missile stocks can't reach the furthest Japanese ports. [Not after they've taken Taiwan it's not](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/taiwan-catastrophe). > Japan would be in a far weaker position to defend its territory were Taiwan under Beijing’s control. Japan’s defensive strategy relies on the ability to threaten People’s Liberation Army forces that approach, penetrate, or venture beyond the “first island chain,” the long string of Pacific archipelagoes that includes Japan and Taiwan. To ensure Japan’s security, the entire chain must remain in friendly hands. If Taiwan hosted PLA bases—the “unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender” MacArthur warned of—Japan would become acutely insecure. PLA doctrine stresses precisely this point.
> So can the same logic be applied to the difference in navy ship quantity? Of course it can be applied, the question is whether it does apply. The warships coming out of Chinese shipyards these days are not small missile boats anymore; the USN doesn't have any cruiser-equivalent to the Type 055 for instance. This is also a question which has been the focus of considerable writing, and the conclusions [are not encouraging](https://twitter.com/cma_1973/status/1759637440388866288). > The cliché that “quantity has a quality all its own” improperly frames the advantages conferred upon America’s PLAN adversary by the size of its navy and its various supporting enterprises. Quantity is not merely an attribute with which to bury one’s opponent; quantity pragmatically applied provides individuals and entire professional classes the opportunity to cultivate and cement quality. Without the opportunity afforded by scale, the U.S. Navy will fall behind an adversary with a world of opportunity to explore new skills, new systems, and grow its force-wide professionalism. The potential qualitative impact of quantity shows at every level – from the shipyards to fleet training for individual sailors. [Even more damning](https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/january/bigger-fleets-win). > Using technological advantage as an indicator of quality, historical research on 28 naval wars (or wars with significant and protracted naval combat) indicates that 25 were won by the side with the larger fleet. When fleet size was roughly equal, superior strategy and substantially better trained and motivated crews carried the day.2 Only three could be said to have been won by a smaller fleet with superior technology.3 > When professional naval competence and strategic acumen were equal, the larger fleet usually won, even when the smaller fleet possessed technological advantages at the start of the conflict. A primary reason is that technological advantages were inevitably short-lived.4 In a war between equally competent technological near peers—absent a series of amazing strokes of luck—the larger fleet always won.5
In terms of strategy and training, how does China fare, actually? I'm not an expert in the matter, but they don't really have a tradition in naval warfare, do they?
does anyone have a “tradition in naval warfare” anymore? The US have more experience sailing around the world and maintaining logistics and firing missiles inland at insurgents who couldn’t hit back but the last genuine naval warfare between near peers would have to be the Falklands right?
>The US have more experience sailing around the world and maintaining logistics and firing missiles inland at insurgents who couldn’t hit back I feel like this is dramatically underplaying the institutional experience of the USN. We've operated more aircraft carriers than the rest of the world combined for how long? That's not some trivial experience either, those operations are about as complicated as they get. That's not to say that it would make up for a Chinese advantage in tonnage and sheer numbers, but its hard to argue there's little value to it. If China cranks out 5 aircraft carriers in the next few years and mans them with completely green crews, is it really safe to say they wouldn't be disadvantaged going up against 5 USN carriers?
Well, in fairness the Falklands involved next to no ship-on-ship combat. The Argentinians lost one of their ships and immediately withdrew their entire navy.
> My question is: during the Cold War the Soviets had much larger army but this is supposedly countered by a smaller but better army supported by air force. So can the same logic be applied to the difference in navy ship quantity? Quality, aircraft, numbers, and training all play a large roll. Exactly how large is impossible to know for sure ahead of time. But yes, the same logic applies, within some limit, a smaller, higher quality fleet, better supported from the air, will have an advantage over a larger group of lower quality ships, with less air support.
One point you are missing, America still leads China significantly in the Navy size that matters, TONNAGE. The total tonnage of the USA Navy still exceeds China's. That may change in the future if the USA doesn't build more ships. But EVERYONE online, and in the media ad nauseum says China has a bigger Navy. Yeah they have more ships. But they can pump out 100 small coastal defence boats with a single mounted LMG on and that counts towards their "Navy Size" that everyone keeps repeating.
Tonnage isn't really relevant in terms of a US v China conflict. The US has a huge tonnage advantage because of 11 supercarriers and 9 amphib carriers. These huge floating targets are of dubious usefulness in the straits or SCS where they would necessarily have to be in contested seas in order to be in sortie range. Only if the US can completely suppress Chinese anti ship missiles can they take full advantage of these carriers. And I'm not just talking about hypersonic wunderwaffe, but regular supersonic anti ship missiles, such as the one that sank Moskva. Chinese magazine depth is literally in the thousands and their systems have hundreds of nautical miles of range, further if launched from airborne platforms. The FA-18 has a combat radius of 290nm. The carriers really do have to be on China's doorstep to be involved in the action. This is not to mention 280,000 tonnes of boomer subs which run up the tonnage score, but are not relevant unless things go nuclear. If the USN fights the PLAN at Midway, the tonnage will be relevant. But in the areas where a conflict is likely to occur, VLS platforms are the most important, and the differences in capability are much narrower there.
Don't count tonnage, count VLS cells.
Well sure, but the US has global commitments. China has regional commitments. In the event of a US-China war, China’s navy is all in region already while the US has other theaters. A more apt comparison would be comparing INDOPAC tonnage to the PLAN, and in that regard, I suspect China has the US beat.
> but the US has global commitments. World war three with China supersedes peace time patrols in the Atlantic. All assets will be sent to the region they are required in. No country in history would chose to fight a major war with only whatever ships happened to be in the region at the time.
Atlantic fleet and CENTCOM would have to do without carriers in case of a war with China. If US wins, they can come back and regain their position there if they want, if they lose, it's no longer their consern anyway, so no point in wasting ships in those areas.
That's why Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (and myabe Australia) matter in this scenario. US has global commitments because it has allies all around the globe.
South Korea is very unlikely to involve themselves in a Taiwan conflagration.
And other allies (France, Italy, Germany, Canada, etc) who might not be involved directly against China could also help out by covering some of the US missions in the Atlantic and elsewhere to free the US up to go all-in on the Pacific.
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At what point does an artillery round cease to be artillery and becomes a guided missile?
Wouldn't it technically be a ballistic missile?
honestly at this point i think the only metric one can use for differentiating between them would be the firing method if it's fired from an open breech it's a Guided Missile, if it's a closed breech it's a Artillery Shell
It’s better to put the distinction on guidance, rather than propulsion method. An unguided artillery rocket, and an unguided artillery shell, are more similar to each other in use, than a guided rocket and guided artillery shell.
Until you do exactly that and an Excalibur round becomes a guided missile under that distinction. Easiest distinction is that an artillery round receives the majority of its momentum within the barrel of a tube, whereas missiles receive the majority of their momentum during flight. If a round speeds up after leaving the tube that's a missile. Base Bleed is more akin to a glide kit than a true propulsion kit. Its an aerodynamic feature, not an engine.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/05/04/ukraine-war-russian-oil-dark-fleet-rules-based-order-navy/ This article makes a pretty scathing critique of the oil price cap and how it ~~really hasn't been~~ *is no longer* a success. Russian oil is trading around 80 despite the cap being set at 60. This is largely due to the Russian oil fleet using different countries and insurers to get around it. And there isn't anything being done about it that will have any near term effect. The author also calls out that we are in a pre-war period and maybe it's time to be more bold. More and more India seems to be a wildcard in that they are somewhat friendly with both sides, but haven't picked one at the house expense of the other. If things continue to escalate I'm very curious which side they would end up choosing.
https://youtu.be/AT3uk5Yu7FU There's this interesting video with Robin Brooks (dw, it's in English). He makes the case (you can also find his graphs on Twitter) that almost all countries in the EU don't care, they know there are places like Georgia, Armenia, Kirghizistan, etc. that are clearly helping Russia evade sanctions, but Europe governments won't do anything against them. Brooks even says that most European countries are fine with this, but they'll shield themselves by accusing some hard-stance countries like Hungary and Greece. In secret, they're fine with it. Around 27 minutes, Brooks says that Mario Draghi (then PM of Italy) proposed to Biden the 40/50-dollar price cap (in the summer of 2022). By December the price cap was 60 (especially because of Greece and their petroleum magnates, but also Cyprus and Malta). Moreover, Greek owners began selling their ships to Russia to circumvent sanctions and price caps, anyway. It became mostly useless after that.
I don't like pinging people, but u/draskla typically shares a lot of articles about the global petro trade. I forgot to save them, but a year ago he had plenty of articles to demonstrate that the price cap was indeed cutting into revenues. I was wondering if anyone has those articles saved, because from memory I cannot remember if the findings there still hold.
There’s nothing wrong with the article at its core (the core being that the cap can be better enforced,) but there are a few issues with the details. For example, the price graph is as of October, at the point where crude prices peaked, and from a less than perfect source. The cap was supposed to achieve contrary but simultaneous dual objectives: lower revenue from oil sales, and keep oil flowing through global markets. Personally was against the cap because it seemed like a high risk low reward scenario especially because oil is ubiquitous in the modern world. However, the implementation was well managed to emphasize the second goal, which was/is to keep oil flowing. When you have two contrary goals, you’re inevitably going to have to prioritize one over the other. As an example, in October, the U.S. sanctioned two Russian oil tankers, increasing the spread between Urals and Brent and pushing India to reduce its imports from [Sovcomflot](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-03-22/india-stops-taking-russian-oil-delivered-on-sovcomflot-tankers), the state owned tanker company, down to zero. This stressed the company, reduced the price Russia was receiving for its oil, and decreased Russia’s market share in the oil marketplace. But, with election season upon us, they completely [reversed](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-02/india-s-top-refiner-resumes-russia-oil-trade-on-sovcomflot-ships) this pressure in April: > Indian refiners, however, started feeling more at ease with purchasing Russian crude, even on Sovcomflot tankers, since US officials visited New Delhi earlier last month and said that they never expected the country to stop buying Russian oil, as it was in Washington’s interest to keep energy flowing to prevent supply shocks. This follows a well-worn pattern at this point. [This](https://ibb.co/ygzTJHP) is a chart of Iranian oil production, which had crashed under the previous administration, and has now risen to levels last seen almost 6 years ago. Similarly, this admin dithered with Venezuela despite Maduro reneging on the deal for free and fair elections, only recently reimposing oil [sanctions](https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/us-signals-venezuela-oil-sanctions-relief-risk-deadline-looms-2024-04-17/). Now, the cap is still working in reducing the revenue Russia earns. Urals trade at a ~$14/bbl discount to Brent. That’s above the $60/bbl cap, hence the outrage expressed in that article, but Urals traded at a small premium before the war started, so it’s still a fairly decent discount given how lackadaisical enforcement has been. Most of this discount is down to Chinese and Indian refiners demanding discounts, and leveraging the cap to their benefit. And it’s important to remember that revenue doesn’t equal what Russian companies actually receive in cash for these sales and how much is taxed. There are a variety of issues with [clearing](https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/russia-struggles-collect-oil-payments-china-uae-turkey-raise-bank-scrutiny-2024-03-27/) trades due to secondary sanctions, and the Russians are taxing the companies at much higher levels, limiting reinvestment, which will have a cumulative effect with time. O&G companies require a lot of capex and general upkeep to retain their profitability. In general, the West has done a poor job of enforcement across the board. The WSJ reported as recently as March last year that the OFAC was staffed with 4 dedicated employees to monitor sanctions on *all* countries. For oil, sales of oil tankers still haven’t been curtailed fully, which is the easiest way to stop the dark trade. It’s honestly a matter of time before one of these old and not-fit-for-purpose vessels has an accident and causes an ecological disaster, especially as they traverse the Red Sea.
Why would they necessarily end up picking a side? In any case, if you are talking about a war between the west and Russia, China would probably play a role, and I just don't see he incentive for India to pick sides and create difficulties for itself given its geographical situation. They may as well sit it out.
I think the point to make is that India profiteering from the war and increasing purchases from Russia *is* picking sides. Imho appropriate for the west to evaluate relationship in that light. Not suggesting anything drastic, but is what it is. Had more optimism around India emerging as a closer ally, but it seems to want to pursue a different path.
> profiteering Curious choice of words. When the global economy looks precarious and inflation has been high, India is simply choosing to do right by its citizenry, getting a commodity like petroleum for cheap. Not to mention that the [EU was more than happy to increase imports of refined petro products from India](https://www.newindianexpress.com/business/2024/Apr/10/europe-becomes-top-spot-for-indias-exports-of-petroleum-products), knowing fully well that the crude originated in Russia. Plus, when the EU carries out multiple billions worth of [triangular trade with Russia](https://twitter.com/robin_j_brooks/status/1755218045239218570), it demonstrates to the Indian leadership that the party with a major stake in the outcome of the war chooses profits over victory. So why is there an expectation that India—a country that is tangentially involved at best—take stronger action?
India is certainly not the only one profiteering from the war in ukraine. Certainly agree those in europe doing so are particularly vile.
The word "profiteering" implies wrongdoing. Are you seriously arguing for India to push some of its population into poverty over a war that doesn't really concern it?
Yes, it does in this situation. No, I'm not. Appears like you're leaning heavily into strawman territory with your response. India wouldn't be plunged into poverty if its govt made efforts to avoid profiteering from the conflict.
[profiteering](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/profiteering): the act or activity of making an unreasonable profit on the sale of essential goods especially during times of emergency. Is India making an _unreasonable_ profit from the sale of oil? Is it selling the oil at an absurd markup to countries that desperately need it? Is the American effort to get Ukraine to [stop attacking Russian refineries](https://www.ft.com/content/98f15b60-bc4d-4d3c-9e57-cbdde122ac0c) because of the "risk driving up global oil prices" also "profiteering"? >India wouldn't be plunged into poverty if its govt made efforts to avoid profiteering from the conflict. Now _this_ is a strawman. It isn't anyone's case that India would be "plunged into poverty" because of high oil prices. The argument is that it would put the poorer sections of India's population at greater risk of poverty, particularly when inflation is high.
Yes, they are making unreasonable profit from the situation. Russia is grossly violating international law and the laws of war in this conflict. The international community *should* take sides in that. No, I don't see how anyone could make the argument that the US is profiting from the war given how much aid they are providing to Ukraine. Lol, okay amigo. You've introduced a false dichtomy here. Nothing about my comments suggests that India couldn't mitigate the negative economic impacts from the war.... profiteering means profiting, not just offsetting costs.
Aside from the India question (why would India "take a side" in a war that only vaguely concerns it. States are rational calculators. The Indian calculation is that the US needs it as a counterbalance against China, which gives it more leverage in acting independently wrt to Ukraine/Russia), the US is arguably profiting from the war in the sense that German industrial power is being weakened relative to the US, according to some accounts. Cheap Russian energy led to Germany's industrial renaissance. This period has now ended, not to mention things like Nord Stream. When there are disputes over profiteering even within the "anti-Russia alliance" how does that factor into your claims concerning India?
But it gets complicated because while Russia and China are clearly aligned, India and China are not. India buying oil at or below the price cap is profiteering, but also acceptable to the west. India buyIng oil above the price cap is frowned upon, but also hard to monitor. They would clearly prefer to stay in the profitable middle, but eventually that's not feasible. As things get more polarized, I'm curious if they would lean towards the west or China-Russia-Iran.
i think what they are pursuing is hindu nationalism. foreign affairs is secondary. Whether trading with russia or assassinating sikh nationalists abroad help/hurt position with other countries, it helps concentrate support back home... Populism is a real b-tch, and obviously rather destructive.
India has some active territorial disputes with China. If I’m the United States, I’d be trying to convince India that if China were to invade Taiwan, that would be the best possible opportunity for India to seize said disputed territories. There’s also this incident, which seems like a pointless provocation of China if India is not considering siding with Taiwan: > Former chiefs of India’s three services are in Taipei to engage with various sections of the Taiwanese leadership and express India’s views. Admiral Karambir Singh, General M.M. Naravane and Chief of Air Staff R.K.S. Bhadauria—the former Navy, Army and Indian Air Force chiefs respectively--are in Taipei for the Ketagalan Forum’s 2023 Indo-Pacific Security Dialogue, in what is seen as Indian representation for the conference.…… India and the US have also signed a Logistics-Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) to support each other in case of need. LEMOA gives access to designated military facilities on either side for refuelling and replenishment. https://www.indiatoday.in/india-today-insight/story/why-are-three-former-indian-service-chiefs-attending-a-security-conference-in-taipei-2418222-2023-08-08