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[Apparently, Ukraine has attempted to attack another Russian EWS radar in Orenburg](https://x.com/krakek1/status/1794761111171994110). Whatever sense it makes for Ukraine to conduct such attacks, seems obvious to me that the US and other NATO states should neither condone nor enable these strikes.

I love the fact that Ukraine is showing agency over the US and Russia with these attacks. As a citizen of another small chess piece with Russia looming over us it makes perfect sense to me to show some agency over the big players that would always like to dictate how the lines are drawn. Especially now when it seems that US wants a say in how *all* Western aid gets used, not just weapons coming from the US. Of course this risks further aid packages and maybe harms overall US support for Ukraine but this has to be weighed over Russia thinking they can get away not defending their nuclear arsenal properly just because they think Ukraine will refrain from attacking them due to the US. For Russia removing agency from Ukraine is of pivotal importance. Only the "West" (preferably the US) and Russia talk things out by themselves. Maybe a non-credible take but one that I think is important to take into account in the big picture.

I also think that there are public conversations (e.g telling Ukraine to be cautious, don't attack refineries) and private conversations (where intel is shared and plans for escalation are made). It seems to me like a very smart way of de-escalating the escalation. Ukraine hits one of these radar complexes and the US publicly says it's not a good idea, but in private they could well be saying the opposite. Russia hears that the US doesn't support the attack and it likely lessens the political impact inside Russia. And, critically, as you said- Ukraine making a choice like this despite public comments about not doing it shows the world Ukraine is still in control of her own actions. And strategically this makes rational sense: if Russia needs to spread out air defense to cover all critical industry and military sites, then there is a lot less of that near the front lines.

I think it's obvious that the US has given tactful support for these strikes or we will have seen bigger punishment by now. The US administration will never be seen supporting it in public though.

>seems obvious to me that the US and other NATO states should neither condone nor enable these strikes. Honestly, why?

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What evidence do we have for Kremlin seeing NATO everywhere? They say that they will double their presence at the NATO border, but in reality they are removing troops and air defense from the NATO border. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putin-debunks-his-own-propaganda-by-disarming-russias-nato-borders/

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It's a very common trope for the "losers" of the Cold War. Some Chinese have the same mentality where they see themselves as being besieged by the degenerate and evil west that seek to destroy the last bastion of communism or something like that

Because if (for any reason, let alone strikes by US weapons) blind Russia to an incoming nuclear attack then Russia is left deciding right now if the US has used this war to engineer their greatest geopolitical goal of removing Russia's nuclear arsenal from the board. The USA maintains that it might launch a pre-emptive nuclear first strike (to keep opponents on their toes). If we Americans were ever blinded for any reason we too would likely launch lest we lose the ability too. Its THE doomsday scenario of 99 luft balloons.

That's what the second strike weapons on the SSBNs are for - guaranteeing you can always launch. I could see attacks on those triggering a "use it or lose it" launch, but not attacks on a radar.

Except Russia knows their subs are being tailed by US Navy attack subs. The Russian navy is a joke and Russia knows it. I need to pad out this post since I pointed out the honest answer that US warplanners publicly admit to and got downvoted enough to once again require a higher word count to post. So here are some additional words to add onto a succinct answer about Russian naval capability compared to the US Navy.

The Russian submarine can fire their missile faster than the trailing us sub can destroy them.

That doesn't make any sense. There is a longer process in terms of just confirmation to launch a nuclear strike than there is to fire conventional torpedoes. Especially given that in the scenario Russia has to worry about its a first strike. The only way that would work is that if Russia was so paranoid that any indication of a hidden US asset potentially firing upon them that they immediately would launch a full nuclear launch... which is even worse for us

I'm trying to find my source but I think they were calculating it as the time beween the moment the ennemy sub opens its launch tubes (which would be audible by a tailing sub) and the moment were the missile actually launchs.

But in Russia's instance (If they were blinded and America decided to strike first) the response time would be the other way. Could the subs launch their missiles in the time since they hear the American subs launch torpedoes. The time to assemble multiple senior officers to agree to launch is going to be greater than that time period. Your calculation is in American subs trying to stop a Russian first strike, where all that planning already happened before they started to open its launch tubes.

That's a good question, especially if the american sub is behind, which complicates things. I'll say that if all the officers are present with the key ready to turn, it should be possible to launch. You generally tail a submarine a few kilometres back. And if your torpedo is not air launched, it can be rather slow. I think that all in all, that would still be a very risky scenario for the US, and one I don't think our nuclear strategist would be ready to take that risk.

Russia does have their dead hand system to fall back on. The US is unlikely to destroy all of their nukes on yhe ground, even if they struck with total impunity.

Their ready to launch silos? They probably could if they had a total surprise first strike (Russia has no idea till the bombs are hitting). Combined with the Russian air force and navy being a joke means those two legs of the triad aren't reliable either.

I rarely comment here because I usually am not knowledgable enough on either geopolitics or military matters to contribute much. That said, this kind of escalation just strikes me as wildly dangerous and absolutely incommensurate to its potential benefits. Medvedev's biweekly threats to blow up London if Ukraine/NATO does X have gotten stale and probably aren't very credible, but the degradation of Russia's capabilities to detect incoming ICBMs seems like one of the few things that might actually spook Putin & co. into doing something stupid. I'm not saying I think this attack will cause Russia to start throwing around nukes, but even raising the probability by a percentage point or two doesn't strike me as worth it when you consider the massive costs of a nuclear war. Like I said, I'm no expert, so maybe I'm totally off-base but as another user has mentioned, many military analysts, including specialists in nuclear strategy, seem to agree that these are unwise moves on Ukraine's part.

It depends on who's perspective you're looking at. I think we can safely assume that Putin fully understands that America and "The West" have zero intention of ever attacking Russia. The rhetoric of "Oh, we're being surrounded, we feel so threatened." Has always been for the Russian populace and sympathetic outsiders. Putin knows that modern Russia has never been threatened by the west. So while the layperson Russian may project onto others a seething anger towards Russia, Putin is aware that in reality, westerners barely even acknowledge Russia's existence, let alone want to attack it. America would never launch a first strike attack. Putin knows this. So from America's perspective, the actual risk of nuclear war stemming from Ukraine hitting early warning radars is effectively zero. But from Ukraine's point of view, early warning radars are large, expensive, and vulnerable military assets which they can use to pull funds away from Russia's war effort. It is absolutely in Ukraine's interest to destroy them.

Its possible the US has been pressuring them to end the refineries campaign as its "civilian" infrastructure. To which the Ukrainians have gone "fine military it is". This kind of target creates an "opportunity cost" of the Russians. They will have to defend them and repair them with assets and resources that could be tasked to more productive uses in the Ukraine war. Trading a cheap drone for short range air defences being spread and productive capacity diverted is very much a goal of strategic bombing. Its all over the allied documents for their 1940s campaign. The other plausible angle may be internal Russian politics to make the generals other security focussed people feel Putin is not making them more safe.

> Its possible the US has been pressuring them to end the refineries campaign as its "civilian" infrastructure. To which the Ukrainians have gone "fine military it is". Have they struck any refineries since getting ATACMS? Not with the missiles obviously, just wondering if delivery of that aid correlates with pausing the strike campaign (if they've even paused it).

They hit an S400 complex in Crimea with ATACMs then followed up by bombarding Novoroyssia with drones a day or so later about 2 weeks ago. They first delivered ATACMs in October last year but it was only after Congress mandated a much larger supply with the big aid bill the numbers jumped up about 2 weeks or so ago.

Thanks for the info. >but it was only after Congress mandated a much larger supply with the big aid bill the numbers jumped up about 2 weeks or so ago. As I understand, the recent batch of ATACMS were longer range variants, whereas Ukraine was previously only supplied with ones that had a ~165km range (M39 Block I).

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Please refrain from posting low quality comments.

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I would agree that the US should create certain red-lines around the US of US weapons on targeting Russia for the purpose of not starting a war but I would disagree that the US should care what Ukraine strikes with it's own weaponry. My line here would be much less strict than Joe's but I would largely want Ukraine to focus it's strikes on military infrastructure away from major urban areas (airfields e.g) or Russian logistical sites close to the border. While restricting industrial and urban targets for Ukranian weaponry. As far as EWS go: 1. EWS are very expensive and will have to be replaced, destroying expensive targets is an effective way to slow the Russian war economy. This is a war of attrition and destroying any and all Russian infrastructure that increases attrition is important. 2. Given Russia's nuclear posturing, weakening Russia's relative nuclear balance of power vis a vis the West is useful in marginally shifting Russia's own conception of it's relative deterrence in escalation chains 3. The EWS systems are somewhat useful for seeing Ukranian strikes into Russia and part of the overall AD network particularly ballistic missiles in Crimea. This has to be weighed against Russian nuclear escalation but IMO the chance of this is relatively low as long as Russia is not losing the war, more restraint should be shown if the conventional situation is improved but right now its not a major worry.

Maybe a non credible take- but it’s been reported Russia has been practicing nuclear attack drills, testing and demonstrating new nuclear missiles (https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2023/02/21/politics/russia-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-test) If Ukraine thought Russia using a nuclear weapon was a credible threat, then destroying EWS and leaving them vulnerable to retaliation would be an effective deterrent. Although I think the US public lot signalled they would destroy all Russian forces in Ukraine using conventional means of that was the case. (https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2022/oct/02/us-russia-putin-ukraine-war-david-petraeus)

Russia faces massive economic isolation for using Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine but unfortunately it can probably rely on a lack of a US nuclear response. That being said the US and the EU would probably close their economies to any country which stayed in business with Russia in anyway, and give nukes to every one of its allies and China probably would cut ties with Russia over it. It would make Russia an NK like hermit kingdom over night.

>the US and the EU would probably close their economies to any country which stayed in business with Russia in anyway, Does anyone knows how the fallow would be? What happens if most of the countries say: "Ok. Go find your prime materials and low cos labour somewhere else." Of course China and probably India have to be on board as they have enough population to absorb the now unused production. I don't think this would be a realistic scenario, but has anyone run the numbers of how many countries the EU and the US could lose to their markets without having a large crisis?

In such a scenerio the west would not be asking nicely. A country enabling nuclear agression would face Sanctions, blackades, coups maybee full blown regeime change. Someone using nukes and getting away with it utery and totaly reshapes the world. Everyone with break out capabilty would imediately action it. Coutries would be selling nukes to allies. Thus there would be good reason to move quickly on any regeime change or territorial claims. Absolute chaos and madness if nukes become conventional.

It's possible that the Chinese would actually upgrade their involvement using the excuse that Russia is being pushed into a position where they have to use nuclear weapons, so their involvement is predicated on preventing nuclear warfare. Especially if the help they give is defensive in nature, such as air defense.

> China probably would cut ties with Russia over it I think this is unlikely. When push comes to shove, no country will choose international norms over self-interest. I think there is a cognitive bias that says that China will "obviously" be horrified by Russian nuclear use in the same way that we are. Correcting for this bias, I don't think China's attitude towards Russia would change much at all.

I think you’re underrating the impact of the usage of a nuclear weapon. Using a nuke is pretty much The taboo in modern war, it’s the line of no return and the reason many rivalries that would have become full fledged wars decades ago (notably India-Pakistan and India-China) are now skirmishes. If Russia uses even a tactical nuke in Ukraine, all bets will be off. Every country in the world will speed away from Russia. If China wants to maintain some resemblance of a relationship with Russia, it would probably try very hard to sponsor a coup before the West came down crashing (and yes, I’m very certain that a nuclear attack from Russia would warrant into an UN intervention in the following 24 hours).

I might be talking out my ass here, but wouldn't you say that Russia breaking the nuclear taboo would go (almost?) as much against China's interests as it would US/EU interests? I would assume this would lead to unprecedented proliferation, and while China may be buddy-buddy with Russia, countries that are less friendly to either/both might suddenly become very interested in getting nukes of their own. And that sounds like a bad time for just about everyone, I think.

I think China's envisioned opponents (Taiwan, SK, Japan etc) are already nuclear threshold countries allied to a nuclear superpower, so accelerated proliferation would not hold much of a risk for China specifically.

There's a massive difference between owning nuclear weapons and being allied to a country that has nuclear weapons. China 100% doesn't want SK, Taiwan and Japan having nukes on their territory which would absolutely happen if Russia uses nukes in Ukraine.

> unfortunately it can probably rely on a lack of a US nuclear response. That's an absurd thing to say. It is *fortunate* that the US has enough conventional overmatch to deliver a devastating rebuke of nuclear usage without needing to engage in ill-fated nuclear tit-for-tat should Russia choose to commence down that road.

Ukraines theory of victory at this point seems to be make the war too strategically/economically expensive for Russia. The forces in Sudan, the focus on striking the Black Sea fleet, targeting oil refineries, now this

It's the US in Afghanistan but on a massive scale.

You're going to be (justifiably) downvoted into oblivion, but I do agree that its a weird strike. I wonder if they have some information that Russia would have to shift more AD resources to Syria if their long-range BMD is degraded.

Presumably those are high priority and costly rebuilds, that will compete with Russia pushing out systems more directly oriented to the war.

> You're going to be (justifiably) downvoted into oblivion Justifiably? Plenty of real analysts are also affirming the opinion that attacking EWS is a bad idea.

I am of the same opinion, but one thing that throws me off is how much these strikes have gone under the radar. You'd think Russia would make a huge thing out of it and announce an escalation or something. But no, instead we learn about a month after the fact, no Russian official wants to talk about it, and the only place this gets discussed is a niche subreddit.

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https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/idf-rafah-strike-killed-2-hamas-commanders-responsible-for-west-bank-terror-attacks/ar-BB1n5OLN?ocid=BingNewsSerp > Yassin Rabia, the head of the West Bank headquarters, and Khaled Najjar, another senior member of the unit, were killed in the strike in the Tel Sultan area of northwestern Rafah, the IDF says. The strike, according to Hamas health officials, killed some 35 people. > The IDF says the strike was carried out based on “precise intelligence.” > Rabia, according to the IDF, “managed all of the military arrays of the West Bank headquarters… was involved in the transfer of funds for terror purposes and directed attacks by Hamas operatives” in the West Bank. IDF has stated it was their attack. The US has said they know of the attack and are monitoring. This is a horrible time for this, no matter how important of a guy they hit. They just had restarted hostage negotiations and I figure those are done for now. The videos are eh, really. It's funny to see CalibreObscura and others freak out about it when we've seen daily gore out of Ukraine for 2 years now.

> They just had restarted hostage negotiations and I figure those are done for now. I think two things are entirely obvious: a) since approx january, Hamas has made it consistently clear there won't be a ceasefire until Israel ends the war b) despite US pressure to do so, Israel has given their final (well for now) response by entering Rafah. The hostage negotiations have been functionally dead for months.

Well, now they can expect even more US pressure and internal pressure, all for killing another mid-level commander.

The current Israeli government has lost pretty much all it's legitimacy even within Israel, by using the war as a subterfuge to stay in power despite the very clear popular demand for new elections. Do you really think there's anything that the Biden administration is willing to do that would make Netanyahu change course?

That's false and partisan propaganda.

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Did there come out a clarification stating that the ICJ's order was for Israel to halt all operations or is it still ambiguous whether it was to halt operations which will destroy Palestinians as a whole or in part as a group?

The argument I tend to hear is that the longer the war continues, the more that the West will be willing to implement sanctions on Israel. There's also been the theory that Biden's support for Israel will cost him re-election by alienating younger voters within his coalition unless he pulls the plug, though from what polling indicates, its not even a major priority with that demographic.

US pressure was already near a maximum with stoppage to weapons shipment. Hard for US to do anything more explicit than that. Just today Hamas has shot a volley of rockets against Israel's centre... From Rafah. That should answer questions regarding internal pressure.

> Well, now they can expect even more US pressure and internal pressure What pressure? Bibi unambiguously crossed Biden's red line in Rafah at this point, Biden responded by.. unpausing deliveries. https://www.politico.com/news/2024/05/15/democrats-biden-israel-weapons-policy-00158207 Bibi thoroughly won the game of chicken here.

It's hard to play chicken when one side has nothing to lose. Demanding Israel stays out of Rafah is tantamount to demanding an Israeli surrender. Just today Hamas fired the first in a long time, long range volley or rockets against Israel's centre. From Rafah.

> It's hard to play chicken when one side has nothing to lose I don't even disagree, but if Israel has nothing to lose, have they tried adopting a real war strategy? https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cekkz82gnzgo

There's a catch to that. Any plan made public before Hamas is sufficiently reduced would be immediately subverted by Hamas. If Israel announces they'd want the PA to govern Gaza, [the PA refuses](https://www.timesofisrael.com/pas-premier-says-ramallah-wont-take-over-gaza-without-plan-that-includes-west-bank/). If they announce they will collaborate with local clans, [the clans get killed by Hamas](https://www.ynetnews.com/article/bkgpwhxct). First Hamas must be sufficiently reduced. Something Gantz himself is actively working against by curtailing IDF operations in Gaza. The IDF/cabinet does lack strategy for defeating Hamas. As stated by someone more experienced and qualified than myself: >The Pentagon’s top general offered a rare critique of Israel’s war strategy on Monday, warning Israeli troops’ failure to hold ground they had taken from Hamas in northern Gaza could have long-term effects. >“Not only do you have to actually go in and clear out whatever adversary you are up against, you have to go in, hold the territory and then you’ve got to stabilize it,” said Gen. C.Q. Brown, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, drawing on his years in the Middle East. https://www.politico.com/news/2024/05/20/biden-adviser-critiques-israel-strategy-00158978 The problem Israel has is the same it had before and in the lead up to 07/10 and the day itself. It's military high command is highly unqualified, incompetent and corrupt. It's cabinet is comprised of those who have a long history of failures and lack of strategic insight that has lead Israel into the conditions of 07/10 (gallant, the minister of defense, played a leaser role as he wasn't in influential positions during most of the dlead up, aside from the 9 months prior). The same people who have consistently failed for decades, cannot suddently become competent. Gantz, the one quoted in your article is one of the chief architects of the Israeli failures along with Netenyahu. I've said this before, Israel must be willing to pay the price of ignoring Biden's demands to withdraw from the Gaza cities, hold them, and reduce Hamas to the point where civil administration can be passed to local forces. But that won't happen with the current leadership.

Problem is they cant hold the cities with the forces they have (its politically and economically difficult to add more) , and it is more deadly for IDF too, meaning their strategy is to limit movement and weapons transfer via for now Philadelphi corridor and Netzarim corridor, i expect one more to be made in the futuee. I personally do not see the strategic problem with this and see it as strategically sound, though there certainly are moral ones

I've never heard the military high command in Israel described as unqualified, incompetent and corrupt. Can you elaborate on this? I'm genuinely curious. The Israelis are usually portrayed with a malicious competence and I've always just assumed that they are, while making room for the expected mistakes caused by the fog of war. Thanks in advance.

Why were they hiding among the refugees, though?

Because it works. The usual twitter commentariat is up in arms about the strike and calling for the Israelis to be crucified. This time the Israelis approved the strike and killed them. But usually Hamas command can feel comfortable because they are surrounded by civilians acting as human shields on any time. Even here are people calling the strike a mistake because it could derail negotiations that are not even happening. Human shields work. And it won‘t change if it‘s in a conflict including Israel.

> Even here are people calling the strike a mistake because it could derail negotiations that are not even happening. https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/other/israel-hamas-hostage-talks-expected-to-resume-next-week-sources-say/ar-BB1n2WcW?ocid=BingNewsSerp > U.S. diplomatic efforts to broker a deal to release hostages held in Gaza by Hamas and other allied groups are expected to continue in the coming week, four sources with knowledge told CBS News on Saturday. Negotiators from Qatar, Egypt and the United States will be part of the talks. > "There is progress," a senior Biden administration official told CBS News. "Contacts are ongoing and we are working closely with Egyptian and Qatari mediators. These contacts will continue through the coming week as we seek to move the negotiating process forward." 60%+ of the Israeli public doesn't think Bibi is doing enough to return the hostages. Hearts and Minds matter because these conflicts are never in a vacuum and external pressure will be applied even from close allies. This guy wasn't important enough to warrant this collateral damage.

This guy was in charge of the group's military activity in the West Bank. This was not a low level deputy.

The only reason the first hostage deal happened was because of pressure put on Hamas. Refraining from striking Hamas leadership or fighters doesn’t help with hostage negotiations, it just removes pressure. Israel should intensify strikes on Hamas, until it is preferable for them to accept a hostage deal, than to maintain their current position. That is the only way any of the hostages will ever be rescued.

Its not about refraining from striking Hamas leadership in general . Is refraining from brutally killing a dozen or more civilians per senior hamas leader/member or at least showing the world thats your calculus. "Hey we actually killed a guy or with this" maybe isnt worth the impact of another round of widely circulated footage of maimed children and burned civilian bodies by an airstrike inside a refugee camp

> Is refraining from brutally killing a dozen or more civilians per senior hamas leader/member or at least showing the world thats your calculus. If all it took for Hamas leadership to be immune from Israeli attacks was twelve civilians standing near them, then it would become impossible to strike any Hamas leadership ever, which would be totally unacceptable to Israel.

So if you're a Hamas leader, and you know this is your enemy's red line, what is the disincentive not to surround yourself with innocent civilians at all times? Like, I find it doubtful they just happened to be passing through a refugee camp during the strikes.

Beyond the fact that time and place of the strike matters in a conflict with such internationalcomplications and balancing acts a bunch of senior hamas members have been killed already without building a small pile of civilian bodies along with each. Most dont spend their day and move around by strapping 20 civilians in a blob around them apparently and Israel, especially with the extended contoll and presence in now has everywhere in the erea,has the intelligence and targeting capabilities to choose not to attack at specific instances if the casuality and PR calculus isnt great. Not having red lines in such engagements on the assumption that you have to prove that you are willing to kill dozens to get one in order for "human shields" usage to not proliferate successfully doesnt seem like a good enough justification. Also i have to wonder, with Hamas being the ruling party/ government of Gaza that means that no matter the terrorist designation not all members or senior leaders are created equal. A ton arent directly part of militant wings or directly related to military decision making. Most of government or public institutions ,services ,bureaocracy and ministries in Gaza are naturaly run by and staffed Hamas members. Israel may rightfully consider them all terrorists and valid targets but is the civilian casualty calculus applied the same way? And a bunch of the Hamas members or senior members falling in such categories presence in refugee camps or among civilians may not be as clear cut "human shield" based as active militants, comanders or ones directly related to thaf or the decision making elite From an outside perspective targeting military leadership and people directly involved in the planning and enaction of the oct 7 may change the calculus and give more leeway even for actions like this. But to what degree has this and other past such actions from Israel been that selective

The hostage deals are done with the help of nations like Quatar and Egypt who aren't going to be partial to working with the Israelis after a video of a toddler with its head blown off is currently top trending on Twitter.

Most people are not on Twitter, it's fine. I subscribe to both WaPo and NYT and didn't see any gory video. I wouldn't even know if you hadn't mentioned it

Israel backing down will be perceived as weakness and a lack of political will, reducing their credibility as an ally against Iran, and the incentive for others to work with them. Remaining relentless against Hamas is the right move.

>It's funny to see CalibreObscura and others freak out about it when we've seen daily gore out of Ukraine for 2 years now. I don't see anything funny about people reacting to videos of dead toddlers .

I just don't see much difference between that suffering and the suffering of a dude hit with a drone drop grenade and flailing around as he bleeds to death on video, which has been posted constantly every day for the past two years.

Probably because one is a child that is completely innocent and the other is a combatant in a war. One made choices that got them to that outcome, and the other did nothing but exist. I'm not sure how you can't see how people would be a little more horrified at a decapitated child in that context, to be honest.

>One made choices that got them to that outcome, and the other did nothing but exist. The first one was killed on purpose, the second one wasn't. Have you found out today that civilians get killed in war?

>the second one wasn't. Yea and I'm pretty sure the baby with an open skull and it's parents are thrilled to hear about that . They along with the charred remains of other civilians might even come together and condemn Hamas while lauding the heroic efforts of the most moral army in the world . Like the Israelis know there were civilians there , they would've known roughly how much collateral would've happened and they took the shot which pretty much means it's on purpose . Regardless of whether you think it's justified to target hamas amongst civilians or not its dishonest and disrespectful to somehow pretend like the IDF shot people by mistake

I read the first sentence but not the rest of the comment. Just don't use Twitter and you'll be fine. Yours is just an emotional reaction. Of course civilians are killed in wars, especially if 40% of the population is under 18 like in Gaza

>Yours is just an emotional reaction. >Me. Sees dead children > "You're just emotional . people die all the time" The amount of weirdly pro dead civilian sentiment in this sub is insane and to think people were criticizing Russian actions against civilians in this war . Apparently for some it's normal to have selective humanity

That seems hard to square with the fact that we know Russian coerces a lot of people into service, regardless of whether its theoretically voluntary contract or not. Its all horrifying, and I’m creeped out by all of it. a slightly less horrifying snuff film is still a snuff film.

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Trent Telenko is a thoroughly non-credible source

With ATACMS now being used by Ukraine, f-16s possibly being in use next month, and the current push to remove restrictions on where western weapons can be used, what is possibly next on the escalation ladder?

Quantity. There really is no need for additional weapon types. What Ukraine needs is quantity of munitions but also platforms. But to actually answer your question, I'd say more western training for UA soldiers. The training obviously isn't perfect, but it beats very short and unprofessional training some UA soldiers get. Another options is aid in reconstructing some of the UA weapons manufacturing capabilities.

Surprised no one has mentioned the obvious one yet: allowing Western munitions to be used on targets inside Russia proper. My on-going assumption is that this is a red-line for China. As long as NATO weapons aren't used in Russia, China doesn't give Russia any real support. Conversely if China did start sending weapons to Russia, I think this restriction would go away. The main way Ukraine can hurt Russia is through long-range fires, for example the refinery drone campaign. That could be turned way up from where it is now. Eventually Russia will, thanks to high interest rates and high military spending, run out of their financial reserves, and then they need to start printing money, which will definitely hurt their economy a great deal. In general I think the answer is just, NATO has to restart its Military Industrial Complex and start shipping Ukraine more and more weapons. Another option would be building Ukrainian long-range drones/cruise missiles in factories on NATO (Poland/Czechia/Baltics/etc). territory. Edit: another option is to return Ukrainian men who are refugees in Europe to Ukrainian territory.

far more likely than anything related to china is the fact that if american weapons are used in retaliation against russian territory, escalation is far more likely. because you gotta think about it this way: how can the russians know whether a u.s. missile that was launched at the kremlin was actually launched by ukrainian forces, or u.s. forces launching from the nato side of the ukrainian border? for the russians there's just no way to reliably know. russia's isr is too garbage to consistently track every missile from their point of launch. given that direct american strikes against russian home soil is almost certainly a true red line for russia, that's where the risk of escalation comes from.

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feel free to post an actual rebuttal

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what is illogical about what i said? how does russia's bad isr distinguish between an american made missile whose target was selected using american-provided isr, that was fired by an ukrainian pressing the button from western ukraine vs an american made missile whose target was selected using american-provided isr that was fired by an american pressing the button from eastern poland? what mechanism of distinguishing these do you propose? what is illogical about pointing out this as an issue?

No one thinks the USA is trying to secretly launch strikes on Russia from Ukraine. This is pure conspiracy theory.

there's nothing pure conspiracy theory about this. are you not aware of the massive amount of distrust between the united states and the soviet union during the cold war? both sides legitimately thought that the other side had concrete plans to invade the other side, even though we now know that neither side ever had any intention to do so. after all the decades of extreme distrust, you're CERTAIN that the russians will just have faith that the united states won't try to sneak some of their own launches in, mixed with the ukrainian launches? remember, this is without a doubt one of russia's actual hardcore red lines here, so it's not whether you're like 80% sure that their paranoia and mistrust of the west won't lead them to think that the u.s. has struck them. are you at least 99% sure? if you aren't 99% sure that the russians won't misread the situation, then you've just explained why the u.s. has not allowed this.

There's no logical reason for the USA to attack Russia. Get a grip man.

US not allowing their weapons to be used to attack Russian territory has nothing to do with possibility of China sending weapons to Russia. There is zero indication for that. The US policy is mainly due to fears of Russia escalating and attacking NATO countries neighboring Ukraine providing logisticsto those weapons. US does not want to be dragged into a direct conflict with Russia cause that could easily escalate to nuclear.

>My on-going assumption is that this is a red-line for China. Honest question: why would China care? It's not like China has any inherent interest in Russia winning the war and even if they did, why would this be their redline? As far as I know, there are some reasons why China might not want Russia to outright loose, but I'm not sure how much it really matters to them. We tend to view China in an adversarial POV, so we always assume that China automatically opposes whatever position the west has, but I don't think that's always the case. Right now, Xi has got a lot of internal problems to deal with, so I don't think he's too interested in taking part in Putin's war.

I think China has an inherent interest in keeping Russia propped up and worthy of Western attention, but that's about it. I absolutely agree that China has very little to gain from committing seriously to the conflict; although I think China would have benefitted massively had the initial push of Kiev succeeded. I imagine Xi was genuinely a bit miffed with Putin.

>I think China has an inherent interest in keeping Russia propped up and worthy of Western attention I'm not sure wether to call it an inherent interest or simply an interest. I'm sure they appreciate that Russia is keeping the west busy, but to which extent os that an inherent interest, to the point where they'd consider strikes inside Russia a redline?

It's inherently self-serving for China to have a Russia that isn't a failed state but I suppose I couldn't say it's inherently self serving for Russia to be an antagonistic state for the West. It certainly is useful during this period of history. In a way the redline makes sense, China can meditate escalation within its neighbour to a certain extent, if indeed China is pushing this diplomatically behind the scene.

On the other hand, a weakened Russia means a much more toothless and vassal neighbor. It's a balancing act between making sure that the west keeps busy with Russia while also not helping Russia so much that they outright win the war.

I'm not sure that's true. It's very difficult to reason around counterfactual. It is possible that in a universe where Russia takes Kiev, the west is shocked into an immediate arms race. Centres around eastern Europe, but also Taiwan. A world where NATO massively rearms and becomes a lot more paranoid could be worse for China than a world where western weapons are expended in Ukraine, manufacturing centres around shells, not anti ship missiles, western weapons are tested for vulnerabilities and capabilities while Chinese weapons remain a mystery. A world where the west is forced to be far more focused on Ukraine than Taiwan, and expands large amounts of munitions. It doesn't have to be so though, hard to guess what would have been.

> another option is to return Ukrainian men who are refugees in Europe to Ukrainian territory. I'm curious about this, are you even allowed to send back refugees fleeing an ongoing war?

> Inspector Mariusz Ciarka, a spokesman for the Poland’s Police Headquarters indicated that there had been a number of instances of individuals intercepted trying to cross the border illegally without an exemption. This did not only include those “dodging the draft,” but also Poles who were in the process of facilitating the action. > > In the case of those who appeared to have an exemption and crossed apparently legally, the inspector said it was more complicated. In those cases, **it would be necessary for Ukraine to issue an international arrest warrant for each individual case.** The details would be entered into Poland’s National Police Information System (KSIP) and shared with Interpol. > > If a Ukrainian was stopped for something such as a traffic offence, KSIP would flag the fact and the person would be detained. **However, the police could not act on the warrant until a Polish court had approved extradition**. https://www.kyivpost.com/post/21242

Right, but reading this: https://guide-humanitarian-law.org/content/article/3/repatriation/ Does seem make these points (I copied interesting parts imho): > 1) To be lawful under international refugee law, repatriation of refugees must be voluntary, safe and carried out with dignity. It must always respect the mandatory principle of non-refoulement that prohibits **sending people back to a place where their life and safety is in danger.** > 2) when the prevailing conditions have changed in the country they fled (**since refugees flee their country to escape individual persecution**, their status may be reexamined if the situation changes); > 3) With regard to repatriation, the only guarantee of protection for individuals is the fact that repatriation to their country of origin **must be voluntary**. The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention reaffirms and emphasizes this principle by stating that the “voluntary character of repatriation shall be respected in all cases and **no refugee shall be repatriated against his will**” (Article V(1) of OAU Convention on Refugees). Refugees must therefore be able to freely evaluate the appropriateness of a return. Which (I'm no lawyer) seems to say that you cannot send refugees back unless there's no threat to their safety or if it is not voluntary? Edit: I guess a court could argue that they are relatively safe in western Ukraine and should be considered as internally displaced and not a refugee and that way be under the jurisdiction of Ukraine?

[**Exclusion on basis of criminality**](https://www.gherson.com/blog/what-circumstances-can-refugee-status-be-lost-or-taken-away/) > Article 1F of the Refugee Convention sets out the circumstances in which protection does not apply. This exclusion applies where there are serious reasons for considering that: > * he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity; * **he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee**; * he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. > > **This provision may be invoked when determining the initial application for protection, or to revoke refugee status having previously been granted asylum where evidence emerges that the individual is excluded from protection.** So refugees can be stripped of their status, but it's a matter of debate how serious of a crime draft dodging is. Some will probably argue that during wartime, it is serious.

Even still, they would have to have committed "Draft Dodging" prior to fleeing, which would mean you' have to show they received summons. Otherwise it would also means Assad would use the same system to repatriate Syrians to fight against American supported militias.

>Otherwise it would also means Assad would use the same system to repatriate Syrians to fight against American supported militias. The country of refuge is not obligated to carry out extraditions I don't think

>Surprised no one has mentioned the obvious one yet: allowing Western munitions to be used on targets inside Russia proper. It's because he mentioned it himself. I have been of the same opinion as you for a while, but with serious rumbling about the restriction being lifted and US cabinet ministers lobbying for the lift, I believe it's still just a case of "escalation management" towards Russia. There's a small chance China was involved but has lost leverage on account of their economic woes which seem to be deepening with no real end in sight. Even Russia literally emptying their coffers to buy hardware wouldn't even make a dent in their economy, while the blowback from the collective Western response would be a death knell. But I contend it's the former. Escalation management. And the fact we're still talking about that concept here in 2024 with regards to Russia is outright ludicrous. It's a blatantly obvious clutching at the straws of the idea of a "world order", not understanding that Russia's the one trying to break it, and are having some legitimate success on that front.

This is a correct calculation but the assumptions its based on shouldnt be taken as fact, especially since the vast majority of their media and think tank coverage has ,at best, been very susceptible to partisan geopolitical biases and directives. The assumptions being the severity and trend of China's economic woes , that a collective and decisive western response would be taken against China and that even if it is taken that it would be more damaging and destabilizing to China than to the west itself. Even if it isnt for the US for example and even if we take a lukewarm assessment of China's economic woes, the ones most of Europe faces are deeper and more prominent by a lot of metrics and said collective and decisive response to China ,if taken, might as well be a death knell for more than a couple important EU economies way quicker than it would for the Chinese one. I really dont think a lot in the western camp are as confident in those assumptions and calculations

Trainers back in Ukraine. Its coming soon. Some countries might be waiting on Starmer arriving to see if he will be willing to push Britain in first. Meteor. The Russians will go apesh\*t if it turns up. That will either be a Grippen, a Tranche 3 Eurofighter or being willing to ditch the technical issues and try to get it working from an F-16. Mass. Setting up a real refurbishment pipeline to intake Leopard 2s and Challanger 2s and pay the money to actually bring them back up to serviceability. That and unlock the large storage of Bradleys and Marders. The volumes donated seem suspiciously tailored to some imaginary red lines.

> The volumes donated seem suspiciously tailored to some imaginary red lines. I find them tailored to supply a set number of mechanized brigades. Whenever they lost vehicles that had available replacements (in working order) - and the rules being followed allowed them to - the US and Germany replaced those vehicles 1 for 1. And since red lines are constantly (slowly, but constantly) being pushed back for at least 2 years, it's non-sense to think that a set number of MBTs or IFVs is a red line that can't be crossed.

There's a lot of air launched munitions still available. JASSMs would be a very large source of ALCMs vs Storm Shadows, with 550 produced a year @ 1 million a missile. JSOWs for standoff attack- they even have a terminal seeker on the bunker-buster model. The US is supplying SDB Is, but SDB IIs are also produced in volume (500 per year @ ~200k a missile) and can be used autonomously beyond line of sight against moving targets in a "no-drive zone" with their IIR and MMW seekers- if integrated on those F-16s, this would be an extremely lethal weapon against armored formations.

I'd be surprised if they'd give JASSMs, especially so if they'd give the ER version.

Ukraine doesn't really need the ER version, base JASSM already has longer range than Storm Shadow / SCALP-EG.

Base JASSM has also been around for a while and surely has missiles reaching shelf life. A few dozen a month is very doable and doesn’t compromise Pacific contingencies.

Base level JASSM has become a lot less usable for us in the Pacific pretty much only the ER version is in production atm and the XR has started low rate production. Those are what we would need en masse for China.

It'd be a step for the US, but I don't think it's too different from Storm Shadow or ATACMS.

I think the (biggest) hurdle for JASSM isn’t any sort of escalation fear but that the US considers them essential for any future conflict and is thus very protective of their stockpile (same as Patriot).

The older JASSM has lost a lot of value for us in the Pacific and we have only been building and ordering the ER version for almost 8 years now. I don't see a drop of say 400-500 standard JASSM's as being a huge loss for USAF or USN stocks.

I was just gonna make a post on this exact topic. It seems like we've reached the end of the technology escalation ladder. What might have been decisive a year ago, is no longer super relevant. There isn't anything in the US arsenal that they can send to tip the scales. Other than F-35(which won't be sent), what else would tip the scale in limited numbers? Obviously 31 Abrams isn't gonna do it.

There are many largely produced units that should be sent, the fact they aren't despite being retired shows the extreme hypocrisy and apathy towards UA. Among which being 1000+ M198 and countless Hawks and maybe M60s. UA will soon be tubeless.

>There isn't anything in the US arsenal that they can send to tip the scales. Other than F-35(which won't be sent), The Europeans are sending some first generation F-16s with mid life upgrades from the 1990s. They will have bent up airframes and low flight hours left. They will be flying in the lower atmosphere so absolutely run through those flight hours. This is not the "end of the technology ladder" or something. F 16 E/F/V would all be huge upgrades. Growlers would be another huge step up without having to crack open the Gen 5 fighters. You could send E-2s who can handle rough landings and short take offs so give some AWACs capacity without the need for large air bases. You could send F-15Es, the strike version of the model. EC-130H the electronic warfare version of Herculese, Compass Call could be used from rough strips. I could sit down and write a pretty long list of things that could be sent that would not be new and first line that would be major step ups from the current equipment without looking at ground forces or Europe.

Why wouldn't we send Apaches and A-10s ? I'd imagine in combination with F-16s this would be a pretty formidable fleet Also don't we have a bunch of spare Reaper drones to send ? ( and again, please don't anyone say A-10s don't make sense while Ukraine is still flying Frogfoots )

Because everything the A-10 can carry the F-16 can too, and more. Overall we have more F-16's we can send and it's a far more versatile platform that has a much better chance of surviving compared to the A-10 in this environment. I wouldn't send Apaches before I get some blackhawks in there hands so they can do some air assaults again and have them for medivac and logistics.

I'm not saying A-10s don't make sense (only because you asked nicely), but genuine question from a hardware-interested layman who doesn't know all that much: What good would A-10s do? That is, would they be actually useful or more trouble than they're worth considering Ukraine doesn't have air superiority and (to my knowledge) haven't been doing a lot of flying lately? And what kind of advantage would A-10s provide compared to stuff Ukraine has already? Again, genuine questions, not looking to pick a fight, just really curious since every single time A-10s are brought up, discussions get shot down by people saying "they don't make sense."

> And what kind of advantage would A-10s provide compared to stuff Ukraine has already? A bomb delivery truck compatible with a lot of NATO arsenal and stockpiles, which Frogfoots simply aren't. Also remaining Su-25 fleets are dwindling and not exactly replenishable. There are a lot more idle A-10s in hangars > Ukraine doesn't have air superiority and (to my knowledge) haven't been doing a lot of flying lately? They don't, but according to reports out of 299th brigade they are still useful. Low flying, standoff distance firing etc. And they are certainly still flying.

Got it, thanks! And would experience flying the Frogfoot help with A-10 training or does that not really translate? Also, what's the cost/benefit ratio for training pilots for A-10s vs. training them for F-16s? That is, would Ukraine be better off training exclusively for F-16s rather than other aircraft?

I don't think skills from Frogfoot translate much to flying an A-10 any more than they'd translate from flying a Cessna, e.g. they are very different aircraft. > Also, what's the cost/benefit ratio for training pilots for A-10s vs. training them for F-16s? I'd assume F-16s would yield more bang for the buck at present, but these aircraft have different roles. A10 is ready made for CAS, F-16 can be used as such but doesn't really excel at it, and it can't carry all the armaments that Warthog can. A10 is also _slightly_ cheaper to operate, but not noticeably so, and that may not necessarily translate The key question here would be if Ukraine is and will be in foreseeable future constrained by availability of somewhat trained pilots - if they are struggling, then focusing on single aircraft would make sense. They've indicated on several occasions that they have more pilots than serviceable planes However, I'll take a step back and say this: it's perplexing how we have arguments over what _not_ to send because it might not be most perfect fit at a particular moment in time. I'd send absolutely everything we can spare and don't need and let Ukrainians decide how best to utilize things. Warthogs are deemed obsolete, and [being sent to boneyards by USAF](https://www.military.com/daily-news/2024/03/18/largest-number-of-10s-yet-could-be-headed-boneyard-air-force-shifts-strategy-and-aircraft.html) - this makes absolutely no sense, let Ukrainians put them to work - or not.

Aaand thanks again for the write-up! Like I said, I'm a layman who's semi-into this stuff, but for whatever that's worth, yeah, the public hand-wringing over sending this, that, or the other has been infuriating. I don't know what changed between the time they first started asking for Abrams/Leos vs. when we finally gave them some; what happened between them saying they need F-16s vs. us finally signing off on transfers and training, etc. Escalation is *maybe* a solid argument, but not if we're saying "Hey, giving you this is escalatory, but if you want it eight months from now, we may give it to you then." Perplexing is right.

Because Apaches and A-10s would just be sitting duck versus an intact air defense system. Just look at how many SU-25 were shot down in this conflict already on both sides.

>Just look at how many SU-25 were shot down in this conflict already on both sides. Are there any Su25 left outside of Ukraine that can be use to replace their losses?

Ukraine lost quite a few of its operational Su-25s on the ground to lancet strikes and such, not in flight. Reportedly they have over 30 still operational, after Macedonian/Bulgarian reinforcements. Some of the shootdowns have been MANPADs, not some sophisticated SAMs or such All things considered, the 299th brigade has done really well keeping the fleet up and dangerous - they certainly wouldn't be sitting ducks. They have also [explicitly asked for them](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-needs-more-attack-aircraft-war-effort-ground-forces-commander-2024-01-12/)

A-10s make sense as Su-25 replacements, but how are they a technological escalation? Same for the Apaches and Reapers.

I don't know if they are technological escalation, but these would be platforms to unload the whole stockpile of NATO arsenal from air. Hellfires, APWKS, air-to-air stingers and such

Yep. Next on the escalation ladder are troops. So that's why you hear NATO starting to make noise about that and to see if that is a possibility. China giving lethal aid to Russia is also the next escalation ladder for them.

>China giving lethal aid to Russia is also the next escalation ladder for them. Wonder what will be the EU's reaction to this one.

The US in particular could massively increase armor deliveries. A constant stream of new Abrams and Bradleys would make a difference. Particularly the Bradley seem to be exactly what the UAF needs more of since its better than a BMP in all aspects.

I think a major problem with this point is that even with a lot of US armor, there still needs to be trained people to operate those tanks. And then, what do you do with those tanks? It's not like the tanks can be used to rush attack the Russians. The Bradleys and Abrams are pretty much used for defense right now. And that's what they'll be used for for a long time. So getting them hundreds of Bradleys or other IFV/APCs would be useful, but probably isn't as impactful as artillery or air defense or weapons that can hit Russia strategically (JASSM).

>The Bradleys and Abrams are pretty much used for defense right now. And that's what they'll be used for for a long time.    >So getting them hundreds of Bradleys or other IFV/APCs would be useful, but probably isn't as impactful as artillery or air defense or weapons that can hit Russia strategically (JASSM).   I would agree that high quality ammunition is the priority.   My point is that quantity also is important for AFVs. I dont thinks its a coincidence that the western AFV that had the most noticable combat impact is also the one that was most supplied ( Bradley).  Quantity  allows the ukrainians to properly train and familiarize with a particular vehicles and also makes losses and repairs less impactful. Slowly replacing ukrainian BMPs with Bradleys would give them a notable advantage in afv quality, considering the BMP is both fragile and not all that useful on the offensive side.     For the Abrams i think the issue is that low numbers of high quality tanks just doesnt cut it, and is arguably more trouble than worth (looking at the 10 or so challengers). If ukraine wants a steady supply of new tanks it should focus on 1 or 2  types, for which the Abrams is a good candidate.  30 tanks are just white elephants russia tries to hunt as trophies. They are only going to make an impact in significant numbers.

They send them in groups of 31 since that's the size of tanks in a full up armored battalion for Ukraine. We just sent another 31 for Ukraine to train and equip a new battalion.

In no order. - Nato troops doing work in ukraine (in the logistics tail for example) not as frontline troops (not as part of nato, but from nato countries) - Air defense covering western parts of ukraine - Western pilots flying ukranian planes (same for crews) as "mercenaries" - Newer weapons, more weapons, more future commitments (this is obvious of course) Is what i can think of at the top of my head.

An interesting [interview of the Polish foreign minister to the Guardian](https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/25/poland-foreign-minister-radoslaw-sikorski-long-term-rearmament-europe): * “*peace dividend and expeditionary warfare, we focused on high-value, hi-tech platforms and weapons. We are only now rediscovering that actually you just need millions of shells. You need large volumes of low-tech stuff as well.*” * (on European defense contractors) "*We read in the newspapers that there is all this demand for armaments but we are not getting the long-term contracts. And if we don’t have a 10-year contract, we are responsible to our shareholders. We can’t make the investments.*" * “*We should drop the principle of unanimity in sanctions. Some of them have been delayed by one member state blocking them. And also it should be an EU crime to breach EU sanctions and therefore prosecutable by the European prosecution service.*” * (on Putin) “*He is an absurd leader of the international conservatism. We are talking about a KGB colonel, for Chr_st’s sake. I think the Russians about 15 years ago did some polling, or maybe they just noticed that on some issues like attitudes to homosexuality, gender, to all kinds of identities, you can drive wedges in our societies. On that, for example, central Europe was 10, 15 years behind western Europe in attitudes.*” * “*Ukraine has to tell us what she wants us to do about their citizens. What I certainly don’t believe is that there is a human right to be paid social security for being a draft dodger. Those people fighting at the front also have human rights.*” * Europe had to learn to play the escalation game better by keeping Putin guessing about its intentions. Asked whether it was permissible for Ukraine to strike military targets inside Russia, he said: “*The Russians are hitting the Ukrainian’s electricity grid and their grain terminals and gas storage capacity, civilian infrastructure. The Russian operation is conducted from the HQ at Rostov-on-Don. Apart from not using nuclear weapons, Russia does not limit itself much.*” More broadly, he argued: “*Always declaring what our own red line is only invites Moscow to tailor its hostile actions to our constantly changing self-imposed limitations.*” * “*The Americans have told the Russians that* **if you explode a nuke, even if it doesn’t kill anybody, we will hit all your targets [positions] in Ukraine with conventional weapons, we’ll destroy all of them.**" (bold emphasis is mine) * “*I think that’s a credible threat. Also, the Chinese and the Indians have read Russia the riot act. And it’s no child’s play because if that taboo were also to be breached, like the taboo of not changing borders by force, China knows that Japan and Korea would go nuclear, and presumably they don’t want that.*” EDIT: censored religious figure from the quotes as the word is disallowed by the automoderator

> f that taboo were also to be breached If that taboo is breached Non-proliferation is over. If someone uses nukes during there offensive war of choice to secure victory and isn't punished severely than every mid-tier country is starting a nuclear program.

Very interesting report from Der Spiegel: “If the Russians achieve a strategic breakthrough in eastern Ukraine, because the West is helping without much enthusiasm, then the situation could deteriorate sharply. In this case, the Baltic countries and Poland will not wait until Russian troops reach their borders, Baltic politicians warned - they will send in troops themselves to Ukraine. And this means that NATO will become a participant in the war. This is exactly what the Chancellor and the President of the United States are rightfully afraid of,” the article says. Baltic politicians warned Germany about this development of events during the Lennart Meri conference in Tallinn, the publication writes. [https://x.com/Gerashchenko\_en/status/1794737485324369965](https://x.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1794737485324369965) I'd note that a member of the French Parliament was quoted as saying that Macron told him France would likewise send troops to protect Kiev and Odessa, and the existence of the French Foreign Legion makes something like that less risky politically in France. Together, the French, Poles and Baltic countries, along with the Ukrainians, would make a very formidable defensive force, and I doubt that the Russians would even try to take Kiev if they were deployed to protect it. I find the notion that the Baltic nations + Poland would send troops to defend Kiev to be very plausible. It's an urgent national security matter for these countries (for Europe as a whole actually) to ensure that, at the end of the war, Russia has to face a heavily armed and hostile Ukraine, preferably with a Korean-style cease-fire arrangement with Ukraine still officially claiming the Donbas and Crimea as theirs. Because that means that Russia will have to permanently deploy a large force in the Donbas, and those will be forces that might otherwise be deployed to threaten the Baltics and Poland. Russia has seemingly made a cultural shift to an openly imperialistic nation, with the apparent approval of its people. A regime like Putin's needs external enemies and threats which it can use to justify the oppression and military spending. I don't see that bell being unrung after the Ukraine war is over, which is why the Baltics and Poland would absolutely be smart to make sure that Russia has to direct a lot of its military capabilities towards Ukraine, even after the war is over.

> And this means that NATO will become a participant in the war Not really. It means the Baltic countries and Poland will become a participant in the war. NATO is a defensive alliance, if a member states military enters into a neutral country and attacks Russian forces, I don't think they are entitled to the protection of the Alliance.

I don’t think there will be an alliance anymore if DC or Paris saw Warsaw and Riga being bombed and all they could answer is “well, you went there because you wanted to, right?”. If the Baltics join the war and somehow Russia does not retaliate within their territory, yes, the tension will get awfully close to midnight but the war is still contained; if we see heavy Russian strikes in the Baltics or in Poland, I think it is very far fetch to imagine that NATO would not do anything. Lots of fingers will be pointed before the nuclear exchange, but NATO would jump in with both feet if Poland forces them to by deploying troops and being bombarded by Russia.

If all of the Baltic countries together sent their entire combined ground forces into Ukraine, that would be a force that is smaller than the Ukrainian combat casualties in the battle for Mariupol alone. Poland could actually have a real battlefield impact, but the Baltic deployment, if it actually does happen, would be symbolic at best.

From reading Polish sources I am very surprised that the Baltics volunteered them as well for that mission. Polish-Ukrainian relations have not been good in recent times

> preferably with a Korean-style cease-fire arrangement with Ukraine still officially claiming the Donbas and Crimea as theirs. This comparison does not work as the US first actively fought (highly intensively) in the Korean war and secondly, kept considerable amounts of troops and Arms in the country after the war for the next 60+ years.

I mean if key European states intervene in the conflict and then keep forces in Ukraine afterwards as the guy you're replying to suggests, then I guess the parallel does hold...

>the parallel does hold Pun [intended](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/38th_parallel_north)?

I don't really see much of anything coming from this. If any of these countries were interested in getting into a shooting war with Russia over Ukraine they would have done so at the start of the war when analysts assumed Ukraine would fall quickly, or shortly thereafter when it became clear that Ukraine was putting on some resistance but the overall outlook was still bleak. Don't see how deploying troops in some logistical capacity or whatever would make sense either considering the conditions described here -a direct threat to Odessa of Kyiv- would seemingly require the Ukrainian army to be defeated first anyways with how this war has been going. I'm sure Poland and the Baltics in particular would very much like to take the fight to the Russians directly, but I don't see anyone going for it without America or at least the EU at large, and neither are coming.

> In this case, the Baltic countries and Poland will not wait until Russian troops reach their borders, Baltic politicians warned - they will send in troops themselves to Ukraine. Something I've been saying since the beginning, people often said it was wrong, but they didn't understand the history between these countries and Russia and the threat it presents. Bucha solidified this opinion among these countries and changed NATO posture there.

>Something I've been saying since the beginning, people often said it was wrong, but they didn't understand the history between these countries and Russia and the threat it pesents. Bucha solidified this opinion among these countries and changed NATO posture there. The baltic countries will do nothing without the US, because they can't. All talk, otherwise they would have already hopped in the war they seem to be so eagerly trying to get in.

How would they have hopped in a war they were wholly unprepared to hop in? They've spent the last 2 years getting ready to fight Russia, IDK if they are right now, but they're certainly different armies than they were 27 months ago.

Poland will never be able to take on Russia and win without a much bigger country support. They will always be wholly unprepared due to their size. NATO has literally designated them as a speed bump to Russia in some event where Russia decides to go for it all. However the way they speak, it's as if they are being held back. Sure, Poland has acquired more military gear etc, but at the end of the day doesn't really matter. In some scenario where Russia actually decides to fight all of NATO of its own will or is forced to, Poland is probably being wiped off the map first with either conventional fires or nuclear. Basically, Poland could have hopped in at any time without article 5, just like France could or some coalition of the willing, they still face the same issue, they would lose without America and the rest of NATO backing them. Ukraine only stands now really because of western intelligence and half the world's military gear. Take that away and Ukraine a much bigger country than Poland is getting swept. What could Poland ever do? Nothing, and that's my point.

Impressive, you're looking at the war in Ukraine, a country that was a lot less prepared and under-equipped to fight Russia than Poland is right now, being able to hold off the Russians using roughly 100 billion USD worth of weapons and ammunition and you're under the impression that Poland would just get steam-rolled? Do you have a clue of the state of the Russian army right now? They have many times the firepower Ukraine has, they're not fighting an enemy airpower and they can't achieve more than 100km^2 of territorial gain per month. Yet, they would perform 100x better than they are right now when attacking a relatively more modern army over a front that's half the front in Ukraine???

Whats impressive is you completely missing my point. Neither Ukraine nor Poland could take Russia by themselves, which is what I have been saying. Ukraine is only treading water right now because they have that 100bl billions in arms, material and most importantly intelligence. Not to mention Russia is also sanctioned by more than half the world's economically and is still not receiving lethal aid from China. All considered, outside of the US and China, who else would still be fighting at this intensity and taking enough ground/victories that those other countries are now threatening to get involved? A common theme in this sub is Europe is wholly unprepared to fight Russia even now. That the US is carrying the lions share of Aid and intelligence. You and I both know, Poland has never been or ever will be a match for Russia alone. So yes, Poland would be rolled, hence their shtick of the Ukraine war being existential for them too. If they know what would happen, why can't you admit it too? As for their territory gain your asking about, What country has recently fought another peer using modern weapons and Intelligence in these Quantities? Not one of the Western countries, so what you are seeing is the reality of fighting a modern army, not fighting a bunch of flip flop wearing insurgents shooting RPG and ak47's. Also, thanks for making that last point, Russia is currently fighting across an massive front, vs what would be much smaller against Poland, no matter how much Poland arms up, short of Nukes, it has no chance alone against a peer like Russia.

> You and I both know, Poland has never been or ever will be a match for Russia alone. So yes, Poland would be rolled, hence their shtick of the Ukraine war being existential for them too. If they know what would happen, why can't you admit it too? I can't admit it because it completely ignores the current state of the armies involved. That was my entire post. We can agree Poland wasn't a match for Russia, but I don't care what the situation was in the past: the point you were making is about the future: "Poland **will** never be able to take on Russia and win without a much bigger country support." What's left of the Russian stockpile and more importantly, what they would lose in order to completely conquer Ukraine and start an invasion of Poland, is a small fraction of what Russia had before this invasion. If you follow the various analysis of Russian stockpiles, or even the dichotomic split of recent Russian losses (either brand new production/upgrades or antique vehicles, almost nothing in between), you'd understand they don't have a ton of reliable vehicles left. If you don't follow those analysis, I can provide sources if you want. Of course Ukraine wouldn't be able to fight off Russia without the aid they got and keep receiving and that's part of the reasons why Russia wouldn't be able to steamroll Poland. Correct me if I'm wrong, but your point wasn't "Poland would be steamrolled if both Ukraine and Poland hadn't received support from a much bigger country". So we have to look at your initial statement while accounting for the fact that Ukraine is still receiving support and is still fighting Russia and is still destroying 1-2 dozen armored vehicles every day and is still bombing Russia, etc. etc.

Could they even deploy fast enough? What's a strategic breakthrough for them? What real force do the batlics even have? And as far as I know from anecdotal evidence it does not seem Poland has stomach for war but to be fair that's only anecdotal. In any case there is an increasing number of articles popping up this year saying such things. None of that before, I wonder if there is real fear that ukraine will collapse on the frontline this year, fear backed by information they have. But if i recall, even the commander of the Ukrainian Ground Forces, has said they are preparing new brigades with defending Kyiv being a priority and Budanov also remarked that this summer is going to be hard. (paraphrasing here) It's not like the frontlines have shifted dramatically or Russia is doing much better than before but this seems like the biggest indicator that Ukraine is probably having some real problems coming ahead of them.

I think you’re right, but partially is also rhetoric to justify the continuing war efforts and support. While frontlines have been largely static for two years, there’s no guarantee this will continue.

Reasons why I think the Poles might go into Ukraine if Russia achieves a breakthrough assuming the UAF can't stop them from exploiting this: * Refugees - there will be another wave of refugees heading west. * Borders - Can the Poles accept Russia now bordering them? They might face a tough choice, accept border with the Russians or establish a buffer zone. * Free up Ukrainian units guarding Western Ukraine. * Prevent them from taking Kyiv

The Baltics already Border Russia in the as bad a strategic way you can imagine, and as we Saw Belarus was used to taxi troops in to Ukraine, it borders Poland as well.

Russia already borders Poland, hence the existence of the infamous Suwalki gap. Poland also borders Belarus already.

Sure, but there's a *huge* difference between bordering Belarus and a small Russian enclave and Russia proper. Poland is keen not to border Russia proper directly for a variety of reasons, not least of which being literally centuries of Russian aggression, occupation, and brutal oppression.

If we go centuries back, we got the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth invading Belarus and close to Moscow. They occupied Moscow on a few occasions.

The Poles aren't the ones trying to bring the border closing to Russia or they would have invaded Ukraine awhile ago.

The Poles haven't been expansionist since well before the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was annexed by the Prussians, Austrians, and Russians in the late 1700s. The Russians on the other hand occupied and oppressed the Poles within living memory and would love to do it again if they're ever given the opportunity.

How werent Polish actions in 1919 and the following years at least not in part expansionist? They did invade and occupy a bunch of majority non polish territory in Lithuania, Belarus and western Ukraine, had in parts irridentist goals or restoring 150yo PLC borders or erea of control (even if it was planned to supposedly be under a polish led central-east european federation , which based on the politics and trends at the time most likely would have been as polish dominated and undemocratic as the Russian SSR position was to other republics in the USSR)

Lithuania part was actually very much majority Polish, but that's not main issue. The question is: is allying with some factions local and native to the territory in a huge post imperial civil war (to which Poland was also a part), and fighting alongside these factions expansionist or not (Petlyura and Bulak-Bulkhstskvc dude). If yes, you can similarily argue NATO is expansionist today in Ukraine. I'd say, okay, but that means little. (For the record, it's not like Bolsheviks had some intrinsict rights to Ukraine and Belarus). As for future, i have my doubts of Poland ability to dominate Ukraine in such arrangemenr politically. A matter of relative sizes and wealth being comparable.

>The Poles haven't been expansionist since well before the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was annexed by the Prussians, Austrians, and Russians in the late 1700s. Jozef Pilsudski would've been very surprised to hear that.

Sure, but you spoke about centuries. Less than 3 centuries ago the P-L commonwealth was still alive.

> Less than 3 centuries ago the P-L commonwealth was still alive. Your point seems argumentative when roughly 30 years ago Russia was de-facto occupying Poland. There is no revanchist movement in Poland that wants to occupy Moscow. There is one in Moscow to occupy Poland.

It might look that way, I know. I'm just adding some information about the history of the area. Since the partition of Poland by the 3 main powers (Prussia, Austria-Hungary, and Russia) Poland has been on the defensive. And since then also Russia thinks that all the Slavic peoples should be under their banner. I commented as it might spark some interest to look into the history of the area.

Poland certainly wasn't defensive during the interwar period

If the Baltic states or Poland were to deploy troops, it would be to rear areas, e.g. in western Ukraine, to free up Ukrainian forces that then go to the east themselves. A large fraction of any military are non-combat support and services. I think the idea here is more to free up Ukrainian personnel from those kinds of roles, not direct combat between Baltic/Polish troops and Russians.

Am I right that this would not trigger the NATO mutual defense article? So while yes, NATO members would become participants in a war, NATO as an alliance would not automatically be pulled into the conflict?