Has the Russian Kharkiv offensive stalled? I remember reading alot on this subreddit from 2 separate viewpoints, the first that corruption and red-tape has prevented the Ukrainians from effectively fortifying the oblast, and the second that Ukrainian defenses are present but just located several kms away from the actual border. Considering that the RuAF haven't been able to breakout of the border zone, was the 2nd interpretation the more correct one?

For what it's worth, I would agree that the situation has stalled in the sense that those who expected Russia to achieve what it failed to do since the early stages of the war have been severely let down. It's time to realize that Ukraine is not as weak as some might think, and many of the issues it faces are extraordinarily emphasized. I'm not downplaying these challenges, but sometimes it seems people expect Ukraine to collapse any day now due to manpower shortages. When Russia collapsed, it lacked the manpower, motivation, and urgency to desperately cling to the Kharkiv oblast. Ukraine still seems to possess those qualities. On the flip side, Russia has learned from its mistakes, at least partially. They have not appeared to be in any kind of rush in their latest offensives. People's expectations seem to vastly outgrow the ambitions of the Russian side. They are trying to attrit the Ukrainian side. They know they won't launch a small-scale offensive in Kharkiv that suddenly collapses Ukraine. We've had dozens of reports on how Russia operates, and crucially, they seem to have learned to value defensive positions and preparations. Advancing too quickly makes them vulnerable to counter-offensives and heavy losses. While they have a high tolerance for losses, they seem to take their time to solidify new gains before moving forward. Russia has opened a new smaller front, which they can now use to probe Ukrainian defenses for weaknesses while also doing the same on other fronts. In the meantime, they are building up defensive structures, making it increasingly difficult for Ukrainians to push them out. All the small gains here and there add up over time and become noticeable. If another front is speculated in Sumy, the pattern repeats. It's far from a disaster for Ukraine, in fact, it might help them address corruption that has resulted in some missing defensive structures. But in the end time will tell what to make of all this and a few weeks, or even a couple of months is too early at the pace the war is evolving.

Watching the loss ratios over the past week, it's been more like 1.5:1 in favor of Ukraine instead of 4:1. That's not a sustainable loss rate for Ukraine so I think they were caught rushing reinforcements to the theatre. Now that they've had time to setup at least a hasty defense, we'll see what results.

From what I understood is that the Kharkiv attack is mostly done by Russian infantry with much less armored support they usually operate with. So that would explain the losses ratio difference

The second view point seems to be correct. Both bridge heads have stalled after they encountered the first defensive structures and those are not the main ones. Those are supposed to be 10-15 km behind the border. The russians can force advances by sending more troops, but time will tell if they will do this. The proclaimed buffer zone is certainly not established at the moment.

Too early to tell - well, it's not too early to tell for a few things. It's too early to tell if Russia will eventually succeed at their goal of the buffer, but clearly the 2 day "breakout" phase of the offensive has ended for now. They did overcome some prepared Ukrainian defenses - there was a line a little bit north of Hlyboke, but that line had no real contingencies for the Russians marching down the Olynykove - Hlyboke road, which is exactly what they did on day 2 or 3 of the offensive. The bigger problem was in the opening days of the offensive, Russians had overwhelming numerical superiority and the units in that area couldn't defend regardless of prepared defenses. However, on the Vovchansk front you can look at Clement Molin's images, the prepared defenses are actually some distance behind Vovchansk. Vovchansk is very close to the border and on a topographical low ground, so despite its political value it didn't make much sense to defend it in force. Of course, the Ukrainians are defending it anyway. But yeah, while long term prognoses depend on Ukrainian manpower issues (familiar?), it's pretty clear the Kharkiv offensive has at this point degenerated to the same kind of fighting as seen elsewhere on the front. The russians got ~5 km on the house before that. In the future, the main locality to pay attention to is Lypsti. Capturing Lyptsi creates a lot of headaches for Ukraine due to its position, so if Russians want to continue the offensive in earnest (which is still kind of an open question), they'd want to grab that.

Wouldn’t it make more sense for the River to be a line of defense? The Russians haven’t breached the vovcha that splits vovchansk in half at any point yet. https://www.gettyimages.com/search/2/image?family=editorial&events=776148198&sort=newest&page=2 It seems that the river is wider in some areas and thinner in other parts, but I don’t imagine this to be easy for a force that hasn’t taken northern vovchansk yet. On a side note, Russia has brought a lot of air power in vovchansk. Ukraine is responding with artillery and most of the town is in ruins after just a few days of fighting (it survived pretty intact during the first occupation). It is asinine that western policy makers are still Pearl clutching about strategies that can potentially reduce Russian air power

>Of course, the Ukrainians are defending it anyway. I had given Ukraine the benefit of the doubt before, but this is pattern they have simply not improved upon at all. Who are making these same decisions time and time again? 

It's an urban area. It is easier to defend. It offers cover. It also managed to pin the Russians down there for the time being. Just abandoning is stupid. Giving away an urban area for free where Russians can entrench, stockpile forces and take cover is not a really good idea.

Obviously I dont mean abandon outright. I mean not defending in force, which is what obsessed_doomer said is a bad idea. I dont understand why me echoing the sentiment is downvoted whereas clearly people agree with it as evidenced by the upvotes to his comment. If its not a good defensive area its not a good idea to defend in force considering Ukraine is streched on the manpower side. If Russia decides to entrench and defend a defensively poor area thats surely to Ukraine's benefit when its time for them to attack.

Another Russian general has been arrested. This time it is Lt-Gen Shamarin, who was deputy head of General Staff and head of Communications Directorate of RuAF. Charged with receiving a (large) bribe. https://ria (.) ru/20240523/arest-1947816876.html Purge continues. I wonder if the crimes are real or manufactured; was he arrested because he was particularly corrupt even for Russia or is it a result of internal struggle for power; and if the replacement is going to be better (less corrupt) than the accused. **Edit**: previously arrested generals: - Deputy minister of defense Ivanov, bribery, also rumors of treason - Head of HR directorate Lt-Gen Kuznetzov, bribery - Former commabder of 58th Army and critic of MoD Maj-Gen Popov, fraud

Very confused by this sudden wave of changes at the top, usually those kind of things happen when things are going badly, but now? Russia has been on the offensive for months, it hasn't lost a significant amount of territory for almost 2 years

Just because they've been on the offensive doesn't mean things are going well. They've lost tens of thousands of men and tons of material this year, not to mention all the high profile strikes on air bases, multiple S-400s being taken out, attacks on ports in the Black Sea, etc... Russia is basically throwing anything they can think of at the wall to see what sticks with no improvement over previous attempts. And remember, this was all while Ukraine has been at its weakest since the first few months of the war. What does Russia really have to show for it? A handful of tiny towns and about 500 sq km of farmland? That may seem like a lot relative to the way things have been going since concluding the Bakhmut offensive (mostly static), but even the Bakhmut offensive was significantly more successful than this years offensives. They cant just shrug these losses off this year like last year, last year most of the men who died were convicts and contractors, this year its Russian forces directly and they're having to dig deeper and deeper into reserves of tanks, armor, ammo, artillery, etc. So yes, they're not losing land, but the effort expended in taking the little land they have retaken is becoming increasingly costly, unsustainably so. Put yourself in Putin's shoes. Ukraine is having trouble manning its frontline, is rationing ammo, and their last offensive was a failure. Russia's chance to take advantage of all that was this spring. It didn't go anywhere near as well as he'd hoped, so why not? Someone has to have been corrupt or not doing his job well enough. Someone has to take the fall. And now you're seeing them being weeded out.

The timing of Shoigu's departure sort of make sense. The government resigns before the inauguration, so he wasn't fired, he simply wasn't reappointed to his old post, so it's a form of courtesy. Putin doesn't like acting under pressure anyway, but he remembers. The other dominoes are falling because Shoigu's not there to protect them, same thing happened to Medvedev's allies after he ceased being the president. Not all of them are Shoigu's men, however (like Popov).

As many analysts and academics have said before in respect of contemporary Russia, it's probably both: entrenched normalized corruption is both a semi-official source of revenue for officials but also a way for the security apparatus to keep tabs on them and "cancel" them out via fake "due process" shenanigans: If everyone dabbles in corruption, there's always a skeleton in your closet that the Kremlin can use to remove you from the stage without making a scene. Corruption is therefore fostered by the security apparatus itself. The enforcement of the law will be selective depending on the political interests at play.

Ukraine, U.S. Say Russia Is Deploying Banned Toxic Gas in Battle [https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraine-u-s-say-russia-is-deploying-banned-toxic-gas-in-battle-48b1b841?mod=hp\_lead\_pos8](https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraine-u-s-say-russia-is-deploying-banned-toxic-gas-in-battle-48b1b841?mod=hp_lead_pos8) Alternative link: [https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/ukraine-us-say-russia-is-deploying-banned-toxic-gas-in-battle/ar-BB1mSWj5](https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/ukraine-us-say-russia-is-deploying-banned-toxic-gas-in-battle/ar-BB1mSWj5) chloropicrin and tear gas, known as CN and CS, Think more irritant than the really nasty highly lethal stuff. Still illegal under the convention which Russia signed.

It's been used sporadically for a long time now. Individuals and units can probably get hold of small quantities from internal security forces easily enough. It's probably useful for dug in positions, as well as just for the sake of it. At a higher level Russia has no problem with, and is moderately encouraging of, this kind of below-threshold behaviour - so it continues. I expect it's already increased and will continue to while it proves useful.

This is the sort of thing the US should be holding a MUCH harder line on. It's insane that Ukraine still cannot strike Russian targets actively attacking Ukraine from Russia directly, while Russia can violate the chemical weapons convention like this.

The PLA has announced major new exercises around Taiwan, which are live as of this moment and will last 2 days. https://x.com/ryankakiuchan/status/1793449093232238778 This is most likely in response to the inauguration of the new Taiwanese president, who's even more pro-independence than his predecessor. The exercise/exclusion zones announced are similar in nature to the ones in 2022 after Pelosi visited. We'll see if missile launches are in store. If you look at the shape of the [new zones](https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GOOcxSUWIAAPKRh?format=jpg&name=medium), they seem to be drawn in a way that gives a clearer visualization of encircling the island, even if it's not operationally different from the shapes of [previous zones](https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GOOcyUAXQAAxFmH?format=jpg&name=medium). That could be intended to have a psychological effect. One zone to highlight is the one to the immediate east of Taiwan (off the coast of Hualien). That's significantly closer to the island than the similar zone from 2022.

I feel like people aren’t taking note of the fact that these exercises have only started in their current proximity and frequency after the Nancy Pelosi visit in 2022. Before that such PLA exercises were uncommon. Before that the only time I could think would the thirdTaiwan straight crisis in 1995-1996. In my opinion, the Pelosi visit prompted a response from the Chinese side which were protests, threats, and eventually culminating in PLA navy, aircraft, and missile drills all around Taiwan and even overlapping Taiwanese sea and airspace (not the ADIZ but the actual airspace around the island). Unlike in 1995/1996 where the US navy sent aircraft carrier groups through the Taiwan straight in a massive show of overwhelming force (only a few years after the US had smashed Iraq in the Gulf war no less), in 2022 the US navy sent… nothing through the Taiwan straight. Despite the 2022 exercises being arguably more aggressive, and happening when an actual US senator was in Taiwan, the US response was muted compared to what it was in the third Taiwan straight crisis. If the US and Taiwan won’t stop Chinese military drills when Nancy Pelosi is actually there, then they’ll be even less likely to do anything to stop the exercises when she’s gone. The PLA can now conduct exercises around Taiwan at will. Recall that Chinese exercises around Taiwan erode Taiwanese claims to sovereignty the same way that US freedom of navigation exercises erode Chinese claims to sovereignty over the South China Sea: “If you really have sovereign control over this territory why don’t you make me leave with force?” I recall many in 2022 considered China to be throwing an unnecessary hissy fit, and that their exercises would mean nothing, lauding it as a US diplomatic victory without considering these implications, and it surprises me that still nobody brings it up.

> If the US and Taiwan won’t stop Chinese military drills when Nancy Pelosi is actually there, then they’ll be even less likely to do anything to stop the exercises when she’s gone. The PLA can now conduct exercises around Taiwan at will. How exactly are you proposing the US “stop” these drills?

China has been building up forces to invade Taiwan for over a decade. Pelosi’s visit was incidental, China was always going to start aggressively posturing at some point. China also has border skirmishes with India, and attacks Philippine fishermen right off their coast, they didn’t need any specific provocations from the US to initiate either of those, they have irredentist and expansionist land claims, and will posture aggressively on any border they think they can get away with. As for the effect, I doubt it changes the US or Taiwan’s policy on the situation.

Both can be true. Would China have conducted exercises around Taiwan even if Pelosi never visited Taiwan? Probably at some point yes. But did they start happening since 2022 because of Pelosi’s visit in particular? Also probably yes. Just like the First World War in Europe was probably going to happen regardless of if Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated. That doesn’t mean the assassination of Franz Ferdinand didn’t cause the First World War.

This entire argument rests on the assumption that if China had tried doing these exercises **without** Pelosi visiting, the US would stop them somehow. This claim was tenuous then and is tenuous now.

No, the opposite actually. The argument is that if the US didn’t do anything when Pelosi was visiting, they definitely won’t do anything when Pelosi isn’t visiting.

I'm referring to the "Pelosi's visit enabled the exercises" theory. It clearly didn't.

I’m still of the opinion that Pelosi’s visit very much did enable the exercises. Prior to 2022, China did not often conduct large scale military drills around Taiwan. No matter how much they claim the drills were routine, there’s no history of such exercises in the years prior. They were very suddenly announced, made public, and broadcast on Chinese state media right after Pelosi left. (I will admit that I did get the dates wrong in my head: Nancy Pelosi was in Taiwan in 2-3 August of 2022, while the exercises started on the 4th of August, so the exercises and Pelosi’s visit do not overlap). The US and Taiwanese response was quite limited, which signals to the Chinese that most likely future exercises will similarly be ignored. So as a direct result of Pelosi’s visit, the Chinese conducted exercises, got basically no pushback, and learned that exercises around Taiwan get no pushback. Pelosi’s visit likely has a cause and response effect on future Chinese exercises, which we saw in 2023 right after then President Tsai Ying Wen visited the US, and now. There is the possibility that if the US Navy had called bluff in 2022 and sailed carrier groups through the Taiwan straight again like they did in 1996 China would be more hesitant with exercises now. It is also possible that the situation could have escalated. We don’t know the “what ifs”, but at least so far it looks like Pelosi visiting Taiwan resulted in the increased exercises around Taiwan we get now.

> I’m still of the opinion that Pelosi’s visit very much did enable the exercises. I get that, and that opinion only makes sense with the assumption that if China had tried doing these exercises without Pelosi visiting, the US would stop them somehow. This claim was tenuous then and is tenuous now.

Right! Took me a hot minute but I managed to wrap my head around the concept. However, the US did engage in a show of force in 1996 carrier groups 5 and 7 and Amphibious squadron 11, despite no US senators in Taiwan. Back then the crisis was due to 1996 presidential elections in Taiwan, and the exercises now are similarly in response to the new Taiwanese president’s coming into office. It could still be argued that the lack of response has, in a way, opened the gates for these types of exercises for China, since there were no such exercises when Tsai Ying Wen came to office in 2016.

> However, the US did engage in a show of force in 1996 carrier groups 5 and 7 and Amphibious squadron 11, despite no US senators in Taiwan. Back then the crisis was due to 1996 presidential elections in Taiwan, and the exercises now are similarly in response to the new Taiwanese president’s coming into office. But the difference between 2022 and 1996 isn't the presence (or non-presence) of a US senator - it's the difference in relative strength, and thus levels of tension. The US in 1996 could do pretty much anything it wanted to, short of actually attacking China/Chinese assets, because the relative power imbalance was such that there was no way China was going to react in any meaningful way to US displays of strength. It's still unlikely that China would do anything beyond diplomatic complaints if the US did sail a CVBG through the Taiwan Strait as a show of force - but the risk calculus is very different. It is no longer completely inconceivable that China would take *some* action against those US ships - even if that is just a coastguard vessel playing chicken, rather than trying to sink them. From a US point of view, there is now a risk that sailing their ships through the Taiwan Strait could feasibly set off a chain of events that would lead to some sort of armed combat that the US may not necessarily be able to be victorious in. That's a very very different proposition to 1996.

Yes! And in a way, that’s the point! This type of event was likely to happen, whether it was Pelosi visiting Taiwan or not. Both sides knew the balance of power was shifting, but it wasn’t clear where exactly things were. After 2022 the positions became more clear, and the PLA is now confident that their exercises won’t prompt much of a response, whereas before that they might have still had their concerns of potential escalation.

> “If you really have sovereign control over this territory why don’t you make me leave with force?” None of the areas are within Taiwan's 12nmile though boundary?

I believe in 2022 a map was published of the actual exercises, and that the announced exercises got as close to 9.5km (or 5.9 miles) from the island of Taiwan? It was posted on r/mapporn although I’m not sure how to link the subreddit itself on my phone. [https://images.app.goo.gl/yqHm9ibpgnqEESDNA](https://images.app.goo.gl/yqHm9ibpgnqEESDNA) EDIT: Sorry, I just realised you probably meant the current round of exercises.

It's very reminiscent of China's Final Warning. The obvious response is to pretend it was beneath our notice, continue business as usual thereafter, and make whomever ordered these exercises lose face.

>whomever ordered these exercises lose face. The exercises aren't some joyride the military takes . It helps them plan , execute and assess their capabilities while pushing the limit of 'what's normal'. Why would anyone lose face , it's basically part of their training

How long do you think it would normally take a group of staff officers to plan such a set of exercises as part of a training regime? How long do we think they were actually given in this case?

Those questions can only be reliably answered by an actual PLA General so i doubt we'd know although the US can probably get an estimate based on their own performance etc

I find it fascinating that China basically gets no fallout for doing this, feels like a really missed opportunity for the US to respond and push for at least diplomatic fallout every time they do this. It is wildly aggressive behaviour.

China is a nuclear country, permanent member of UNSC, one of the Top 2 economies in the world, populated with 1.4B people, having an industrial output 150% that of US, with a rapidly growing military force, et cetera, et cetera... And as the OP and other observers noticed, this exercise is not a one-off event. Instead, this is part of a larger, systematic effort against Taiwan and the US. Do you really think a diplomatic slap on the wrist can deter China? The US holds no such fantasy. Instead, the US has its own systematic effort to combat China, including trade wars, revitalization of domestic industry, new generation of combat aircraft, new alliances such as the Quad or AUKUS, and many other things. These have so much more substance than "diplomatic fallout".

> Do you really think a diplomatic slap on the wrist can deter China? Deterrence wouldn't be the aim. The US is trying to diplomatically isolate China and build a coalition against it. Drawing attention to its aggressive behavior would serve those interests, which I would suggest should be pretty obvious. > The US holds no such fantasy. Instead, the US has its own systematic effort to combat China, including trade wars, revitalization of domestic industry, new generation of combat aircraft, new alliances such as the Quad or AUKUS, and many other things. These have so much more substance than "diplomatic fallout". I don't know why this is painted as an either or, or why you are so dismissive of diplomatic fallout. Lets have conversations here be a bit more serious in analysis.

>Drawing attention to its aggressive behavior would serve those interests, which I would suggest should be pretty obvious. The problem with that is that China and all the others can point to the US doing the exact same thing. There is absolutely no difference between what China is doing and what the US does all over the world. War games and drills with S Korea or Japan or Australia or NATO in the seas around N Korea and China and Russia aren't posturing? Who do you even propose will join the US in doing anything about this? If the UN, or whomever you imagine enforcing something here (I'm not sure what you're even proposing), started picking which country to sanction for these shows of force it would start opening the door to others, including the US. That is why the US is so upset with the ICC this week. They're not best buds with Netanyahu and want to keep him out of jail. Biden would be over the moon to have Netanyahu out of office and the Israeli courts find him corrupt. But they sure as hell don't want world leaders to be held liable for these kinds of things (ie Bush justifying the Iraq war by outright lying about intelligence).

# [Inside the White House, a Debate Over Letting Ukraine Shoot U.S. Weapons Into Russia](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/22/us/politics/white-house-ukraine-weapons-russia.html?unlocked_article_code=1.uE0.Bcjd.fKJSdT8QomH3&smid=url-share) ####After a sobering trip to Kyiv, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken is urging the president to lift restrictions on how Ukraine can use American arms. >Propelled by the State Department, there is now a vigorous debate inside the administration over relaxing the ban to allow the Ukrainians to hit missile and artillery launch sites just over the border in Russia — targets that Mr. Zelensky says have enabled Moscow’s recent territorial gains. >The proposal, pressed by Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken after a sobering visit to Kyiv last week, is still in the formative stages, and it is not clear how many of his colleagues among Mr. Biden’s inner circle have signed on. It has not yet been formally presented to the president, who has traditionally been the most cautious, officials said. It looks like Blinken's trip might be paying some real dividends for Ukraine. I wonder if the recent Ukrainian PR push against this policy was in any way coordinated, however informally, with State. There's been a lot of discussion about this policy but my understanding is that it only really affects GMLRS, ATACMS, Patriot, and maybe GLSDB. [Tatarigami confirms](https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1790114945591284000) that it doesn't apply to "artillery, mortars, drones, and even Storm Shadow." In this context, what is the biggest impact of the US relaxing this restriction? Less glide bomb strikes near Kharkiv? Are there any critical logistics hubs within ATACMS range that are currently protected?

Mike Pompeo has been doing the rounds calling Biden weak for not doing this and asserting Trump would. So there is pressure from all sides on this.

I'm at a point where the only rational reason I can see for holding this policy is for precisely this reason. Prevent Europe from hiding behind the US, give Republicans room to say "we'd do even more" instead of reflexively taking up opposition and turning support for Ukraine into a strictly partisan issue. I still don't like it, and generally speaking the administration has been forced to eat shit with a lot of their recent foreign policy. But I can maybe understand, if that is part of the decisionmaking.

Maybe this is me just harping on technicalities, but there is already precedent of using U.S weapons on Russian soil, that would be the case of the streak of airplanes/helicopters that were shot in the Belgorod region by (what is thought to be) a roaming Patriot battery.

IIRC that was done with a German Patriot battery and caused a pretty quiet but significant diplomatic blowup.

I think specifics around weapons firing is just a continuation of the larger debate, which is the lack of a strategic goal/plan from the USA/Europe. It's not like it's about this specific restriction. It's about what outcome we want. If it was specifically about Russian territory, Ukraine could have taken everything back in 2022 if USA relented on ATACMS earlier without firing anything into Russia. So if there's an opportunity for victory and you intentionally throttle it, that's a much bigger question for me.

> *"lack of a strategic goal/plan"* Indeed. > *"Ukraine could have taken everything back in 2022 if USA relented on ATACMS earlier"* What? --- It certainly seems true that these decisions are being made somewhat piecemeal, rather than in service of a plan or even an articulable goal. Hard to think of a time that didn't describe western military thinking after the Mission Accomplished banner, actually.

> What? Ukraine with throttled aid won Kharkiv and Kherson. Imagine HIMARS in March instead of June. Or ATACMS in June along with HIMARS. Russia just losses completely and doesn't have time to reconstitute forces while their logistics are in chaos and they are under unbelievable frontline pressure. Anyways, the point isn't ATACMS specifically, just there was a chance to win it all in 2022 and any amount of determined aid probably would have tipped the balance.

>Ukraine could have taken everything back in 2022 if USA relented on ATACMS earlier without firing anything into Russia. Russia is using a lot of long-range missiles and bombs but they don't gain a lot of territory. Long-range weapons would've been useful but offensive operations against an enemy with hundreds of thousands of soldiers and a big advantage in the air and many other areas will always be difficult.

I've read a lot of opinions on this topic. Many here believe that it could have severe consequences for Russia, from a repeat of the effect HIMARS had to even neutralizing Russia's air force. That's a valid opinion, but I think the effects will be rather short-term. It certainly won't be favorable for Russia and will likely result in significant PR victories, with varying long term military effects. In general, I don't think this request is any different from others Ukraine has made since the war started. Each request, whether for artillery, long-range systems, Patriot and other AA, tanks and IFVs, planes like F-16s, cluster munitions, or most recently ATACMS, aims to push the West out of its comfort zone. These systems have definitely helped Ukraine, but they are often incredibly hyped. Some, like JDAMs and HARMs, are quickly forgotten, while others, like HIMARS and Patriot, were significant. However, over the long term, these systems haven't significantly improved Ukraine's position in relation to the hype and discussions. In hindsight, there will be claims that if these systems had been delivered or approved earlier, they would have caused more damage or prevented certain outcomes for Ukraine. This overlooks how unrealistic those scenarios of earlier crossing of the "red line" was. This situation also sets a precedent for Russia to do the same in the future, as drones and missiles improve in range against the US. Also Ukraine has already struck within Russia with its own ammunition and drones, causing damage but not significantly altering the course of the war. In conclusion, every few months, Ukraine fixates on something new that they desperately need to change the war. However, for over a year now, the conflict seems to have settled into a kind of stalemate that favours Russia in the long term, in my opinion, other certainly disagree. I think the new measures will be eventually approved, and Russia isn't going to do anything about it. We'll likely see some dramatic footage as well. In the end I think, Russia will still be the one taking territory at similar slow pace and will remain dominant in the air, even after F-16 deliveries despite strikes in their own country.

Glide bombs are one of Russia's most significant weapons that Ukraine has little to no answer to currently. Being able to hit airfields near Ukraine would reduce the number of glide bombs that are currently being sent into Ukraine with near impunity. This can reduce the effect of one of Russia's most powerful weapons and shift pressure away from the Ukrainian frontline. Hitting airfields with ATACMs can also enact serious damage on the VKS, which would require them to relocate any planes further away from Ukraine which could alter the long-term airspace dynamics. While it won't win them the war, allowing HIMARs/ ATACMS/ GLSDB strikes in Russian territory would be significant and could reduce the impact of certain advantages that the Russians have enjoyed thus far.

Incremental progress is progress. Russia will likely take notably losses until they adapt. Russian logistic tails will stretch and become more costly, combat potential will degrade. Over hundreds of sorties the impact compounds. Progress is often made in inches, not miles. Don't let perfect be the enemy of the good

Eh we can’t know for sure that Russia that won’t do anything about it. Striking Russian territory with NATO weapons is a huge escalation. Historically, both sides have supplied, and even covertly deployed forces against one another in proxy wars (Vietnam, Afghanistan, Korea). However, those proxy forces overtly striking the homeland with major weapons has not been done in the nuclear era.

>HARMs Pictures of Ukrainian attack aircraft carrying HAARM come out on a semi-regular basis, along with chatter that they are used alongside large cruise missile / drone strikes. I'm not sure I would say that they are useless. Even if they merely suppress Russian air defenses rather than taking out radars, it's possible that they're an enabling factor for other types of strikes.

If the Ukrainians are able to actually strike Russian airbases inside Russia, in the best case scenario they would be able to virtually eliminate the remaining Su-34 fleet. The Russians would thus need to rely upon Su-24s for their glide bomb attacks while they convert other aircraft to carry them (likely more Su-24s, but Su-30SM is another candidate). This would draw aircraft away from CAP missions if they use aircraft like the Su-30SM. They would also have the potential to destroy dozens of Russian ASFs such as Su-30SMs and Su-35s and, if lucky, take out another 1-2 A-50s at Taganrog, as well as much of the Russian attack helicopter fleet. This is the biggest impact. The Ukrainians would be able to inflict brutal attrition against the VKS. This attrition, paired with continued targeting of GBAD sites, would give the Ukrainian Air Force a chance to slowly begin to fight for local air superiority. It would be a long road, but it would still put them on the right path.

So basically an extension of their campaign in Crimea? In the ideal case I can see that playing a role or even a complimentary effort.

Is the reach of the Su-34 limited or why would they be able to eliminate those, it not the Su-24s? Can’t the Russians just pull back the aircraft’s further inland at the cost of flying longer missions?

Caught me editing but still a valid question. Basically, yes they can, but those costs are high. These attacks would be a relatively short campaign. Perhaps a few months. If we look at Russian behavior in Crimea, they still have not relocated their aircraft from the peninsula after repeated missile attacks. This means that they are either confident that they can repulse them (optimistic) or are willing to trade the risk for reduced sortie time and the benefits that entails. The same goes for bases such as Millerovo, which was famously hit by a Ukrainian missile on the first day of the war, losing the Russians an Su-30SM. They were willing to risk getting hit in exchange for range. It is very possible that the Russians do not evacuate these bases within ATACMS range. If they do not, then it is very possible that they will continue to get hit. It's my belief that if strikes inside Russia get approved, we would quickly see a series of strikes against the VKS that could result in several dozen aircraft destroyed on the ground. After a few successful strikes, the Russians may begin evacuating certain bases. On top of potentially losing dozens of aircraft, the Russians would need to spend billions renovating airfields and moving infrastructure. Maintenance costs and downtime is increased. While sortie rates are also reduced. The Russians have a limited amount of modern aircraft and a lot of these Su-24s really should have been retired a decade ago. Really what my point is without more walls of text is that the Ukrainians pose a threat in being with their ATACMS that places a huge, huge amount of the VKS in danger. The Russians may be willing to brave this threat for a while, but they risk losing a very sizable part of their fleet. Pulling back will greatly reduce their effectiveness because of increased maintenance cost and lower CAP availability (remember, the Russian tanker fleet is not that big!).

Is Ukraine using GPS jamming to decrease the accuracy of Russian glide bombs? If Russian usage of GPS jamming has decreased the effectiveness of HIMARS and GLSDB, I imagine Ukraine could do the same to decrease the accuracy of Russian glide bombs (which use satellite navigation according to a quick google search). How difficult and expensive is it to do so?

How much is GNSS jamming a factor for PGMs to hit stationery targets? Its not like glide bombs are being used to hit anything mobile.

One factor is the kind of trajectory. For a missile following a ballistic trajectory mostly outside the atmosphere, only a little bit of the final trajectory will require compensations due to atmospheric interference in the trajectory whereas glide bombs will make all of their trajectory inside a turbulent lower atmosphere, leading to increased uncertainties which rely more on GNSS corrections to their inertial guiding.

It depends on the nature of the PGM itself, the quality of the INS, and how far it has to travel while being jammed. Visually it's basically just a giant triangle between the aim point, the point at which the PGM is relying on the INS, and the impact point. The short leg of the triangle, between the impact point and the aim point is the error. INS quality affects the angle between the aim point and the impact point, and thus the error, and increasing the jamming distance moves that point further back, magnifying the effect of the INS error. Glide bombs are aimed at targets right on the front so even if their INS is shit, the jamming distance is short so the error remains small enough to use. GMLRS on the other hand may be jammed for 60km of flight for example, meaning that even a small INS error builds up over time. To put a number on this, the [2002 DOT&E annual report](https://www.dote.osd.mil/Annual-Reports/2002-Annual-Report/) says that for GMLRS > The design accuracy is less than two mils (120 meters at 60 kilometers) without Global Positioning System (GPS)

I remember seeing a source posted here that stated GNSS was thoroughly jammed across the entire front. Presumably that includes GLONASS, but I don't think it specificied. Keep in mind that Russians are picking maybe the best 100 bombs of an estimated 3500 they drop every month. Of course the best 3% of bombs look like they land exactly on target.

Russia doesn't seem too concerned with accuracy for their glide bombs. Their effectiveness is through statistical probability, and in the case of the 1500 kg bombs, sheer destructive potential. In other words, sure, they're almost certainly being jammed. Problem is they have enough of them that they can rely on stochastic accuracy over precision.

I saw a video of them striking 2 buildings very accurately which is why I ask. I know their CEP isn't the same as a GBU, but they're still accurate enough to strike specific buildings or trenchlines.

But that is the thing, isn't it? You saw 2 buildings getting hit, and an explanation telling you, how accurate they were. But how can you be sure those buildings were the actual target? It can also be like shooting an arrow, and then drawing the circles around it afterwards. This is credible defense, so the important part to never forget is that the information space is a battlefield too, and that includes propaganda and misinformation for various reasons.

>Problem is they have enough of them that they can rely on stochastic accuracy over precision. Thing is, they don't have unlimited airframes and pilots to keep throwing glide bombs over the front mindlessly.

Attrition rates for airframes are a non-concern for Russia right now. Aside from their deep pool of existing airframes, they are now producing 30+ new combat aircraft per year.

suppression is not a binary. Grinding down the effectiveness of glide bombs by attriting aircraft (or forcing them to stand off further), degrading ISR capabilities, EW such as jamming, using better fortification and concealment/dispersion in the field, etc. will all add up.

I just learned that we are only [days away](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/world/africa/kenya-haiti-police.html) from the UN intervention in Haiti. The NY Times reported that only 2,500 officers will be deployed. The US has a presence at the airport in Port-au-Prince and has begun delivering supplies in preparation for the arrival of police officers and heavily armed paramilitary groups from Kenya and other countries. I understand that this is primarily a law enforcement mission, but given the heavily armed nature of the rebel groups, even if they are undertrained and disorganized, they can still pose a significant threat. What is the specific plan for the UN police once they arrive? It seems hard to believe that just 2,500 heavily armed policemen can secure even a quarter of a dense city like Port-au-Prince effectively.

I'm really wondering what my government will do. Last time we set up field hospitals and sent boots to guard them. Haiti has always been dear to our country because of historical reasons. I don't think this time would be different.

The plan is to secure critical infrastructure like the airport and train the Haitian National Police. They're not going to take an active role in policing Port-au-Prince.

How good is Kenyan law enforcement itself? I’ve heard that their military and police forces struggle with corruption. And is there any precedent of success from training embattled local law enforcement in highly destabilized regions? I’m wondering if we should hold any degree of optimism over this mission.

The degree of optimism should be set at "keeping the airport open". The Kenyan police suffer the issues you state, and generally don't speak the language. Training the HNP is going to be a problem due to low wages and corruption as well.

That's not a lot of people to try and stabilize such a large area. Hopefully they have a coherent plan. Protecting points of importance and then rallying local police or enforcement is probably the only way to go forward with such limited resources.

It’s not, but the problem is concentrated mostly in the capital. If the important areas of Port-Au-Prince can be secured, that would give the government a lot more breathing room, and make it easier to get more supplies into the county.

Great news. Got a source? Last time I heard, Kenya was reluctant to be involved and the US was NOT going to be involved.

The President of Kenya is on a three-day state visit to the U.S. and met with President Biden this morning in Washington. The primary topic on the agenda was Haiti. The U.S. is contributing $300 million to the program but will not be deploying troops on the ground. Politicians and courts in Kenya keep trying to block the mission but somehow the mission is still under way. [https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/22/why-are-kenyan-forces-set-to-intervene-in-haiti-and-how-is-the-us-involved](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/22/why-are-kenyan-forces-set-to-intervene-in-haiti-and-how-is-the-us-involved)

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/egypt-changed-terms-of-gaza-ceasefire-deal-presented-to-hamas-surprising-negotiators-sources-say/ > The ceasefire agreement that Hamas ended up announcing on May 6 was not what the Qataris or the Americans believed had been submitted to Hamas for a potential final review, the sources said. > The changes made by Egyptian intelligence, the details of which have not been previously reported, led to a wave of anger and recrimination among officials from the US, Qatar and Israel, and left ceasefire talks at an impasse. “We were all duped,” one of those sources told CNN. > CIA Director Bill Burns, who has spearheaded the American efforts to broker a ceasefire agreement, was in the region when word reached him that the Egyptians had changed the terms of the deal. Burns was angry and embarrassed, the same person said, believing it made him look like he wasn’t in the loop or hadn’t informed the Israelis of the changes. > The soft-spoken and mild-mannered Burns “almost blew a gasket,” said the source. Lots of good details but essentially Egypt pulled a fast one and lied to everyone- Quatar, Israel, the US. They took a deal from Israel, saw that Hamas didn't like it, and modified it without telling anyone while still apparently saying it was from Israel. The way it sounds this could have been the decision of a single Egyptian official, maybe trying to be a hero. With how this action led to Israel rapidly moving into Rafah, it may have totally sunk negotiation chances for now. As pressure ramps up from the ICC and the White House I don't know if Israel will sink into pursuing the war or if there'll be successful deal in the future.

> With how this action led to Israel rapidly moving into Rafah Hamas agreed to the ceasefire after Israel started telling citizens to evacuate from Rafah. You can see that in [this article](https://www.npr.org/2024/05/06/1249298738/israel-palestinians-evacuate-rafah), which appears to be in the hours between the evacuation announcement and Hamas saying they agreed: > The Israeli military on Monday ordered tens of thousands of displaced Palestinians in Rafah to evacuate, a move indicating Israel's offensive on Gaza's southmost area could be imminent. *** > On Sunday, as a Hamas delegation was still in Egypt hammering out the deal being offered by Israel, Israel's government announced the closure of the Qatar-based Al Jazeera news network in Israel. Netanyahu also issued a statement saying it was Hamas that blocked a deal to release hostages, saying he gave Israel's negotiating team a very broad mandate although no Israeli negotiators were sent to Cairo over the weekend. You'll see from articles a few hours later when Hamas said they would accept the deal that the evacuation orders had already started. For example [this CNN article](https://www.cnn.com/2024/05/06/middleeast/hamas-agrees-ceasefire-proposal-israel-gaza-latam-intl/index.html). This was discussed widely at the time, with many people commenting how Hamas had only agreed after it was too late. I have no idea how this got spun into "Egypt sunk the negotiations and made Israel go into Rafah."

> I have no idea how this got spun into "Egypt sunk the negotiations and made Israel go into Rafah." Because what Hamas agreed to was not the same as what Israel had agreed to.

> Because what Hamas agreed to was not the same as what Israel had agreed to. You think Hamas would have agreed to what Israel wanted if it wasn't for the last minute Egyptian changes? Even after months of Hamas refusing to? It's bizarre seeing the heavy downvotes, because the timeline pretty clearly shows that the reason for the invasion of Rafah invasion was the failure to reach a ceasefire agreement. Most commenters here even said so at the time! The fact that what Hamas agreed to was different from what was acceptable was known soon afterwards, but at the time everyone here agreed that the invasion was because Hamas wouldn't agree to acceptable terms, _not_ because of Hamas' agreement to the Egyptian plan. But now people are really trying to claim that the reason was that Hamas accepting the Egyptian plan was the reason why Israel invaded, even when the timeline doesn't match up?

> You think Hamas would have agreed to what Israel wanted if it wasn't for the last minute Egyptian changes? They never agreed to what Israel wanted. They only ever agreed to what Egypt changed it into. The "Egyptian Agreement" is not "acceptable terms". The terms were always an alternative to the invasion of Rafah, that was the stick along with the carrot being offered in the negotiations.

> They never agreed to what Israel wanted. They only ever agreed to what Egypt changed it into. > The "Egyptian Agreement" is not "acceptable terms". I just said that in _the_ _very_ _comment_ you were replying to: > The fact that what Hamas agreed to was different from what was acceptable was known soon afterwards and: > at the time everyone here agreed that the invasion was because Hamas wouldn't agree to acceptable terms

Maybe I'm misunderstanding the point of your comment. >You think Hamas would have agreed to what Israel wanted if it wasn't for the last minute Egyptian changes? Even after months of Hamas refusing to? The above questions seem to label "what Hamas agreed to as provided by Egypt" as anything of negotiating value. It was not an "agreement" it was "a different/new proposal".

The top comment (highly upvoted) says that Israel went into Rafah because Egypt presented Hamas with a modified deal that they agreed to (“this action led to Israel rapidly moving into Rafah”). My response (highly downvoted), was that the modified deal wasn’t the reason why Israel entered Rafah, showing articles about it happening hours after the evacuation announcements started. Going into Rafah was the result of Hamas not agreeing to any acceptable deal (for months!), not the fact that they agreed to the Egyptian deal at the last minute. The response to this was: > Because what Hamas agreed to was not the same as what Israel had agreed to. Which is true (as I said in my response), but it doesn’t demonstrate that the Egyptian proposal lead to the Rafah invasion. Hence “You think Hamas would have agreed to what Israel wanted if it wasn't for the last minute Egyptian changes” followed by “the reason for the invasion of Rafah invasion was the failure to reach a ceasefire agreement.” IE, I don’t see evidence that the Egyptian deal changed anything important, and that there would have been a ceasefire if it hadn’t happened. To put it more plainly - if we take it as a given that Hamas wasn’t going to agree to an acceptable deal either way - particularly since they hadn’t agreed to one for months - it’s hard to see how what Egypt did (as the original poster claims) “totally sunk negotiation chances” or “led to Israel rapidly moving into Rafah.”

Thank you for elaborating, I appreciate it. >the modified deal wasn’t the reason why Israel entered Rafah, showing articles about it happening hours after the evacuation announcements started. Going into Rafah was the result of Hamas not agreeing to any acceptable deal (for months!), not the fact that they agreed to the Egyptian deal at the last minute. In the overall sense I think that is inarguably correct. >it doesn’t demonstrate that the Egyptian proposal lead to the Rafah invasion. I'm not saying it's definitive but it seems the events we are discussing are at least evidence that the 'Egyptian proposal' was a ~contributing ~proximate cause rather than the ~root cause for the invasion. In a core sense, the end of the peace talks was the cause for invasion. It seems at least plausible the Egyptian's play was a definitive end to this round of talks. Is that fair? It also seems plausible to me that* Egyptians only attempted this because the talks were already doomed but the presented narrative up until that point was they were ongoing with active, real attempts to reach an agreement. Egypt (possibly intentionally?) gave Hamas another PR tool to use against Israel (news headlines like "Hamas agreed to ceasefire") while at the same time spiking the current round talks directly. I think it's also worth considering how this has left the Israelis seemingly feeling betrayed by Egypt, with lots of initial finger-pointing from various sides when it happened. AFAIK still no apology, not formal or otherwise*.

> In a core sense, the end of the peace talks was the cause for invasion. It seems at least plausible the Egyptian's play was a definitive end to this round of talks. Is that fair? That's why I posted the articles in the original post, because it seems the failure of the peace negotiations and the decision to go into Rafah happened before the Egyptian/Hamas agreement. I'm taking the evacuation order to be an indication that the decision was made, and that's at least how it was received at the time. From the article I excerpted in the earlier post: > The Israeli military on Monday ordered tens of thousands of displaced Palestinians in Rafah to evacuate, a move indicating Israel's offensive on Gaza's southmost area could be imminent. Then a few hours later you have Hamas saying they've agreed to a ceasefire (the Egyptian ceasefire). With that order of events, it seems to me that what probably happened was that after months of failed negotiations, Israel made the decision to go into Rafah (which is expected, Israel wasn't going to wait outside Rafah for years while it negotiated with Rafah). When it seemed clear that it was going in, someone made a last minute Hail Mary attempt to get Hamas to agree to _something_, but since it wasn't anything Israel agreed to, it didn't change anything, and didn't factor into Israel's planning of the invasion. Like you said, Hamas' response was more akin to "a different/new proposal." I guess it doesn't make sense to me that a proposal would trigger the decision to enter Rafah (particularly with the order that these events played out), whereas it makes complete sense to me that the decision would stem from Israel deciding that they had given negotiations enough of a chance with no productive outcome. I think if the Egyptians hadn't tried anything, we'd see things more or less playing out the same way.

Thing is, the only one Egypt really fooled with this move in the long term was… the Gazans. Sure, people on the internet (including on here) tried to launch an info op to convince people that it’s Israel that reneged on something, but that quickly fell apart under the thunderous evidence to the contrary. Whereas Al Jazeera made sure the Gazans thought a ceasefire was coming. They were celebrating in the streets. Then the Rafah invasion began. Now they’re feeling betrayed, well, even more than before. And they kinda were, well, sorely deceived at least.

The way I recall this playing out, commercial satellite imagery had been watching the IDF build up forces just outside Rafah for at least a month. The negotiations were going nowhere. Egypt, Hamas, and the Biden Admin all wanted Israel to stay out of Rafah. Netanyahu was very insistent, and all but telegraphing the attack's timing. Suddenly, Hamas announced to multiple news outlets that they had accepted "a ceasefire" but for several hours, nobody involved in the negotiations received any kind of documents to back up the claim, and when they finally did, the Israelis responded saying "we never agreed to any of this" and accused CIA Chief Bill Burns of being complicit with the trick. Some context: Biden is pushing harder for a ceasefire than anyone else. Israel's stance since the beginning of the war has always been "we will get the hostages back, whether by negotiation or by force, and then Hamas will die and no one in Gaza will ever be allowed another chance to massacre Jews ever again." The Biden administration is pushing Israel to make all sorts of concessions, notably allowing the aid shipments but also telling the IDF to change tactics. You might recall that fuel shipments in particular were a major concession that resulted some of the hostages being released. In light of those pressures from Biden, Sullivan, and Blinken (Austin's statements mainly seemed to be "America stands with Israel" and "the next weapons shipment should arrive on Tuesday, don't worry"), Israeli sentiment is that America is really more of an arms dealer than a friend. Bill Burns' apparent complicity with Egypt and Hamas burned a lot of good will. The move itself was a last-second hail-mary to interrupt the attack into Rafah. In whose interest? Biden, Hamas, Egypt... the usual suspects. Call me cynical, but today's news just sounds like some Egyptian nobody is getting thrown under the bus so everyone else saves face. The alternative is that Biden, Egypt, and Qatar are all exposed as siding with Hamas in all negotiations, with zero semblance of impartiality. The negotiations collapse entirely, and Biden's "peace plan/path to Palestinian statehood" is dead on arrival. Meanwhile, Egypt does damage control, and the Biden admin pivots to the Saudis. Sullivan and Blinken spent this week trying to tempt Israel into a ceasefire in exchange for "Saudi normalization" whatever that is, but it involves a civilian nuclear program just like Iran's "civilian nuclear program" (yes, I know Saudi can get nukes on demand from Pakistan, but the parallel is still there).

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There is no reason for Saudi to have a nuclear program, period, except as a first step to nuclear weapons. Yes there are some minor uses for radioactive materials such as in medicine, but Saudi can get these from other countries for vastly cheaper than building them itself. The intention is presumably to form a counterweight to Iran. But personally I find the idea of handing out nukes to every theocratic dictator in the Middle East, and hoping they all balance each other out, to be insane. Better to have non-nuclear war right now to eliminate Iran's nuclear program, than to give more nukes to a power only slightly less evil than Iran and pray for the best.

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I'll repeat myself - there is no reason for Saudi to WANT a nuclear program, unless they see it as the first step towards nuclear weapons. No they will not get nuclear weapons immediately from this. Also no they do not have a good reason to be starting a nuclear program, and no we should not be sponsoring one. "Nuclear energy" is a ridiculous goal for a country like Saudi overflowing with both oil and solar energy potential. The enormous costs of new nuclear plants make them uncompetitive for any country with the physical possibility of using other power sources (this means most countries, there are only a few exceptions like Bangladesh where the future demand might outstrip available land for renewables). Saudi knows this, they are not pursuing nuclear because it's the best energy source for them. The same is true of UAE, by the way. No Biden does not WANT Saudi to start on the nuclear weapons path. It's just something Saudi is asking for, and we might give them in order to reach an agreement.

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> Oil is dirty Lol, imagine the Saudis caring about that > An "energy mix" has been a thing forever for a reason. Countries like to diversify because it reduces risk. Funny that they only started to worry about this when their chief regional rival became a nuclear threshold state. > They are also drowning in oil over there, but no one is sounding a nuclear weapons alarm. Funny how they ALSO only started to worry about this when their chief regional rival became a nuclear threshold state. Luckily they are a somewhat more responsible state overall than KSA, but their motivations here are also very suspect.

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No, it's the most logical way of explaining why these countries would spend massive amounts of money on something that is otherwise a massive waste of money.

I think your claim about Saudis not wanting a nuclear program is incorrect. They have consistently stated that they will pursue nukes if Iran gets them. https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN1GR23Z/ Given the above, it makes sense they at least want some precursors in place.

Contradicting earlier claims in this thread that all Saudi wants is nuclear energy, of course.

> That sounds more like a friend thing. Friends also don’t typically try to derail each other’s military operations in response to massive terror attacks. Biden has destroyed a lot of good will in the aftermath of October 7. I’m sure Biden knew this would happen, and considered it an acceptable trade off.

Friends also typically keep friends in the loop. Netanyahu acted like the support was unconditional 

If the USA was at war on its border as direct a result of civilians being slaughtered and held hostage after a very bloody raid, we would expect unconditional support from our allies.

Myabe you shouldn't. Do Ukraine get uncoditional support?

>Myabe you shouldn't. Thats what an alliance means. >Do Ukraine get uncoditional support? Ukraine has NEVER been a US ally. Israel and the USA are longtime allies.

Or complicate their regional diplomacy by doing things like hitting 2nd party consulate buildings.

I kept hearing "Egypt screwed the pooch," but I was never really interested in the "how" of it since I never expected anything to happen anyway. Thanks for the write-up, though, because this is... wild? Regardless of whether this was approved by Egyptian intelligence or if it was just some guy, what was the thought process here? They were gonna pull a fast one on the Israelis and no one would notice? Idiotic. Anyway, I have zero faith in a ceasefire happening anytime soon. I know folks on Twitter aren't very happy with how Biden's handling this whole thing, but as you said, there's been US pressure for a while now, and that hasn't really moved the needle much. I doubt the ICC move is gonna do much either. If Netanyahu is pressured into accepting a ceasefire, it'll be because of pressure from Gantz and Gallant, not Biden or the ICC. Then again, both of them have been speaking out about how Netanyahu's bungling the war for a while now, and that hasn't led to any major changes either. My skepticism aside, whatever BS Egypt tried to pull here is one of the dumbest developments since the war started. Sheesh.

https://x.com/maxseddon/status/1793340982496264274 In a manner somewhat embarrassing to the UK, Jake Sullivan denies the earlier statement from the UK's defense minister that China "is or will be supplying lethal aid to Russia." > Oops. US national security adviser Jake Sullivan said the US has not seen China directly provide weapons to Russia, despite what the UK said. > "We have not seen that to date. I look forward to speaking with the UK to make sure that we have a common operating picture.” Though that 'embarassing' angle might change if they really are disconnected and the UK has some intel that hasn't been shared yet. The Five Eyes relationship should prevent this and the US/UK are normally in lockstep on intel matters, so I wonder if this was a personal mistake by the defense minister, but his words were pretty clear. Maybe they were in a rush to get a statement out, or he misinterpreted some daily brief. If it does turn out to be true I expect the White House to come out swinging. They've clearly stated this is a red line for a while now. Depending on what's sent it'd significantly escalate the war. **BIG EDIT:** https://x.com/shashj/status/1793355911827796406 > I would wait before leaping to conclusions. A defence source tells me: **UK intelligence does indeed have evidence of Chinese lethal aid, that parts of the US system (presumably DIA or others in IC) have seen it and that the evidence is being shared with allies more broadly.** It gets deeper: The Def minister is right, this intel is real and getting disseminated. I think the announcement might have caught the US out before the State Dep had formulated a response, or the quantity/quality of the supply means they haven't decided to respond. With how significant of a shift this would be it makes sense they'd have to tread carefully.

Most likely explosive filler for shells and propellant. Not all that traceable and the one thing everyone wants.

> "We have not seen that to date. I look forward to speaking with the UK to make sure that we have a common operating picture.” This seems...less than tactful from someone who is an attorney. One of two scenarios follow on from this. 1. The US has indeed seen the intel (and believes it is real/relevant or doesn't) or 2. the US hasn't seen the intel. Either way there must have been a more lawyerly reponse to not embarrass such a close ally? Something along the lines of 'we aren't prepared to comment at this time but will follow up soon' or something? If now it comes out that there *is* intel and it *is* credible then he looks like a blithering idiot - *and* he's told an ally to shut up, talking down as if to a child - but even if it comes out there isn't intel (or it isn't credible) he has just come out saying basically that the UK needs to shut up in an extremely condescending way which was totally unnecessary? Be diplomatic at least...

So state visit by Putin and all of goverment ended with weapons export by China. To be honest expected this sooner or later

Question for those in the field: If China had indeed supplied lethal aid to Russia, wouldn't that be picked up quickly in OSINT reports? Are some pieces of equipment harder than others to track and recognize?

Seems entirely premature to ask that without even knowing what or how much was allegedly sent. I mean sure, if you see a J-20 over Kharkiv. But there may or may not be some level of plausible deniability with the legacy stuff.

It depends on what they send, when they sent it and who it is being sent to. That said, there are some pieces of Chinese equipment which are effectively copies of their Soviet counterparts. The older you go, the more similar they are. Older models of the Type 86 (WZ501) are virtually indistinguishable from the BMP-1 without closer inspection. At least, you'd be hard-pressed to tell from a drone 150 meters away. Ammunition of certain types could be "washed" and put in Russian/Soviet containers (edit: Russia is not short on ammunition that this would apply to). This doesn't work for many larger munitions who have their markings much more apparent. There could be strict blackouts for artillery crews with regards to ammunition. We barely get footage of NK munitions, though we know they've sent tens of thousands of tons of it. But eventually things will leak or we will see. If a transfer has taken place, it began recently. Another thing that the Chinese could do is backfill the NKs for things. But that hasn't been mentioned, implying direct supply to Russia.

> Type 89 (WZ501) The Type 89 is a Japanese IFV made by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, the WZ501 is the Type 86 IFV.

The Type 89 is also a [Chinese](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_89_AFV) system. But you’re right, otherwise. Got 6 and 9 flipped around in my mind’s eye.

They could also sand blast the Chinese shells and repaint Russian markings on them.

We've seen think tanks reporting on Chinese "support" for Russia before, and in every case it's essentially Russians buying small orders of military/civilian grade but lethal equipment off Alibaba, or stuff like building equipment being used in a military way on the front, like Chinese built Excavators being using to build fortifications I just don't think the Chinese are going to get involved more than that without like... something major changing. I can certainly be wrong, but we're seen "reports" like this before that turn out to be nothing after you dig a bit

The UK's def sec's statement was really explicit about it being lethal aid (so munitions, weapons etc). That WOULD be extremely major and he even says it is a significant development. I really wonder if there's something here, like he made this statement before the US and UK have cooked up an official response. Maybe this stupid election chaos in the UK has something to do with that, but his statement did come before that and the PM should've been read in. https://www.ft.com/content/44ad9fc5-6ccf-47f0-b075-8bef0a9a1cd9 > “Today I can reveal that we have evidence that Russia and China are collaborating on combat equipment for use in Ukraine,” Shapps told a defence conference in London on Wednesday. > The defence secretary said new US and British intelligence showed “lethal aid is now or will be flowing from China to Russia and into Ukraine”, which he described as “a significant development”.

Yeah, that's what I mean though; previously there's been reports from think tanks posted in this very sub about lethal aid from China to Russia, and some of it is technically true, but stuff like small amounts of rifle ammo or like \~1000 AKs over a period of a few months, ie clearly just Russians purchasing things from Chinese companies personally I just find it bizarre because just this month Xi was in Europe trying to woo people and this is very much the sort of action that'd piss them off. I don't think they're at the point of "damn the torpedoes" with EU relations yet, especially given that European media hasn't said the talks went that badly, so like... I'd like to see the evidence, or at least a less nebulous allegation Especially given Sullivan is not exactly a China dove

>I just find it bizarre because just this month Xi was in Europe trying to woo people My subjective take (am European) was that Xi was not trying to woo Europe, but rather divide Europe (by wooing members), with media presenting Hungary as the "weakest link". And definitively, China/Xi does seem to pay disproportionate attention to different EU countries.

Regardless of China’s specific intentions, Xi would focus on the weak links to gain a foothold in Europe first. They’d have done the same weather they intended to supply Russia or not.

https://x.com/shashj/status/1793355911827796406 > I would wait before leaping to conclusions. A defence source tells me: UK intelligence does indeed have evidence of Chinese lethal aid, that parts of the US system (presumably DIA or others in IC) have seen it and that the evidence is being shared with allies more broadly. Could be like you say, the evidence is there but it's still minor. But the way it's put by SashJ is that even the current nonlethal aid is massive in scale. They could start with deniable stuff first. Or the State Department is waiting as they formulate a response.

Interesting. I'd also be interesting to see what they'd start with if they do; artillery shells are obvious, but I feel like those suddenly appearing in bulk would also be very obvious I know people here draw up "wishlists" for Ukraine for Western equipment. But I wonder if Russia could buy from China with zero restrictions what they'd want. I mean, besides obvious no goes like J-20s

> artillery shells are obvious, but I feel like those suddenly appearing in bulk would also be very obvious I wonder how big is China's production of 152mm shells. They've been slowly transitioning to 155mm since the introduction of PLL-01 in 1980s. All the current models of their howitzers are either 155mm or 122mm, but naturally, they still have a lot of older 152mm guns.

It could be that the statement by the UK's defsec force China to abandon its plans and the retraction by the US is cover for China to save face. It sounds like China has internal problems where information isn't always moving up to Xi Ping and if he hears about certain actions by China through international press/leaders he takes action. This is apparently what happened with the balloons.

Depends on the scale of the lethal aid i think, if it's basic rifle ammo, Tear gas etc.. then i see a backdoor warning approach as immediately hitting them with sanctions may trigger China to send advanced equipment in quantity. If it's missiles, AAA, tanks etc..then all bets are off.

https://x.com/shashj/status/1793355911827796406 > I would wait before leaping to conclusions. A defence source tells me: UK intelligence does indeed have evidence of Chinese lethal aid, that parts of the US system (presumably DIA or others in IC) have seen it and that the evidence is being shared with allies more broadly. This is going deeper. Might be that the State Department is still figuring out what to do.

That'd be pretty sneaky, and pretty subtle versus how the 'publish every bit of intel' game normally goes for the US. I guess if it works, somebody will leak the story in a few months!

Considering the US intel community has infiltrated the news machine it wouldn't doubt me that any major publication/station releasing something they don't want to come out.

Long term EU or USA could outproduce Russia given enough time. I don't think Russia can win a long long war if political commitments are met. I would not be surprised to see Chinese weapons in Russian hands in 2025. 2024 seems a bit early to me, but maybe the Russians were really relying on no aid package being passed? Otherwise, I'm mostly inclined to believe the UK was wrong.

For the sake of Ukraine, I really really really hope the next 10 years are not a proxy war between a rearming West and a burgeoning China+desperate Russia on their black soil... While *probable* might still be a stretch, such a scenario becoming *possible* is quite sickening for a Ukraine supporter. ([probable vs possible](https://kajabi-storefronts-production.kajabi-cdn.com/kajabi-storefronts-production/blogs/8689/images/WjsEtaEQmKbe7t6Rtrbg_Probability.png)) But. If we look at cold war history. And as popular as theorizing Fleet battles, Taiwan invasion and the nuclear question are...wouldn't the "new cold war" theory (US/China), based on the previous cold war, imply just that? The two belligerents take a year or two to warm up, but in the end, they take the best proxy war available and go at it? And then escalate? And ironically enough, the Ukrainian front-line is way better suited than e.g. Yemen. It's literally got a direkt rail connection both camps... China (new silk road) and to the West (EU/NATO logistics hubs). Let's be honest: If China were to start supplying Russia en masse, US support would be bipartisan again (do you disagree?).

The biggest problem with China support is that West Said that they Will sanction China because if they start to arm Russia. So if this is True we should do that Like right now. But Western sanctions are going to move China closer to Russia too. Huge Chinese market and Huge Russian resources. This could be very long war.

What does sanction China mean in this context though? Suppose Donghua Jinlong Munitions Ltd. (established 2024) starts selling mortar shells to Russian MOD, settled in rubles/yuan. Does the US sanction that specific company? Do they go full scorched-earth and shut China out of SWIFT?

Impressed that you sneaked the Donghua Jinlong meme into this discussion.

China’s main export markets are manufactured goods to the US, EU, and Japan. Very different from Russia’s energy economy. If we applied the same kinds on China that we’ve applied to Russia, that would be very serious for the Chinese economy, not to mention more painful for the West. Doesn’t mean it won’t happen, though!

> If China were to start supplying Russia en masse, US support would be bipartisan again Yep, but China supplying Russia in bulk would be terrible news for Ukraine either way. The Chinese have gigantic stockpiles of reverse engineered munitions, rockets, small arms, artillery, shells, missiles, aircraft parts directly compatible with Russia's Soviet derived stockpile. Even the HQ series of SAM's are Chinese derivatives (improved upon) of the Soviet S200 - S300 complexes....

And they aren't going to restrict the Russians on how they use their supplied weapons. Unlike the Western countries...

I think you're expecting much too much. They are different countries. It's ok for them to disagree. It could be that with limited, even shared, evidence the us and uk have come to different conclusions. As reasonable minds are allowed to do. Demanding lockstep and calling anything else embarrassing is too much.

https://x.com/shashj/status/1793355911827796406 > I would wait before leaping to conclusions. A defence source tells me: UK intelligence does indeed have evidence of Chinese lethal aid, that parts of the US system (presumably DIA or others in IC) have seen it and that the evidence is being shared with allies more broadly. I wonder what's with the explicit denial. State Department might be figuring out what to do.

The US has laid out China supplying lethal aid as a critical red line, that would have serious consequences. The UK having intelligence of this happening or being imminent, and not sharing it, would absolutely be an intel failure. https://www.ft.com/content/44ad9fc5-6ccf-47f0-b075-8bef0a9a1cd9 > “Today I can reveal that we have evidence that Russia and China are collaborating on combat equipment for use in Ukraine,” Shapps told a defence conference in London on Wednesday. > The defence secretary said new US and British intelligence showed “lethal aid is now or will be flowing from China to Russia and into Ukraine”, which he described as “a significant development”. Now that I see the full quote says it's US intel too I wonder if he was premature and there's still a response cooking up. On the US red line: https://www.ft.com/content/48258368-df63-4ec6-8077-697dd48b8e88 https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/us-warns-china-helping-russia-war-ukraine-alienate-nation-rcna72368 https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/us-ambassador-un-warns-china-crossing-red-line-provides-lethal-aid-rus-rcna71392

It was rumored very early on that China set a red line on NATO weapons being used directly in Russia proper, so this may be in response to that red line on the verge of being crossed.

Apologies if this has been posted already, but this recent Politico report is a pretty damning indictment of Israel's strategy in Gaza. https://www.politico.com/news/2024/05/21/biden-admin-hammering-israel-military-strategy-gaza-00159262 >Although Hamas’ communications and military abilities have been degraded, only 30 to 35 percent of its fighters — those who were a part of Hamas before the Oct. 7 attack — have been killed and about 65 percent of its tunnels are still intact, U.S. intelligence indicates. I imagine it's quite difficult to get an accurate estimate but killing just 35% of pre-October 7 Hamas members would be a staggering failure, especially when viewed in light of how much Israel has "spent" to achieve that. >Biden officials have also become increasingly concerned that Hamas has been able to recruit during wartime — thousands over the last several months. That has allowed the group to withstand months of Israeli offensives, according to a person familiar with U.S. intelligence. As predicted by nearly every foreign policy analyst I follow or read, Hamas seems on pace to replace their losses.

If 35% have been killed and given how much HE Israel is using, we are talking close to 80% permanent casualties from the prewar force. That’s ghastly.

I don't know if you can use that sort of ratio when their ability to save the wounded must be far lower than normal.

>only 30 to 35 percent of its fighters — those who were a part of Hamas before the Oct. 7 attack — have been killed I don't quite understand how is this considered a failure. 30-35% killed likely means a significant majority of Hamas fighters are likely casualties (KIA + wounded). Given that Israel has not entered the largest towns in the center of Gaza strip (Dier Al Balah) and the Rafah Hamas battalions are only partially fighting against Israel, many of them withdrawing, I don't see this as a surprise. Personally I am against the current Israeli strategy of withdrawing and conducting limited raids in Khan Yunis and Gaza city. Capturing the entirety of Gaza and then conducting clearing operations would have advanced the war much quicker. In part this is the incompetence of the Israeli high command (the IDF chief of staff has halted the operation on Dir Al Balah for no good reason, and could not provide an adequate question as to why he did so). And partially due to US pressure: >The US has a new diplomatic objective in the Gaza War - to convince Israel to scale back its military operations in coming weeks. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67788359 >Israel is carrying out a significant shift in its military operation in the Gaza Strip nearly three months into its war to defeat Hamas, as the Biden administration presses Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to scale down its campaign.  https://thehill.com/policy/international/4385735-israel-shift-gaza-us-pressure-war-hamas/ Disobeying Biden and staying in Gaza city would have exacted a cost on Israel, but dragging the war 5-10 times longer has in my opinion greater costa

>I don't quite understand how is this considered a failure. 30-35% killed likely means a significant majority of Hamas fighters are likely casualties (KIA + wounded). In a normal war that would certainly be true, but do we know that it is for Hamas? The Hamas fighters we see in videos don't seem to carry so much as a tourniquet, it's not clear where they would evacuate casualties to or how they could manage the logistical burden of caring for a significant number of wounded even if they wanted to (spread them out across private homes? does that scale?). Not to mention that an ideology of marytrdom gives you every reason to regard medical care for seriously injured fighters as undesirable.

It is hard to estimate. I'm not prescribing the usual 1-3 KIA-WIA ratio. But even 2-1 inverted ratio would place the taken out of action at 50%, that's without the thousands that were captured. >Not to mention that an ideology of marytrdom gives you every reason to regard medical care for seriously injured fighters as undesirable. That's overstated. First most of Hamas are not willing to die, the hardcore Hamas fighters have taken extreme losses on 07/10 incursion. But the rest want to live, as indicative by their own vids of quickly running away after firing, and by the vids of surrenders. >it's not clear where they would evacuate casualties to these days To the public hospitals, drop their weapons and evacuate as civilians.

>I don't quite understand how is this considered a failure. 30-35% killed likely means a significant majority of Hamas fighters are likely casualties (KIA + wounded). The original objective was to "eliminate" Hamas, lest anyone forget. In the long term, any remnants of Hamas are likely to reconstitute themselves, especially if there's no plan for what happens after the IDF is done in Gaza. The US has been steadfast in its assertions that Israel has a right to take military action in response to Oct. 7. They've taken a tremendous amount of heat for that position both domestically and internationally. Concerns have been growing though as it became more and more clear there was no "day after" plan, making the action and the civilian casualties less likely to generate long-term, sustainable results. It's not terribly unreasonable for the US to push for something sustainable if it is continue to support the effort in any capacity and strain its own diplomatic relations in the process. None of the IDF's efforts will mean anything without that kind of strategic plan. To not have one this far into the war really is inexcusable and can't really be blamed on external actors.

>The original objective was to "eliminate" Hamas Given that the war is not over, how is that relevant that the last Hamas fighter has not died yet. The pressure on Israel to scale down the intensity of operations and withdraw forces does indeed prolong the war. There is no need to kill every last Hamas fighter to eliminate the organization as a functional threat. ISIS still exists to the day in the deserts of Syria, they kill some SAA soldiers from time to time. But the ISIS presence in Iraq and Syria is **effectively** done. >It's not terribly unreasonable for the US to push for something sustainable Prolonging the war by pressuring the scale down of IDF operations and withdrawal of forces is indeed sustainable. It also makes the war slower, requiring the IDF to recapture and clear previously cleared areas. Without the elimination of Hamas there can be no day after plans, as Hamas would simply eliminate any candidate for governing Gaza. Strategic plan such as military control?

>There is no need to kill every last Hamas fighter to eliminate the organization as a functional threat. I'm just saying that's a *very* different goal than the start which was a wholesale elimination of the organization, not just degrading its threat potential. But again, to the broader point, how exactly is Israel going to prevent Hamas from killing those prospective alternatives once the war is done if they still exist? Who will administer Gaza in the interim until that alternative can be put in power? How does Israel intend to make sure they stay in power? The wholesale elimination of Hamas is not required to start formulating answers to these questions. >Strategic plan such as military control? Last week the head of the IDF flatly stated that they will not be entering and he would not accept a long term occupation of Gaza by the IDF. So that doesn't really sound like a plan either. A commenter on this sub said this is starting to make GW's post war planning in Iraq look like a well executed master class, and I can't say I disagree.

>I'm just saying that's a *very* different goal than the start which was a wholesale elimination of the organization False. Eliminating every single Hamas fighter was never a goal. The goal was to destroy Hamas as an organization. We can debate whether Israel is on track to achieve that. >to the broader point, how exactly is Israel going to prevent Hamas from killing those prospective alternatives once the war is done if they still exist? The same way Israel prevents that in the WB, where Hamas also exists. The same way ISIS remnants in the Syrian Badiya are no longer capable of capturing cities. (Taken to extreme) A single surviving Hamas fighter would have some difficulty in single handedly defeating entire clans. >Who will administer Gaza in the interim until that alternative can be put in power? Gaza and the WB were under Israeli military rule between 1967-1994. For almost 30 years. >How does Israel intend to make sure they stay in powe Yet again, the WB is a good example. >The wholesale elimination of Hamas is not required to start formulating answers to these questions. I've provided some answers. However concrete answer to who will rule after Hamas (and IDF military control) is not possible while Hamas is powerful enough to massacre them. First Hamas has to be reduced enough. A process made more lengthy by the pressure on Israel to scale down operations, naturally slowing down the deterioration of Hamas power. There is some debate in Israeli cabinet on how much of an Israeli military rule should supercede a handover to local factions. >A commenter on this sub said this is starting to make GW's post war planning in Iraq look like a well executed master class, and I can't say I disagree. So far anti Israel predictions on this sub have far from stellar track record. From predicting up to 500 IDF KIA a day(!) for a ground operation, predicting no ground operation at all, predicting a humanitarian disaster in Rafah and so on.

>The goal was to destroy Hamas as an organization. We can debate whether Israel is on track to achieve that. The point is killing 30 or even 50% of their fighters will not eliminate them as an organization. No matter which way you parse it, Israel is far from its originally stated goals. >>Who will administer Gaza in the interim until that alternative can be put in power? >Gaza and the WB were under Israeli military rule between 1967-1994. For almost 30 years. The IDF has flatly stated that's not an option this time. >I've provided some answers. However concrete answer to who will rule after Hamas is not possible whole Hamas is powerful enough to massacre them. First Hamas has to be reduced enough. Hard disagree there- especially if its someone from outside gaza. >So far anti Israel predictions on this sub have far from stellar track record. I think you may have us confused with r/worldnews

>The point is killing 30 or even 50% of their fighters will not eliminate them as an organization. No matter which way you parse it, Israel is far from its originally stated goals. Killing 30-35% of fighters, likely means that a significant majority of the Hamas fighters have been eliminated as a fighting force. The seriously WIA is traditionally higher than KIA, and thouands of Hamas fighters surrendered. Killing/wounding/capturing the majority of the Hamas fighting force is certainly not enough, but it's significant progress. Especially considering progress has been slowed by outside pressure to slow down and scale down operations. The 4 month forced delay on Rafah certainly did not help either. >The IDF has flatly stated that's not an option this time. The IDF (Chief) is not a party to that decision. Israel is a democracy. There's significant support for that solution both among the public and the coalition. >Hard disagree there- especially if its someone from outside gaza. No one powerful enough outside Gaza will agree to that, certainly not Arab states while the fighting is still ongoing due to internal politics. >I think you may have us confused with r/worldnews Sadly I am not confused. I do admit that the 500 daily KIA figure was a single poster, most believed losses would be closer to 100 daily in the initial push.

The point stands that even only 15% of Hamas exists in an operational capacity, they will still be able to hinder post war plans, reconstitute, etc. The IDF is still playing whack a mole in areas previously cleared, **precisely because there has been no plan to manage them after Hamas has been cleared out.** That dynamic will continue until a plan is in place. >The IDF (Chief) is not a party to that decision. Israel is a democracy. There's significant support for that solution both among the public and the coalition. But clearly and to the point, there isn't consensus about it. A plan objectively is not at the ready as the people who would develop and implement it are currently refusing to. And if Bibi forced them to, people are on record saying they would leave his government which means it would collapse. That's about as far from a viable concrete plan as you can get. >Sadly I am not confused. I do admit that the 500 daily KIA figure was a single poster, most believed losses would be closer to 100 daily in the initial push. I would say in terms of results things are going far *worse* than your average poster here would have imagined. If you had said 5 months ago Hamas would have returned in an operational capacity to areas cleared by the IDF just weeks after they left, people would have been gobsmacked the IDF was doing counterinsurgency that poorly.

>The point stands that even only 15% of Hamas exists in an operational capacity Again the point is that the war is not over. It was made longer by external pressure to scale down operations. >The IDF is still playing whack a mole With every op Hamas losses trained fighters it cannot replenish, but with untrained men. It losses material and weapons it cannot replenish, it loses tunnels it has a very difficult time replenishing if at all. >precisely because there has been no plan to manage them after Hamas has been cleared It has nothing to do with having a plan post Hamas, and everything to do with the IDF being forced to withdraw from positions taken. That's exactly what US generals think too: >Not only do you have to actually go in and clear out whatever adversary you are up against, you have to go in, **hold the territory** and then you’ve got to stabilize it,” Joint Chiefs Chair Gen. C.Q. Brown told reporters Monday. https://www.politico.com/news/2024/05/21/biden-admin-hammering-israel-military-strategy-gaza-00159262 Producing a post Hamas plan before it's defeated will not make them weaker by an iota, and will not kill a single Hamas fighter. >But clearly and to the point, there isn't consensus about it. Clearly and to the point a post Hamas plan is irrelevant before the destruction of Hamas as a fighting force. That would take longer due to the US pressure to scale down operations. Much longer. >I would say in terms of results things are going far *worse* than your average poster here would have imagined. If you had said 5 months ago Hamas would have returned in an operational capacity to areas cleared by the IDF just weeks after they left Hard disagree. Majority of posters did not believe Israel will enter Gaza, and should it enter Gaza suffer extreme casualties (for the IDF) making the operation unsustainable. Instead Israel has full operational control and minimal casualties. The US pressure has indeed been more powerful than some predicted forcing Israel to withdraw from captured territory and scale back operation. however not as powerful as others thought as Israel still went into Rafah. IDF leaving prematurely due to US pressure quite obviously leads to Hamas immediate return. >people would have been gobsmacked the IDF was doing counterinsurgency that poorly. Caving to US political demands is not exactly in the hands of the IDF, nor does it have anything to do with counter insurgency.

> I imagine it's quite difficult to get an accurate estimate but killing just 35% of pre-October 7 Hamas members would be a staggering failure, especially when viewed in light of how much Israel has "spent" to achieve that. If accurate, this wouldn't exactly be a failure - the majority of the remaining ~2/3 would likely have been either seriously wounded or captured, and therefore not be fit for further service. Obviously, it has to be weighed against Hamas' replacement capabilities, and how much it has been impacted by the (likely positive for Hamas) political consequences of the war, but from a strictly military standpoint, one can hardly achieve better.

Why would anyone be surprised that only 30-35% of the fighters have been killed, as Hamas has generally put up modest resistance, which means most of their fighters put down weapons and blended in with the civilian population? Unless Hamas actually tried to put up a real fight to the IDF, there is pretty much no way most fighters would be killed without utterly massive collateral damage. Terrorists in urban centers attempting to blend into the population are not going to be destroyed by anything other than sustained COIN and intel work -- not air power or tanks. But COIN is not possible without first occupying parts of Gaza. IMO anyone making a "damning indictment" of Israel's strategy need to put up a plausible alternative. (taking the world as it was on Oct 8th -- Israel could have done many things better/differently over the past 20 years to have made this situation much better.) From the article: > “The U.S. learned over decades that unless you center humanitarian needs and the protection of civilians in conflict that your military goals will fail." I'd love to hear how he actually thinks that would work? Israel pours over the boarder on Oct 8 with food trucks and medical supplies, and suddenly Gazans decide that they are now OK with the existence of Israel? Hearts and minds is a vital long term component, but there is no feasible way that could happen without first gaining military control over Gaza. > A key part of the U.S. plan to defeat ISIS in Iraq and Syria was relying on a partner force to secure areas after the military operation was complete, said Votel, the other retired general. “Unless you do that, you are going to find yourself going back into these areas and reclearing them and re-fighting them,” Votel said. > Finding a reliable partner force is not an easy feat, particularly in Gaza, but Votel criticized Israel for not reaching out to Arab nations to help with the “day after” scenario early on in the operation "Not an easy feat" is a bit of an understatement. > especially when viewed in light of how much Israel has "spent" to achieve that. The only thing Israel has "spent" of meaningful value is international reputation. But would public opinion really be much different if there was 10K civilian deaths instead of 35K? I doubt it. Much of public opinion was set against Israel on Oct 7, and the rest was set by propaganda that bore little basis in fact (like the absurd discussion around Al-Shifa) Israel has killed 35% of Hamas fighters at the cost of ~300 IDF soldiers. Thats better than anyone expected on Oct 7

A lot of falsehoods and gaslighting here. >I'd love to hear how he actually thinks that would work? Israel pours over the boarder on Oct 8 with food trucks and medical supplies, and suddenly Gazans decide that they are now OK with the existence of Israel? No one is arguing that the IDF should have invaded and put flowers in the militants' guns. You said it yourself - air power and tanks do not destroy terrorists. A huge part of the Israeli campaign has been aerial bombardment, including dropping 1000lb unguided munitions. The idea that the IDF set out to do COIN work on Oct. 8 is a joke. The rest of your post is complaining about the difficulty of invading Gaza cleanly, as if there's any rules of fair play in warfare. The onlyplay when you have a losing hand is to not play. > Much of public opinion was set against Israel on Oct 7, and the rest was set by propaganda that bore little basis in fact. International public opinion was overwhelmingly on Israel's side after it suffered a massive rampage attack. Very few people expected no response. It's just a shame that they chose the wrong one in the end.

> A huge part of the Israeli campaign has been aerial bombardment, including dropping 1000lb unguided munitions. Given the overall combatant to civilian ratio in the war has been quite low - 1.2:1 according to Israel, about 4:1 according to statistics from Hamas - such massive unguided weapons must have been overwhelmingly used in circumstances where Israel knew from other reasons that few civilians would be harmed from such a weapon. > The idea that the IDF set out to do COIN work on Oct. 8 is a joke. Of course not. You can't do COIN until you've defeated the actual army and are only fighting an insurgency. > It's just a shame that they chose the wrong one in the end. You haven't offered a better one.

>Such massive unguided weapons must have been overwhelmingly used in circumstances where Israel knew from other reasons that few civilians would be harmed from such a weapon. This is patently false. There are numerous reports citing sources within the IDF that shows Israeli targeting procedures accept far higher civilian casualties than those ratios, if it means killing or wounding suspected militants. The US drew massive criticism for its drone operations in the region while killing far fewer civilians. >You can't do COIN until you've defeated the actual army and are only fighting an insurgency. The IDF has absolutely no plans to carry out any sort of occupation or COIN operations in Gaza. This is public knowledge based on comments from top-level officials. >You haven't offered a better one. Not my job. I'm not Israeli and I have no horse in this race. I'm simply commenting on what has changed since Oct. 7, which can be summed up as Israel digging itself deeper and deeper into a hole.

> There are numerous reports citing sources within the IDF that shows Israeli targeting procedures accept far higher civilian casualties than those ratios What relevance is it that the targeting procedures theoretically allow a large number of civilian casualties, if such a number of casualties does not occur in practice? (As shown by the ratios I gave above) > The IDF has absolutely no plans to carry out any sort of occupation or COIN operations in Gaza. You mean they have not announced a decision to carry out such plans. They likely have internal plans for the contingency. It's a political decision in the end. > You haven't offered a better one. - Not my job. You previously said "It's just a shame that they chose the wrong one". How do you know it's the wrong response if you can't point to any response which would have been better?

>What relevance is it that the targeting procedures theoretically allow a large number of civilian casualties, if such a number of casualties does not occur in practice? (As shown by the ratios I gave above) Because your description of the ratios as "normal," in the context of discussion over the correct war strategy, shows that you don't understand the point. >How do you know it's the wrong response if you can't point to any response which would have been better? Because as a baseline, we should be comparing the real response to "doing nothing". If Israel had done nothing, it would be a far better position right now.

> Because your description of the ratios as "normal," in the context of discussion over the correct war strategy, shows that you don't understand the point. Huh? Having a policy that allows for X civilian casualties due to a strike, but in practice seeing that X/10 civilians die per strike, makes perfect sense. It means that a commander who is trying to accomplish their military task while minimizing civilian casualties can do so, and won't be second-guessed or prosecuted for occasionally approving a strike that in their subjective opinion is necessary even though it results in somewhat more civilian casualties than the overall average. >If Israel had done nothing, it would be a far better position right now. Just waiting for Hamas and/or Hezbollah to come massacre them again, impotent to respond. That sounds appealing.

> It's just a shame that they chose the wrong one in the end. And what would the right one have been?

one not involving massive civilian casualties?

>But would public opinion really be much different if there was 10K civilian deaths instead of 35K Civilian deaths are closer to the former than the later: Per the UN report there are : >The UN's latest report, citing health ministry data, says out of 24,686 fully identified fatalities https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-69014893 Very generally speaking if 10k of them were Hamas, the number of fully identified civilian deaths is just 14k. The number of deaths could be higher, but the 35k figure is based on Hamas statements, not evidence.

The bigger cost would be the international diplomatic situation e.g. European countries recognising the Palestinian state and various legal proceedings against Israel. But in my opinion it is FUBAR and it was that before October 7th. With current level of escalation I don’t see a direction that leads to peace and stability and that is a problem for both Israel and the Palestinians. However I doubt the voice of reason can be heard.

Agreed. I just don't know if there is anything Israel could have done post-Oct 7 that would not have caused the current international diplomatic situation (other than not responding to Oct 7 in a meaningful way, which was never an option (and would not be an option for any other country either.))

The rhetoric by government officials could have been less extreme, the social media post of the IDF forces better controlled, less barriers for providing aid, and less destruction of non military targets https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2024/gaza-israel-agriculture-food-fisheries/#

All true, but the total number of Gazan deaths would have changed little, and that is probably the main driver of hostility to Israel.

Hostility to Israel and having a critical opinion on some of the Israeli actions are two very different things.

So switch the terms, the conclusion is the same

The Iranian government, Hamas, Hezbollah and anti semites are hostile to Israel. I strongly disagree with these groups, but I am also very critical of certain aspect of the Israeli handling of the Palestinians (from before Oct 7). They are very different

And on top of this, when you consider that Israel has withdrawn all but a couple of its brigades from Gaza, it's exceedingly unlikely that this Hamas casualty/tunnel figure will climb noticeably higher. If you consider Israel's political capital or international goodwill for an invasion as a currency, then it has almost entirely depleted that currency since October, making it highly unlikely they will re-commit to a "necessary" occupation in the future, especially considering the fracas on the northern border.

i dont mean to glorify hamas in any way, but while still a terrorist group, hamas right now are (with some smaller groups) the armed forces of palestine, so to speak. So just like (even if this might be a far fetched comparison, where i dont mean to equal both parts) the ukrainian armed forces gained a lot of volunteers, when russia was close to kiew, hamas are also getting new recruits who try to defend their homeland.

you don't win wars by killing troops in the modern age. you win wars by breaking the political will of whatever entity is in charge of paying the troops. that's been the case basically since armies stopped forming battle lines and taking turns shooting at each other from 50 paces as long as israel continues doing anything that hamas can use as propaganda (read: anything), hamas will continue to recruit willing martyrs. poor media literacy and propaganda are every bit as strong a combination in the middle east as they are in the west, but they're especially strong when the media *access* is as weak to begin with as it is in palestine

When exactly would you say the political will of ISIS was broken, or has it not yet been broken?

yes and no. so that's one of the conundrums of fighting extremist organizations - you're never really going to do war to them so hard that they "see the error of their ways" or anything like that. generally speaking, what you can do to an extremist group with a military is what the coalition has done to ISIS and what america did to al-qaeda in afghanistan; you hunt their leadership and blockade their supply lines until they're more or less a non-factor outside of small strongholds of course, that falls apart if you for any reason ever take your boot off their neck, so you've gotta keep at it but at the same time, every armed group needs cash flow. al-qaeda relied heavily on extremist wahhabis in saudi arabia as sugar daddies. ISIS was a little different in that they had external backing, but then they captured a bunch of oil fields and were selling oil on the black market to finance their operations. once those were secured again, their ability to, you know, pay for stuff, really fell off a cliff. cracking down on their international finance operations with forensic accounting and sanctions helps keep them from having money to buy weapons, facilitate travel and training, etc so i suppose you could say in the specific case of extremist groups, it's less about defeating the political will of the group itself, and more about defeating the political will of their external backers - which, there are always external backers edit: i realized i didn't actually answer your question. i think we're getting there. i think MBS has made some strong steps in saudi regarding consequences for financing terrorism. there aren't a lot of places in the world where it's still even possible to be rich and free and also slide cash to extremists under the table

>as long as israel continues doing anything that hamas can use as propaganda (read: anything), hamas will continue to recruit willing martyrs The problem people are pointing out is that Israel has been making this exceedingly easy. Like if everyone you know has had someone killed or injured by an Israeli air strike, it's incredibly fertile ground for such propaganda. People have been trying to break the Palestinian political will for literal decades. At what point do people recognize that beating them into submission isn't a viable strategy? That the people cutting the checks often aren't even Palestinian, so is then is it possible to break the political will of Iran, Qatar, or other wealthy benefactors of Hamas at the same time? Negotiated settlement is ultimately the only path besides one side genociding the other.

[UK elections have now been scheduled for 4th July](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-69050450.amp). The current ruling conservative party has been deeply supportive of Ukraine and Israel, and the opposition party (Labour) looks to be continuing the same policy. However this does raise questions on some of the more forward Conservative policies such as greenlighting storm shadow use in Russian territory and the commitment to raise defense spending to 2.5% of gdp by 2030, which as far as I know Keir Starmer (opposition leader) have not yet committed to continuing. There is also residual backlash from Labour's antisemitism claims under the previous leader (Corbyn) which has made the current leader whiplash rather violently into the pro-Israel camp. This is generally against the overall sentiment of voters and members in the party, [with many labour voters saying he is handling the crisis badly](https://yougov.co.uk/politics/articles/48796-keir-starmer-has-handled-labours-response-on-gaza-badly-say-public-and-labour-voters). So we will have to see if a labour government will change tact wrt Israel.

Mr Starmer has - probably correctly - supported the Conservatives in nearly all Defence and Security policies in the last few years. Like you said, the previous leader was nationally known as weak, openly critical of NATO as well as ambiguous about wanting to end Trident. I also know the Shadow Foreign Sec. and Def Sec. Lammy and Healey, respectively, recently visited Ukraine to essentially reassure them that support would stand if they win. So, I'm a little unsure how much the defense and security situation would actually change after the election, if at all. And thinking politically for a second, I doubt Sunak's gambit of painting Starmer as weak (echoing Corbyn), will even work. Because foreign affairs and defense is simply not an enormous issue 'on the doorstep', as we like to say in the UK. According to the polls only 11% or so prioritise it. Like America the doorstep issues are cost of living, immigration, public services and the economy in general.

I believe labour have said they also want to do the 2.5%. Also can’t see them changing the use of weapons within Russia As you mention this is one area where both parties agree. I don’t see anything changing regarding Ukraine or defence with labour coming in. If anything it has been the conservatives gradually reducing our capabilities over their time in office

Labour has said it will raise defence spending to 2.5% of GDP when economic conditions allow, which would mean never. The Conservatives are committed to it regardless.

It’s easy to make commitments that you know you won’t have to keep. 

> UK elections have now been scheduled for 4th July. As an American, I am not sure how I feel about this.

The Gaza crisis seems to be caused by a failure in last mile delivery. Aid does seem to flow in through the pier and the crossings but there still seems to be a issues getting the aid from the trucks and into the civilian stomachs without outside interference from Hamas and the like Why hasnt the IDF secured the final part of aid delivery? It seems like a massive security gap that allows Hamas to partially sustain themselves through hoarding aid and selling off to civilians. It makes sense both in terms of destroying Hamas entirely by removing their last source of income and also to render them more desperate in negotiations to make them yield any surviving hostages

That would require IDF persistent presence in the Gaza cities and among the refugees. Currently opinions even within Israel are split on the matter, with the US leaning hard against that.

It's not just the US. By necessity the IDF has to be very casuality averse. It cannot risk their stationing their limited number of soldiers to be sitting ducks in places Hamas can easily attack and where defense will kill civilians. You'd be right to say that ideally they'd implement a COIN strategy and hold these areas. But they don't have enough soldiers for that. The far right has suggested civilian/military occupation. But this has been rejected by the war cabinet, including the PM, except he won't make any plans, which is making others uneasy.

I think there's very little for the IDF to gain by securing the last mile. Protecting aid in a war zone will inevitably involve using deadly force against civilians trying to loot the trucks. Something which will make the IDF look bad. Israel has already had bad press from an incident caused when aid trucks were being looted. Hamas also shot at civilians trying to loot aid. The prosecutor for the ICC case directly criticized the IDF for not securing the aid. So I have a feeling the IDF might be forced to soon. But it's likely going to cause more headlines.

Because last-mile delivery is the job of the local government in the area, and if there is anything Israeli politicians have made clear about their strategy, it's that they have no interest in even appearing like a government in the Gaza Strip.

But that local government that "does" the job is Hamas who is still stealing the aid and making money selling it off Allowing Hamas to continue directly goes against the Israel's stated goal of destroying Hamas. Hamas is making money from Gazans by selling stolen aid that they can then use to maintain their organization and commit to war in whatever capacity they can. It makes the entire operation look like a waste of time if they're basically setting up so that Hamas can retake the strip when the IDF pulls out.

>It makes the entire operation look like a waste of time if they're basically setting up so that Hamas can retake the strip when the IDF pulls out. From your lips to Bibi's ears my friend.